Tag: Kenya
No idyll
The Kenyan Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission has finally reported on its five-year effort. While some of its findings will be contested, the overall picture is all to clear. Anyone still thinking of Kenya as idyllic should peruse the executive summary:
The Commission finds that between 1895 and 1963, the British Colonial administration in Kenya was responsible for unspeakable and horrific gross violations of human rights. In order to establish its authority in Kenya, the colonial government employed violence on the population on an unprecedented scale. Such violence included massacres, torture and ill-treatment and various forms of sexual violence. The Commission also finds that the British Colonial administration adopted a divide and rule approach to the local population that created a negative dynamic of ethnicity, the consequences of which are still being felt today. At the same time the Colonial administration stole large amounts of highly productive land from the local population, and removed communities from their ancestral lands.
The Commission finds that between 1963 and 1978, President Jomo Kenyatta presided over a government that was responsible for numerous gross violations of human rights. These violations included:
- in the context of Shifta War, killings, torture, collective punishment and denial of basic needs (food, water and health care);
- political assassinations of Pio Gama Pinto, Tom Mboya and J.M. Kariuki;
- arbitrary detention of political opponents and activists; and
- illegal and irregular acquisition of land by the highest government officials and their political allies
The Commission finds that between 1978 and 2002, President Daniel Arap Moi presided over a government that was responsible for numerous gross violations of human rights. These violations include:
- Massacres;
- unlawful detentions, and systematic and widespread torture and ill-treatment of political and human rights activists;
- Assassinations, including of Dr. Robert Ouko;
- Illegal and irregular allocations of land; and
- economic crimes and grand corruption.
The Commission finds that between 2002 and 2008, President Mwai Kibaki presided over a government that was responsible for numerous gross violations of human rights:
- unlawful detentions, torture and ill-treatment;
- assassinations and extra judicial killings; and
- economic crimes and grand corruption
The Commission finds that state security agencies, particularly the Kenya Police and the Kenya Army, have been the main perpetrators of bodily integrity violations of human rights in Kenya including massacres, enforced disappearances, torture and ill-treatment, and sexual violence.
The Commission finds that Northern Kenya (comprising formerly of North Eastern Province, Upper Eastern and North Rift) has been the epicenter of gross violations of human rights by state security agencies. Almost without exception, security operations in Northern Kenya has [sic] been accompanied by massacres of largely innocent citizens, systematic and widespread torture, rape and sexual violence of girls and women, looting and burning of property and the killing and confiscation of cattle.
The Commission finds that state security agencies have as a matter of course in dealing with banditry and maintaining peace and order employed collective punishment against communities regardless of the guilt or innocence of individual members of such communities.
The Commission finds that during the mandate period the state adopted economic and other policies that resulted in the economic marginalization of five key regions in the country: North Eastern and Upper Eastern; Coast; Nyanza; Western; and North Rift.
The Commission finds that historical grievances over land constitute the single most important driver of conflicts and ethnic tension in Kenya. Close to 50 percent of statements and memorandum received by the Commission related to or touched on claims over land.
The Commission finds that women and girls have been the subject of state sanctioned systematic discrimination in all spheres of their life. Although discrimination against women and girls is rooted in patriarchal cultural practices, the state has traditionally failed to curb harmful traditional practices that affect women’s enjoyment of human rights.
The Commission finds that despite the special status accorded to children in Kenyan society, they have been subjected to untold and unspeakable atrocities including killings, physical assault and sexual violence.
The Commission finds that minority groups and indigenous people suffered state sanctioned systematic discrimination during the mandate period (1963-2008). In particular, minority groups have suffered discrimination in relation to political participation and access to national identity cards. Other violations that minority groups and indigenous people have suffered include: collective punishment; and violation of land rights and the right to development.
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Kenya: preventing electoral violence
Global Communities hosted a discussion Thursday morning with their own Kimberly Tilock, Jackie Wilson of the U.S. Institute of Peace and Lauren Ploch Blanchard of the Congressional Research Service. Tara Candland, a master’s student at SAIS, reports:
Presidential elections will take place in Kenya Monday, March 4. Many domestic and international observers worry about a recurrence of the violence that followed the 2007 elections.
Kenya was a one-party state until 2002, when an ethnically based opposition finally succeeded in pressuring the five-term president to step down. The subsequent elections were peaceful, assuaging the international community’s fears of a violent transition and giving a false sense of electoral stability. Despite warning signs in the lead-up to the 2007 elections, the violence took many by surprise. Ethnic tensions had led to violence in the 1980s and 1990s, but international observers considered it marginal.
