Tag: Jordan
Stevenson’s army, April 5
– Something’s happening in Jordan. Not sure what.
– NYT rerports secret talks with Taliban.
– While Afghan president has own peace plan.
-CNN reports Russian buildup in Arctic.
– WaPo has different perspective on US economy
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Peace Picks | August 3 – 9, 2020
Notice: Due to recent public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live stream.
- Coronavirus and the Conflict in Syria | August 4, 2020 | 9:00 AM – 10:15 AM | US Institute of Peace | Register Here
Countries in conflict have been especially hard hit by COVID-19, with the pandemic compounding numerous pre-existing challenges. In Syria, limited humanitarian access, a devastated health care system, and unreliable data have hampered the response—particularly in areas outside of regime control, where autonomous authorities struggle with minimal testing capabilities and access to aid. As the virus begins to make significant inroads into the conflict-affected country, there are also worries about how the virus will impact the millions of Syrians currently displaced.
Speakers:
The Honorable Nancy Lindborg: introductory remarks
President and CEO, U.S. Institute of Peace
David Lillie: Executive Director, Syrian American Medical Society
Dr. Mohammad Al-Haj Hamdo: Health Coordinator in Northeast Syria, Syria Relief
Dr. Hamza Alsaied Hasan: Quality and Development Manager for Northwest Syria, Syrian American Medical Society
Dr. Amjad Rass: Chairman of the Northern Syria Medical Relief Committee, Syrian American Medical Society
Dr. Bachir Tajaldin: Senior Program Manager for Turkey, Syrian American Medical Society
Mona Yacoubian (moderator): Senior Advisor to the Vice President, Middle East and Africa, U.S. Institute of Peace
- Gender and Displacement in the Middle East during COVID-19 | August 4, 2020 | 10:00 AM | Middle East Institute | Register Here
As the global refugee crisis continues amid the spread of Covid-19 and economic collapse, displaced women face growing dangers in the Middle East. Women refugees and IDPs are at greater risk of domestic and gender-based violence, and many struggle with new roles as both primary income earners and sole caregivers of their children in unfamiliar environments. Additionally, sexist legal systems have become a push factor for women refugees, and insufficient legal protections exist for women refugees in many host countries.
How does the lens of gender help to understand the female migrant experience? How do changing social and economic roles impact the livelihoods and safety of displaced women? What policies and practices can be implemented to provide greater protection from violence and insecurity for women refugees?
Speakers:
Shaza Al Rihawi: Researcher, Leibniz Institute for Educational Trajectories; co-founder, Network for Refugee Voices
Miriam Azar: In-Country Representative for Lebanon and Turkey, The Malala Fund
Devon Cone: Senior advocate for women and girls, Refugees International
Dalal Yassine: Executive director, Middle East Voices
Hafsa Halawa (moderator): Nonresident scholar, MEI
- Jordan in 2020: Protests and Pandemic | August 5, 2020 | 10:00 AM | Middle East Institute | Register Here
The start of the new decade in Jordan has been marred by unrest. In January, thousands of Jordanians took to the streets to protest both President Trump’s Middle East peace plan and the gas deal signed between Israel and Jordan. This wave of dissent came on the heels of the 2019 protests against increased austerity measures, a follow up to the 2018 movement that saw the resignation of Hani Mulki’s government. Though Jordan quickly adopted stringent measures to combat the virus, the economy will suffer a huge blow, exacerbating Jordan’s existing development challenges and popular discontent. Furthermore, the pandemic prompted troubling restrictions on freedom of speech, with an April decree stating that sharing anything that may “cause panic” about the pandemic is punishable with up to three years in prison.
How have protest movements in Jordan been impacted by Covid-19, and what do recent protests over honor killings and gender based violence portend for progress in this area? How do these long standing grievances meet the current moment of the impending Israeli annexation? What will be the long term impact of the pandemic on Jordan’s economy and human rights, especially for the country’s millions of refugees?
Speakers:
Laith Al Ajlouni: Political economist
Rana Husseini: Journalist, author, and human rights activist
Sara Kayyali: Syria researcher, Middle East and North Africa Division, Human Rights Watch
Oraib Al-Rantawi (moderator): Founder and director general, Al Quds Center for Political Studies
- Why Did the United States Invade Iraq? A Conversation with Robert Draper | August 5, 2020 | 11:00 AM – 12:00 PM | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | Watch Here
The 2003 invasion of Iraq is one of the most debated, misunderstood, and consequential foreign policy episodes in modern U.S. history. In To Start a War, New York Times bestselling author Robert Draper offers the definitive account of the march to war in Iraq.
Join us for a conversation between Robert Draper and Ambassador William J. Burns, former U.S. deputy secretary of state, about the war, its consequences, and its lessons.
Speakers:
Robert Draper: contributing writer to the New York Times Magazine and National Geographic and a correspondent to GQ
William J. Burns: President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He previously served as U.S. deputy secretary of state.
- Pakistan’s National Security Outlook | August 5, 2020 | 10:30 AM – 11:30 AM | United States Institute of Peace| Register Here
Join USIP for a conversation with Dr. Moeed Yusuf, Special Assistant to Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan on national security and strategic policy planning and a member of Pakistan’s coronavirus response team. The discussion will look at what these developments mean for Pakistan’s national security outlook towards its neighbors and its relationship with the U.S., as well as how the pandemic impacts Pakistan’s security and economic policy.
Speakers:
The Honorable Nancy Lindborg, opening remarks: President and CEO, U.S. Institute of Peace
Dr. Moeed Yusuf: Special Assistant to the Prime Minister on National Security and Strategic Policy Planning, Pakistan
Former Associate Vice President, Asia Center, U.S. Institute of Peace
Amb. Richard Olson (moderator): Senior Advisor, U.S. Institute of Peace and former Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan
- After Qassem Suleimani: The Islamic Republic’s Strategy for the Arab World | August 6, 2020 | 10:00 AM | Middle East Institute | Register Here
The January assassination of Qassem Soleimani shocked the leadership in Tehran. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei had not expected the United States to escalate tensions between the two countries in such a manner. The assassination of Soleimani was an effort to change Tehran’s strategic calculations and policies for the Middle East. With continued sanctions imposed by the United States, regional tension, and the loss of a key decision maker, Iran is facing intensified challenges to achieve its goals at home and in the region. The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to welcome a group of experts to assess Iranian policy towards the Arab world following the death of Soleimani and to discuss how Arab states are reacting to Iran’s actions.
How has Iran’s strategy in the Arab world performed following Soleimani’s death? In what ways have proxy forces in the Middle East that operate under Tehran’s command been affected? Who is left to make key decisions about the Islamic Republic’s involvement in the Arab states, and are we faced with a weaker IRGC Quds force after Soleimani? Finally, what do Arabs think of Iranian policies aimed at them?
Speakers:
Tarek Osman: Author and broadcaster
Ariane Tabatabai: Middle East fellow, Alliance for Securing Democracy, German Marshall Fund of the United States
Morad Vaisibiame: Journalist and editor, Radio Farda, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
Alex Vatanka (Moderator): Director, Iran program and senior fellow, Frontier Europe Initiative, MEI
Stevenson’s army, March 4
-NYT says Iran has enough fuel for a bomb.
– Trump talks with a Taliban leader, while the US strikes at Taliban.
– David Ignatius warns of trouble in Jordan.
– EU supports Greek efforts to seal border.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Realism redefined
Different from previous plans, Trump’s Middle East Peace Plan addresses key issues like borders, Jerusalem, settlements, and refugees. Although the plan has enraged the Palestinians , it has received a much more favorable reception from many states than experts predicted, such as Europe and the Middle East. Without a Palestinian partner, is the plan destined, as its critics argue, to fail? Or will it, as its supporters claim, reshape the conflict in significant, beneficial, and lasting ways?
On February 11, the Hudson Institute hosted a panel discussion on the topic of “President Trump’s Plan for Peace in the Middle East.” The discussion featured two speakers: Michael Doran and Jon Lerner. Both serve as senior fellows at the Hudson Institute.
Previous plans vs Trump’s
Lerner and Doran noted that Trump’s plan addresses all final status topics in detail, including Jerusalem, settlement, borders, and right to return, while previous plans left out these issues. Lerner believes that Trump’s plan accepts the reality, contrary to previous plans that sought to change reality on the ground. This plan guarantees Israel’s control over a unified Jerusalem rather than dividing the city. Since it is impossible for Israelis to uproot settlements from the West Bank, Trump legalizes Israeli settlements. Although this plan is a setback for Palestinians, it creates an independent Palestinian state with a capital, grants economic support to Palestinians, allows Palestinians access to Israeli ports, and proposes a tunnel connecting the West Bank and Gaza.
Bilateral or trilateral?
