Tag: Jordan
Realism redefined
Different from previous plans, Trump’s Middle East Peace Plan addresses key issues like borders, Jerusalem, settlements, and refugees. Although the plan has enraged the Palestinians , it has received a much more favorable reception from many states than experts predicted, such as Europe and the Middle East. Without a Palestinian partner, is the plan destined, as its critics argue, to fail? Or will it, as its supporters claim, reshape the conflict in significant, beneficial, and lasting ways?
On February 11, the Hudson Institute hosted a panel discussion on the topic of “President Trump’s Plan for Peace in the Middle East.” The discussion featured two speakers: Michael Doran and Jon Lerner. Both serve as senior fellows at the Hudson Institute.
Previous plans vs Trump’s
Lerner and Doran noted that Trump’s plan addresses all final status topics in detail, including Jerusalem, settlement, borders, and right to return, while previous plans left out these issues. Lerner believes that Trump’s plan accepts the reality, contrary to previous plans that sought to change reality on the ground. This plan guarantees Israel’s control over a unified Jerusalem rather than dividing the city. Since it is impossible for Israelis to uproot settlements from the West Bank, Trump legalizes Israeli settlements. Although this plan is a setback for Palestinians, it creates an independent Palestinian state with a capital, grants economic support to Palestinians, allows Palestinians access to Israeli ports, and proposes a tunnel connecting the West Bank and Gaza.
Bilateral or trilateral?
Because most Arab states have more concerns other than than the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, they didn’t offer united supports to pressure Israel into concessions, Lerner says. Due to the lack of support, Palestine should consider engaging with the US and Israel. Lerner predicts that,
- If the Palestinian were to engage in negotiations but didn’t accept the plan, they would receive a receptive audience, which could force Israel to stop its annexation.
- If the Palestinians don’t engage in negotiations, which is likely, Israel will keep moving forward and weaken the Palestinians further.
Lerner thinks the Palestinian made a wrong choice to cut all dialogue with the US after Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in 2017. Instead, the Palestinians should have rejected Trump’s decision and worked with him on a plan until they achieved what they want. Lerner urges the Palestinian to engage in negotiations, or they will be more likely to lose ground.
US interests
Doran argues that the US has more issues in the region nowadays and needs to cooperate with its allies. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has weakened its Israeli ally, especially after Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza failed to bring stability. If the US forced Israel out of the West Bank and handed its control to Abbas, he would not have the capability to maintain control and fend off Hamas. Jordanian security could not be guaranteed either. Lerner added that the US avoided the unproductive perception of even-handedness with allies on one side, and sympathy towards Palestinians on the other. Trump’s plan is rooted in realism and the administration’s support for allies.
Lerner pointed out that irrespective of who wins the presidential election in November, the content of this plan has changed political dynamics in both Israel and the US. It will be hard for the Israeli government to accept a less generous plan than Trump’s in the future. It will also be difficult for future US administrations to propose any plan more like previous plans and less like Trump’s plan.
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A bad barometer reading
On June 26 the Atlantic Council held a panel to discuss the release of opinion poll data collected by the Arab Barometer about the state of the economy, migration, governmental performance, corruption, and other topics in the Middle East. Survey data was collected in Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan. Presentation of data was followed by a panel discussion that included Mark Tessler, professor of political science at University of Michigan, Kathrin Thomas, Research Associate at the Arab Barometer, Abbas Khadim, director of the Iraq Initiative at the Atlantic Council, and Faysal Itani, Senior Fellow at Atlantic Council. Vivian Salam, reporter at the Wall Street Journal, moderated.
There is little optimism about the economy improving in the Levant. In Jordan, 70% of respondents cite the economy as a primary concern. In all three countries, (Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon) more than 85% percent of respondents perceived the governments of their respective states to be corrupt.
Survey data also noted a slight upwards trend in desire to emigrate from the Levant region. An uptick in a desire to emigrate can be explained by the “brain drain” phenomenon in which highly educated youths seek to leave their home countries due to lack of high-level employment opportunity. Respondents indicated that “economic reasons”, “political reasons” and “security reasons” were the primary drivers for the choice to emigrate.
