Tag: Jordan
Coexistence on the border of war
My colleagues at the International Repubican Institutehad me do a facilitation training workshop in December with some of their staff and collaborators, focused on growing frictions between Syrian refugees and their Jordanian hosts. This brief description of the workshop on “Promoting Coexistence Between Syrian Refugees and Jordanians” was published originally on the IRI website.
With more than 630,000 registered Syrian refugees out of a population of 6.5 million, Jordan faces inevitable tensions between its own citizens and the people it has sheltered from the civil war tearing apart its northern neighbor.
Most of the Syrian refugees live in cities near the border, not in camps. Populations of Jordanian towns have doubled and even tripled. Syrians and Jordanians compete for housing, jobs, water, electricity, waste disposal, health and education in a country whose economic performance has been middling at best. Local governments and the services they provide are overwhelmed. For the Syrians, a seemingly temporary emergency is turning into a long-term nightmare.
Jordanians and IRI staff concerned about this situation and its longer term risks met recently in Amman to consider possible solutions. Their energetic brainstorming session identified six goals that, if realized, would significantly reduce the risks involved and promote coexistence between Syrian refugees and Jordanians:
- Improve community-level conflict management
- Build local governance capacity
- Increase awareness of legal rights and responsibilities
- Promote social and economic integration
- Expand economic opportunity
- Enlarge donor assistance and make it more effective
Little is being done along these lines yet. Few Jordanians and Syrians are prepared to manage local conflicts. Local governments have limited resources and little interest in meeting the needs of Syrians, who Jordanians sometimes view as privileged by international donors. Rights are ignored and responsibilities neglected. The Syrian and Jordanian communities are largely segregated from each other and enjoy little communication or mutual exchange. Economic opportunities are limited for both communities in a country that has a high fixed exchange rate with the dollar and little appetite for economic reform. Donors are neither transparent nor accountable from the local community perspective.
A far more intense focus on these issues is required. Training in conflict management of key people in both communities, perhaps to work in tandem, would provide a quick response capability as well as a longer-term capacity to reduce tensions. Overwhelmed local governments need help, including from local civil society organizations, in analyzing and responding to needs. More integration in win/win economic enterprises and social services would reduce tensions. Donor transparency and accountability would give both Jordanians and Syrians confidence that they are being treated fairly.
This dialogue among Jordanians was just the start of a much broader process of consultation. Syrian refugees should meet to brainstorm their own goals, which are likely to be different from those the Jordanians outlined. Then they will together need to look for ways in which both groups can cooperate to turn their difficult challenges into opportunities. Syrians may be in Jordan for a long time, like the Palestinians and Iraqis who preceded them. Both countries can ultimately gain from the talents and enterprise Syrians have to offer.
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Glad to be left out of a dubious category
I’m in Amman, talking to people about southern Syria. This is a counterpart to my visit to Gaziantep, near the Turkish border with Syria, in October to talk with people about the north, which is now suffering serious turmoil.
There are essentially three geographic components to southern Syria at the moment. Daraa and Quneitra governorates, Suweida to the east and Rif Damascus to the north. Daraa and Quneitra are largely under opposition control, though the Islamic State and Jabhat al Nusra sometimes fight with each other and with Free Syrian Army (FSA) brigades in Quneitra. Suweida, which is mostly Druze, is under regime control but tries to remain out of the fray. Important parts of Rif Damascus to the south and east of Damacus are opposition controlled but under siege by pro-regime forces, including Iranians and Hazara Afghan immigrants to Iran.
Daraa, in contrast to the north, is enjoying a period of relative stability. Sixty-five per cent is said to be under control of units (originally 56 of them!) that claim FSA association under the rubric of the Southern Front, which claims 35,000 fighters. “Control” is a relative term. The chief justice of the opposition-affiliated Deraa court was assassinated Tuesday. It wasn’t the first assassination in Daraa. There is some presence of regime forces in the center of Daraa and along the main north/south road. There is lots of bang bang, but they are not pressing hard to gain territory. Russian air attacks, though greatly feared, are relatively few. The population mostly belongs to the Hoorani tribe, making infiltration harder than in less homogeneous and more urbanized areas. Free Syrian Army supporters in Amman are holding back on any offensives, in particular against the regime stronghold in the center of Daraa town. Some think this is in exchange for a limit on Russian air strikes, which the Jordanians in particular want to avoid because they would chase more refugees across the border. The Coalition Military Operations Center in Amman holds a good deal of sway over the Southern Front, as it provides money and vital supplies.
The big problem for the Syrian opposition in the south continues to be barrel bombs, which still rain down on civilians despite Russian and Syrian denials. No ceasefire in the south can take hold as long as the FSA sees this happening.
Governance in Daraa is a hit and miss affair. The opposition provincial council recently redrew districts to include areas under regime control, but only one of six districts has managed to hold an election. The other members are chosen in indirect elections by more local councils, if I understood correctly. Civil defense is sometimes well-organized and schools are open in many areas, despite sometimes being targetted. Water and electricity are scarce. Police are virtually non-existent. The local councils are however important in delivery of humanitarian supplies, which flow amply across the border from Jordan. Some local people are returning from Jordan to Daraa, but that may be more a signal of the economic difficulties they face in Jordan rather than improved conditions in Syria.
The Israeli and Jordanian borders in the south are tightly monitored. The Jordanians have closed the more accessible border crossing points to refugees, though they remain open to FSA fighters. Twelve thousand refugees have accumulated in a no man’s land at a less accessible border crossing point. The Israelis are said to provide medical treatment to all comers at their border, regardless of affiliation. Some think this a successful “soft power” ploy; others think it is an intelligence gathering operation. It could be both. The procedures for delivering patients, sometimes with notes from Syrian doctors pinned to their clothes to indicate what treatments have already been attempted, are tight and conducted under sniper supervision only at night.
Farther north in Rif Damascus, the situation in East Ghouta remains miserable. Jaish al Islam is dominant among the opposition forces there, though Jabhat al Nusra is also present. Both are fighting the Islamic State. Local councils are present in more peaceful areas but fighters dominate closer to the front lines. Courts apply Sharia, as does the court in Deraa, but the worst “hudud” physical punishments are not utilized.
Jaish al Islam was represented at last week’s Riyadh meeting of the Syrian opposition, along with Ahrar al Sham and other Islamist groups. There is a palpable shift in sentiment in the opposition, including the Islamist groups, towards negotiation with the regime, even if they all continue to insist that Bashar al Assad must go. None think the fighting will stop if he doesn’t. Ahrar al Sham, loathed by some because it includes Jabhat al Nusra (Al Qaeda) participation, is seen by others as turning in a more civilized and perhaps even democratic direction. Some say it does not to commit massacres, unlike the Islamic State.
The Syrian army has been decimated by more than four years of war. It is said to be down to 100,000 from a troop strength of 320,000, though some believe its morale has risen significantly with the Russian air strikes. Hizbollah is now leading the fight against the opposition in many areas. Iran, the opposition believes, gives the orders. Bashar al Assad has been reduced to talking about regime control of “useful Syria,” by which he means Damascus, north to Homs and Hama, and west to Latakia and Tartus, more or less. The south is glad to be left out of that dubious category.
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Tatters
American policy in Syria has supported the “moderate” opposition and sought the removal of Bashar al Assad. Four and a half years into the rebellion there, extremists have largely sidelined the moderate opposition in the center of the country. Russia and Iran are doubling down on their support for Bashar al Assad, who is well on towards fulfilling his prophecy “either me or the jihadis.”
Washington has also wanted to protect Syria’s neighbors from its civil war. Efforts to contain the war’s effects have been no more successful than the efforts to win it. With more than 4 million refugees unsettling Syria’s neighbors and 7 million displaced inside the country, it will take decades to restore the region to some semblance of order. The Islamic State has taken over one third of Iraq. The war has embroiled Turkey in renewed conflict with its own Kurds. Lebanon and Jordan hang by threads to a semblance of order. Israel faces extremists just a few miles from the Syrian territory it occupies on the Golan Heights.
Attention in the press is focused on the Pentagon’s failed efforts over the past year to train and equip viable “moderate” forces to fight against the Islamic State in Syria. Few Syrians sign up. They prefer to fight Assad. The vetting process is long and arduous. Of the few who have gone back to Syria, most have ended up dead, captured or intimidated into turning over equipment and weapons to extremists. The rebalancing of the military equation that John Kerry had rightly recognized as necessary to altering the outcome in a direction the US would find agreeable is simply not occurring.
Enter the Russians. Moscow’s deployment of fighting forces, including attack aircraft, to Latakia would not be necessary if the Assad regime were doing well. Moscow’s immediate military goal is to block the advance of opposition forces towards western Syria, where both the heartland of the Alawite population and Russia’s naval base lie. Its bigger purpose is to protect the regime and foil America’s intention of replacing it with something resembling a democracy. Moscow won’t distinguish in its targets between extremists and moderates but will seek to rebalance the military equation in a direction opposite to what Kerry had in mind.
