Tag: Jordan
Cancer of the status quo
The Carnegie Endowment for Middle East Peace hosted two panels on Tuesday for the release of their new study Arab Horizons: Pitfalls and Pathways to Renewal. The report was the second major installment within the Arab Horizons project launched by Carnegie 3 years ago. William Burns, president of Carnegie, introduced the report and discussed the history of the Arab Horizons project, saying, “the object was straightforward, if ambitious: to look beyond the tumult around us, to the long-term trajectory of the region, its people and its place in the world. What we wanted to offer was an updated picture of the human and political landscapes of the region, building less on pronouncements and prescriptions from Washington, and more on the perspectives from Carnegie’s network across the Arab world.”
“The Arab regional order is collapsing: politically, economically, socially even. We don’t have answers to any of these questions, but… lets go back to first principles and try to provide a road map for leaders, policy makers, activists and citizens.”
– Perry Cammack
The first report, Arab Fractures, Burns described as an updated assessment of the Middle East, “by the region, for the region, for all those with a stake in its future.” The latest installment, Pitfalls and Pathways to Renewal, offered a set of principles and recommendations, “to address the stark diagnosis” in the first report.
Burns acknowledged Jamal Kashoggi as one of the project’s partners and addressed his abduction and murder as indicative of the lack of tolerance for “stubborn, independent journalists, unafraid to speak truth to power” within the current social contract of the Arab world. “It’s a region where authoritarians feel the wind in their sails, and it is a time where democracies around the world, including my own, are adrift and losing their way.” Burns lamented ailing institutions and the increasing politics of fear, but, “all of this reminds us of the urgent task of rewriting the social contract in the Arab world.” Social contract was the buzzword of the day throughout a discussion which was at turns hopeful for the talents of the Arab people and scathingly critical of the leadership from their governments.
The first discussion featured Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 2014-2018 and former Jordanian Ambassador to the US, and moderator Marwan Muasher, vice president for studies at Carnegie and former Jordanian foreign minister. Reminiscing with each another, Zeid laughed over past tensions between two career civil servants who shared a vision for the future of their country, but at times disagreed on how to get there. He shared with the crowd how after his retirement from the civil service he and Marwan sat down over ceviche in New York to chat, and Marwan took the opportunity to ask him, “How many of my instructions as foreign minister do you think you actually implemented as the ambassador?” “For you, my friend” Hussein replied, “maybe 70%.”
Hussein communicated through anecdotes, walking through pivotal moments and realizations in his career which shaped his outlook on the region and the world. Again and again his stories homed in on key policy grievances in the Middle East: lack of commitment to individual rights and free thought. This problem is symptomatic of an incomplete transition from tribal to modern states and a stubborn unwillingness by Arab politicians to call a spade a spade or confront their failures.
The second panel featured Marwan Muasher again, along with Perry Cammack, a fellow in the Middle East program at Carnegie, both contributors to the report, along with Rabah Azreki, chief economist for the Middle East and North African Region at the World Bank and Hala Aldosari, a researcher and scholar on human rights and women’s health at the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice. Elise Labott, CNN’s global affairs correspondent, moderated.
“The Arab world has two choices and two choices only: either the headache of change or the cancer of the status quo”
– Marwan Muasher
Discussion reverted repeatedly to stagnation and change, locked in conflict. The oil economy has long sustained rentier states, headed by leaders who resisted change as a matter of principal. As oil prices drop, the social bargains they supported are buckling, explaining the events Muasher described as the last kick of authoritarianism in the region. It all led neatly to one pressing need: to renew the social contract in the Arab world in a way that puts citizens first.
The West errs in seeing each new generation of the old guard as reformers. Symbolic gestures along the lines of Saudi Arabia allowing women the right to drive, even while imprisoning Saudi activists who advocated those reforms, are evidence of an empty promise designed to stall the will of the people, not further it. The idea that change in the Middle East needs to be led by authoritarian reformers is false. In fact the people have been leading.
As the discussion swayed between hope and fear for the near future of the Arab world, a central narrative emerged: the Arab world desperately needs change, the people know this, and yet as change hurtles towards them at frightening speed, the current political leaders cling desperately and futilely to the status quo. A diverse wealth of human capital promises to hold the keys to that change if their leaders will only invest in them and hand them the reins. What remains to be seen is if change will be given or taken.
