Tag: Jordan
Syria: is there hope?
Salon.com asked me to review recent events in Syria and their significance. They published it today under the heading “Has the Syria threat cooled?”:
Watching Syria is like looking through a kaleidoscope. The picture seems to change dramatically in response to the slightest jolt, but the components remain the same. The past week has seen lots of jolts, but no real change in the elements that make up the sad picture.
Inside Syria, the regime’s forces have started an ethnic cleansing campaign in the west intended to clear Sunnis from areas its Alawite supporters want to secure for themselves. The regime has also successfully pushed south toward the Jordanian border. In much of the rest of the country, there is lots of fighting but only marginal changes in the confrontation lines, which run through many urban areas, or between the urban centers and the countryside. Almost 7 million Syrians are now thought to need humanitarian assistance. The number could rise dramatically during the rest of the year.
Secretary Kerry’s visit to Moscow this week revived, once again, hopes for a negotiated settlement. He and the Russians agreed to try to convene a conference, even before the end of the month, that would include both the Syrian opposition and the Assad regime. The prospect of this conference will relieve President Obama of any need for a quick decision on unilateral action in Syria, since it would hardly be appropriate to preempt the conference. That is likely what both the Russians and the Americans wanted: more time.
Pressure had been building for action, including possible direct American shipment of arms to the opposition, safe areas for displaced people, a no-fly zone, or an attack on Syria’s air force and missiles, which are being used against civilians. Evidence that the regime has used chemical weapons put President Obama on the spot, as he has several times said that crossing this red line would change his calculus. American credibility, some thought, was at stake.
The ink was barely dry on the allegation of chemical weapons use when Carla Del Ponte, a Swiss member of a U.N. human rights inquiry for Libya, suggested that she knew of evidence that chemical weapons were used by the opposition rather than the regime. This allegation has little credibility, not only because of the technical difficulties involved but also because Del Ponte has a record of sensational allegations that are difficult to prove (or disprove).
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Still the beginning
A lot of the news today about Syria is not only about Syria. Keeping your eye on Syria means watching:
- Russia: Secretary Kerry will be in Moscow this week trying to close the gap with the Russians, who have not wanted a political solution that begins by requiring Bashar al Asad to step down. It would be hard to do better for Russia experts than Michelle Kelemen’s piece this morning on NPR, but I confess they did not hit hard on what I think is the best bet for Kerry. Russia and the United States share an interest in preventing an extremist Sunni takeover of Syria. The longer the violence persists, the more likely that outcome is. A concerted, UN Security Council push for a political settlement that moves definitively to a post-Asad regime would not only help the Russians save face but also provide the best chance of blocking extremists.
- Israel: The Israelis have conducted more air raids into Syria, ostensibly to stop war materiel from shipment to Hizbollah. The Syrian government, which in the past has not acknowledged Israeli attacks, denounced them on Sunday, thus providing an opportunity to claim Israel is in cahoots with Syria’s revolutionaries and also raising the odds on retaliation. It would appear the air strikes did not trigger Syria’s much-vaunted, Russian-supplied air defense system. Some say that is because the Israelis entered Syria from Lebanon. Whatever. It still suggests that Syria’s air defense capabilities are over-rated. The US should be able to do at least as well as the Israelis.
- Jordan: The Syrian border with Jordan is now largely in revolutionary hands and refugees are pouring across into a country that was already under severe internal strain from political protests and economic downturn. The UN is projecting a million Syrian refugees in Jordan by the end of the year. Many wonder whether Jordan’s monarchy can meet the challenges.
- Lebanon: Israeli entry into Syria from Lebanese airspace gives Beirut something all parties can denounce, but at the same time it illustrates all to starkly the parlous state of Lebanese sovereignty. Lebanese Hizbollah and Sunni fighters are already killing each other inside Syria. They also clash occasionally inside Lebanon. Hizbollah has made it absolutely clear that it regards preservation of the Asad regime as vital to its own existence.
- Turkey: There are already something like half a million Syrian refugees inside Turkey, which is now blocking them at the border. The Turks have wisely reached a ceasefire agreement with their own Kurdish (PKK) rebellion, thus limiting the damage Damascus can do by supporting Kurdish militants. NATO exercises at Incirlik, close to the Syrian border, were presumably scheduled some time ago, but they occurring now and signal that Turkey has backing in preventing spillover from Syria. But Turkey still faces dissent from its anti-Asad posture from its own Turkish-speaking Alevi population (second cousins to the Arabic-speaking Alawites of Syria).
