Tag: Jordan
Tatters
American policy in Syria has supported the “moderate” opposition and sought the removal of Bashar al Assad. Four and a half years into the rebellion there, extremists have largely sidelined the moderate opposition in the center of the country. Russia and Iran are doubling down on their support for Bashar al Assad, who is well on towards fulfilling his prophecy “either me or the jihadis.”
Washington has also wanted to protect Syria’s neighbors from its civil war. Efforts to contain the war’s effects have been no more successful than the efforts to win it. With more than 4 million refugees unsettling Syria’s neighbors and 7 million displaced inside the country, it will take decades to restore the region to some semblance of order. The Islamic State has taken over one third of Iraq. The war has embroiled Turkey in renewed conflict with its own Kurds. Lebanon and Jordan hang by threads to a semblance of order. Israel faces extremists just a few miles from the Syrian territory it occupies on the Golan Heights.
Attention in the press is focused on the Pentagon’s failed efforts over the past year to train and equip viable “moderate” forces to fight against the Islamic State in Syria. Few Syrians sign up. They prefer to fight Assad. The vetting process is long and arduous. Of the few who have gone back to Syria, most have ended up dead, captured or intimidated into turning over equipment and weapons to extremists. The rebalancing of the military equation that John Kerry had rightly recognized as necessary to altering the outcome in a direction the US would find agreeable is simply not occurring.
Enter the Russians. Moscow’s deployment of fighting forces, including attack aircraft, to Latakia would not be necessary if the Assad regime were doing well. Moscow’s immediate military goal is to block the advance of opposition forces towards western Syria, where both the heartland of the Alawite population and Russia’s naval base lie. Its bigger purpose is to protect the regime and foil America’s intention of replacing it with something resembling a democracy. Moscow won’t distinguish in its targets between extremists and moderates but will seek to rebalance the military equation in a direction opposite to what Kerry had in mind.
The advancing opposition forces in the center of the country are mostly Sunni extremists, not moderates. Extremists have agreed to a population exchange with Hizbollah that will clear Sunnis from near the strategically important border with Lebanon and Shia from extremist-held areas farther north. Population exchange aids cantonalization: Syria will soon be a patchwork of areas of control: the regime in Damascus and the west, Kurds along much of the northern border with Turkey, relatively moderate opposition in the south and some Damascus suburbs, assorted Islamist extremists in the center and the Islamic State in the center east. Enclaves will be overrun or traded. Confrontation lines will congeal. Stalemate will ensue.
None of this is good news for either Syrians or Americans. But it is not the worst news.
The viability of the patches will depend on two factors: the strength of the military forces that control them and how effectively they are governed. The regime has been protecting and governing the areas it controls well enough that they have attracted a significant inflow of people, including many whose sympathies are with the opposition. The Islamic State governs brutally in the territory it controls, but has lost some in the north to Kurdish forces, who have set up representative governing structures that include Arabs and appear to be functioning relatively well, their lives made easier by the de facto truce between the Kurds and the Assad regime.
The relative moderates have arguably been less effective than the regime, the Islamic State and the Kurds in governing the areas they control. This is important. The war can be lost on the battlefield. But it has to be won in city hall. The local councils that have formed more or less spontaneously in many “liberated” areas are not doing well. Strapped for cash and untended by the opposition Syrian Interim Government, in many areas they are unable to deliver much except political squabbling among themselves. While unquestionably better than nothing, they lack both legitimacy and technical capabilities as well as connections to a broader political framework. Western aid to local councils has sometimes done more harm than good.
The US military effort in Syria is visibly in tatters. But it won’t matter much if the less visible civilian effort conducted in areas controlled by relative moderates doesn’t improve dramatically.
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Refugees are not the problem
The flow of refugees into Europe from the Middle East and North Africa is now attracting widespread attention. The 71 Syrians who suffocated last week in a truck in Austria, and the three-year-old who drowned in the Mediterranean, have done what close to 250,000 dying in Syria over the past 3.5 years (that’s an average of about 200 per day) could not: they have mobilized public opinion. Germany and Sweden are rightly praised for opening their doors. Hungary is trying to seal itself off. The Americans may take more than the trickle of refugees they have accepted so far, but still an insignificant number. The UN is appealing for funds, which have been sorely lacking. More than $8.4 billion is needed.