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All eyes on Russia
On Friday, a large convoy of tanks and military vehicles flying Syrian and Russian flags arrived at the Nasib-Jaber crossing into Jordan, marking the return of regime control over Syria’s strategic southern border for the first time in five years. Hours later, Al Jazeera reported that opposition fighters agreed to a cease fire with Russian negotiators representing regime forces in Dera’a Province. The story is familiar. Rebel forces will give up their heavy weapons and civilians in Dera’a will return to living under Assad’s rule, while fighters who refuse to surrender are transported to the last remaining opposition strongholds: a small area of Idlib Province and a thin sliver of land east of the Golan Heights.
One key aspect, however, differentiates this cease fire from its predecessors in Homs, Aleppo, and Eastern Ghouta: Russian military police will administer the newly-recaptured areas in an attempt to encourage the 320,000 Syrians displaced by the offensive to return to their homes. While largely symbolic, continued Russian influence on the ground, even after fighting ceases, represents another step in Russia’s evolution from one of several powerful players to the key actor in the Syrian conflict. The message is clear: Moscow will control how this conflict ends. Past inaction indicates that the US cannot do anything about it.
This development is particularly troubling at a time when US president Trump is angling to score a big win with President Putin at their summit in Helsinki on July 16, with Ukraine and Syria at the top of the agenda. In an April 9 interview with the Washington Post, King Abdullah II of Jordan argued that isolating the two conflicts would not lead to any significant progress on either issue. Instead, he said, the US must deal with the Russians on Syria and Ukraine simultaneously and “horse-trade.”
The problem is that Trump does not have a horse to trade in either case, making prospects for Russian deescalation in Syria or Ukraine unlikely. On the Syrian front, Trump has already made his intentions clear. He wants to remove the 2,000 US special forces headquartered in At-Tanf as soon as possible. Withdrawal would open the door for Assad to take back eastern Syria, as the US represents the driving force behind the fragile alliance that holds the area.
Trump has already shown his cards. His attitude during the southern Syria offensive demonstrates that Trump will not stand in Putin’s way if push comes to shove in eastern Syria. Further, Trump’s behavior at the G7 summit, where he argued that Crimea rightfully belongs to Russia and argued for Putin to be allowed back into the group, indicates that US sanctions imposed against Russia in retaliation for the invasion of Ukraine could be up for negotiation, for little to nothing in return.
Trump has weakened his position in recent months at a time when Putin has significantly strengthened his. This means that the US delegation will go into Helsinki with barely any of what Trump, of all people, should know is necessary: leverage. Putin will likely get what he wants in Syria: US troop withdrawal. In exchange, Trump will get no more than vague pledges to curb human rights abuses in Syria as well as the Iranian presence. He may also get a nonbinding agreement to deescalate in Ukraine.
All parties will leave the summit satisfied; Trump will have his tweetable win, while Putin will solidify his status as kingmaker in Syria and Ukraine. This result will continue to erode US credibility on the Arab street. US popularity in the Arab world is at a nadir after “nation building” turned Iraq into a failed state, Assad’s chemical weapons use was met mostly with military silence, and Jerusalem was given to Israel on a platter. Betrayal in Syria will only further damage American interests in the region, which are already hanging by a thread.
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American independence compromised
All you need to know on July 4, 2018 about American independence is that a bipartisan report confirms Russian interference in the 2016 US election. The Senate Intelligence Committee has confirmed the January 2017 intelligence community assessment that
- Moscow in 2016 escalated its long-standing effort to undermine the US-led liberal democratic order;
- Putin ordered an influence campaign that sought to support Donald Trump and hurt Hillary Clinton;
- The campaign included cyber operations, in particular against the Democratic National Committee.
The Committee also suggested that assertions about Moscow-run propaganda in the assessment had not been appropriately updated from 2012 and that historical context on Russian efforts in the original intelligence assessment was thin, but that nevertheless the assessment was “sound.”
When this report was released, a 100% Republican (that’s unusual) Codel was in Moscow to meet with Foreign Minister Lavrov (President Putin let it be known he didn’t have time for them). Senator Shelby of Alabama told the Russians, without raising Russian interference in the election:
We don’t necessarily need to be adversaries.