The electoral contest this year is primarily between the current Luo prime minister, Raila Odinga, and Uhuru Kenyatta, a Kikuyu. The Luo and the Kikuyu are two of the largest ethnic groups in the country and frequently compete with each other. Kenyatta would be the current president’s (also a Kikuyu) chosen successor.
The situation is complicated by the fact that both he and his running mate have been indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes against humanity associated with the 2007 electoral violence. The current president has been liaising with Kenya’s business community to try to determine the potential impact on Kenya’s economy if the new president were to be an ICC indictee.
Despite progress since the 2007 elections, Blanchard cautions that there are still numerous problems as the election approaches and clear warnings of possible violence. In 2010, a new constitution was adopted through a peaceful and credible referendum. It overhauled the electoral system. Nevertheless, vote buying has already begun, politicians are resorting to hate speech and ethnically based politicking, and grievances associated with land tenure and natural resources remain unresolved. Furthermore, decentralization, a key aspect of the new system, has proven problematic, as both Blanchard and Tilock highlighted. Many of the new districts are drawn along ethnic lines, reinforcing ethnic differences.
In the midst of these problems, Wilson explained, come reports of weapons stockpiling, increased presence of armed groups, rising police brutality and civilian aggression against the police. The violence cannot usually be traced back to a particular candidate, but there are reports of politicians orchestrating the violence through late-night meetings and secret phone calls. Tilock added that people have started to relocate to their tribal lands or have been evicted from their communities based on ethnicity. Businesses are shutting down in anticipation of the election. Observers are trying to determine what the trigger to violence might be, including long lines expected in most voting stations and intimidation.
According to Wilson, there are two main challenges to preventing electoral violence:
- There is a lack of analysis on how it occurs and how to prevent it.
- There is a critical gap between early warning and early response.
The Kenyan government has tried its best, making this one of the best elections in terms of available information, but there is still a need for action. Local communities no longer trust the national system or the police and now want to form their own local response teams that would be based on text messaging networks and local dispute resolution committees.
One area that has commanded a lot of attention are the informal settlements, especially those in Nairobi where Global Communities works. Tilock explained that they were a hotspot in the last election because the settlements are a microcosm of the country, with many different ethnic groups segregated into their own communities but living side-by-side. There is high unemployment and a large youth population from which the leaders of the 2007 violence drew many of their supporters. Global Communities is working in the settlements to try educate people and help them recognize the way the national leaders are manipulating them. The youth are destroying their communities for a couple of dollars a day to help leaders who have ignored the communities’ plight.
Global Communities has used different strategies to try to prevent violence in the informal settlements. It has tried to establish meaningful dialogues between the different ethnic groups by training community mediators who are also responsible for monitoring the situation in the settlements and reporting on it. It has also tried to depoliticize the situation by focusing on educating the residents as to their rights and the government’s responsibilities according to the 2010 constitution.
The focus has been mainly on settlement leaders and youth. Global Communities believes that leaders will be leaders no matter the circumstances. Therefore the best leaders for a peace campaign are the people who are currently leading the settlements: the gang leaders. This has proven remarkably successful.
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Prevent what?
Most of us who work on international affairs think it would be much better to use diplomacy to prevent bad things from happening rather than waiting until the aftermath and then cleaning up after the elephants, which all too often involves expensive military action. But what precisely would that mean? What do we need to prevent?
The Council on Foreign Relations survey of prevention priorities for 2013 was published last week, just in time to be forgotten in the Christmas rush and New Year’s lull. It deserves notice, as it is one of the few nonpartisan attempts to define American national security priorities. This year’s edition was in part crowd-sourced and categorizes contingencies on two dimensions: impact on U.S. interests (high, medium, low) and likelihood (likely, plausible, unlikely).
Syria comes out on top in both dimensions. That’s a no-brainer for likelihood, as the civil war has already reached catastrophic dimensions and is affecting the broader region. Judging from Paul Stares’ video introduction to the survey, U.S. interests are ranked high in part because of the risk of use or loss of chemical weapons stocks. I’d have ranked them high because of the importance of depriving Iran of its one truly reliable ally and bridge to Hizbollah, but that’s a quibble.
CFR ranks another six contingencies as high impact on U.S. interests and only plausible rather than likely. This isn’t so useful, but Paul’s video comes to the rescue: an Israeli military strike on Iran that would “embroil” the U.S. and conflict with China in the East or South China seas are his picks to talk about. I find it peculiar that CFR does not treat what I would regard as certainly a plausible if not a likely contingency: a U.S. attack on Iran. There are few more important decisions President Obama will need to make than whether to use force to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Certainly it is a far more challenging decision than whether to go to war against China in the territorial disputes it is generating with U.S. allies in Pacific. I don’t know any foreign policy experts who would advise him to go in that direction.
