Tag: Jordan

Tabler and Lynch go ten rounds

The Obama administration’s decision to arm the Syrian rebels is controversial in Washington.  While some support the decision, others consider it “probably [Obama’s] worst foreign policy decision since taking office.”  Last week, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy hosted a debate on Arming the Syrian Rebels: Sliding Toward Iraq or Inching Toward StabilityAndrew Tabler, a senior fellow in the Program on Arab Politics at the Washington Institute, argued for arming the rebels.  On the other side stood Marc Lynch, associate professor at George Washington University and editor of Foreign Policy’s Middle East Channel.  Robert Satloff, executive director and Howard P. Berkowitz Chair in U.S. Middle East Policy at the Washington Institute, moderated the discussion. Read more

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Syria options

With Washington still undecided what to do about Syria, it is time to look again at military options.  The regime is doing well enough on the battlefield that it won’t be much interested in a serious negotiated solution.  The opposition won’t want one on the terms the regime would accept.

I see three basic military options at this point:

  1. Arm the rebels.  It takes time.  It will kill more people.  The arms may fall into the wrong hands and be used for the wrong purposes.  But it makes the Syrians responsible for their own fate and may strengthen relative moderates, if we can get weapons into the right hands.  Some might prefer it be done covertly, though it is unlikely to stay secret for long.  Nothing does these days.
  2. Safe haven/humanitarian corridor/no-fly zone.  These are all to a first approximation the same thing.  If successfully instituted, they would presumably save lives and enable the opposition to begin governing, as the Kurds did in northern Iraq under Saddam Hussein.  But they require patrolling by US (or allied) aircraft, which means the Syrian air defenses have to be taken down first.  That is an act of war that would provide invaluable intelligence to the Syrians (and therefore also the Iranians) on our operating capabilities and signatures.  Safe havens did not work well in Bosnia–it was their failure that led to the bombing that turned the tide of war, not their success.
  3. Nail the Syrian air force, Scuds and communication nodes.  This too would be an act of war, but one that does not require continued patrolling.  It might even be possible without taking down the Syrian air defenses (the Israelis don’t seem to have bothered with that in nailing missile shipments to Hizbollah or Syria’s clandestine nuclear reactor).  But we won’t get everything.  The Syrians will bunker their more precious items under ground and park their tanks and artillery next to schools and mosques, fearing they will be the next targets.  If the Bosnian war is to be taken as a guide, it would be best also to  go after military communication nodes.  The regime’s ability to coordinate its forces, which depends on communications, is a big advantage over the fragmented opposition.

Options 2 and 3 require the use of US forces, which needs to be justified on the basis of vital American interests.  Two are most in evidence right now:

  • A regime victory in Syria would be a major regional triumph for Iran, ensuring its link to Hizbollah in Lebanon, putting pressure on Iraq to toe ever more Tehran’s line, and endangering Israel.
  • Continued fighting will weaken state structures in the Levant, including Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Turkey.  The resulting chaos could create a breeding ground for Al Qaeda and other Islamic extremists.

The use of force, presumably without UN Security Council approval, would infuriate Russia and China.  Their cooperation is still important to the P5+1 nuclear negotiations with Iran.  Russia’s cooperation in maintaining the Northern Distribution Network is important to the drawdown of American troops from Afghanistan.

Then there are the American people.  War weary and budget fatigued, they are not anxious for another Middle East war, especially since domestic oil production is up dramatically and dependence on Middle Eastern producers declining.

Not a pretty set of options, but if we do nothing at this point we’ll have to live not only with our consciences but also with the results.

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Power, Power and Rice

While some are predicting (or hoping for) big changes in American foreign policy in the liberal interventionist/human rights first direction with the appointments of Susan Rice as national security adviser and Samantha Power as UN ambassador, I doubt it.

Both have already left marks on US foreign policy, Samantha through the Atrocities Prevention Board and Susan in the Libya intervention and many other efforts at the UN, including the successful use of its Human Rights Commission to report on atrocities in Syria.  I wouldn’t suggest these are enormous departures from the past, but they certainly reflect the view that saving foreigners from mass atrocity has its place in US p0licy and needs to be given due consideration along with more traditional national interests of the military, political and economic varieties.