The survey catalogued a slight increase in support for women’s rights and prominence in politics and business. 60% of respondents would support a female head of state, with Lebanon the most supportive of the notion at a rate of 77%. Despite this, 66% of respondents in the Levant said that men inherently make better political leaders than women.
Since 2016 there has been a decline in the belief that the Middle East and North Africa would benefit from stronger relations with the United States. Survey data revealed that people in the Levant widely believe that Iraq is a proxy of Iran, despite the fact that the Shia in Iraq have not sided with Iran.
Itani notes that the economic anxiety present in the region, specifically in Lebanon, is a reminder to Western policy makers that issues of chief importance to the West (Hezbollah, etc), do not necessarily take precedence in the region. The expectation of poor economic performance will have implications for future investment and growth. Itani attributes Lebanese decrease in willingness to strengthen ties with Washington to US policy in region, specifically US dealings with Israel and the change in American leadership in 2016.
Khadim spoke more specifically to the Iraqi data. Surveys confirm sentiments Iraqis usually express only through social media or encrypted messengers. There is a divergence of opinions held regarding the United States government and US citizens. Iraqis view American citizens more favorably than the American government, which Khadim says can open avenues in the realm of public diplomacy and good faith action between the two countries. On the Iraq-Iran relationship, he says GCC media have ascribed an affinity between Iraq and Iran that does not necessarily exist. Iran does have influence over certain discrete groups in Iraq, but that influence is not as widespread as many believe.
Tessler and Thomas, the administrators of the data collection, focused on the ways in which the data can be used to determine if there are links between different variables. Specifically, they expect a link between corruption perceptions and education levels as well as support of Iran depending on religion. While they had not yet conducted the analysis on these variables, they expect to confirm Khadim’s assertion that support for Iran in Iraq is contained to certain demographics and is not a widespread sentiment. Tessler further notes that the trend of declining support for strengthening relations with a United States dates to 2006.
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The Middle East wants reform
On Tuesday the Middle East Institute (MEI) hosted the presentation of the latest Middle East Public Opinion poll by James Zogby. Polling was conducted in 10 countries: Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Turkey and Iran. Zogby, Co-founder and President of the Arab American Institute and Director of Zogby Research Services, presented a summary of the data and key points before a panel discussion that featured Paul Salem, President of MEI, Kate Seelye, Vice President of MEI, Alex Vatanka, an MEI Senior Fellow, and Steven Cook, Eni Enrico Mattei Senior Fellow for Middle East and Africa Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Throughout the Middle East citizens expressed discontent with the policies of their governments. Only in the UAE did a majority of respondents indicate that their country was on the right track. This discontent spanned the rough divide opened by the Arab spring. Egypt and Tunisia both followed the “democratic track” after successful revolutions in 2011, but a majority of respondents there believe their countries to be on the wrong track, joining Iraq and Palestine as states with majority disapproval. In Egypt the drop included the military, whose confidence levels have fallen 50 points since 2013. Government reform was ranked 3rd overall in the list of political priorities, topping extremism, foreign enemies, health care, and personal rights. This contradicts a common narrative, which justified the failure of the Arab Spring by claiming that the people desired only improved economic and security conditions and cared little for political reform as long as those conditions were met. Downplaying the desire for reform may have been simply wishful thinking by authoritarian leaders in the region. The survey conveyed a sense of foreign policy pragmatism. Regarding Syria there was growing support for a national unity government with participation of Bashar al Assad. Regarding Iran, while majorities supported the Trump administration’s move to pull out of the nuclear deal, in every country except Tunisia and Egypt the majority believe that peace between Iran and the Arab world is “very possible” or “somewhat possible.” Eight out of ten countries, including Iran, held the majority view that it is important to bring Iran into a regional security arrangement with the Arab countries to help bring peace to the region. One exception to this pragmatism is the the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A growing majority in 5 out of 7 Arab states were opposed to a partnership with Israel, even if Israel returns occupied Palestinian lands and fulfills the terms of the Arab Peace Initiative. Palestinians themselves remained overwhelmingly prepared for peace with Israel if the refugee issue is solved and Israel returns to its pre-1967 borders, but a growing number believe the Israelis would never agree to those terms. Given the growing struggle between Saudi Arabia and Turkey for regional influence, the polling reflected just how close the competition is. Turkey surpasses the Saudis for favorability in Tunisia, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan and Iraq, and tightened the gap in Egypt. A majority of Arab countries view Turkey as playing a more positive role than Saudi Arabia in both Iraq and Syria. Public opinion of America has fallen in the region. The EU, Russia and China all fared better than America. The panel believed that this drop in opinion was largely due to the perception of the American government as inept. The polling indicates a continued sense of unrest in the region. With little faith in their own institutions, the people of the Middle East remain largely uninspired by the jingoistic foreign policies of their governments and continue to seek an end to costly civil wars, in order to focus on domestic reforms and economic improvement.Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Cancer of the status quo
The Carnegie Endowment for Middle East Peace hosted two panels on Tuesday for the release of their new study Arab Horizons: Pitfalls and Pathways to Renewal. The report was the second major installment within the Arab Horizons project launched by Carnegie 3 years ago. William Burns, president of Carnegie, introduced the report and discussed the history of the Arab Horizons project, saying, “the object was straightforward, if ambitious: to look beyond the tumult around us, to the long-term trajectory of the region, its people and its place in the world. What we wanted to offer was an updated picture of the human and political landscapes of the region, building less on pronouncements and prescriptions from Washington, and more on the perspectives from Carnegie’s network across the Arab world.”
“The Arab regional order is collapsing: politically, economically, socially even. We don’t have answers to any of these questions, but… lets go back to first principles and try to provide a road map for leaders, policy makers, activists and citizens.”
– Perry Cammack
The first report, Arab Fractures, Burns described as an updated assessment of the Middle East, “by the region, for the region, for all those with a stake in its future.” The latest installment, Pitfalls and Pathways to Renewal, offered a set of principles and recommendations, “to address the stark diagnosis” in the first report.
Burns acknowledged Jamal Kashoggi as one of the project’s partners and addressed his abduction and murder as indicative of the lack of tolerance for “stubborn, independent journalists, unafraid to speak truth to power” within the current social contract of the Arab world. “It’s a region where authoritarians feel the wind in their sails, and it is a time where democracies around the world, including my own, are adrift and losing their way.” Burns lamented ailing institutions and the increasing politics of fear, but, “all of this reminds us of the urgent task of rewriting the social contract in the Arab world.” Social contract was the buzzword of the day throughout a discussion which was at turns hopeful for the talents of the Arab people and scathingly critical of the leadership from their governments.
The first discussion featured Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 2014-2018 and former Jordanian Ambassador to the US, and moderator Marwan Muasher, vice president for studies at Carnegie and former Jordanian foreign minister. Reminiscing with each another, Zeid laughed over past tensions between two career civil servants who shared a vision for the future of their country, but at times disagreed on how to get there. He shared with the crowd how after his retirement from the civil service he and Marwan sat down over ceviche in New York to chat, and Marwan took the opportunity to ask him, “How many of my instructions as foreign minister do you think you actually implemented as the ambassador?” “For you, my friend” Hussein replied, “maybe 70%.”
Hussein communicated through anecdotes, walking through pivotal moments and realizations in his career which shaped his outlook on the region and the world. Again and again his stories homed in on key policy grievances in the Middle East: lack of commitment to individual rights and free thought. This problem is symptomatic of an incomplete transition from tribal to modern states and a stubborn unwillingness by Arab politicians to call a spade a spade or confront their failures.
The second panel featured Marwan Muasher again, along with Perry Cammack, a fellow in the Middle East program at Carnegie, both contributors to the report, along with Rabah Azreki, chief economist for the Middle East and North African Region at the World Bank and Hala Aldosari, a researcher and scholar on human rights and women’s health at the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice. Elise Labott, CNN’s global affairs correspondent, moderated.
“The Arab world has two choices and two choices only: either the headache of change or the cancer of the status quo”
– Marwan Muasher
Discussion reverted repeatedly to stagnation and change, locked in conflict. The oil economy has long sustained rentier states, headed by leaders who resisted change as a matter of principal. As oil prices drop, the social bargains they supported are buckling, explaining the events Muasher described as the last kick of authoritarianism in the region. It all led neatly to one pressing need: to renew the social contract in the Arab world in a way that puts citizens first.
The West errs in seeing each new generation of the old guard as reformers. Symbolic gestures along the lines of Saudi Arabia allowing women the right to drive, even while imprisoning Saudi activists who advocated those reforms, are evidence of an empty promise designed to stall the will of the people, not further it. The idea that change in the Middle East needs to be led by authoritarian reformers is false. In fact the people have been leading.
As the discussion swayed between hope and fear for the near future of the Arab world, a central narrative emerged: the Arab world desperately needs change, the people know this, and yet as change hurtles towards them at frightening speed, the current political leaders cling desperately and futilely to the status quo. A diverse wealth of human capital promises to hold the keys to that change if their leaders will only invest in them and hand them the reins. What remains to be seen is if change will be given or taken.
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All eyes on Russia
On Friday, a large convoy of tanks and military vehicles flying Syrian and Russian flags arrived at the Nasib-Jaber crossing into Jordan, marking the return of regime control over Syria’s strategic southern border for the first time in five years. Hours later, Al Jazeera reported that opposition fighters agreed to a cease fire with Russian negotiators representing regime forces in Dera’a Province. The story is familiar. Rebel forces will give up their heavy weapons and civilians in Dera’a will return to living under Assad’s rule, while fighters who refuse to surrender are transported to the last remaining opposition strongholds: a small area of Idlib Province and a thin sliver of land east of the Golan Heights.
One key aspect, however, differentiates this cease fire from its predecessors in Homs, Aleppo, and Eastern Ghouta: Russian military police will administer the newly-recaptured areas in an attempt to encourage the 320,000 Syrians displaced by the offensive to return to their homes. While largely symbolic, continued Russian influence on the ground, even after fighting ceases, represents another step in Russia’s evolution from one of several powerful players to the key actor in the Syrian conflict. The message is clear: Moscow will control how this conflict ends. Past inaction indicates that the US cannot do anything about it.
This development is particularly troubling at a time when US president Trump is angling to score a big win with President Putin at their summit in Helsinki on July 16, with Ukraine and Syria at the top of the agenda. In an April 9 interview with the Washington Post, King Abdullah II of Jordan argued that isolating the two conflicts would not lead to any significant progress on either issue. Instead, he said, the US must deal with the Russians on Syria and Ukraine simultaneously and “horse-trade.”
The problem is that Trump does not have a horse to trade in either case, making prospects for Russian deescalation in Syria or Ukraine unlikely. On the Syrian front, Trump has already made his intentions clear. He wants to remove the 2,000 US special forces headquartered in At-Tanf as soon as possible. Withdrawal would open the door for Assad to take back eastern Syria, as the US represents the driving force behind the fragile alliance that holds the area.
Trump has already shown his cards. His attitude during the southern Syria offensive demonstrates that Trump will not stand in Putin’s way if push comes to shove in eastern Syria. Further, Trump’s behavior at the G7 summit, where he argued that Crimea rightfully belongs to Russia and argued for Putin to be allowed back into the group, indicates that US sanctions imposed against Russia in retaliation for the invasion of Ukraine could be up for negotiation, for little to nothing in return.
Trump has weakened his position in recent months at a time when Putin has significantly strengthened his. This means that the US delegation will go into Helsinki with barely any of what Trump, of all people, should know is necessary: leverage. Putin will likely get what he wants in Syria: US troop withdrawal. In exchange, Trump will get no more than vague pledges to curb human rights abuses in Syria as well as the Iranian presence. He may also get a nonbinding agreement to deescalate in Ukraine.