It is striking that few of the other “plausible” and high-impact contingencies are amenable to purely military responses:
- a highly disruptive cyberattack on U.S. critical infrastructure
- a mass casualty attack on the U.S. homeland or on a treaty ally
- severe internal instability in Pakistan, triggered by a civil-military crisis or terror attack
It is not easy to determine the origin of cyberattacks, and not clear that a military response would be appropriate or effective. The same is also sometimes true of mass casualty attacks; our military response to 9/11 in Afghanistan has enmired the United States in its longest war to date, one where force is proving inadequate as a solution. It is hard to imagine any military response to internal instability in Pakistan, though CFR offers as an additional low probability contingency a possible U.S. military confrontation with Islamabad “triggered by a terror attack or U.S. counterterror operations.”
In the “moderate” impact on U.S. interests, CFR ranks as highly likely “a major erosion of security in Afghanistan resulting from coalition drawdown.” I’d certainly have put that in high impact category, as we’ve still got 100,000 troops in Afghanistan and a significant portion of them will still be there at the end of 2013. In the “moderate” impact but merely plausible category CFR ranks:
- a severe Indo-Pakistan crisis that carries risk of military escalation, triggered by a major terror attack
- a severe North Korean crisis caused by another military provocation, internal political instability, or threatening nuclear weapons/ICBM-related activities
- a significant increase in drug trafficking violence in Mexico that spills over into the United States
- continuing political instability and emergence of a terrorist safe haven in Libya
Again there are limits to what we can do about most of these contingencies by conventional military means. Only a North Korea crisis caused by military provocation or threats would rank be susceptible to a primarily military response. The others call for diplomatic and civilian responses in at least a measure equal to the possible military ones.
CFR lets two “moderate” impact contingencies languish in the low probability category that I don’t think belong there:
- political instability in Saudi Arabia that endangers global oil supplies
- renewed unrest in the Kurdish dominated regions of Turkey and the Middle East
There is a very real possibility in Riyadh of a succession crisis, as the monarchy on the death of the king will likely move to a next generation of contenders. Kurdish irredentist aspirations are already a big issue in Iraq and Syria. It is hard to imagine this will not affect Iran and Turkey before the year is out. Neither is amenable to a purely military response.
Most of the contingencies with “low” impact on U.S. interests are in Africa:
- a deepening of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo that involves military intervention from its neighbors
- growing popular unrest and political instability in Sudan
- military conflict between Sudan and South Sudan
- renewed ethnic violence in Kenya surrounding March 2013 presidential election
- widespread unrest in Zimbabwe surrounding the electoral process and/or the death of Robert Mugabe
- failure of a multilateral intervention to push out Islamist groups from Mali’s north
This may tell us more about CFR and the United States than about the world. Africa has little purchase on American sentiments, despite our half-Kenyan president. All of these contingencies merit diplomatic attention, but none is likely to excite U.S. military responses of more than a purely emergency character, except for Mali. If you’ve got a few Islamist terrorists, you can get some attention even if you are in Africa.
What’s missing from this list? CFR mentions
…a third Palestinian intifada, a widespread popular unrest in China, escalation of a U.S.-Iran naval clash in the Persian Gulf, a Sino-Indian border crisis, onset of elections-related instability and violence in Ethiopia, unrest in Cuba following the death of Fidel Castro and/or incapacitation of Raul Castro, and widespread political unrest in Venezuela triggered by the death or incapacitation of Hugo Chavez.
I’d add intensification of the global economic slowdown (high probability, high impact), failure to do more about global warming (also high probability, delayed impact), demographic or financial implosion in Europe or Japan (and possibly even the U.S.), Russian crackdown on dissent, and resurgent Islamist extremism in Somalia. But the first three of these are not one-year “contingencies,” which shows one limit of the CFR exercise.
I would also note that the world is arguably in better shape at the end of 2012 than ever before in history. As The Spectator puts it:
Never has there been less hunger, less disease or more prosperity. The West remains in the economic doldrums, but most developing countries are charging ahead, and people are being lifted out of poverty at the fastest rate ever recorded. The death toll inflicted by war and natural disasters is also mercifully low. We are living in a golden age.
May it last.
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This week’s peace picks
Peacebuilding and corruption get a lot of attention this week. I hope “Frankenstorm” won’t affect too many of the events.
1. Global Corruption: Money, Power, and Ethics in the Modern World, Monday October 29, 10:00 AM – 11:30 AM, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Venue: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Choate Room
Speakers: Laurence Cockcroft, Michael Hershman, Claudia Dumas, Raymond Baker
Corruption is a key factor in sustaining appallingly high levels of poverty in many developing countries, particularly in relation to the provision of basic services such as education and health. It is also a major reason why increases in the growth rate in Africa and South Asia have failed to benefit large segments of the population. Corruption drives the over-exploitation of natural resources, capturing their value for a small elite – whether timber from Indonesia or coltan from the Congo. In the developed world, corrupt party funding undermines political systems and lays policy open to heavy financial lobbying.