Because most Arab states have more concerns other than than the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, they didn’t offer united supports to pressure Israel into concessions, Lerner says. Due to the lack of support, Palestine should consider engaging with the US and Israel. Lerner predicts that,
- If the Palestinian were to engage in negotiations but didn’t accept the plan, they would receive a receptive audience, which could force Israel to stop its annexation.
- If the Palestinians don’t engage in negotiations, which is likely, Israel will keep moving forward and weaken the Palestinians further.
Lerner thinks the Palestinian made a wrong choice to cut all dialogue with the US after Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in 2017. Instead, the Palestinians should have rejected Trump’s decision and worked with him on a plan until they achieved what they want. Lerner urges the Palestinian to engage in negotiations, or they will be more likely to lose ground.
US interests
Doran argues that the US has more issues in the region nowadays and needs to cooperate with its allies. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has weakened its Israeli ally, especially after Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza failed to bring stability. If the US forced Israel out of the West Bank and handed its control to Abbas, he would not have the capability to maintain control and fend off Hamas. Jordanian security could not be guaranteed either. Lerner added that the US avoided the unproductive perception of even-handedness with allies on one side, and sympathy towards Palestinians on the other. Trump’s plan is rooted in realism and the administration’s support for allies.
Lerner pointed out that irrespective of who wins the presidential election in November, the content of this plan has changed political dynamics in both Israel and the US. It will be hard for the Israeli government to accept a less generous plan than Trump’s in the future. It will also be difficult for future US administrations to propose any plan more like previous plans and less like Trump’s plan.
A bad barometer reading
On June 26 the Atlantic Council held a panel to discuss the release of opinion poll data collected by the Arab Barometer about the state of the economy, migration, governmental performance, corruption, and other topics in the Middle East. Survey data was collected in Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan. Presentation of data was followed by a panel discussion that included Mark Tessler, professor of political science at University of Michigan, Kathrin Thomas, Research Associate at the Arab Barometer, Abbas Khadim, director of the Iraq Initiative at the Atlantic Council, and Faysal Itani, Senior Fellow at Atlantic Council. Vivian Salam, reporter at the Wall Street Journal, moderated.
There is little optimism about the economy improving in the Levant. In Jordan, 70% of respondents cite the economy as a primary concern. In all three countries, (Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon) more than 85% percent of respondents perceived the governments of their respective states to be corrupt.
Survey data also noted a slight upwards trend in desire to emigrate from the Levant region. An uptick in a desire to emigrate can be explained by the “brain drain” phenomenon in which highly educated youths seek to leave their home countries due to lack of high-level employment opportunity. Respondents indicated that “economic reasons”, “political reasons” and “security reasons” were the primary drivers for the choice to emigrate.
The survey catalogued a slight increase in support for women’s rights and prominence in politics and business. 60% of respondents would support a female head of state, with Lebanon the most supportive of the notion at a rate of 77%. Despite this, 66% of respondents in the Levant said that men inherently make better political leaders than women.
Since 2016 there has been a decline in the belief that the Middle East and North Africa would benefit from stronger relations with the United States. Survey data revealed that people in the Levant widely believe that Iraq is a proxy of Iran, despite the fact that the Shia in Iraq have not sided with Iran.
Itani notes that the economic anxiety present in the region, specifically in Lebanon, is a reminder to Western policy makers that issues of chief importance to the West (Hezbollah, etc), do not necessarily take precedence in the region. The expectation of poor economic performance will have implications for future investment and growth. Itani attributes Lebanese decrease in willingness to strengthen ties with Washington to US policy in region, specifically US dealings with Israel and the change in American leadership in 2016.
Khadim spoke more specifically to the Iraqi data. Surveys confirm sentiments Iraqis usually express only through social media or encrypted messengers. There is a divergence of opinions held regarding the United States government and US citizens. Iraqis view American citizens more favorably than the American government, which Khadim says can open avenues in the realm of public diplomacy and good faith action between the two countries. On the Iraq-Iran relationship, he says GCC media have ascribed an affinity between Iraq and Iran that does not necessarily exist. Iran does have influence over certain discrete groups in Iraq, but that influence is not as widespread as many believe.
Tessler and Thomas, the administrators of the data collection, focused on the ways in which the data can be used to determine if there are links between different variables. Specifically, they expect a link between corruption perceptions and education levels as well as support of Iran depending on religion. While they had not yet conducted the analysis on these variables, they expect to confirm Khadim’s assertion that support for Iran in Iraq is contained to certain demographics and is not a widespread sentiment. Tessler further notes that the trend of declining support for strengthening relations with a United States dates to 2006.