The main “to intervene or not” issue today is Syria.  Susan and Samantha have both already been involved in internal debates on Syria, where President Obama ignored the advice of Hillary Clinton, David Petraeus and Leon Panetta.  They all advised a more interventionist stance.  It is the president, not the advisers, who is choosing not to try to stop the Syrian civil war, largely because of issues unrelated to Syria:  Russian support on the withdrawal from Afghanistan and in the nuclear negotiations with Iran, not to mention the American public’s war weariness and the parlous budget situation.  No doubt someone at the Pentagon is also telling him that allowing extremist Sunnis and Shia to continue killing each other in Syria is in the US interest. Read more

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No narrow way out

This rare interview with Salim Idriss, who (sort of) commands the forces in Syria that call themselves the Free Army, is telling.  It demonstrates three things:

  1. The rebels are still in need of weapons.
  2. Their fragmented structure makes supplying them a dicey proposition.
  3. Disunity is a serious impediment to their military progress.

This is not an unfamiliar situation.  It is comparable to the Bosnian army during the first year of that country’s miserable war, which started more than twenty years ago and went on for three and a half years before the Federation forces started winning and the Dayton accords ended it.

By then, the Bosnian (ABiH) was unified under General Rasim Delic and fighting in tandem with the Croat Defense Force (HVO) and the Croatian Army (HV) against the Republika Srpska army (VRS).  But things hadn’t started that way.  The HVO and the ABiH had even fought with each other in 1992 and 1993, just as some rebel forces inside Syria have in recent months.

Likewise in Kosovo, the Kosovo Liberation Army was not completely unified at first and fought occasionally with the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosovo (FARK), a less well-known group that also fought against the Yugoslav security forces.

The Syrian rebel forces will need greater unity if they are to make further progress against the Syrian army, which has been gaining ground in the past few weeks.  That is at least in part due to Iranian and Lebanese Hizbollah forces fighting inside Syria.  The regime’s objective is to relieve Damascus and secure the route to the Alawite-populated areas of the northeast, where ethnic cleansing of Sunnis has been proceeding apace.

The rebel forces are also going to need more international help, at the very least arms supplies, but some want a much narrower focus.  Aram Nerguizian wants American intervention to focus exclusively on chemical weapons and extremists among the rebels:

How U.S. military power could be used is to selectively target risks tied to proliferation of chemical weapons and other strategic capabilities in Syria. It could be used to contain and curtail the expansion of al Qaeda in the Levant and to prevent the preeminence of radical forces in the region.

The chemical weapons seem to me strategically irrelevant.  If used, they have killed a tiny fraction of the more than 80,000 dead. It can still be argued that the President’s “red line” has to be enforced, lest failing to do so sends the wrong message to Iran.  Certainly a credible threat of military force to block Tehran from getting nuclear weapons is vital to the diplomatic strategy the President is pursuing.  But the notion that chemical weapons, like nuclear bombs, are “weapons of mass destruction” is hyperbole.  Syria’s use of chemical weapons has nothing like the implications of Iran gaining nuclear ones.  Finding and destroying Asad’s stocks of sarin and other poisons would be a major military enterprise, not the limited intervention some may imagine.

Extremists are likewise a difficult target to engage.  Muslim extremists also emerged in Bosnia and Kosovo but were quickly undone once the fighting was over.  That will be a far more difficult process in Syria, as it will not be getting the tens of thousands of NATO peacekeeping forces that made it happen quickly, and in retrospect easily, in the Balkans.  But how, precisely, does one target Jabhat al Nusra in Syria?  Do we really want to be hunting them down with drones while they are fighting the Asad regime?  Or encouraging the Free Syria Army, which is less than fully effective against the regime forces, to engage against them while the extremists are fighting Asad?  We have made it clear that Jabhat al Nusra is not acceptable to the international community, something the UN reinforced last week with financial sanctions.  But do we really need to do more than that right now?

The higher priority is to focus on protecting civilians in Syria.  The regime is targeting civilians in rebel-held areas daily, trying to make life there unbearable and governance impossible.  The purpose is to get the civilians to expel the insurgents, in the hope doing so will provide some measure of relief from artillery and air bombardment.   Protecting Syria’s civilian population from these ravages should be our priority concern.