Corruption has to be seen as the result of the interplay between elite ‘embedded networks’, political finance, greed and organized crime. It has been facilitated by globalization, the integration of new and expanding markets into the world economy, and by the rapid expansion of ‘offshore’ financial facilities, which provide a home to largely unregulated pools of finance derived from personal fortunes, organized crime and pricing malpractice in international trade.
This analysis probes beneath the surface of the international initiatives to curb corruption which have evolved since the 1990s. It indicates that there remain key ‘roadblocks’ to real reform which have to be addressed before major progress can be made. These include recognizing that the huge ‘shadow’ unrecorded economy in many countries is a reservoir of corrupt payments, that organized crime is a critical factor in controlling many political systems, that the finance to fund political parties always requires a pay-off which endangers political stability, and that ‘mispricing’ by local and international companies continues to prevent a just return to lower income countries participating in world trade.
RSVP for this event to pbenson@gfintegrity.org.
2. Diplomacy in Conflict: A Panel Discussion of US Foreign Policy in Times of Crisis, Monday October 29, 7:00 PM – 9:00 PM, Elliott School of International Affairs
Venue: Elliott School of International Affairs, 1957 E Street NW, Washington, DC 20052, Room 213
Speakers: Edward Gnehm, David Shinn, Patricia Lacina
In the wake of the tragedies at the U.S. outposts in Libya and Egypt, this event will serve as an opportunity to examine what goes on inside embassies and consulates during times of crisis. The panelists will discuss their experiences in the Foreign Service, the communication flow from leadership to staff on the ground, and other realities of diplomacy in conflict zones.
7:00 PM – 7:30 PM Pre-reception
7:30 PM – 9:00 PM Discussion
Register for this event here.
3. From Conflict Analysis to Peacebuilding Impact: Lessons from the People’s Peacebuilding Perspectives, Tuesday October 30, 9:30 AM – 11:00 AM, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Venue: Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Rome Building, 1619 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Rome Building Auditorium
Speakers: Janet Mohammed, Teresa Dumasy, James Ndung’U, Robert Parker
Rigorous conflict analysis is essential for all actors operating in settings of violence and social conflict. Many different assessment frameworks are in use by various international non-governmental and governmental institutions working in development, peacebuilding, and governance sectors, including US agencies. But analysis tools and the manner in which assessments are conducted vary widely, with mixed results.
Saferworld and Conciliation Resources are leading NGOs working internationally on programs and policies relating to conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The People’s Peacemaking Perspectives (PPP) project was a joint initiative implemented in close collaboration with a number of local actors and organizations on the ground. Panelists will present the conclusions of the PPP project and implications for US agencies and other institutions working in conflict settings using case studies in Kenya and other contexts. They will illustrate the benefits, success criteria and challenges to taking a participatory approach to conflict analysis.
This special event is co-sponsored by 3P Human Security, the Alliance for Peacebuilding, and the Conflict Management Program at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).
Register for this event here.
4. Third Annual Conference: Preventing Violent Conflict, Wednesday October 30, 9:00 AM – 5:15 PM, USIP
Venue: USIP, 2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20037
Speakers: Abiodun Williams, Jim Marshall, Nicholas Burns, Deborah Avant, Johnnie Carson, Robin Wright, Moeed Yusuf, Victor Cha, Lawrence Woocher, Michael Lund, Joseph Wright, Michael Lekson, Patrick Meier, Melanie Greenberg, Bertrand Ramcharan, Patricia Haslach, Chester Crocker, John Prendergast
Preventing violent conflict has been high on the agenda of several governments, international institutions, and non-governmental organizations in recent years. Last January, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon declared 2012 the “Year of Prevention.” These various actors have also taken necessary steps to develop frameworks for designing and implementing prevention strategies, as well as to enhance their institutional capacities for prevention. The justification for this is clear: conflict prevention is preferable to reactive approaches for moral, strategic, and economic reasons.
Yet from Syria to Mali, from Iran to the Korean Peninsula, effective conflict prevention remains an immense challenge. There is a need for a better understanding of how conflict prevention strategies can be applied to country-specific situations. To support this effort, USIP will convene experts and policymakers to discuss challenges and opportunities for conflict prevention around the world at its third annual conference on Preventing Violent Conflict.
The keynote address will be delivered by Ambassador Nicholas Burns, Professor at Harvard University and former Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs. The first panel will highlight regional challenges in preventing future conflict. The afternoon panel will reflect on the roles and tools available to key prevention actors, including the U.S. government, the United Nations, regional organizations and civil society. This year’s conference includes four concurrent break-out sessions allowing participants to discuss specific challenges facing conflict prevention efforts, including the prevention of mass atrocities, nuclear proliferation, and violent transitions from authoritarianism.
The goals of this event are to spotlight the importance of conflict prevention; address specific challenges facing prevention efforts; and identify priority areas for USIP’s future work on conflict prevention.
Schedule for this event here.
Register for this event here.
5. What the UN Can and Should Do to Fight Corruption, Wednesday October 31, 12:00 PM – 1:30 PM, UN Foundation
Venue: UN Foundation, 1800 Massachusetts Ave NW Washington, DC 20036, Conference Room
Speakers: Frank Vogl, Janine Wedel, Nathaniel Heller
Frank Vogl, a founder of Transparency International, will discuss his new book “Waging War on Corruption- Inside the Movement Fighting the Abuse of Power” to begin the conversation on corruption and transparency worldwide. Vogl’s book has received positive reviews from media sources, having already been featured in The American and in interviews with Trust.org and Voice of America.
Professor Janine Wedel from George Mason University and Nathaniel Heller from Global Integrity will follow with brief remarks on the topic before all three speakers invite audience questions.
Please feel free to bring your own lunch to enjoy at this event.
Register for this event here.
6. The Missing Peace Symposium: Sexual Violence in Conflict and Post-Conflict Settings, Thursday November 1 through Saturday November 3, USIP
Venue: Attendance by webcast at www.usip.org/webcast or at USIP by invitation only
Speakers: Donald Steinberg, Zainab Hawa Bangura, Jody Williams, Patricia Sellers, Melanne Verveer, Wegger Christian Strommen, Abigail Disney
Sexual violence in conflict and post-conflict settings is increasingly recognized as a threat to international peace and security. From conflicts in the Balkans to the Democratic Republic of Congo and from East Timor to Guatemala, state and non-state armed actors have used sexual violence against women, men, and children to intimidate and to terrorize populations, and as a means of displacing people from contested territory, destroying communities and silencing victims. As these wars have ended, however, sexual violence often does not end—which, in turn, undermines reconstruction efforts and the transition to more stable, secure, and peaceful societies.
Despite the increased international attention to sexual violence as a weapon of war, including the adoption of UN Security Council resolutions, and important rulings in international criminal courts, initiatives to prevent or mitigate these violent acts continue to fall short. Existing international interventions may lack an integrated understanding of the causes for sexual violence and its implications for societies at large.
The United States Institute of Peace (USIP), the Human Rights Center at the University of California, Berkeley, the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute North America (SIPRI North America) will convene a group of scholars, policymakers, practitioners, and military and civil society actors to examine the issue of sexual violence in conflict and post-conflict settings, identify gaps in knowledge and reporting and explore how to increase the effectiveness of current responses to such violence.
See the conference schedule here.
7. Military Strategy Forum: The Future of the United States Army: Critical Questions for a Period of Transition, Thursday November 1, 10:30 AM – 11:30 AM, CSIS
Venue: CSIS, 1800 K Street NW, Washington DC, 20006, B1 Conference Room
Speakers: Raymond T. Odierno, John J. Hamre, David Berteau, Kim Wincup
Discussion with General Raymond T. Odierno, Chief of Staff of the Army, and Dr. John J. Hamre, President and CEO of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Followed by Q&A with General Odierno, moderated by David Berteau, CSIS Senior Vice President and Director of the International Security Program, and Kim Wincup, CSIS Senior Adviser.
Discussion: 10:30-11:00 a.m.
Q&A: 11:00-11:30 a.m.
Sponsored by Rolls-Royce North America
Dress is business attire or working uniform
Register for this event here.
8. Linking the Caspian to Europe: Repercussions of the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline Agreement (TANAP) for Azerbaijan, Turkey, and the Region, Thursday November 1, 2:00 PM – 4:00 PM, Rethink Institute
Venue: Rethink Institute, 750 First Street NE, Washington, DC 20002, Suite 1125
Speakers: Michael J. G. Cain, Rovshan Ibrahimov, Michael Ratner, Fevzi Bilgin
The intergovernmental agreement recently signed between the governments of Azerbaijan and Turkey begins the next phase of the Trans-Anatolian natural gas pipeline project (TANAP). The pipeline, which is estimated to cost $7 billion, will transport 16 billion cubic meters of gas each year from Azerbaijan through Georgia to Turkey, with most of the gas volumes going to Europe. Deliveries of Azerbaijani gas are expected to begin in 2017, while project planning starts in 2013.
Although the volumes of gas reaching Europe are relatively small compared with the original Nabucco project, TANAP officially opens the coveted “southern gas corridor” to EU states. This corridor will provide Caspian gas directly to European markets not controlled by Moscow or Tehran. Despite the strong backing of the United States for Nabucco across several US administrations, the European goal of weakening Moscow’s resource influence on the economies of the European Union remains a distant dream. Considerations of power politics notwithstanding, European, US and Russian power probably did not ultimately determine Nabucco’s fate. Realist power politics had little role to play. Instead regional political and commercial considerations associated with the smaller TANAP project sealed Nabucco’s fate. TANAP emerged as the preferred pipeline to Europe from the Caspian, because of its local political and economic appeal. This suggests an important lesson for international relations in the 21st century-that regional politics when combined with commercial interests and local market development can trump geopolitical resource competition.
Why did realist politics among the great powers give way to the local interests of smaller regional states? This paper identifies several key internal domestic drivers of TANAP for both Azerbaijan and Turkey to better understand why TANAP prevailed over the much heralded, Western backed Nabucco pipeline project. These domestic factors illustrate how exploiting natural resources and geographic comparative advantages translate into increased political power for each state. The paper also shows how the construction and operation of TANAP will likely accelerate the economic integration of Caspian states while strengthening the economic and political linkages of Azerbaijan, Turkey and Georgia to Europe.
Register for this event here.
9. Becoming Nonviolent Peacemakers, Friday November 2, 12:00 PM – 1:30 PM, Berkeley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs
Venue: Berkeley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs, 3307 M Street, Washington, DC 20007, Suite 200, 3rd Floor Conference Room
Speaker: Eli McCarthy
Why do many US residents, Catholics and Catholic leaders among them, too often fall short of adequately challenging the use of violence in US policy? Even when community organizers, policymakers, members of Catholic leadership, and academics sincerely search for alternatives to violence, they too often think about nonviolence as primarily a rule or strategy. Catholic Social Teaching has been moving toward transcending the limits of these approaches, but it still has significant room for growth. In order to contribute to this growth and to impact US policy, McCarthy draws on Jesus, Gandhi, Ghaffar Khan, and King to offer a virtue-based approach to nonviolent peacemaking with a corresponding set of core practices. This approach is also set in conversation with aspects of human rights discourse to increase its possible impact on US policy.
Eli McCarthy, author of Becoming Nonviolent Peacemakers: A Virtue Ethic for Catholic Social Teaching and US Policy, will be joining us to discuss his new book and provide insights into these questions.
Register for this event here.
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The coming week’s peace picks
Too much this week, and most of it happening Wednesday:
1. Are economic sanctions the key to resolving the nuclear dispute? CSIS, February 27, 6-8 pm.
The Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) is pleased to invite you to a debate on the recent sanctions imposed on Iran. These sanctions target Iran’s banking sector and are widely believed to have had significant effects not just on Iran’s ability to acquire materials for its nuclear program, but also its energy sector and economy as a whole. Although many agree that Iranian development of a nuclear weapon would have serious security implications for the Middle East, questions about whether or not this is truly Iran’s intent and what the United States should do about it remain hotly contested. Does diplomacy still offer a means of resolving this issue and, if so, are the economic sanctions being passed on Iran making a diplomatic solution harder or easier to achieve?
Two highly distinguished scholars will come to CSIS to present opposing views on this issue and debate the policy of sanctioning Iran on its merits. The debate will feature:
Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution
and
Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute
Dr. Maloney will present her argument that sanctioning Iran has become counterproductive and that the U.S. “cannot hope to bargain with a country whose economy it is trying to disrupt and destroy.” Mr. Rubin will take the opposing view that “only overwhelming pain” will convince the Iranian leadership to cooperate fully with the IAEA.
A cocktail reception with appetizers will begin at 6:00pm and the debate will commence at 6:30pm.
RSVP to David Slungaard at dslungaard@csis.org.
Webast: For those that cannot attend, the debate will live streamed. A link to the webcast will posted on this page on the day of the debate.
This event is the 13th installment of PONI’s ongoing Live Debate Series, which is an extension of the PONI Debates the Issues blog. The objective of the series is to provide a forum for in-depth exploration of the arguments on both sides of key nuclear policy issues. Please join us for what promises to be an exciting debate on a crucial issue of concern for the nonproliferation community, international security analysts, and regional specialists focusing on the Middle East.
2. Policing Iraq, USIP, February 29, 9:30-11:30 am
Under Saddam Hussein, a complex web of intelligence and security institutions protected the regime and repressed the Iraqi people. Underfunded and mismanaged, the Iraqi police were least among those institutions and unprepared to secure the streets when Coalition Forces arrived in 2003 and disbanded the rest of the security apparatus. Iraq’s police forces have made important strides, and some 400,000 Iraqi police have been trained and stationed across the country. However, with the U.S. drawdown in Iraq, the future of the Iraqi police and U.S. police assistance is uncertain.
On February 29, the United States Institute of Peace and the Institute for the Study of War will co-host a panel of distinguished experts who will discuss the history of the Iraqi police and the U.S. police assistance program in Iraq. This public event will introduce a new USIP Special Report by Robert Perito on “The Iraq Federal Police: U.S. Police Building under Fire.”
Speakers
- General Jim Dubik (U.S. Army, ret.), Panelist
Senior Fellow, Institute for the Study of War
Former Commander, Multi National Security Transition Command-Iraq - Dr. Austin Long, Panelist
Assistant Professor, Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs
- Ginger Cruz, Panelist
Former Deputy Inspector General, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) - Robert Perito, Moderator
Director, Security Sector Governance Center, U.S. Institute of Peace
Author, USIP Special Report, “The Iraq Federal Police: U.S. Police Building under Fire” - Tara Sonenshine, Introduction
Executive Vice President, U.S. Institute of Peace - Marisa Cochrane Sullivan,Introduction
Deputy Director, Institute for the Study of War
3. Webs of Conflict and Pathways to Peace in the Horn of Africa: A New Approach? Woodrow Wilson Center, 6th floor auditorium, February 29, 10-11:30 am
The Horn of Africa is one of the world’s most conflicted regions, experiencing over 200 armed conflicts since 1990. In recent months, the region has been afflicted with drought, famine, refugee migrations and military confrontations. All of these dynamics have catapulted the Horn of Africa upwards on the priority list for US policymakers.
In response to this on-going crisis, the Wilson Center’s Project on Leadership and Building State Capacity established a Horn of Africa Steering Committee in 2010 that focused on developing a regional US policy framework for the Horn. A conflict mapping report that analyses the major patterns, cross-cutting issues, and interrelationships in the Horn’s ongoing armed conflicts was subsequently commissioned, as well as a set of recommendations for US policy in the region going forward.
On February 29, 2012, the Leadership Project, in partnership with Alliance for Peacebuilding and Institute for Horn of Africa Studies and Analysis (IHASA) The overall objective of the recommendations publication is to employ a conflict resolution-oriented approach to a US regional framework for the Horn, including the need to promote good governance, increase human security (not just state or regime security), strengthen regional cooperation, and boost economic development and regional economic integration.
This event will be taking place at the Woodrow Wilson Center in the 6th Floor Auditorium on February 29th from 10:00am-11:30am. Please RSVP to leadership@wilsoncenter.org.
Program Agenda
Scene-Setter
Paul Williams, Associate Professor, George Washington University
Discussants
Akwe Amosu, Director, Africa Advocacy, Open Society Institute (Invited)
Chic Dambach, Chief of Staff, Congressman John Garamendi, CA
Raja Jandhyala, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Africa, US Agency for International Development
Ambassador David Shinn, Former Ambassador to Ethiopia and Professor, George Washington University
Location:
Event Information
When
Wednesday, February 29, 2012
10:30 AM to 12:00 PM
Where
Falk Auditorium
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC
Map
Participants
Panelists
Suzanne Maloney
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy
Natan B. Sachs
Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy
Shibley Telhami
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy
5. Presidential Elections in Russia – What’s Next?, Carnegie Endowment, February 29, 12:30-2 pm
Dmitri Trenin, James F. Collins
Register to attend
With Russia’s presidential election less than a month away, Vladimir Putin is facing the most serious challenge since the establishment of his “power vertical.” Tens of thousands of people have taken to the streets across Russia, undeterred by plunging winter temperatures. Moscow is also facing challenges abroad—its recent veto of the United Nations Security Council resolution condemning the Syrian regime has threatened its relations with much of the Arab world, and the U.S.-Russia “reset” appears stuck in neutral.
Dmitri Trenin and Ambassador James F. Collins will discuss how Russia’s presidential elections will influence its policies.
6. China’s International Energy Strategies: Global and Regional Implications, Elliott School (Lindner Family Commons) February 29, 12:30-1:45 pm
Philip Andrews-Speed, Fellow, Transatlantic Academy, the German Marshall Fund of the United States; Associate Fellow, Chatham House
Discussant: Llewelyn Hughes, Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, GW
China is now a major player in the international energy arena. Imports of all forms of energy are increasing; national energy companies are investing around the world; and the government is active in different forms of energy diplomacy. These behaviors are driven by a range of interests from within and outside China. The external political consequences are rather greater than the economic ones, and vary around the world. China is a key player, along with Japan, in the progress of energy cooperation in East Asia.