But refugees are not the root of the problem. Nor are the ones who arrive in Europe and the US the Syrians most in need or most at risk. They are the symptom–a relatively small and distant one–of a much larger and more challenging problem: the multi-sided conflict in Syria, to which we’ve become unfortunately inured. Four million people have managed to escape Syria, mostly fleeing to neighboring countries. They are the relatively fortunate ones, when not jammed into a truck in Austria or drowning in the Med. Seven million have been displaced inside Syria, where relief is much harder to find.
Of course problems are much more visible when up close and personal. But we need to keep the focus on the disease, not only the spreading ripple of symptoms.
The disease has its origins in the Syrian dictatorship’s response to peaceful pro-democracy protests. Determined to stay in power, it cracked down violently, concentrating its efforts against relative moderates and the majority Sunni community, both of which were a real threat to Bashar al Assad’s hold on power. The natural result was the growth of Sunni extremism, which has helped Bashar demonstrate that the only alternative to his rule is Al Qaeda and the Islamic State. To this day, his forces continue to focus disproportionately not on jihadi terrorism but rather on those who say they want a secular, democratic state.
There is no way to run this history backwards. The extremists will not disappear if Assad falls. It is highly unlikely that relative moderates would replace him. The best we can hope for now is to create some relatively safe places inside Syria where moderates can govern, providing protection for civilians and beginning to service their needs so that they don’t flee.
The northern area that the Americans and Turks are contemplating for this purpose is hardly ideal. Large parts of it are barren rural areas over which control will be hard to establish. Turkomans populate much of the border area with Turkey, along with Kurds against whom the Turks have been fighting. The Kurds already control much of the rest of the border, where the key to making things safer for civilians will be cooperation between them and the Arabs who live both among them and farther south.
The area along the Jordanian/Syrian border in the south is another possible protected zone, one dominated by relatively moderate Sunni insurgents, including some with US training, and the non-Muslim, Arab Druze. The Druze have tried to hold their fire and avoid close alignment with either the regime or the insurgents. Self-preservation is their priority. Bringing them into closer alignment with the insurgents would require giving them the confidence that they will be protected from the vindictive reaction of the regime.
Protected areas north and south would not solve Syria’s problems, but with Coalition (read US plus at least some European and Gulf) support, they might begin to stem the tide. If nothing is done to enable Syrians to remain in their country, it is a virtual certainty that next year’s outflow will be much greater than this year’s, with economic and political consequences for both the neighboring countries and Europe that will dwarf what we are seeing today. But the refugees will still not be the root of the problem.
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Limits of US-Turkey cooperation in Syria
On Thursday, the SETA Foundation hosted a talk entitled The U.S.-Turkey “Safe Zone” Agreement: What does it mean?. Panelists included: Sabiha Senyucel, research director of the Center for Public Policy and Democracy Studies (PODEM), Mark Perry, independent author, Melissa Dalton, fellow and chief of staff at the CSIS International Security Program, and Kadir Ustun, Executive Director of the SETA Foundation. Kilic B. Kanat, research director of the SETA Foundation, moderated. The panelists believe that the recent US-Turkey cooperation in Syria will remain limited because Turkey and the US continue to have divergent interests.
Senyucel said that the recent bombing in Southeast Turkey pushed Turkey to take a more active role in the anti-ISIS coalition. Now the coalition can use İncirlik for bombings. The Kurdish issue is no longer just a domestic Turkish issue. The Turkey-PKK peace process is finished for now, but Senyucel hopes it can restart soon. The roles of the PKK, the PYD and the Syrian Kurdish entity are all linked. YPG fighters fought ISIS in Kobane, giving the Kurds international legitimacy. This changed the Kurds’ thinking about what they could achieve regionally.
After Kobane, the YPG and PKK demonstrated that they could fight ISIS on the ground and US airstrikes helped them take Tel Abyad. This concerned Turkey, which has good reason to distrust the PYD because of its links to the PKK. After the Gezi Park protests, the PKK stopped honoring its commitments and asserted de facto control over some parts of Eastern Turkey. There may have been mistakes from the Turkish side, but the Turkish government also displayed restraint. The PKK’s mid-July announcement that they were returning to arms was unjustified. Turkey is now reminding the PKK that they won’t achieve their ambitions. The US has agreed to support Turkey in this, but Senyucel isn’t sure how long this will last.