All parties will leave the summit satisfied; Trump will have his tweetable win, while Putin will solidify his status as kingmaker in Syria and Ukraine. This result will continue to erode US credibility on the Arab street. US popularity in the Arab world is at a nadir after “nation building” turned Iraq into a failed state, Assad’s chemical weapons use was met mostly with military silence, and Jerusalem was given to Israel on a platter. Betrayal in Syria will only further damage American interests in the region, which are already hanging by a thread.
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American independence compromised
All you need to know on July 4, 2018 about American independence is that a bipartisan report confirms Russian interference in the 2016 US election. The Senate Intelligence Committee has confirmed the January 2017 intelligence community assessment that
- Moscow in 2016 escalated its long-standing effort to undermine the US-led liberal democratic order;
- Putin ordered an influence campaign that sought to support Donald Trump and hurt Hillary Clinton;
- The campaign included cyber operations, in particular against the Democratic National Committee.
The Committee also suggested that assertions about Moscow-run propaganda in the assessment had not been appropriately updated from 2012 and that historical context on Russian efforts in the original intelligence assessment was thin, but that nevertheless the assessment was “sound.”
When this report was released, a 100% Republican (that’s unusual) Codel was in Moscow to meet with Foreign Minister Lavrov (President Putin let it be known he didn’t have time for them). Senator Shelby of Alabama told the Russians, without raising Russian interference in the election:
We don’t necessarily need to be adversaries.
True enough, in the abstract and at a friendly moment. But definitely not what you want to be saying on the day your colleagues in the Senate, on both sides of the aisle, have concluded that we are in fact adversaries, because Russia saw fit to attack the United States.
Of course they had their reasons. They didn’t like Hillary, whom Putin blamed for fueling anti-government demonstrations in 2011 and 12. Trump in 2016 hired a Russian agent as his campaign manager. His real estate empire depends heavily on Russian money. Several of his foreign policy advisers were close to the Russians, including son-in-law Jared Kushner and future, if briefly, National Security Adviser Michael Flynn.
Collusion is not really the issue. There is no need to collude if you and your staff agree with the Russians on most things. Shelby wasn’t colluding, he was just kowtowing. Trump doesn’t really care if Putin was trying to undermine the liberal democratic order, because he is against it too. You might expect however a bit of embarrassment when it turns out the Russians have hacked your opponents and supported your candidate’s election.
Not from Trump, who plans to meet one-on-one to start his summit with Putin July 16. This is a big and dangerous moment. Mike McFaul, President Obama’s ambassador to Moscow, reminded us yesterday:
In last 2 weeks Trump has invited Russia to join G7, denied Russian interference in 2016 election, hinted at recognizing Crimean annexation, pulling out of Syria & reducing US troops in Germany. In return for these monumental concessions Trump has asked Putin to do…?
#Artofdeal
Trump is already turning over southern Syria to the Russians and Iranians, who are cooperating with the Syrian army in driving hundreds of thousands of people to take shelter near the borders with Israel and Jordan, causing these two American allies real concern. He can’t invite the Russians to rejoin the G7 without the other members agreeing, but the Pentagon is already studying withdrawal of US troops from Europe, which Trump claims is worse than China when it comes to trade. Just smaller, he said, though Europe’s economy is bigger than China’s.
The worst would be recognizing the annexation of Crimea, which would set off a string of partitions worldwide and help Putin to justify his occupation of parts of Georgia and Moldova. Kurt Volker, my very capable former colleague at SAIS who is now the point man for the Administration on the Ukraine, quoted the White House spokesperson saying this yesterday:
“We do not recognize Russia’s attempt to annex Crimea… And our Crimea sanctions against Russia will remain in place until
returns the peninsula to
.”
That’s really good. Now all he has to do is to make it stick in Helsinki, where Trump will be freelancing and trying to impress his paymaster and comrade.
Sad to say, American independence on this July 4 is compromised, at the top.
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