True enough, in the abstract and at a friendly moment. But definitely not what you want to be saying on the day your colleagues in the Senate, on both sides of the aisle, have concluded that we are in fact adversaries, because Russia saw fit to attack the United States.
Of course they had their reasons. They didn’t like Hillary, whom Putin blamed for fueling anti-government demonstrations in 2011 and 12. Trump in 2016 hired a Russian agent as his campaign manager. His real estate empire depends heavily on Russian money. Several of his foreign policy advisers were close to the Russians, including son-in-law Jared Kushner and future, if briefly, National Security Adviser Michael Flynn.
Collusion is not really the issue. There is no need to collude if you and your staff agree with the Russians on most things. Shelby wasn’t colluding, he was just kowtowing. Trump doesn’t really care if Putin was trying to undermine the liberal democratic order, because he is against it too. You might expect however a bit of embarrassment when it turns out the Russians have hacked your opponents and supported your candidate’s election.
Not from Trump, who plans to meet one-on-one to start his summit with Putin July 16. This is a big and dangerous moment. Mike McFaul, President Obama’s ambassador to Moscow, reminded us yesterday:
In last 2 weeks Trump has invited Russia to join G7, denied Russian interference in 2016 election, hinted at recognizing Crimean annexation, pulling out of Syria & reducing US troops in Germany. In return for these monumental concessions Trump has asked Putin to do…?
#Artofdeal
Trump is already turning over southern Syria to the Russians and Iranians, who are cooperating with the Syrian army in driving hundreds of thousands of people to take shelter near the borders with Israel and Jordan, causing these two American allies real concern. He can’t invite the Russians to rejoin the G7 without the other members agreeing, but the Pentagon is already studying withdrawal of US troops from Europe, which Trump claims is worse than China when it comes to trade. Just smaller, he said, though Europe’s economy is bigger than China’s.
The worst would be recognizing the annexation of Crimea, which would set off a string of partitions worldwide and help Putin to justify his occupation of parts of Georgia and Moldova. Kurt Volker, my very capable former colleague at SAIS who is now the point man for the Administration on the Ukraine, quoted the White House spokesperson saying this yesterday:
“We do not recognize Russia’s attempt to annex Crimea… And our Crimea sanctions against Russia will remain in place until
returns the peninsula to
.”
That’s really good. Now all he has to do is to make it stick in Helsinki, where Trump will be freelancing and trying to impress his paymaster and comrade.
Sad to say, American independence on this July 4 is compromised, at the top.
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Israel’s “center”
On Monday, the Brookings Institution hosted M.K. Yair Lapid, founder of the centrist Yesh Atid party, the largest opposition party in the Knesset. Lapid shared his views about current Israeli domestic and foreign policy, including its relationship with the US, as well as his vision for the country’s future. John R. Allen, president of the Brookings Institution, gave introductory remarks, and Tamara Coffman Wittes, senior foreign policy fellow at Brookings Center for Middle East Policy, moderated the discussion. Below, I discuss key takeaways from Lapid‘s remarks.
Foreign Policy Flashpoints
At a time when regional conflict threatens Israel’s relative stability, Lapid described how his country and the international community should approach Israel’s main foreign policy challenges to ensure future Israeli security. On the Palestinian front, Lapid stressed the importance of breaking the silence that has stalled negotiations on a two state solution since the Trump embassy move. A return to dialogue represents the only road to peace. A Palestinian Jerusalem, however, is off the table. Lapid stated that “Jerusalem is a capital; if someone came to DC and asked [the US] to share it with Mexico, they would refuse.” Lapid also criticized UNRWA, arguing that having a refugee agency solely for Palestinians allows Arab countries to maintain a false moral high ground in the conflict.
Lapid blamed Hamas for the recent killing of hundreds of protestors in Gaza by Israeli snipers, saying that the violent protests threatened national security. Although it is not at fault for the violence, Israel must work quickly to solve the humanitarian crisis; after all, Gazan sewage contaminates Israeli water. However, any Israeli efforts to solve the crisis must be predicated by Hamas’ fall from power, clearing the way for humanitarian aid to reach Gazan hands without funding terrorist activities.