Kadir asserted that the US and Turkey can’t agree on the big picture in Syria. Obama believes the US only has limited interests; he isn’t trying to fix Syria. The PYD is a local actor that can contribute to the US’s non-strategy strategy. Turkey has tried to protect its border, host refugees, prevent the spillover of the conflict and resolve the Kurdish question. Necessity has limited Turkish actions. Turkey can’t ally with the PKK-linked PYD; the PKK has asserted de facto control over some towns in eastern Turkey and hasn’t fully committed to withdrawing guerrillas.
Turkey will allow the US to use İncirlik and will work to create a safe zone in Syria for the moderate opposition. Ankara wants a broader strategy from the US, but the US is uninterested. Will planes taking off from İncirlik help the PYD? The PYD has been reluctant to distance itself from the PKK and stop expelling Arabs from its territory. The PYD also allows Assad’s air force to overfly the territories it controls. If these things continue, the US and Turkey won’t come to a real agreement, but both sides need a broader strategy to make lasting progress.
Dalton agreed that the US and Turkey have divergent objectives. The Turks have called the recent agreement a safe zone, but the US has avoided this term. The agreement will involve enhanced border cooperation. The length of this cooperation area will be ~65 miles, but other elements are unknown:
- How deep into Syria will it go?
- Will Assad’s air force be excluded?
- Will there be cover for civilians in nearby cities outside the zone?
Broader US-Turkey cooperation will be needed for a long-term solution, but the anti-ISIS fight and border cooperation are likely to be the focus for now.
Perry highlighted the fact that there is unlikely to be any well-articulated US strategy from this administration, but there are three observable US policy principles:
- We maintain relations with allied regional states despite difficulties.
- Our enemy is Islamic extremism.
- There is no appetite for strong anti-Assad action.
We want Assad to lose, but don’t want his opponents to win. This is a tough line to walk with Turkey. The use of İncirlik will allow the US to gather better drone intelligence. Assad is unlikely to launch air operations in the area of the proposed safe zone because Assad doesn’t want to tangle with the US Air Force. The Obama administration’s vagueness may not be bad. The US has made many foreign policy mistakes; doing nothing is a viable option since Syria is so complex. We can protect our friends, maintain our strength, assist the victims, and remain friendly with Erdogan, without further intervention.
Barbara Slavin, nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council South Asia Center, asked about the US train and equip program. Many of the 54 rebels that we have trained have reportedly been captured by Jabhat Al-Nusra. Slavin asked whether the possible safe zone could be an injection point for these rebels. Dalton stated that it could be used for this purpose, because there is currently no other logical injection point. However, questions about how and at what cost the US and Turkey plan to protect such a zone remain. Kadir took a similar position, noting the slowness of the program. Perry discounted the program entirely, noting that the last successful US train and equip program was in the Philippines in 1899. The US is keeping the fiction of train and equip so that we can keep our hand in the game in Syria.
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A nervous region wary of the nuclear deal
On Wednesday, the Conflict Management Program at SAIS and MEI hosted a talk entitled After the Deal: A Veteran Journalist’s View from Tehran. Speakers included Roy Gutman, McClatchy Middle East bureau chief, and Joyce Karam, Washington bureau chief for Al-Hayat. Daniel Serwer of both SAIS and MEI moderated. Both speakers emphasized the dynamics that caused regional players to be wary of Iran.
Early last Spring, Gutman traveled to Israel, Jordan, Egypt and Turkey.
In Israel, he observed that the major national security concern wasn’t the Iranian nuclear program, but rather Iran’s conventional threat through the buildup of Hezbollah forces. Israelis were disappointed that the US was leaving a security vacuum in Syria for Iran to fill. The Israeli position on the Iran deal is difficult to understand; Israeli politicians oppose it, but Israel’s foreign policy elite considers Iranian conventional forces a larger threat.
Jordanian officials also worried about regional chaos and Iranian influence. They were baffled by the half-hearted US response to Assad, as well as its airstrike-only response to ISIS.
Egypt is preoccupied by terrorism and the upheaval in Libya, but Egyptian officials are also concerned about Iran’s growing influence and US inaction.
Officials in every government (aside from Turkey’s) spoke of collusion between Turkey and extremists. The Turks think the Iranians know that the US is not a determined counterpart. They believe the US is appeasing Iran.
Gutman then traveled to Tehran to gauge the mood there. Iran has come in from the cold after 36 years, but Tehran resents the last 36 years of US policy. Change in Iran won’t happen fast. Khamenei has said that Iran’s policy towards the “arrogant” US government won’t change and that Iran will keep supporting its regional allies.
Israel views Hezbollah’s buildup as a direct threat, but Iranian officials told Gutman that the Tehran holds the trigger on Hezbollah’s weapons and won’t pull it unless Israel threatens Lebanon or Iran. However, a former Iranian diplomat admitted that Iran has no vital interest in Lebanon or the Palestinians. Iran also appears to have no vital interest in Yemen, but likes seeing Saudi Arabia embroiled in an unwinnable war. Iran is unalterably opposed to the breakup of Iraq into three states.
Iranian officials don’t think the deal is perfect, but still see it as a win-win for both sides. They view themselves as MENA’s most powerful and stable state. They are glad that US has accepted them as a regional player and negotiating partner.
After the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq, Iran filled the vacuum. The Iraqi Army collapsed on Iran’s watch. Iran does not acknowledge its responsibility for this and ascribes the rise of ISIS to others. They also believe that foreign forces fought in Deraa and refused to acknowledge Assad’s role in fomenting terrorism by releasing terrorists from prison. Iranian officials also stated that all sectors of Lebanese society back Hezbollah’s deployment in Syria. Iran needs a reality check.
Iran opposes the creation of a safe zone/no-fly zone in Iraq and has threatened to send basijis into Syria if this happens. Iranians don’t understand the scope of Syria’s humanitarian catastrophe or Iran’s role in it. There are too many disagreements between the US and Iran to form a regional security agreement now. The US needs a policy for Syria; if we don’t have a policy, others will fill the vacuum. The US also needs an official version of what happened in Syria to counter the Iranian invented view of history.
Karam noted that the Arab response to the deal is less monolithic than Israel’s, but the GCC and Israel view Iran’s regional behavior similarly. The UAE, Oman, and Turkey quickly welcomed the deal because they have good trade relations with Iran. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Qatar were more cautious. The Saudis don’t view the deal as US abandonment, but they fear increased Iranian regional meddling. Arab public opinion has shifted drastically since 2008, when 80% of Arabs viewed Iran positively. Now only 12% do. The Arab street is suspicious of the deal. The US explained the deal to Arab governments, but not to their people. The Arab street wonders whether the money Iran will gain from sanctions relief will go to funding Iranian students, or to Qassem Suleimani and more chlorine gas, barrel bombs, and Hezbollah fighters for Assad. Assad is a costly budget item for Iran. When will Iran realize that Assad can’t win? Nevertheless, Hezbollah keeps getting more involved in Syria.
Karam stated that the Gulf countries obtain commitments from the US at talks like Camp David, but then nothing gets done. The US is four years behind on Syria and needs an official policy.
Serwer noted in conclusion that the regional issues would be far worse if Iran had, or were about to get, nuclear weapons.
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Shore-up Jordan before it’s too late…
Ambassador Oded Eran (Senior Research Fellow, INSS, former Israeli ambassador to Jordan, the EU and NATO, and former head of the Israeli negotiating team with the Palestinians) and Eddie Grove (Research Assistant Intern, MEI and former Research Assistant Intern, INSS) co-authored an article entitled Threats to Stability in Jordan in the July 2015 issue of INSS Strategic Assessment. The article describes the challenges that Jordan must overcome in both the short-term and the long-term to remain stable.