RSVP at: http://go.gwu.edu/ASFeb29
Sponsored by Sigur Center for Asian Studies
7. Assessing U.S. Foreign Policy Priorities Amidst Economic Challenges: The Foreign Relations Budget for Fiscal Year 2013, 2172 Rayburn, February 29, 1:30 pm
Full Committee
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), Chairman
You are respectfully requested to attend the following open hearing of the Full Committee to be held in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building.
The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton
Secretary of State
U.S. Department of State
8. To What Extent Is Iran a Threat to Israel? 1055 Thomas Jefferson Street NW, Suite M100 February 29, 4-6 pm
9. Measuring and Combating Corruption in the 21st Century, SAIS Rome building rm 200, March 2, 12:30-2 pm
Summary: Nathaniel Heller, co-founder and executive director of Global Integrity, will discuss this topic. For more information and to RSVP, contact developmentroundtable@jhu.edu.
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What threatens the United States?
The Council on Foreign Relations published its Preventive Priorities Survey for 2012 last week. What does it tell us about the threats the United States faces in this second decade of the 21st century?
Looking at the ten Tier 1 contingencies “that directly threaten the U.S. homeland, are likely to trigger U.S. military involvement because of treaty commitments, or threaten the supplies of critical U.S. strategic resources,” only three are defined as military threats:
- a major military incident with China involving U.S. or allied forces
- an Iranian nuclear crisis (e.g., surprise advances in nuclear weapons/delivery capability, Israeli response)
- a U.S.-Pakistan military confrontation, triggered by a terror attack or U.S. counterterror operations
Two others might also involve a military threat, though the first is more likely from a terrorist source:
- a mass casualty attack on the U.S. homeland or on a treaty ally
- a severe North Korean crisis (e.g., armed provocations, internal political instability, advances in nuclear weapons/ICBM capability)
The remaining five involve mainly non-military contingencies:
- a highly disruptive cyberattack on U.S. critical infrastructure (e.g., telecommunications, electrical power, gas and oil, water supply, banking and finance, transportation, and emergency services)
- a significant increase in drug trafficking violence in Mexico that spills over into the United States
- severe internal instability in Pakistan, triggered by a civil-military crisis or terror attacks
- political instability in Saudi Arabia that endangers global oil supplies
- intensification of the European sovereign debt crisis that leads to the collapse of the euro, triggering a double-dip U.S. recession and further limiting budgetary resources
Five of the Tier 2 contingencies “that affect countries of strategic importance to the United States but that do not involve a mutual-defense treaty commitment” are also at least partly military in character, though they don’t necessarily involve U.S. forces:
- a severe Indo-Pak crisis that carries risk of military escalation, triggered by major terror attack
- rising tension/naval incident in the eastern Mediterranean Sea between Turkey and Israel
- a major erosion of security and governance gains in Afghanistan with intensification of insurgency or terror attacks
- a South China Sea armed confrontation over competing territorial claims
- a mass casualty attack on Israel
But Tier 2 also involves predominantly non-military threats to U.S. interests, albeit with potential for military consequences:
- political instability in Egypt with wider regional implications
- an outbreak of widespread civil violence in Syria, with potential outside intervention
- an outbreak of widespread civil violence in Yemen
- rising sectarian tensions and renewed violence in Iraq
- growing instability in Bahrain that spurs further Saudi and/or Iranian military action
Likewise Tier 3 contingencies “that could have severe/widespread humanitarian consequences but in countries of limited strategic importance to the United States” include military threats to U.S. interests:
- military conflict between Sudan and South Sudan
- increased conflict in Somalia, with continued outside intervention
- renewed military conflict between Russia and Georgia
- an outbreak of military conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, possibly over Nagorno Karabakh
And some non-military threats:
- heightened political instability and sectarian violence in Nigeria
- political instability in Venezuela surrounding the October 2012 elections or post-Chavez succession
- political instability in Kenya surrounding the August 2012 elections
- an intensification of political instability and violence in Libya
- violent election-related instability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
- political instability/resurgent ethnic violence in Kyrgyzstan
I don’t mean to suggest in any way that the military is irrelevant to these “non-military” threats. But it is not the only tool needed to meet these contingencies, or even to meet the military ones. And if you begin thinking about preventive action, which is what the CFR unit that publishes this material does, there are clearly major non-military dimensions to what is needed to meet even the threats that take primarily military form.
And for those who read this blog because it publishes sometimes on the Balkans, please note: the region are nowhere to be seen on this list of 30 priorities for the United States.
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