- United Nations: Carla Del Ponte, a Swiss member of a UN inquiry commission into human rights violations, suggested yesterday that it was the rebels, not the government, that had used sarin gas in Syria. The former prosecutor of The Hague Tribunal concerned with war crimes in former Yugoslavia, she has a previous record of making controversial statements that are difficult to confirm or deny. Best to wait for the UN chemical weapons experts to pronounce on the subject.
I’ll be posting later today on how the Syria crisis affects different political forces inside Iraq. Suffice it to say: the news is not good there either.
Inside Syria, the regime has been ethnically cleansing western parts of the country, presumably in preparation for making them an Alawite stronghold.
What we are seeing are developments–refugees, military exercises and operations, political maneuvering, ethnic cleansing, chemical weapons allegations–that challenge the state structures in the Levant and put many of them under severe strain. The strain is likely to get much worse, as there is little evidence of anything that would prevent a further slide. We are still at the beginning of this tragic story, not near its end.
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Arab uprisings fail to satisfy the street
From Tunisia to Egypt new transitional leadership has yet to address the economic, security and structural grievances that triggered the Arab spring uprisings. The concerns that triggered the revolutions continue to pull the people into the streets.
Why have the new political leaders failed to address these concerns? According to University of California professor Laurie Brand, the desire to consolidate power in the face of new challenges and constraints, rather than domestic mass politics, drives current post-revolutionary leaders’ behavior. In her paper Arab Uprisings and Mass Politics: Possibilities, Constraints, and Uncertainty discussed this week at the Wilson Center, Brand examines the mass politics of Egypt and Jordan to understand the effects of increased popular political mobilization on Arab states’ regional behavior.
Egyptian President Morsi’s commitment to the peace treaty with Israel is an example of his continuation of domestically unpopular policies. Morsi’s approach to the Gaza tunnels has proven even tougher than Mubarak’s. Morsi’s confidence after his mediating role between Israel and Gaza led him to assume extra-constitutional powers, causing the greatest domestic uproar of this presidency and showing how disassociated he has become from mass sentiment. The economic crisis and Egypt’s IMF requests make this an inopportune moment for the Egyptian president to risk alienating the US by giving in to domestic anti-treaty sentiment. An “uncomfortable marriage of convenience” between the Muslim Brotherhood and the military ties Morsi’s hands on corruption, a main popular grievance. Several articles in the new constitution protect key military interests at the expense of transparency. The $1.3 billion in annual US military aid keeps Morsi from stepping on the military’s toes.
The real differences between Morsi and Mubarak’s foreign policies occur at the regional level, not in relation to the US. Under Morsi, Egypt entertains closer relations with Muslim Brotherhood-sympathising Qatar than with Mubarak’s preferred Saudi Arabia. Morsi’s visit to Iran also represents a significant break with the previous regime. These shifts in regional alignment did not result from mass political pressures, but rather from an attempt to reassert Egypt’s independent regional role.
Much like Morsi, Jordan’s King Abdullah has remained steadfast in the face of mass protests, even as young East Bankers have mobilized in the Harika movements and directly criticize the government, calling for its removal. Jordan’s relations with the US have remained unchanged, while its relations with Egypt have chilled. Military exercises between the US and Jordan testify to the continued relationship, while Jordan’s domestically unpopular containment of the Muslim Brotherhood renders relations with the Egyptian government difficult.
Since the beginning of the Arab spring, popular demands have focused on domestic issues like unemployment, inflation, insecurity and the rule of law. These mass demands have not however shaped the current Arab leaders’ behavior. They are far more interested in solidifying their power in the face of regional and international challenges and constraints. The growing gap between the people of Arab Spring countries and their governments will probably become a source of renewed conflict in the future. Marginalization of the youth and labor movements – what Brand calls the “footmen of the revolution”—resulted in the their failure to produce charismatic leaders with legitimate revolutionary credentials. Instead of new, young leaders coming to the fore, long suppressed, exiled or co-opted opposition leaders attained political power. Once in charge, these leaders did not find serious disagreement with their predecessors’ international alignments and presented no remedy for the countries’ domestic issues.
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Nowruz/Passover/Easter: better than expected
I did not anticipate how well President Obama’s visit to Israel, Palestine and Jordan would go last week. I was not alone. In Washington, pre-roadtrip skepticism prevailed: differences over Iran and Palestine were anticipated to overshadow any cosmetic improvements in the President’s often tense personal relations with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu.