Despite persistent predictions of the imminent demise of the Hashemite regime, Jordan has remained stable, buoyed by international aid from the US and the GCC. Jordan faces a growing jihadi threat, fueled largely by a poor economy and high youth unemployment. In the short-term, Jordan’s stability will be aided by low oil prices and a temporary rise in patriotism after pilot Muath al-Kasasbeh’s murder by ISIS. In the long-term, Jordan needs to address water and energy scarcity issues to remain stable and serve the needs of a growing population, including its many refugees.
Jordan has high unemployment, including a youth unemployment rate of ~30%. A few key reasons for this include:
- Jordan’s education system doesn’t provide students with necessary skills for the workforce.
- Jordanian students often choose fields of study that aren’t in high demand in the workforce.
- Syrian refugees compete for informal sector jobs.
Youth unemployment, often long in duration, leads to frustration. This frustration is compounded by a lack of avenues for political expression among Jordanian youth. Little real reform occurred during Jordan’s relatively small-scale Arab Spring protests.
Some discontented youth see jihadism as attractive. Experts estimate that there are 5,000-10,000 jihadis in Jordan, and that this number may have doubled since the Arab Spring. Jordan’s jihadis were traditionally mainly Palestinian, but growing numbers of ethnic Jordanians (East Bankers) have been joining the movement. East Bankers have traditionally been regime loyalists and comprise the majority of the military and security services. Cracks in their loyalty pose a serious threat to the regime.
The government closely watches jihadis; it arrests those who post jihadi content online and preachers who deliver extremist sermons. According to one expert, the vast majority of Jordan’s jihadis now sympathize with ISIS. ISIS has grassroots support, if not an organized presence. YouTube videos have shown pro-ISIS rallies in Ma’an and Zarqa and there is also evidence of ISIS sympathizers in Irbid. As of fall 2014, there were 1000-1500 Jordanian fighters in Syria, and 8% of Jordan’s population sympathized with ISIS. Ten percent didn’t consider ISIS a terrorist organization, and opposition to Jordan’s participation in coalition airstrikes was widespread: #ThisIsNotOurWar was a trending Twitter hashtag.
When Muath Al-Kasasbeh was murdered, it prompted an anti-ISIS backlash and a surge in patriotism. A February 2015 poll showed overwhelming support for Jordan’s participation in coalition airstrikes, and that 95% of the population now considered ISIS a terrorist organization. Confidence in PM Ensour’s government also increased. King Abdullah urged Jordanians to “hold their heads high.” This became a trending hashtag on Twitter. The surge in patriotism was not universal, however, as a Jordanian MP and a high-ranking Jordanian diplomat publicly derided this new slogan. In addition, an ISIS cell was arrested in Mafraq in March 2015, a poor city with many Syrian refugees.
The wave of patriotism will fade and energy costs will increase, so Jordan needs to address its water
and energy scarcity issues. Water scarcity may have been a contributory cause of Syria’s civil war, and Jordan is one of the world’s most water-scarce countries. Additionally, ~40% of the inputs into Jordan’s water networks become Non-revenue Water (NRW). NRW is essentially water that is not accounted for when customers are billed, due to leakage, illegal use, faulty meters, incompetent meter-readers, and poor accounting. Israel provides Jordan with water from Lake Kinneret, and this quantity may increase in the future. Jordan also plans to desalinate water at Aqaba. However, solving Jordan’s water crisis requires progress on multiple fronts, including NRW reduction (with the help of the international community). Climate change could worsen Jordan’s water woes, and comparisons between Jordan and Syria are ominous. Water scarcity drove internal migration in Syria, which combined with other factors like corruption, unemployment and inequality to ignite the crisis. Jordan displays similar risk factors.
Jordan must also address its energy scarcity issues. Jordan used to import natural gas from Egypt, but repeated terror attacks on the pipeline through the Sinai halted the imports and damaged Jordan economically, forcing it to import costlier petroleum products. Low oil prices provide a temporary respite. Fortunately, Jordan has plans to diversify its energy sources by 2020, with the following breakdown:
- 10% from wind and solar.
- 14% oil shale.
- 6% nuclear.
- 29% natural gas.
- 1% imported electricity.
- 40% petroleum products.