Lapid also used national security to defend his country’s controversial position in the Golan Heights. In addition to their strategic importance in fending off the rising Iranian and Hizbollah threat, giving the Golan Heights back to Assad is simply not an option, as it would put 22,000 Jewish lives at risk. Similarly, opening the northeastern border to Syrian Arab refugees also represents an unacceptable security risk. Instead, Lapid called on the US to recognize Israeli sovereignty over the Heights, arguing that this move would allow the US to send the message that it does not tolerate Assad’s human rights abuses.
Israeli-US Relations: Troubling Times Ahead?
While Lapid lauded the Trump administration’s goodwill towards Israel, he expressed concern that positive relations on the executive level are papering over fissures that will emerge after Trump leaves office. Chief among these is American Jewry’s increasing disinterest in Israel. Orthodox Jews in Israel have criticized American Reform Jews too much, causing them to feel alienated. Increasing anti-Israel discourse on US college campuses has prevailed over American Jews’ ties to their ancestral homeland. Lapid also linked heightened partisanship under Trump to the erosion of the bipartisan support Israel has enjoyed in the past. As a consequence, bilateral relations could deteriorate during the next democratic administration, leaving Israel more exposed than ever to national security threats from within the Arab world.
Careful Optimism: A Winning Call?
As he discussed his chances for beating Netanyahu in the next parliamentary elections, Lapid emphasized that Israelis are more hesitant about large political shifts than US voters. For that reason, Lapid argued that emphasizing satisfaction with the status quo while calling for gradual crackdowns on corruption and moving towards a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict will be a winning call in 2019. In addition, Lapid advocated for a move away from using empty rhetoric to avoid confronting issues head-on, saying that “we need a government that actually does stuff, not [one] that just eloquently describes the problem.” While his strategy of emphasizing continuation and subtle changes might mean that Yesh Atid does not differentiate itself enough from Likud enough to win in 2019, Lapid hopes that centrist success in Germany and France might bode well for Israel.
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The Levant: from bad to worse
The Wilson Center hosted a panel yesterday entitled “The Middle East: A Region in Chaos?” to discuss the current situation in the Middle East and the U.S. government’s reaction to this situation. Jane Harman, Director, President, and CEO of the Wilson Center, introduced the speakers before the moderator, Michael Yaffe, Vice President, Middle East and Africa at the U.S. Institute of Peace, provided a brief summary of the many developments in the region in 2018. The panel included:
Robin Wright – USIP-Wilson Center Distinguished Fellow
Bruce Riedel – Senior Fellow and Director, Brookings Intelligence Project, Brookings Institution
Mona Yacoubian – Senior Advisor, Syria, Middle East and North Africa, U.S. Institute of Peace
Aaron David Miller – Vice President for New Initiatives and Middle East Program Director, Wilson Center.
This post will focus on the panel’s analysis of recent developments in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and the Syrian Conflict. A previous post focused on the Iran/Saudi Arabia dimension.
As the conversation shifted to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Miller painted a bleak picture of future prospects for a two-state solution. At a time when Syria, Iraq, and Egypt – traditional, vocal allies of the Palestinian cause – are projecting less power across the region because of unrest at home, the US-Israel relationship has reached unprecedented strength. This realignment is a central premise of Jared Kushner’s peace plan strategy. Kushner hopes that aligning fully with Israel on previous roadblocks, such as the governance of Jerusalem, will take these issues off the table while heaping pressure on Netanyahu to accept concessions made to the Palestinians. At the same time, Palestinian demoralization with the current state of affairs will push them back to the negotiating table if any unexpected compromises are made. Miller argued that Kushner’s moves will have the opposite effect; Palestinian trust in America to be an honest broker has evaporated over the last six months, leaving them less inclined than ever even to engage with the United States to find a viable two-state solution.
Miller and Yacoubian also highlighted the diminishing US leadership as power vacuums emerge across the region due to the dysfunction of many Arab states. As Trump continues the Obama administration’s hands-off approach to the region, these voids are being filled by Russia, Turkey, Israel, and non-state actors. US aversion to conflict has also allowed Iran to dramatically increase its influence in Syria, leading to direct military engagement between Israel and the Islamic Republic. Yacoubian argued that a possible Israeli airstrike on Iranian positions close to the Syria-Iraq border could mean that more escalation is on the horizon. Paradoxically, continued hostilities could drag the United States into a proxy war between Israel and Iran fought in Syria and Iraq.