It may still turn out that way in the longer-term. Whatever new castles Obama built in the Mediterranean sand could be quickly swept away. But for those who think the US is decline and can no longer influence events in the Middle East, this trip should sow doubt. And for those who thought Mitt Romney would do better with the Israelis than Obama, this trip suggests the contrary.
The President went out of his way to establish his bona fides with Israelis: praising their democracy, admiring their courage, recalling their idealism, remembering their history, sharing their losses, ensuring their security. But he at the same time spoke bluntly of the need to make peace with the Palestinians, who will have enjoyed his performance less but still got a blunt and unambiguous defense of their right to a state of their own. The well-crafted statement brought the president ample applause also from Israelis. Presumably there were not a lot of West Bank settlers in the audience. It was a virtuouso performance.
So much for the flash. What about the substance? The big issues for the trip to the Middle East were three:
Iran: The President and Netanyahu sounded more united on preventing Iran from getting nuclear weapons. In fact, there are differences, with Israel concerned that the Americans will agree to allow Iran to hold on to a substantial quantity of 20% enriched uranium, which could be further enriched quickly with more advanced centrifuges that Iran is now installing. The Iranians are slowing their accumulation of enriched material while increasing their capacity to move quickly if they decide to develop nuclear weapons. Obama made it clear he would not stand in the way of Israel taking military action, but only the US can cause serious damage to the Iranian nuclear program. Netanyahu seems now to accept that the Americans will draw the redline, albeit closely consulting with the Israelis.
Syria: Secretary Kerry has been leaning forward on bringing an end to the civil war in Syria, but President Obama is still wanting it to be done without US military intervention or lethal supplies to the opposition. Israel is increasingly concerned about more advanced arms flowing to Hizbollah and about the buildup of more radical Sunni Islamists on its Golan Heights boundary with Syria. The apparent use during the week of chemical weapons–the regime says by the revolutionaries, the revolutionaries say by the regime–is a big problem for President Obama, who side-stepped the issue during his trip by saying he would await a determination on whether they were really used or not. Still, he said their use would be a game changer, whatever that may mean.
Palestine: The US and Israel need to keep the Palestinian Authority afloat, even as they discourage it from seeking further international recognition, taking Israeli officials to the International Criminal Court and reconciling with Hamas. This is a delicate dance, and Obama was less than clear on next steps. He is downplaying settlements per se and wants direct negotiations on borders, which of course would limit the extent of Israeli settlements.
Obama also has to be concerned about other issues:
Jordan: The big problem is the burgeoning flow of refugees from Syria, who are getting close to half a million. Amman just doesn’t have the capacity to welcome many more and needs help to manage the burden of those who have already arrived. The presidential visit will buck up King Abdullah, but the public relations effect is likely to be short-lived. He needs financial help (Obama pledged $200 million more for Syrian refugees in Jordan) and some good advice on carrying forward political reform. He is getting most of the former from the Saudis, who aren’t likely to give him much of the latter.
Egypt: The Israelis will have expressed concern about instability in Egypt, even though Muslim Brotherhood President Morsi has so far not undermined the peace treaty. The presence of Islamist extremists in Sinai appears still to be growing. The difficulties Egypt is having in establishing its new regime and maintaining legitimate governance throughout the country will be of concern to both Israel and the US.
Turkey: The big surprise of the President’s trip was his successful mediation of a Netanyahu apology for an attack on an aid flotilla to Gaza that killed nine Turks in 2010. This comes along with Turkish success in convincing imprisoned Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan to agree to a ceasefire in the decades-long rebellion. Both moves will help to shore up Turkey in its continuing confrontation with Bashar al Asad and restore some confidence in an Ankara whose “zero problems with neighbors” policy had been in tatters.
I have my doubts Obama will succeed where other presidents have failed: on Palestine and Iran in particular. But he did well last week, and for that we should all be thankful. The Nowruz/Passover/Easter season is proving better than expected.
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Syria seen from Venus and Mars
I enjoyed yesterday two events on Syria, back to back and less than a block from each other. An all-women panel at the Stimson Center co-sponsored by the Middle East Institute was upbeat and optimistic. An all-men panel at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) was anything but. Commentators on both panels were keen observers, including several with recent experience in and near Syria.