Unfortunately, this won’t happen, at least not by 2020. Israel may import gas from Israel, but this is politically challenging and Israel’s gas companies are embroiled in an anti-trust dispute with the Israeli government. Gas from Gaza is more politically palatable for Jordan, but is unlikely to come online soon for political reasons. Jordan imports LNG from Qatar, but this is costlier than gas via pipeline. Little progress has been made on the wind and solar projects, and Jordan’s nuclear ambitions may never come to fruition because of high costs and international opposition. Oil shale (not to be confused with shale oil) has never before been extracted on a commercial scale and may not be viable at oil prices below $75/barrel.
Costly energy imports damage Jordan’s economy (and therefore its stability) as follows:
- High energy prices increase the cost of living for struggling Jordanians.
- Jordan’s remaining energy subsidies are a burden on the government’s budget and divert funds from key areas.
- Energy subsidies crowd-out private sector investment.
Energy diversification (with the help of the international community) would alleviate these issues, and help counteract the poor economic conditions that contribute to the rise in jihadism.
Israel has a strong interest in preserving Jordan’s stability, as Jordan is a buffer state. Jordan used to
export goods through Syria, but Israel has allowed Jordan to use Haifa’s port for exports, and is improving the facilities there. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is always a complicating factor in Israeli-Jordanian relations; the majority of Jordan’s population is Palestinian, causing a political climate in which Jordan requires at least a semblance of progress in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations to ensure quiet domestically. Jordan’s 2014-2015 UN Security Council membership further complicates this balancing act.
To shore-up Jordan’s stability, Israel can:
- Increase bilateral cooperation (this has likely already happened).
- Expedite water and gas transfers.
- Allow for greater access of Jordanian products to Israel, but more importantly, the Palestinian market.
- Increase its use of Jordan’s port of Aqaba, which could produce mutual benefits.
In addition, the US and GCC must keep up financial assistance to Jordan, but ensure that this assistance addresses long-term issues. The immediate risk posed by ISIS is likely not a frontal attack. ISIS rather seeks to exploit pockets of poverty and unemployment within Jordan, including among East Bankers. Financial resources are needed to prevent this.
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Don’t take Jordan’s stability for granted
On Tuesday, the Wilson Center hosted a panel discussion on Jordan and the Challenges of Confronting ISIS Next Door. Panelists included Anja Wehler-Schoeck, Resident Director, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Jordan & Iraq and David Schenker, Aufzien Fellow and Director, Program on Arab Politics, WINEP. Henri J. Barkey, the director of the Middle East Program at the Wilson Center, moderated. Both Wehler-Schoeck and Schenker agreed that the primary threat to Jordan’s stability is internal radicalization, not an external ISIS assault.
Wehler-Shoeck stated that there was a slight opening in Jordan at the beginning of the Arab Spring, accompanied by some small-scale protests. The Hirak Movement, while smallish in size, attracted Jordanians of diverse backgrounds. The Jordanian government instituted a few reforms and pursued a strategy of co-optation. The movement has now died down.Both Wehler-Shoeck and Schenker stated that Jordanians are refraining from protesting because they are wary of regional instability.
According to Wehler-Shoeck, a dominant security logic took hold in 2013. Journalists are no longer allowed to publish articles about the Jordanian military or the Iraqi-Swedish national who was recently arrested for plotting bomb attacks on Iran’s behalf. There is also self-censorship among journalists and a strict anti-terror law. Within Jordanian society, conspiracy theories about the formation of ISIS abound. Jordanians continue to the view the US critically, partially as a byproduct of the 2003 Iraq invasion.
Wehler-Shoeck asserted that many Jordanians felt conflicted in September 2014 when Jordan joined the anti-ISIS coalition. Most didn’t like ISIS but don’t support their country’s bombing fellow Sunnis. Many people in Ma’an told her that if they had to choose between a government that was fighting fellow Sunnis and ISIS, they would choose ISIS. Schenker pointed out that the leading hashtag on Twitter during this time was #This_Is_Not_Our_War. Jihadist leaders like Abu Sayyaf claimed that Jordan’s participation in the coalition would be the beginning of the end of the regime. According to a poll by the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan, a significant percentage of Jordanians did not consider ISIS, the Nusra Front or Al-Qaeda terrorist organizations. Many Jordanians viewed them as effective fighting forces against Assad.