The advancing opposition forces in the center of the country are mostly Sunni extremists, not moderates. Extremists have agreed to a population exchange with Hizbollah that will clear Sunnis from near the strategically important border with Lebanon and Shia from extremist-held areas farther north. Population exchange aids cantonalization: Syria will soon be a patchwork of areas of control: the regime in Damascus and the west, Kurds along much of the northern border with Turkey, relatively moderate opposition in the south and some Damascus suburbs, assorted Islamist extremists in the center and the Islamic State in the center east. Enclaves will be overrun or traded. Confrontation lines will congeal. Stalemate will ensue.
None of this is good news for either Syrians or Americans. But it is not the worst news.
The viability of the patches will depend on two factors: the strength of the military forces that control them and how effectively they are governed. The regime has been protecting and governing the areas it controls well enough that they have attracted a significant inflow of people, including many whose sympathies are with the opposition. The Islamic State governs brutally in the territory it controls, but has lost some in the north to Kurdish forces, who have set up representative governing structures that include Arabs and appear to be functioning relatively well, their lives made easier by the de facto truce between the Kurds and the Assad regime.
The relative moderates have arguably been less effective than the regime, the Islamic State and the Kurds in governing the areas they control. This is important. The war can be lost on the battlefield. But it has to be won in city hall. The local councils that have formed more or less spontaneously in many “liberated” areas are not doing well. Strapped for cash and untended by the opposition Syrian Interim Government, in many areas they are unable to deliver much except political squabbling among themselves. While unquestionably better than nothing, they lack both legitimacy and technical capabilities as well as connections to a broader political framework. Western aid to local councils has sometimes done more harm than good.
The US military effort in Syria is visibly in tatters. But it won’t matter much if the less visible civilian effort conducted in areas controlled by relative moderates doesn’t improve dramatically.
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Refugees are not the problem
The flow of refugees into Europe from the Middle East and North Africa is now attracting widespread attention. The 71 Syrians who suffocated last week in a truck in Austria, and the three-year-old who drowned in the Mediterranean, have done what close to 250,000 dying in Syria over the past 3.5 years (that’s an average of about 200 per day) could not: they have mobilized public opinion. Germany and Sweden are rightly praised for opening their doors. Hungary is trying to seal itself off. The Americans may take more than the trickle of refugees they have accepted so far, but still an insignificant number. The UN is appealing for funds, which have been sorely lacking. More than $8.4 billion is needed.
But refugees are not the root of the problem. Nor are the ones who arrive in Europe and the US the Syrians most in need or most at risk. They are the symptom–a relatively small and distant one–of a much larger and more challenging problem: the multi-sided conflict in Syria, to which we’ve become unfortunately inured. Four million people have managed to escape Syria, mostly fleeing to neighboring countries. They are the relatively fortunate ones, when not jammed into a truck in Austria or drowning in the Med. Seven million have been displaced inside Syria, where relief is much harder to find.
Of course problems are much more visible when up close and personal. But we need to keep the focus on the disease, not only the spreading ripple of symptoms.
The disease has its origins in the Syrian dictatorship’s response to peaceful pro-democracy protests. Determined to stay in power, it cracked down violently, concentrating its efforts against relative moderates and the majority Sunni community, both of which were a real threat to Bashar al Assad’s hold on power. The natural result was the growth of Sunni extremism, which has helped Bashar demonstrate that the only alternative to his rule is Al Qaeda and the Islamic State. To this day, his forces continue to focus disproportionately not on jihadi terrorism but rather on those who say they want a secular, democratic state.
There is no way to run this history backwards. The extremists will not disappear if Assad falls. It is highly unlikely that relative moderates would replace him. The best we can hope for now is to create some relatively safe places inside Syria where moderates can govern, providing protection for civilians and beginning to service their needs so that they don’t flee.
The northern area that the Americans and Turks are contemplating for this purpose is hardly ideal. Large parts of it are barren rural areas over which control will be hard to establish. Turkomans populate much of the border area with Turkey, along with Kurds against whom the Turks have been fighting. The Kurds already control much of the rest of the border, where the key to making things safer for civilians will be cooperation between them and the Arabs who live both among them and farther south.
The area along the Jordanian/Syrian border in the south is another possible protected zone, one dominated by relatively moderate Sunni insurgents, including some with US training, and the non-Muslim, Arab Druze. The Druze have tried to hold their fire and avoid close alignment with either the regime or the insurgents. Self-preservation is their priority. Bringing them into closer alignment with the insurgents would require giving them the confidence that they will be protected from the vindictive reaction of the regime.
Protected areas north and south would not solve Syria’s problems, but with Coalition (read US plus at least some European and Gulf) support, they might begin to stem the tide. If nothing is done to enable Syrians to remain in their country, it is a virtual certainty that next year’s outflow will be much greater than this year’s, with economic and political consequences for both the neighboring countries and Europe that will dwarf what we are seeing today. But the refugees will still not be the root of the problem.
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Limits of US-Turkey cooperation in Syria
On Thursday, the SETA Foundation hosted a talk entitled The U.S.-Turkey “Safe Zone” Agreement: What does it mean?. Panelists included: Sabiha Senyucel, research director of the Center for Public Policy and Democracy Studies (PODEM), Mark Perry, independent author, Melissa Dalton, fellow and chief of staff at the CSIS International Security Program, and Kadir Ustun, Executive Director of the SETA Foundation. Kilic B. Kanat, research director of the SETA Foundation, moderated. The panelists believe that the recent US-Turkey cooperation in Syria will remain limited because Turkey and the US continue to have divergent interests.
Senyucel said that the recent bombing in Southeast Turkey pushed Turkey to take a more active role in the anti-ISIS coalition. Now the coalition can use İncirlik for bombings. The Kurdish issue is no longer just a domestic Turkish issue. The Turkey-PKK peace process is finished for now, but Senyucel hopes it can restart soon. The roles of the PKK, the PYD and the Syrian Kurdish entity are all linked. YPG fighters fought ISIS in Kobane, giving the Kurds international legitimacy. This changed the Kurds’ thinking about what they could achieve regionally.
After Kobane, the YPG and PKK demonstrated that they could fight ISIS on the ground and US airstrikes helped them take Tel Abyad. This concerned Turkey, which has good reason to distrust the PYD because of its links to the PKK. After the Gezi Park protests, the PKK stopped honoring its commitments and asserted de facto control over some parts of Eastern Turkey. There may have been mistakes from the Turkish side, but the Turkish government also displayed restraint. The PKK’s mid-July announcement that they were returning to arms was unjustified. Turkey is now reminding the PKK that they won’t achieve their ambitions. The US has agreed to support Turkey in this, but Senyucel isn’t sure how long this will last.
Kadir asserted that the US and Turkey can’t agree on the big picture in Syria. Obama believes the US only has limited interests; he isn’t trying to fix Syria. The PYD is a local actor that can contribute to the US’s non-strategy strategy. Turkey has tried to protect its border, host refugees, prevent the spillover of the conflict and resolve the Kurdish question. Necessity has limited Turkish actions. Turkey can’t ally with the PKK-linked PYD; the PKK has asserted de facto control over some towns in eastern Turkey and hasn’t fully committed to withdrawing guerrillas.
Turkey will allow the US to use İncirlik and will work to create a safe zone in Syria for the moderate opposition. Ankara wants a broader strategy from the US, but the US is uninterested. Will planes taking off from İncirlik help the PYD? The PYD has been reluctant to distance itself from the PKK and stop expelling Arabs from its territory. The PYD also allows Assad’s air force to overfly the territories it controls. If these things continue, the US and Turkey won’t come to a real agreement, but both sides need a broader strategy to make lasting progress.
Dalton agreed that the US and Turkey have divergent objectives. The Turks have called the recent agreement a safe zone, but the US has avoided this term. The agreement will involve enhanced border cooperation. The length of this cooperation area will be ~65 miles, but other elements are unknown:
- How deep into Syria will it go?
- Will Assad’s air force be excluded?
- Will there be cover for civilians in nearby cities outside the zone?
Broader US-Turkey cooperation will be needed for a long-term solution, but the anti-ISIS fight and border cooperation are likely to be the focus for now.
Perry highlighted the fact that there is unlikely to be any well-articulated US strategy from this administration, but there are three observable US policy principles:
- We maintain relations with allied regional states despite difficulties.
- Our enemy is Islamic extremism.
- There is no appetite for strong anti-Assad action.
We want Assad to lose, but don’t want his opponents to win. This is a tough line to walk with Turkey. The use of İncirlik will allow the US to gather better drone intelligence. Assad is unlikely to launch air operations in the area of the proposed safe zone because Assad doesn’t want to tangle with the US Air Force. The Obama administration’s vagueness may not be bad. The US has made many foreign policy mistakes; doing nothing is a viable option since Syria is so complex. We can protect our friends, maintain our strength, assist the victims, and remain friendly with Erdogan, without further intervention.
Barbara Slavin, nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council South Asia Center, asked about the US train and equip program. Many of the 54 rebels that we have trained have reportedly been captured by Jabhat Al-Nusra. Slavin asked whether the possible safe zone could be an injection point for these rebels. Dalton stated that it could be used for this purpose, because there is currently no other logical injection point. However, questions about how and at what cost the US and Turkey plan to protect such a zone remain. Kadir took a similar position, noting the slowness of the program. Perry discounted the program entirely, noting that the last successful US train and equip program was in the Philippines in 1899. The US is keeping the fiction of train and equip so that we can keep our hand in the game in Syria.
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A nervous region wary of the nuclear deal
On Wednesday, the Conflict Management Program at SAIS and MEI hosted a talk entitled After the Deal: A Veteran Journalist’s View from Tehran. Speakers included Roy Gutman, McClatchy Middle East bureau chief, and Joyce Karam, Washington bureau chief for Al-Hayat. Daniel Serwer of both SAIS and MEI moderated. Both speakers emphasized the dynamics that caused regional players to be wary of Iran.
Early last Spring, Gutman traveled to Israel, Jordan, Egypt and Turkey.
In Israel, he observed that the major national security concern wasn’t the Iranian nuclear program, but rather Iran’s conventional threat through the buildup of Hezbollah forces. Israelis were disappointed that the US was leaving a security vacuum in Syria for Iran to fill. The Israeli position on the Iran deal is difficult to understand; Israeli politicians oppose it, but Israel’s foreign policy elite considers Iranian conventional forces a larger threat.
Jordanian officials also worried about regional chaos and Iranian influence. They were baffled by the half-hearted US response to Assad, as well as its airstrike-only response to ISIS.
Egypt is preoccupied by terrorism and the upheaval in Libya, but Egyptian officials are also concerned about Iran’s growing influence and US inaction.
Officials in every government (aside from Turkey’s) spoke of collusion between Turkey and extremists. The Turks think the Iranians know that the US is not a determined counterpart. They believe the US is appeasing Iran.
Gutman then traveled to Tehran to gauge the mood there. Iran has come in from the cold after 36 years, but Tehran resents the last 36 years of US policy. Change in Iran won’t happen fast. Khamenei has said that Iran’s policy towards the “arrogant” US government won’t change and that Iran will keep supporting its regional allies.
Israel views Hezbollah’s buildup as a direct threat, but Iranian officials told Gutman that the Tehran holds the trigger on Hezbollah’s weapons and won’t pull it unless Israel threatens Lebanon or Iran. However, a former Iranian diplomat admitted that Iran has no vital interest in Lebanon or the Palestinians. Iran also appears to have no vital interest in Yemen, but likes seeing Saudi Arabia embroiled in an unwinnable war. Iran is unalterably opposed to the breakup of Iraq into three states.
Iranian officials don’t think the deal is perfect, but still see it as a win-win for both sides. They view themselves as MENA’s most powerful and stable state. They are glad that US has accepted them as a regional player and negotiating partner.
After the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq, Iran filled the vacuum. The Iraqi Army collapsed on Iran’s watch. Iran does not acknowledge its responsibility for this and ascribes the rise of ISIS to others. They also believe that foreign forces fought in Deraa and refused to acknowledge Assad’s role in fomenting terrorism by releasing terrorists from prison. Iranian officials also stated that all sectors of Lebanese society back Hezbollah’s deployment in Syria. Iran needs a reality check.
Iran opposes the creation of a safe zone/no-fly zone in Iraq and has threatened to send basijis into Syria if this happens. Iranians don’t understand the scope of Syria’s humanitarian catastrophe or Iran’s role in it. There are too many disagreements between the US and Iran to form a regional security agreement now. The US needs a policy for Syria; if we don’t have a policy, others will fill the vacuum. The US also needs an official version of what happened in Syria to counter the Iranian invented view of history.
Karam noted that the Arab response to the deal is less monolithic than Israel’s, but the GCC and Israel view Iran’s regional behavior similarly. The UAE, Oman, and Turkey quickly welcomed the deal because they have good trade relations with Iran. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Qatar were more cautious. The Saudis don’t view the deal as US abandonment, but they fear increased Iranian regional meddling. Arab public opinion has shifted drastically since 2008, when 80% of Arabs viewed Iran positively. Now only 12% do. The Arab street is suspicious of the deal. The US explained the deal to Arab governments, but not to their people. The Arab street wonders whether the money Iran will gain from sanctions relief will go to funding Iranian students, or to Qassem Suleimani and more chlorine gas, barrel bombs, and Hezbollah fighters for Assad. Assad is a costly budget item for Iran. When will Iran realize that Assad can’t win? Nevertheless, Hezbollah keeps getting more involved in Syria.
Karam stated that the Gulf countries obtain commitments from the US at talks like Camp David, but then nothing gets done. The US is four years behind on Syria and needs an official policy.
Serwer noted in conclusion that the regional issues would be far worse if Iran had, or were about to get, nuclear weapons.
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