With Mona Yacoubian moderating, the Stimson/MEI panel focused on “Syria Beyond Assad: Building a New Syria from the Grassroots.” Rafif Jouejati, spokesperson for the Local Coordinating Committees and leader of FREE Syria (a nongovernmental organization) underlined that the mood among Syrians, who are seeking freedom, dignity and democracy, is far more optimistic than the Western press would lead you to believe. The revolution is determined to build civil society and protect minority rights. There are still upwards of 300 peaceful demonstrations every Friday. Fear of an Islamist takeover is exaggerated. A hijab may be necessary to meet some people, but they quickly forget if it slips off your head. Civil society training for Syrians in Turkey is accomplishing a lot, as they go back into Syria and train others.
Honey al Sayed, a former Syrian anchor now associated with ROYA Association for a Better Syria and the internet radio station SouriaLi emphasized the importance of rebuilding from the grassroots, as Syrian society has collapsed. The challenges are enormous, but Syrians believe in “unity in diversity” and will meet them. Elizabeth O’Bagy of the Institute for the Study of War focused on the relationship between the civilian local councils and armed groups, which she said are not anxious to provide basic services or govern because they are still fighting the regime. Warlordism is not the problem portrayed in the Western press–there is lots of room to empower civilians. There has been some abuse of regime prisoners, looting and exploitation of aid shipments, but no major massacres. Islamist fighters have no difficulty dealing with a Western woman asking questions. Al Qaeda-linked Jabhat al Nusra keeps its distance, but most other armed groups do cooperate with each other.
Only Leila Hilal of the New America Foundation clouded the Venusian horizon. The situation is complex and fluid. There are a lot of questions about local legitimacy and authority. Who is really in charge? Elders? Religious leaders? Fighters? Technocrats? What will their relationship be to the Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (SOC in Washington parlance)? Will the local councils provide aid? Will they also govern? Are they political bodies or technical ones? What will the role of minorities and women be? How will Western preferences for inclusivity be met? Should we even express them?
The clouds thickened at WINEP, where staff reported on recent travel in the region. With Patrick Clawson moderating, Andrew Tabler described Syria as melting down and spilling over. Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan are facing serious refugee challenges. Jordan has seen 100,000 enter in the last 60 days, many of them running a regime gauntlet to get out of Syria. Fighting has spilled into Lebanon. Hizbollah and Sunni fighters are spilling back from Lebanon into Syria. In addition to refugees, Turkey is seeing a big buildup of displaced people inside Syria along the border. There is a concentration of Islamist extremists (including Jabhat al Nusra) along the border with Israel, which is concerned about the transfer of “strategic” weapons (chemicals, anti-aircraft and missiles) to Hizbollah and to Sunni extremists.
The food and medical supplies that the US has announced it will provide to the Coalition will not help to bring down Bashar al Asad. Sentiment within the revolution has turned dramatically against the US and the West and towards the Salafists and jihadists. With no political settlement in sight, the US is unable to influence the armed groups who will decide the outcome. It would be far better to provide aid to the armed groups: those taking the shots will soon be calling them. The SOC, and likely the provisional government to be named this weekend, has little traction inside Syria and risks becoming a Potemkin village.
Jeff White continued in this vein. Localized fighting is the basis of political legitimacy and power inside Syria. The revolutionaries are fragmented. Civilians are marginalized. The military councils are really in charge. The Islamists are in the vanguard. They have cohesion, discipline, leadership and morale. Jabhat al Nusra is also particularly good at civic action, including securing and distribution of food as well as street cleaning. Their command and control is tight.
The Free Syria Army has more problems with civilian/military relations, jihadists vs. nationalists and regime penetration. A revolution that began in the name of freedom and democracy has turned definitively in the direction of an Islamic state. Antipathy to the West, in particular the US, and the international community in general is strong. Conspiracy theories are common, most notably the notion that the US, Iran and Israel are collaborating against the revolution.
Though better equipped now with antitank weapons, the revolutionaries still suffer shortages and maldistribution of weapons. Logistics are ad hoc. There is a security vacuum in the south–a kind of no man’s land. No two revolutionary units are alike and numbers are hard to come by. The rebels are nevertheless gaining territory.
Though losing control, the regime remains cohesive, with good supplies from Russia and Iran. Hizbollah’s fighting role is increasing, as is the role of irregular regime forces (Shabiha). The army is being hollowed out, losing 40 or more dead per day and several times that in wounded. The Syrian air force is a wasting asset.
