Tag: Kazakhstan
Hobson’s nuclear choices
No one seems overwrought that the latest nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1 (that’s US, UK, France, Russia, China + Germany) ended inconclusively yesterday in Almaty, Kazakhstan. An agreement on the eve of Iran’s presidential election campaign (voting is scheduled for June 14) was not likely. Iran is looking for acknowledgement of its “right” to enrich uranium, even if it limits the extent of enrichment and the amount of enriched material. The P5+1, led by European Union foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton, are looking for strict limits on enrichment (to 5% or below, with most more highly enriched materials shipped out of the country) and tight international inspections without acknowledging Iran’s right to enrich. They are also looking for suspension of enrichment at Iran’s underground facility at Fordo and a strict accounting for past activities, which appear to have included some nuclear weapons development.
There are related non-nuclear issues on which the gaps may be greater. Iran wants sanctions relief up front as well as cooperation on Syria and Bahrain. The Western members of the P5+1 want to maintain sanctions until they have satisfactory commitments and implementation that prevent Iran from ever having a nuclear weapons program. They are not willing to soften their support for the revolution in Syria against Iran’s ally Bashar al Asad or for the Sunni minority monarchy in Bahrain, which faces a Shia protest movement that Iran supports.
The Israelis are the only ones who seem seriously perturbed:
“This failure was predictable,” Yuval Steinitz, Israel’s minister of strategic affairs, said in a statement. “Israel has already warned that the Iranians are exploiting the talks in order to play for time while making additional progress in enriching uranium for an atomic bomb.” He added, “The time has come for the world to take a more assertive stand and make it unequivocally clear to the Iranians that the negotiations games have run their course.”
But there is precious little they can do about the situation. An Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities will do relatively little damage but will end the prospect of a negotiated solution and make Tehran redouble its efforts to get nuclear weapons. President Obama is in no hurry to do the more thorough job the Americans are capable of. He seems satisfied that there is still time. The Iranians have in fact been slowing their accumulation of 20% enriched uranium by converting some of it to fuel plates for their isotope production reactor, which makes the material difficult to enrich further. The Israelis may not like it, but it looks as if everyone will hold their breath until after the Iranian election, when the question of further meetings and a possible agreement will arise again.
In the meanwhile, the Iranians will be watching North Korea closely. It has tested several nuclear weapons and presumably made more. Pyongyang is sounding committed not just to keeping them but to acquiring the missile capability to deliver them. While the press makes a great deal of Kim Jong-un’s threats against the United States, he represents a much more immediate threat to South Korea and Japan. If he manages to hold on to his nuclear weapons and thereby stabilizes his totalitarian regime, the Iranian theocrats will read it as encouragement to continue their own nuclear quest.
With the “sequester” budget cuts forcing retrenchment on many fronts, Washington is trying for negotiated solutions and hesitating to enforce its will that neither Iran nor North Korea acquire serious nuclear capabilities. It is hoping the Chinese will help with Pyongyang, which nevertheless seems increasingly committed to maintaining and expanding its nuclear capabilities. Tehran has slowed its accumulation of nuclear material but is expanding its technological capability to move rapidly if a decision is made to move ahead. President Obama could soon face a Hobson’s choice in both cases: either act militarily, despite the costs and consequences, or accept two new nuclear powers, despite the costs and consequences.
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Democracy fails between elections
Newly arrived Middle East Institute summer intern Ilona Gerbakher writes:
While the world is significantly more democratic today than it was twenty years ago, there have been notable failed transitions. Political scientists Danielle Lussier and Jody Laporte gave a joint talk Tuesday at the Woodrow Wilson Center on “The Failure of Democracy in Post-Soviet Eurasia.” Lussier focused on the regression to authoritarian rule in Russia under Vladimir Putin. Laporte investigated the ways in which three post-Soviet authoritarian regimes – Georgia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan – deal with political opposition between elections. Lussier and Laporte chart the decline of freedom in former communist countries, and ask the question, “why did democracy fail to survive in Russia and the Eurasian republics?”
The case of Russia is perplexing, as it is an outlier in the context of democratization theory. Its level of wealth, education and history of independent statehood suggest Russia should be more politically open than it is today. Lussier presented a graph which showed that, since 1998, Russia’s domestic policies have been backsliding into authoritarian territory. Examples of this backsliding include passage of laws that have obstructed the formation of political parties, cancellation of elections and legislation that curtails freedoms of press and association.
Lussier rejects the three common explanations for the return to authoritarianism in Russia. First of these is that Russia’s elite is insulated from popular pressure by hydrocarabon wealth. Second is that Russia’s history instilled a cultural preference for authoritarian rule. Third is that the failure of liberalization in the 1990’s discredited democracy in Russia.
She suggests an alternative explanation: that the Russian public failed to constrain the Russian political elite. Elite constraining activities, such as building and supporting opposition parties and campaigns as well as public acts of political dissent, are a vital check on the tendency of governments to centralize power in economically or politically difficult periods. The Russian public more consistently engages in elite-enabling activities that support hegemonic parties.
One elite-enabling activity, contacting public officials to perform private favors, is the single (non-voting) political activity with the highest public participation. Other forms of non-voting political participation have steadily declined for the last two decades. They are episodic rather than repetitive. Young people are the least politically engaged sector of society. The decline in political participation preceded the decline in political openness (and the rise of authoritarianism) in Russia.
Laporte shifted the focus from Russia to Georgia, Azerbaijan and Kazakstan. Twenty years after the fall of the Soviet Union, the only post-Soviet democracies are Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The rest are non-democracies, because vote fraud and voter manipulation is endemic. Elections are neither free nor fair. In order to investigate the inner-working of these authoritarian regimes, Laporte examined the way that they treat political opposition between, as well as during, elections.
In all three countries, the election committees are dominated by pro-government officials, state resources are abused in order to mobilize support for the government, and vote fraud is endemic. Opposition parties are prevented from registration in various ways, their space for campaigning is limited, and opposition party operatives are often harassed.
Between election cycles differences emerge. In Kazakhstan, repression of opposition parties is constant and unconditional. All opposition groups and operatives are targeted, the dominant tactic is violent repression, and the goal of the government seems to be to completely eradicate the opposition. In Georgia, repression of opposition parties between elections is intermittent, the targets are random, the dominant tactic of repression is public and private criticism by government officials (acts of violence against opposition groups are rare), and the intent seems to be harassment rather then eradication of the opposition. In Azerbaijan, repression of opposition parties is reactive and the targets are contingent upon circumstances, with more opposition parties are being targeted in recent years. The main goal is to discourage criticism of the government. The dominant tactic is judicial, such as high court fines levied against protestors. Why do we see these differences in the treatment of opposition groups? Laporte speculates that both the nature of the opposition party and patterns of political corruption are at play.
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