On the southern front, the Syrian Arab Army’s ongoing siege of Dera’a and Al-Quneitra provinces could force even more refugees to flee to Jordan. The Hashemite Kingdom is already reeling from the political blowback to tax hikes designed to combat the country’s ailing economy, and another refugee influx would further inflame internal tensions. Yacoubian argued that recent US inaction in Syria suggests that the State Department’s promise for “firm and appropriate measures” in response to cease fire violations in Southern Syria is also bluster, so Jordan is on its own. Yacoubian also revealed that efforts to convince the Kurds to leave Manbij and move east of the Euphrates in northern Syria could easily derail, leading to more violence, while Trump’s desire to quickly withdraw US. troops could leave a power vacuum that ISIS would exploit.
The Bottom Lines: The political situation in the Levant has gone from bad to worse over the last six months. Increased US support of Israel at the expense of Palestinian goodwill appears to have driven them away from the negotiating table completely, at least for now. In Syria, immediate US withdrawal will only lead to further destabilization. While the train has left the station for Trump to intervene in the south to limit further economic and political strain on Jordan, maintaining a presence in the east could prevent a resurgence of ISIS in this sparsely populated, US-controlled region.
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Syria strategy
Secretary of State Tillerson today in a speech at the Hoover Institution outlined US goals in Syria. Tobias Schneider summarized them succinctly on Twitter:
- Enduring defeat of ISIS & AQ in Syria
- Political resolution to Syria conflict (w/o Assad)
- Diminishing Iranian influence
- Create conditions for safe refugee return
- Syria free from WMD
Those sound in principle desirable to me, though they leave out an important one: preventing instability in Syria’s neighbors, including Iraq, Turkey, Lebanon, Israel and Jordan (all more or less US friends if not allies).
The problem lies one step further on in defining a strategy: the ways and means. Tobias and others on Twitter see this set of goals as a license for an unending US commitment to remain in Syria and to “stabilize” it. Hidden under that rock, which Tillerson was careful to say was not a synonym for nationbuilding, lies a commitment to guess what? Nationbuilding.
But let’s deal first with the the ways and means issue. As I see it, this is all we’ve got going for us in Syria:
- US military presence and capability, including control through proxies of major oil-producing wells and maybe a proxy presence along the borders with Israel and Jordan.
- A UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution (2254) that outlines a political process to prepare a constitution, hold elections, and begin a transition to a democratic system.
- The US veto in the UNSC over any successor resolution that approves and advances the political process.
- US aid to parts of Syria outside Assad’s control, US clout in the IMF and World Bank, and influence over European and Gulf aid.
Is this enough to deliver the five goals? I doubt it. Take just refugee return: it requires that people not be forced back but that they return of their own volition. The trickle (50,000 Tillerson said) who have returned in the last year are truly a drop in the bucket. Most refugees (upwards of 5.5 million if I remember correctly) won’t return until Assad and his security forces are gone, or at least blocked from acting in parts of Syria. Likewise the political resolution, diminishing Iranian influence, and getting rid of WMD also depend on getting rid of Assad, which is a necessary but not sufficient condition.
Even the enduring defeat of ISIS and Al Qaeda likely require Assad to be pushed aside, as he has consistently used his forces preferentially against the moderate opposition rather than the extremists, with whom his regime had an excellent cooperative relationship when US forces were in Iraq from 2003 to 2011. Assad will want to keep some of them around even now, as they help to justify his brutal repression of the Syrian population.
But getting rid of Assad means, let’s face it, rebuilding the Syrian state, which is unlikely to survive in a form able to deliver on the above goals once he is gone. He has made sure of that by waging war against his own population for six long years.
Remember too: he has Russian and Iranian backing to remain in power.
Without better means, it looks to me as if the US is in Syria for a long time and will ultimately fail. That’s not an attractive proposition. The question is whether it would be better to leave now, or soon. Do we have to stay to do nationbuilding? How can it be done best? How long will it take? How much will it cost? More on that in a future post.
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