Wehler-Schoeck and Schenker explained that the murder of Muath Al-Kasasbeh changed this dynamic. The government cleverly rode the wave of public outcry against ISIS. Schenker compared this shift to the way that Jordanian public opinion turned against AQI following the 2005 Amman hotel bombings. He speculated about how long this shift in opinion will last.
Wehler-Schoeck and Schenker discussed whether Jordan will remain stable. Schenker noted that Jordan looks great compared to much of the region. The IMF and World Bank forecasts for Jordan’s economy are bullish. Wehler-Schoeck, however, pointed out that the economy has been weakened by trade disruptions. Jordan also suffers from dependence on foreign energy.
Both Wehler-Schoeck and Schenker cited Jordan’s strong allies and increased border security. But Wehler-Schoeck stated that Israel is building a wall on its border with Jordan and is forming a new battalion to protect the border. This is telling. Schenker cited frequent reports of skirmishes on the Jordan-Syria border. Jordan spent $1.3 billion on homeland security measures in 2013. Jordan’s military is cohesive, loyal and well-trained. The US has increased its security aid to Jordan.
Wehler-Schoeck stated that both Jordan and the US have denied that Jordan is planning a buffer zone inside Syria. Jordan does not want to send ground forces to Syria. Schenker asserted that ISIS’s capture of Palmyra and Tadmor changed the debate about whether Jordan needs to be more proactive. A buffer zone would be risky. Jordanian soldiers involved in the creation of a buffer zone would be targeted by ISIS, the Nusra Front, and the Assad regime. Significant casualties could produce a backlash domestically. The Assad regime, which has so far refrained from attacking Jordan, could cause a large movement of IDPs towards the border, through actions such as bombing the power plants in Daraa. It could also sponsor terrorist attacks within Jordan. Jordan’s pro-West orientation makes it a target for both Sunni and Shiite radicals.
Both Wehler-Schoeck and Schenker highlighted the potential for radicalization within Jordan. Wehler-Schoeck cited the significant number of Jordanians who joined Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in 2003 and the fact that Al-Zarqawi was Jordanian. The jihadist preachers Al-Maqdisi and Abu Qatada are still active in Jordan. There are roughly 2000 Jordanian fighters currently in Iraq and Syria. Within Jordan, there are sleeper cells as well as outright ISIS supporters, but Jordan has a very strong security apparatus. The majority of Jordanians disapprove of ISIS but there are large numbers of unemployed men who are targets for jihadi recruiters. Even better educated Jordanians can be radicalized, as radicalization is also a search for Sunni religious identity. Many young Jordanians who went to Syria and came back frightened and disillusioned were imprisoned. This may be counterproductive, as prisons can serve as centers of radicalization.
Wehler-Schoeck noted that Jordan has tolerated the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in the past but has taken stricter steps against it recently, such as the arrest of Zaki Bani Rushaid, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood (MB) deputy director. The government’s marginalization of the MB is risky because the MB has served as a platform for more moderate Islamism in the past.
Schenker emphasized that ideology isn’t confined to borders. In Ma’an, there have been several small pro-ISIS demonstrations. Ma’an is 3 hours outside Amman. Authorities are more concerned about radicalism in cities that border Amman, like Zarqa, Rusaifa and Salt. There is a large concern about ISIS sleeper cells among the Syrian refugees. Jordan hosts at least 700,000 Syrian refugees, but the true total may be closer to 1,000,000. Palestinians and East Bank Jordanians contribute about equally to the jihadi-Salafi movement. Two sons of MPs have joined the jihad in Syria. Schenker stated that anecdotally, Jordan appears far more Salafi than it did a couple decades ago. He believes there is a fine line between Salafis and jihadi-Salafis, though Wehler-Schoeck thinks there is a clear difference and that the government must engage with quietist Salafis.
Wehler-Schoeck and Schenker both believe that there is a serious risk of lone-wolf attacks in Jordan. Wehler-Schoeck cited the existence of fatwas calling for such attacks. Schenker warned that traditional targets, such as Western interests, government buildings and tourist attractions could be attacked. The threat from both lone wolves and sleeper cells is very serious. Jordan has excellent security and intelligence services, but they can’t stop all threats.
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