Simon Henderson talked about Gulf attitudes, where there is strong support for the Syrian opposition because of the prospect of a strategic setback for Iran. But competition among the Gulf states is proving stronger than their distaste for Iran. Saudi Arabia and Qatar are both supporting the revolution, but they are also competing for influence. The competition is trumping concern about the outcome, leaving the GCC divided in the absence of strong US leadership. Qatar is far less willing than Saudi Arabia to be seen bucking Iran, as it shares hydrocarbon resources in the Gulf with Tehran.
Are these views from Venus and Mars reconcilable? My heart is on Venus. I hope the women are right. My head is on Mars. What the men are seeing is all too real.
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Reform or else
Laurentina Cizza reports on last week’s discussion at the Middle East Institute:
Jordan’s King Abdullah had three main objectives for the January 23 election: to increase the integrity of the election process in response to heavy criticisms of the previous one, increase voter turnout in the face an Islamist boycott, and to usher in reform, or at least give Jordanians that impression. A Middle East Institute discussion last week on the challenges ahead suggested that the King made some progress on the first two counts but fell short of meaningful reform. The upheavals in Egypt, Syria and Libya have bought King Abdullah some time, but he needs to deliver more substantive reform before his luck runs out.
Recently returned National Democratic Institute election observer, Leslie Campbell argued the January 23 election was better run than last time. An Independent Election Commission (rather than the Ministry of the Interior) used a pre-printed standardized ballot. This was a significant improvement over the previous blank pieces of paper, which opened the door to fraudulent practices. The standardized, numbered ballots made cheating more difficult. For the first time authorities assigned voters to polling stations, making tracking of individuals easier. The improved technical organization of the elections increased the credibility of the results.
However, the King’s failure to deliver on more profound reforms reduced these technical adjustments to little more than cosmetic changes. The combination of unequally sized districts and the single non-transferable vote in multiple-member constituencies served to prevent ideological cohesion and to amplify family, clan and tribal cleavages. Candidates in Jordan run as individuals, not on party lists. This renders political parties irrelevant. Strong family and ethnic ties compel individuals to vote for the candidate with shared family ties, not shared ideology.
In addition, The West Bank origin portion of the Jordanian population is disadvantaged relative to the King’s traditional East Bank powerbase. Campbell offered an extreme example: while a candidate running in the 1st district of Amman (majority Palestinian-origin population) needed 19,000 votes, a candidate running in the rural, tribal area of Ma’an needed a mere 1,600 votes to be elected.
A truly national legislative body cannot develop under these conditions. The unequal distribution of districts and the single-vote system over-represent the rural areas, amplify ethnic divisions, and hinder the development of ideologically cohesive political actors. A parliamentary system with no ideological blocks does not lead to effective coalition building, but rather to a system that sees the King fully in charge as the parliamentarians squabble for something to unite over.
Campbell remained optimistic nevertheless. Improvements in the process could move Jordan in the right direction. This round of elections 34 candidates of Palestinian origin made it to Parliament versus 19 last time. Only 33 incumbents made it back into parliament this time around.
Election observer Danya Greenfield of the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East focused on what new insights the elections could provide. Islamic Action Front (IAF) appeals to boycott the elections fell flat. Only 2,000 people showed up to protest, and only 2-5% of Jordanian voters refrained from voting with the express purpose of boycotting the elections. Turnout was better than in the last elections, though the statistics indicate that Jordanians still feel apathetic about politics. Turnout of registered voters was 56%, but only 40% of the eligible voter population. This is low in comparison to the rates of electoral participation in neighboring Egypt and Libya.
The IAF remains popular. Since family ties motivated people to go to the polls, voters may have been reluctant to boycott. Studies indicate that in an equitable distribution system the IAF would win 20 to 25% of the parliamentary seats. The increased turnout is not a good barometer of the King’s popularity. To the contrary, the low turnout compared to neighboring countries suggests disappointment with the reforms the King is offering.
The conflict in Syria has frightened Jordanians, but they are unlikely to remain quiescent. Upcoming IMF-mandated food and fuel price spikes, and the continued influx of refugees from a hemorrhaging Syria, are increasing political pressure in the Kingdom.
Both Campbell and Greenfield came to the same conclusion: the King must demonstrate his commitment to reform to boost Jordanian confidence in the future. Perhaps the King’s abstention from tampering with the Parliament’s upcoming selection of the Prime Minister will represent the perfect opportunity.
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