Tag: Kenya
Stevenson’s army, January 27
– WaPo says US isn’t planning Ukraine offensive
– Michael Kofman et al. have their suggestions on WOTR
– Kenya court blocks Haiti mission; Haiti suffers.
– Congress approves F16s to Turkey
– Additional countries halt aid to UNRWA
– Biden promises border crackdown if new law is passed
– WaPo says Trump plans expanded trade war with China
– Fred Kaplan revisits Ukraine nuclear decision with declassified documents
– SAIS Prof Hal Brands sees risks of global war
– NYT reviews Gaza peace efforts
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My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Stevenson’s army, October 10 and 11
I was traveling yesterday, so here is a double edition:
October 11:
– WaPo explains what a siege in Gaza looks like and how Hamas breached the wall
– NYT assesses Israel’s failures
– WSJ says Hamas got money through crypto financing
– Atlantic reminds what Hamas believes
-Kenya force to Haiti blocked
– Polish generals resign over politicization
– US may send another carrier toward Israel
– Analyst summarizes US failures in Afghanistan
-Op-ed writer says Space Force needs own lobbyist on Hill
October 10:
– At the Atlantic Andrew Exum questions the quality of the IDF conscript soldiers.
– NSC calls for Israel to make “proportionate” response.
– Politico sees a “high tech failure”
– US now calls Niger coup a coup
– DOD seems to run the best schools in US
– Susan Glasser examines Jake Sullivan’s actions on Ukraine.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Stevenson’s army, October 5
– Walter Pincus describes GOP maneuvering on defense appropriations.
– Quincy Institute says 80% of retired 4 star officers go into defense industry.
– RollCall details big changes House made to defense budget request.
– UNSC is sending Kenyan police — not military — to Haiti
– Fred Kaplan says Philippines stood up to China
– David Andelman analyzes recent foreign elections
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Stevenson’s army, September 6
– Is Kim-Putin alliance a win-win for both, as NYT says?
– Can Kenya force really pacify Haiti?
– Is Modi going to change India’s name?
– Will AUKUS fail unless US changes laws?
– Do we really need a Space Command?
– Can Senate “jam” House GOP on spending bills?
– How bad is the Ukraine assassination program?
And from Legistorm’s free weekly newsletter:
Republican staffers are more likely than their Democratic counterparts to pass through the revolving door, according to LegiStorm data.
So far this year, 415 partisan ex-staffers have registered as federal lobbyists or foreign agents. Of those, 225 (54%) were Republicans, and 190 (46%) were Democrats. Republicans made up 53% of partisan staffers who registered as lobbyists in 2022.
For over a decade, Republicans have made up the majority of staffers-turned-lobbyists every year except 2021, when numbers were virtually tied.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Stevenson’s army, March 16
– Pew shows US support for Ukraine.
– NYT reports burst of centrism in Congress.
– Biden signs bill with more aid.
– WSJ reports more aid planned.
– NYT says US military wants more operations in Kenya.
Just in time for our intelligence topic in class, an old but still relevant report on how Congress handles classified information.
Yesterday Charlie also distributed this:
Prof. Cohen has a new piece in Atlantic that criticizes US policy and comments on Ukraine.The most important paragraphs are these:
The American fear of escalation has been a repeated note throughout this conflict. But to the extent American leaders express that sentiment, or spread such notions to receptive reporters, they make matters worse, giving the Russians a psychological edge. The Russians can (and do) threaten to ratchet things up, knowing that the West will respond with increased anxiety rather than reciprocal menace. We have yet to see, for example, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin telling the world what a wretched hand the Russians are playing militarily, and how superior ours is—a message he is particularly fit to deliver.
As for the nuclear question: We should not signal to the Russians that they have a trump card they can always play to stop us from doing pretty much anything. Nuclear weapons are why the United States should refrain from attacking Russia directly, not why it should fear fighting Russians in a country they invaded. Only a few years ago, the United States Air Force killed Russian Wagner mercenaries by the hundreds in Syria; American and Russian pilots tangled in the skies over Korea and possibly Vietnam. Nuclear deterrence cuts both ways, and the Russian leadership knows it. Vladimir Putin and those around him are ill-informed but not mad, and the use of nuclear weapons would threaten their very survival.
I disagree. Maybe we make the Russians feel better if we say we won’t fight a nuclear war with them, but we shouldn’t ever fight such a war. The entire world will be a more dangerous place if anyone ever uses another nuclear weapon in anger. So we should say it because it’s true and it’s right. And while our policy is sympathetic but not locked in to no first use, Russian policy is openly “escalate to deescalate.”
Eliot Cohen thinks the Russians won’t mind if we kill their people outside Russia’s borders. We would and we do. But we have tolerated sanctuaries, as painful and frustrating as they are, for geostrategic reasons. We didn’t want Russians or Chinese to fight us in Vietnam, or a nuclear-armed Pakistan to retaliate against attacks on the Taliban and its allies there.