The costs of failing to do so are high.  US humanitarian relief in Syria could total $1 billion by the end of this year.  Unless we focus on civilian protection we are not likely to recover some measure of confidence in Syria’s Sunni Muslim population and prevent its youth from further radicalization.  A post-Asad Syria dominated by extremists will be a problem for the Middle East and the US for decades into the future.  We should want a Syria that respects the rights of its citizens (regardless of sect or ethnicity) as well as its borders with Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, Israel and Lebanon.  That will take time and effort.  There is no shortcut.  A narrow focus on chemical weapons and extremists will not serve these broader strategic purposes.  There is no narrow way out.

 

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Syria: is there hope?

Salon.com asked me to review recent events in Syria and their significance.  They published it today under the heading “Has the Syria threat cooled?”: 

Watching Syria is like looking through a kaleidoscope. The picture seems to change dramatically in response to the slightest jolt, but the components remain the same. The past week has seen lots of jolts, but no real change in the elements that make up the sad picture.

Inside Syria, the regime’s forces have started an ethnic cleansing campaign in the west intended to clear Sunnis from areas its Alawite supporters want to secure for themselves. The regime has also successfully pushed south toward the Jordanian border. In much of the rest of the country, there is lots of fighting but only marginal changes in the confrontation lines, which run through many urban areas, or between the urban centers and the countryside. Almost 7 million Syrians are now thought to need humanitarian assistance. The number could rise dramatically during the rest of the year.

Secretary Kerry’s visit to Moscow this week revived, once again, hopes for a negotiated settlement. He and the Russians agreed to try to convene a conference, even before the end of the month, that would include both the Syrian opposition and the Assad regime. The prospect of this conference will relieve President Obama of any need for a quick decision on unilateral action in Syria, since it would hardly be appropriate to preempt the conference. That is likely what both the Russians and the Americans wanted: more time.

Pressure had been building for action, including possible direct American shipment of arms to the opposition, safe areas for displaced people, a no-fly zone, or an attack on Syria’s air force and missiles, which are being used against civilians. Evidence that the regime has used chemical weapons put President Obama on the spot, as he has several times said that crossing this red line would change his calculus. American credibility, some thought, was at stake.

The ink was barely dry on the allegation of chemical weapons use when Carla Del Ponte, a Swiss member of a U.N. human rights inquiry for Libya, suggested that she knew of evidence that chemical weapons were used by the opposition rather than the regime. This allegation has little credibility, not only because of the technical difficulties involved but also because Del Ponte has a record of sensational allegations that are difficult to prove (or disprove).

Syria’s neighbors are increasingly under strain. Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan are over-burdened with refugees, now more than 1.4 million strong and likely to double within the year. In Iraq, the Syrian fighting is exacerbating sectarian tensions between the government in Baghdad and Sunni protesters. Prime Minister Maliki is worried that a successful revolution in Sunni-majority Syria will export insurgency to his Shia-majority Iraq. At least some of the protesters will not be unhappy if he is correct.

Israel struck by air inside Syria twice last weekend, ostensibly to block missiles from trans-shipment to Lebanon’s Hezbollah from Iran. This has cast doubt on the efficacy of Syria’s air defenses, which has been a consideration inhibiting American military action in support of the opposition. Hezbollah is saying Syria will arm it with “game-changing” weapons. If so, we can expect more Israeli attacks to prevent their transfer. At the same time, Israel is at pains to make it clear it is not intervening in the Syrian civil war. It is also strengthening its border defenses against a buildup of radical opposition Islamists in the Golan Heights.

Syria is also causing serious political tensions elsewhere in the Middle East. Turkey and Qatar are supporting Muslim Brotherhood-affiliates inside Syria. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates dislike the Brotherhood and claim to be supporting secularists, which is what the United States prefers. The Syrian opposition remains fragmented. The Brotherhood-affiliated prime minister has not yet named his government, presumably a vital step before a conference can be held.

None of these developments suggest much hope for a negotiated settlement at an upcoming peace conference. Conferences of this sort went on for years during the Bosnian war, without result until the Americans twisted arms at Dayton. It is not clear whether the Americans and Russians are prepared to twist opposition and regime arms with the vigor required to get a settlement. But Secretary Kerry’s backpedaling from insistence that Bashar al Assad leave office at the start of a transition opens up an area of possible agreement with Moscow that has not been in evidence previously.

It would be foolish, however, to suggest that a negotiated settlement is just around the next corner. We are still at the beginning of Syria’s strife. It would be much safer to assume things will get even worse before they get better. There will be more unexpected jolts and changes in the kaleidoscopic pattern before this is over.

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Still the beginning

A lot of the news today about Syria is not only about Syria.  Keeping your eye on Syria means watching:

  1. Russia:  Secretary Kerry will be in Moscow this week trying to close the gap with the Russians, who have not wanted a political solution that begins by requiring Bashar al Asad to step down.  It would be hard to do better for Russia experts than Michelle Kelemen’s piece this morning on NPR, but I confess they did not hit hard on what I think is the best bet for Kerry.  Russia and the United States share an interest in preventing an extremist Sunni takeover of Syria.  The longer the violence persists, the more likely that outcome is.  A concerted, UN Security Council push for a political settlement that moves definitively to a post-Asad regime would not only help the Russians save face but also provide the best chance of blocking extremists.
  2. Israel:  The Israelis have conducted more air raids into Syria, ostensibly to stop war materiel from shipment to Hizbollah.  The Syrian government, which in the past has not acknowledged Israeli attacks, denounced them on Sunday, thus providing an opportunity to claim Israel is in cahoots with Syria’s revolutionaries and also raising the odds on retaliation.  It would appear the air strikes did not trigger Syria’s much-vaunted, Russian-supplied air defense system.  Some say that is because the Israelis entered Syria from Lebanon.  Whatever.  It still suggests that Syria’s air defense capabilities are over-rated.  The US should be able to do at least as well as the Israelis.
  3. Jordan:   The Syrian border with Jordan is now largely in revolutionary hands and refugees are pouring across into a country that was already under severe internal strain from political protests and economic downturn.  The UN is projecting a million Syrian refugees in Jordan by the end of the year.  Many wonder whether Jordan’s monarchy can meet the challenges.
  4. Lebanon:  Israeli entry into Syria from Lebanese airspace gives Beirut something all parties can denounce, but at the same time it illustrates all to starkly the parlous state of Lebanese sovereignty.  Lebanese Hizbollah and Sunni fighters are already killing each other inside Syria.  They also clash occasionally inside Lebanon.  Hizbollah has made it absolutely clear that it regards preservation of the Asad regime as vital to its own existence.
  5. Turkey:   There are already something like half a million Syrian refugees inside Turkey, which is now blocking them at the border.  The Turks have wisely reached a ceasefire agreement with their own Kurdish (PKK) rebellion, thus limiting the damage Damascus can do by supporting Kurdish militants.  NATO exercises at Incirlik, close to the Syrian border, were presumably scheduled some time ago, but they occurring now and signal that Turkey has backing in preventing spillover from Syria.  But Turkey still faces dissent from its anti-Asad posture from its own Turkish-speaking Alevi population (second cousins to the Arabic-speaking Alawites of Syria).
  6. United Nations:  Carla Del Ponte, a Swiss member of a UN inquiry commission into human rights violations, suggested yesterday that it was the rebels, not the government, that had used sarin gas in Syria.  The former prosecutor of The Hague Tribunal concerned with war crimes in former Yugoslavia, she has a previous record of making controversial statements that are difficult to confirm or deny.  Best to wait for the UN chemical weapons experts to pronounce on the subject.

I’ll be posting later today on how the Syria crisis affects different political forces inside Iraq.  Suffice it to say:  the news is not good there either.

Inside Syria, the regime has been ethnically cleansing western parts of the country, presumably in preparation for making them an Alawite stronghold.

What we are seeing are developments–refugees, military exercises and operations, political maneuvering, ethnic cleansing, chemical weapons allegations–that challenge the state structures in the Levant and put many of them under severe strain.  The strain is likely to get much worse, as there is little evidence of anything that would prevent a further slide.  We are still at the beginning of this tragic story, not near its end.

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