Does this mean that we are telling the Russians that they have a trump card they can always play to stop us from doing pretty much anything? Not at all. We are telling them that we will NOT do pretty much anything to prevent their conquest of Ukraine. We will do many things, including providing weapons that Ukrainians will deploy in their own country to fight the Russians. But we will consciously limit our direct involvement because that is in our interests.
Nuclear weapons force all combatants to be especially careful. We should not be killing Russians anywhere in a deliberate and sustained policy. We have important security and humanitarian interests in Ukraine, but no vital national interest.Yes, Nuclear deterrence cuts both ways. It should deter both of us from climbing the escalation ladder for less than existential reasons.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Toward a critical C/PVE perspective
Terrorism and violent extremism represent some of Africa’s greatest security threats in 2021. Local groups with international terror links are embedded in East, West, and Southern Africa. They exacerbate local conflicts and enable organized crime rackets—destabilizing an already fragile political landscape. Meanwhile, years of government-led security force interventions, many supported by the US and European governments, have not dislodged the insurgents. On February 24, the United States Institute of Peace convened a panel in conjunction with the RESOLVE Network to discuss local approaches that incorporate tactics beyond kinetic counterterrorism. Speakers and their affiliations are listed below:
Dr. Alastair Reed (opening remarks): Senior Expert, US Institute of Peace; Executive Director, RESOLVE Network
Dr. Akinola Olojo: Senior Researcher, Lake Chad Basin Program, Institute for Security Studies
Dr. Phoebe Donnelly: Research Fellow, International Peace Institute; Member of the RESOLVE Research Advisory Council
Dr. Joseph Sany (moderator): Vice President, Africa Center, U.S. Institute of Peace
Bethany L. McGann (closing remarks): Program Officer, Program on Violent Extremism, US Institute of Peace; Research and Project Manager, RESOLVE Network
Framing Violent Extremism
All of the panelists acknowledged the importance of beginning any discussion of countering/preventing violent extremism (C/PVE) methods with an examination of the definitions that undergird these policies. Olojo stressed that counterterrorism is often a particularly problematic term. State actors, particularly in Africa, have frequently exploited the concept of counterterrorism to abuse their political power. By shifting to discussions of preventing violent extremism rather than counterterrorism, policymakers and scholars can begin to focus on risk factors, early warning mechanisms, and root causes, as opposed to security responses to violence.
In addition to the effect for high-level actors, definitions and terms matter for local actors. As Donnelly noted, women’s groups in particular have raised concerns about threats they have received due to their association with counterterrorism and counterviolent extremism programming. Moreover, Western groups frequently engage with African countries with a preconceived idea of what constitutes the most significant security threats, while ignoring contradictory information from local groups. As a result, Sany emphasized that local actors must own the framing of C/PVE programming.
The COVID-19 pandemic and violent extremism
The COVID-19 pandemic has been a significant development in the evolution of violent extremist organizations in Africa. Olojo pointed to two groups in Africa in particular: Boko Haram and al-Shabab. Since the onset of the pandemic, Boko Haram has pushed narratives that the pandemic is a punishment from God. Through these narratives, the group has sought to capitalize on the crisis to aid their recruitment strategies. In the Horn of Africa, al-Shabab established a COVID-19 prevention and treatment center. The group’s decision to form this center highlights both how the pandemic has exacerbated governance failures. Violent extremist organizations are exploiting these failures to increase their standing.
Community-oriented C/PVE
Discussions of community-oriented C/PVE methods and the role of gender dominated much of the panel’s discussion. Olojo identified four key ideas regarding the inclusion of communities in C/PVE programming. First, community voices ought to be included because they bear the brunt of violence from these groups. Second, research on communities should not simply focus on gathering data, but should also allow communities to express their views. Third, emphasis should be placed on developing a shared vision across communities, which is ultimately a prerequisite to successful dialogue. Finally, policymakers and scholars should remember that their ultimate responsibility lies with enhancing the welfare of these local communities.
Donnelly remarked on the importance of including women’s voices–and a discussion of gender more broadly–in engagements with local communities. She delineated three particularly pressing issues along these lines for Africa in 2021:
- Deep concern about the upcoming elections in Somalia and the prospects for election violence perpetrated by al-Shabab. In particular, she fears that an election crisis could sideline the activism of women.
- Frustration that PVE policy and programming has continued to fail with respect to the re-integration of women participants in violent extremist organizations. Re-integration programming to date has focused almost entirely on male participants in these organizations, despite the fact that women experience unique barriers to re-entering society.
- Societies have not reckoned with the reality of child members of these organizations. Many children were either born into these groups or have been integrated into them, and as a result many children have now been imprisoned due to their connections to Boko Haram.
To watch the event in full: