Tag: Kurds
Big trouble brewing
President-elect Trump’s cabinet appointments were not moderates from the first. With the exception of Defense and Homeland Security, he has appointed people who oppose the missions of the departments they have been named to lead. Rick Perry famously couldn’t even remember that Energy was one of the departments he said as a candidate he wanted to abolish. Ryan Zinke, named to Interior, opposes the conservation that department is entrusted with.
On domestic issues, we can anticipate that Congress will present a roadblock to some of the more outrageous proposals from the new administration. Abolishing Obamacare without providing an alternative isn’t going to happen, for precisely the reason Republicans opposed it in the first place: there are a lot of people enjoying its benefits. Depriving 20 million people of health insurance is not a winning political maneuver. The Energy Department isn’t going away, if only because it makes our nuclear weapons and manages nuclear waste. I’ll bet the national parks will still be the national parks four years from now, even if they will be open to more commercial activity than today.
On foreign policy, there are fewer constraints. The beneficiaries are not so well defined and presidential powers are dominant. Trump shook the One China policy with a single phone call, precipitating bellicose rhetoric from Beijing about the South China Sea. He has named as ambassador to Israel an advocate of Jewish settlements on the West Bank who opposes the two-state solution and looks forward to moving the embassy to Jerusalem. His bromance with Putin is already shaking allied confidence in NATO. Trump is a master at upsetting apple carts with small gestures.
His nominee for Secretary of State, Exxon CEO Rex Tillerson, is not at first sight the same type. By all reports, he has been a capable, maybe even an outstanding, manager of a gigantic energy company, which under his guidance even accepted that global warming is real and caused in part by human activity. But he too has been willing to defy expectations and do business not only with Russian President Putin but also a non-sovereign state like Iraqi Kurdistan as well as with petty dictators in weak states who need Exxon to exploit their resources so they can steal the revenue and keep themselves in power. It is hard to picture Tillerson supporting democratic reforms after a career of ignoring regime abuses, as Rachel Maddow ably made clear last night in an interview with Steve Coll:
Perhaps the most important foreign policy nomination has not yet been made: the US Trade Representative is presumably the person who will need to fulfill Trump’s campaign promises by renegotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), withdrawing from the Trans Pacific Partnership negotiations, and ending the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). If he follows through, these moves will make Europe, Asia and Latin America doubt America’s longstanding commitment to free trade and investment, present the Chinese and Russians with opportunities to fill giant gaps, and undermine the World Trade Organization.
That however is not my biggest concern. Trump is an ethnic nationalist with an extreme ethnic nationalist, Steve Bannon, as his chief strategist. They will be sympathetic to ethnic nationalist reasoning, which is what Russian President Putin is offering as an explanation for his aggression in Crimea, Donbas, Transnistria, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia. “Just trying to protect ethnic Russians,” Putin says. How many of these places will Trump be willing to concede to Russia in order to consummate his bromance with Putin? The Trump administration may also be more sympathetic than Obama has been to Iraqi Kurdistan’s independence ambitions, setting off a series of partitions in the Middle East (Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, even Turkey and Iran are potential candidates).
Four years is a long time. I don’t think it will be more than a month before some of Trump’s international moves brew the United States big trouble.
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Peace picks, December 5-9
- The Arab Woman: Enhancing Leadership and Resilience | Monday, December 5 | 10:00am – 3:30pm | United States Institute of Peace | Click HERE to Register
Social and economic empowerment of women has been shown to strengthen stability and resilience. From the national level to the grassroots, Arab women continue to face and overcome challenges to lead their countries and communities, while empowering one another.
Panelists, including leaders of government and civil society, will explore opportunities for the League of Arab States to invest in supporting women’s empowerment for the region’s peace and prosperity. The discussion will feature success stories of Arab women leaders breaking barriers, assess Arab and global initiatives focusing on women, and make recommendations for greater inclusivity.
Featuring Ambassador Inas Mekkawy,Head of Women, Family and Childhood Development, League of Arab States, Randa Hudome, Founder, Fahmy Hudome International, Manal Omar, Associate Vice President, Center for Middle East and Africa, U.S. Institute of Peace, Hibaaq Osman, Founder & CEO, El Karama, Donald Steinberg, CEO, World Learning, Representative Ilhan Omar, Minnesota House Representative for District 60B, Linda Bishai, Director of North Africa Programs, U.S. Institute of Peace, Kathleen Kuehnast, Senior Gender Advisor, U.S. Institute of Peace, Marwa AlKhairo, Manager of Partnership Development, International Youth Foundation, Hajar Sharief, Co-Founder, Libya Ma’an Nabneeha, Sali Osman, Cybersecurity Risk Advisory, Ernest and Young, “One to Watch” Award from Executive Women’s Forum - The Future of US-Turkish Relations: Cooperation or Frustration | Monday, December 5 | 10:00am – 11:15am | Bipartisan Policy Center | Click HERE to Register
Change may be in the future for U.S.-Turkey relations. Members of the incoming administration of President-elect Donald Trump have expressed both admiration for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and deep suspicion toward his brand of Islamist politics. Whether the new administration goes all in on Turkey or abandons it, this decision will have profound implications for the fight against ISIS, the outcome of the Syrian civil war, and Turkey’s domestic stability.
At this crucial juncture, join the Bipartisan Policy Center for the release of a new report detailing recommendations for the next administration and a discussion of the future of U.S.-Turkey relationship.
Featuring Charles Wald (Ret.), Former Deputy Commander, U.S. European Command, Co-Chair, BPC’s National Security Program, Eric Edelman, Former U.S. Ambassador to Finland and Turkey, Co-Chair, BPC’s Turkey Initiative, Amberin Zaman, Public Policy Scholar, Woodrow Wilson International, Center for Scholars, Columnist, Al-Monitor - Global Economic Challenges for Donald Trump | Monday, December 5 | 10:00am – 12:00pm | American Enterprise Institute | Click HERE to Register
On January 20, 2017, Donald Trump will assume office at a time of considerable strain in the global economy and after an election campaign that has raised serious questions about the relative benefits of globalization.
This seminar will take stock of how the US economy might be affected by the ongoing European sovereign debt crisis, the transformation of China’s economic growth model, and Japan’s renewed efforts to stave off deflation. It will also consider what international economic policies the Trump administration should pursue and the risks that unorthodox monetary policies by the world’s major central banks might pose for the global currency market.
Featuring Alex J. Pollock, R Street Institute, Fred Bergsten, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Jeffrey Frankel, Harvard University, Greg Ip, The Wall Street Journal, Anne Krueger, SAIS, Desmond Lachman, AEI - Strengthening US-Arab Cyber Security Policy Cooperation | Monday, December 5 | 1:30pm – 4:30pm | Middle East Institute | Click HERE to Register
Cyber threats are on the rise in the Middle East, ranging from electronic vandalism or financial crimes to sabotage and virtual acts of war. Governments and businesses in the Middle East have suffered damaging attacks. State actors and hacker collectives in the region are also believed to be targeting the U.S. military, civilian government agencies, and private sector systems.
What systemic problems will the United States and Arab states confront in the next few years? Are there gaps in national policy or in the collaboration between governments and the private sector that render the United States vulnerable? What is the state of the U.S.-Arab dialogue within these global issues, and how can Washington and its Arab partners coordinate better?
The Middle East Institute is pleased to host industry and policy experts for a program examining Middle Eastern cyber threat trends and developments affecting national security, essential services, and the economy. Register now to hear the analysis and recommendations of these leaders in the field.
Featuring Wendy Chamberlin, President, Middle East Institute, Sean Kanuck
Attorney and Strategic Consultant; former National Intelligence Officer for Cyber Issues, Omar al-Ibrahim, Security Researcher and Consultant, Omprotect LLC; Assistant Professor, Kuwait University, Robert Knake, Whitney Shepardson Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, Paul Kurtz, Founder and CEO, TruSTAR Technology, Patrick Tucker, (Moderator), Technology Editor, DefenseOne, James A. Lewis, Senior Vice President and Director, Strategic Technologies Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies - Kurds—A Beacon of Hope or a Harbinger of More Chaos | Monday, December 5 | 2:00pm – 3:00pm | Brookings Institution | Click HERE to Register
For the United States, Syrian Kurds are reliable boots on the ground in the fight against the Islamic State. Their agenda for autonomy and self-rule in northern Syria, however, is a source of vexation for Turkey. Ankara is worried about the emergence of a Kurdish state along its borders, which could bolster the demands of Kurds within Turkey for greater political recognition. Limitations on Kurds’ right to social and cultural self-expression is now viewed as a major flaw in Turkey’s democratic edifice. Its actions in Syria against the Kurdish forces also undermine the international coalition against ISIS. In return, these factors hamper Turkey’s relations with the U.S.
How can the actors in this regional theater break through the deadlock? In the latest Turkey Project Policy Paper, “Two routes to an impasse: Understanding Turkey’s Kurdish policy,” Ayşegül Aydın of University of Colorado and historical sociologist Cem Emrence of Leiden University explore how “politics of moderation” could offer the most effective solution to the crisis in the region, and discuss how the different actors involved—Turkey, the Kurds, and the United States—should take a more proactive approach, including a willingness to make compromises, in the interest of forging a lasting peace.
On December 5, 2016, the Turkey Project at Brookings will host a panel discussion on new approaches to the “Kurdish issue” in Turkey and its neighborhood. At the event, Ayşegül Aydın will present conclusions from her co-authored paper. Following her remarks, Nicholas Danforth of the Bipartisan Policy Center and Soner Cagaptay of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy will offer their perspectives. The discussion will be moderated by the Brookings TÜSİAD Senior Fellow Kemal Kirişci. - Inside the Islamist Terrorist’s Mind: A Conversation with Former CIA Interrogator James Mitchell | Tuesday, December 6 | American Enterprise Institute | Click HERE to Register
As a key architect of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation program, James Mitchell spent thousands of hours questioning terrorists, including 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM). He came to understand the terrorist mind better than anyone in America.
Now, for the first time, Dr. Mitchell will share what KSM told him — including his opinions of US counterterrorism policy, the Bush administration’s response to 9/11, his plans for future attacks, and why he is certain they will ultimately prevail in their war against America.
Join Dr. Mitchell and AEI’s Marc Thiessen for a discussion of Dr. Mitchell’s new book, “Enhanced Interrogation: Inside the Minds of the Islamic Terrorists Trying to Destroy America” (Crown Forum, 2016), as he offers a first-person account of the enhanced interrogation program and his personal interactions with the men behind the deadliest terrorist attack in history. - Afghanistan in 2016: A Survey of the Afghan People | Wednesday, December 7 | 9:30am – 11:30am | United States Institute of Peace | Click HERE to Register
The Asia Foundation, in partnership with the U.S. Institute of Peace, will present the findings of the 2016 Survey of the Afghan People at USIP on December 7. Crucial questions of security, economic stability, and reconciliation face the administration of President Ashraf Ghani and CEO Abdullah Abdullah. As they begin their third year in office, an atmosphere of increasing civilian casualties and unrest in the provincial capitals threatens the fragile but significant progress the country has made toward peace and prosperity over the past decade.
The findings of The Asia Foundation’s 12th annual Survey of the Afghan People are being released at an important moment for Afghanistan. The 2016 survey, based on face-to-face interviews with a nationally representative sample of more than 12,600 Afghan citizens, reveals their views on a range of issues including security, the economy, essential services, governance and political participation, corruption, justice, and gender equality. This year’s survey extends to new areas, including youth issues, migration, citizens’ awareness of legal resources, reconciliation with the Taliban, the Islamic State (ISIL/ISIS), landmines, and access to social media on mobile phones.
Conducted across the country’s 34 provinces, The Asia Foundation’s series of annual surveys since 2004 in Afghanistan provides an unmatched barometer of Afghan public opinion over time. Taken together, the surveys are a resource for policymakers in government, the international community and the broader Afghan public as they seek to navigate a difficult landscape toward a more peaceful and prosperous future for Afghanistan and the region.
Featuring Nancy Lindborg, President, U.S. Institute of Peace, David D. Arnold, President, The Asia Foundation, Zach Warren, Survey and Research Director in Afghanistan, The Asia Foundation, Idrees Ilham, Director of Governance Programs in Afghanistan, The Asia Foundation, Jena Karim, Former Deputy Country Representative for Programs in Afghanistan, The Asia Foundation, Scott Worden, Director, Afghanistan and Central Asia Programs, U.S. Institute of Peace - Potential for Middle East Cooperation in Various Fields | Wednesday, December 7 | 11:30am – 2:30pm | Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies | Click HERE to Register The Middle East Institute (MEI) and the Conflict Management Program of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) are pleased to host five of the contributing authors, Anthony Cordesman (CSIS), Shahrokh Fardoust (College of William and Mary), Querine Hanlon (Strategic Capacity Group), Ross Harrison (MEI), and Jean-Francois Seznec (MEI & SAIS), for a discussion of opportunities in regional cooperation and the costs of the prevailing competition and rivalries between states. Paul Salem (MEI) will moderate the discussion.
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Assad reaps the whirlwind
Syria’s almost six-year struggle with itself is coming to an ignominious end for an important contingent of its motley revolutionaries, who are facing defeat and even obliteration in eastern Aleppo. Idlib, where the opposition has generated an elaborate set of governing structures, will presumably be the next target of the Iranian/Russian/Syrian offensive. Provided that coalition continues its support, President Assad will soon control all of Syria’s major western population centers though still face Turkish-backed resistance in the north as well as CIA-backed resistance in the south. The Kurdish cantons along the Turkish border can’t be counted as revolutionary, but they aren’t likely to give up their autonomy any time soon.
The smart money is betting that the regime victory in Aleppo will tilt the playing field in Assad’s direction, lead at least some of the revolution’s external supporters to abandon their surrogates, and cause them to seek a modus vivendi with the Assad coalition. This will mean local surrenders and population transfers, which have become common. There will indeed be a political solution, but not of the kind Washington has sought. Assad will not need to agree to a political transition but instead claim to direct a “transition” himself, perhaps even including trappings like another Potemkin election.
The war against the Islamic State, especially the US-supported offensive investing Raqqa, will presumably continue, though a big question mark hangs over who lead the fight and govern in Raqqa (Kurds? Arabs? backed by Turkey? the US?) once ISIS is removed. The Assad regime has better prospects in Deir Azzour, where it has managed to maintain a presence.
Driven from control of cities, the Islamic State will presumably do in Syria what it has done in Iraq: head for the hinterland, go underground and revert to terrorist attacks on regime-controlled areas. This will help the regime to justify its repression, which relies on a bewildering half dozen security agencies as well as “anti-terrorism” courts that have jailed something like 100,000 Syrians.
Reconstruction faces insurmountable obstacles: Assad’s Russian and Iranian friends have told him they won’t pay. Iran might ante up a bit for resettling Alawites and Shia (Syrian or not) into strategically important areas around Damascus and on the road north, but they can afford little else. The Americans, the Gulf states, and the international financial institutions will refuse all but humanitarian assistance so long as Assad remains in power, unless the Trump Administration surprises all of us and decides to make him America’s latest Great White Hope. Alissa Rubin in today’s New York Times suggests Assad may be able to use the threat of increased refugee flows to blackmail the Europeans into footing some of the bill, but they aren’t likely to write checks in the hundreds of billions of euros required.
Fighting will likely continue even after the fall of Aleppo, Raqqa and Idlib, though likely at far lower levels than for the past year. The Russians and Iranians will be able to remove at least some of their troops and reduce some of their aid to Assad, though the country’s economic catastrophe will render him their ward for a long time to come. Syrian society, which in the leadup to the war was nowhere near as sectarian as Iraq’s, will not revert quickly (or likely ever) to its prior state. Alawites and Shiites, most of whom remained loyal, are going to expect rewards. Sunnis will be sharply divided between those who stuck with the regime and those who joined the revolution, but the latter aren’t likely to forget what Assad, the Russians and Iranians have done.
This is a war whose only winner is Assad, but what he has won is in many places reduced to rubble and unsustainable.
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The day after Mosul
It is almost certain that ISIS’s Iraqi capital, Mosul, will fall to Iraqi and Kurdish forces within the next year. However, the question remains as to how the city will rebuild itself. For that, we can look to the experience of Kirkuk, another major Iraqi city that was secured by Kurdish forces in 2014.
On Monday, the Kirkuki governor Najmaldin Karim spoke at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He was interviewed by Michael Knights, a Lafer fellow at the Washington Institute.
Karim explained that despite the Kurdish control of the city, Kirkuk is in a precarious position. Since the Mosul operation began last month, ISIS militants have begun attacking Kirkuk, leading to 13 deaths and 200 injuries. It is difficult for Kirkuki officials to detect ISIS militants because they disguise themselves as civilians and internally displace people (IDPs). Additionally, some of the suburbs around Kirkuk are still controlled by ISIS. These represent a major threat to Kirkuk. The governor expressed disappointment that the Iraqi military and the Peshmerga decided to address the problem in Mosul before the problems around Kirkuk.
The problems that created Al Qaeda in Iraq—ISIS’s predecessor—still exist. The discord between Iraqi Sunnis and Shias as well as Kurds and Arabs still causes problems in Iraq. If these divisions are not addressed, ISIS or another radical group will take root in Iraq even after the Mosul operation ends. Karim noted that Mosul is especially tricky due to its internal ethnic divisions and the large number of ISIS supporters in the city. It will also be very difficult to return IDPs to the city, since much of it will be destroyed in the fighting.
Karim focused on how Kirkuk has been handling its population of IDPs. The majority are Sunnis from Mosul. Some are from towns that have already been liberated from ISIS, but due to destruction they have not been able to return. The city has received no financial assistance from Baghdad to help care for and resettle the IDPs. In fact, the city is fully supported by the KRG, which has not been able to give Kirkuk what it should. Karim sees the issue of IDPs as central to the rebuilding of Iraq. If the IDPs cannot return home and lead happy, productive lives, Iraq will remain in chaos, even after ISIS has left the country.
Karim was asked if he were the governor of Mosul, what would be his priorities for the day after liberation? He answered that he would be vigilant not to prioritize certain areas over others. If the governor of Mosul chooses to rebuild Shia areas before Sunni areas, the Sunni population of Mosul would rise up in protest and cause instability. Rebuilding should be prioritized based on the number of people.
The KRG representative to the United States, Bayan Sami Abdul Rahman asked Karim if perhaps Kirkuk is subtly trying to pursue an agenda of Arabization by accepting a large number of Sunni Arab IDPs. Karim admitted that from an outsider’s perspective it might look as though this is Kirkuk’s agenda, especially given Arabization efforts in Kirkuk in the past. However, he said, Kirkuk is desperately trying to return the IDPs to their homes. They are stuck in Kirkuk for the time being, for better or for worse.
Karim said that he hopes President-elect Trump will focus more on stabilizing Iraq rather than defeating ISIS. Kurds are worried that once ISIS is defeated they will lose US support and will not be able to pursue their goal of independence. However, Karim remains hopeful that KRG president Barzani will be able to negotiate greater Kurdish autonomy with Iraqi president Al-Abadi in the aftermath of the Mosul operation.
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The toughest nut in the Middle East
The Middle East Institute held their 7th annual conference on Turkey last week, gathering regional experts to discuss Turkey’s turbulent domestic politics and regional role. This post focuses on the regional issues discussed.
Haim Malka of the Center for Strategic and International Studies focused on Turkey-Israel relations. The reconciliation agreement following Israel’s 2010 raid on a Turkish flotilla headed to Gaza is being implemented. This is a mutually-beneficial, low-cost measure. Strategic cooperation is likely to remain limited.
Syria will test the renewed relationship as it is an arena where both Turkey and Israel’s interests intersect. Israel’s policy on Syria has to date been confused and vague, perhaps intentionally so, but ultimately the Israelis want to see a Syria with minimal Iranian influence. The fall of Iran’s ally Assad may be assumed beneficial to Israel, but the Israelis seem to have followed a ‘better the devil you know’ approach so far and do not appear to be supporting alternative political actors in Syria.
Bill Park of King’s College, London discussed Turkey’s relations with the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq, which saw marked improvement in 2009 and 2010 due to trade and energy connections, shared mistrust of Maliki’s Baghdad government, and President Barzani’s role as a potential partner in the peace process with Turkey’s own Kurds (the PKK). While these foundations for positive relations remain, Turkey’s refusal to support Syrian Kurds in the fight against IS, Turkey’s re-establishing a relationship with Baghdad following the replacement of Maliki by Abadi, and a change in perception of Barzani’s leadership record have undermined the rapprochement.
Senior Associate with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Karim Sadjadpour discussed Turkey-Iran relations. There are notable commonalities between the two states as they suffer both a superiority and inferiority complex – both do not see their current status in world affairs as reflecting their histories as great empires. There is also a strong shared cultural history. The Iran-Turkey border has proven stable in an otherwise turbulent region for centuries. Also important is their economic partnership, with shared gas projects and common concern with Kurdish independence.
Having suffered from terrorist attacks, Turkey is disappointed in Iran following Assad’s lead, especially in ignoring the radical Islamist threat in Syria. Upcoming events could exacerbate frictions between Turkey and Iran. These include the upcoming US presidential election, the May 2017 presidential elections in Iran, and whether the nuclear deal lasts ten years.
Presenting the complex relationship of Turkey, the US and Kurds was Amberin Zaman, Public Policy Fellow with the Wilson Center. She believes the US has an opportunity to use its leverage with the Syrian Kurds (the PYD) and Turkey to revive the Turkey-Kurdish peace process. This will require the US to abandon the fiction that the PYD and PKK are separate groups. The PYD is not seeking an independent state but rather a subnational federal unit within Syria, which the Kurds term “Rojava.”
While Turkey is unable to determine a military outcome, Ankara holds considerable soft power, especially in assisting the moderate opposition.
It was agreed among all the panelists that the US must articulate its policy for the region, and Syria in particular, as Turkey and its neighbors are looking for US leadership and unwilling to pursue their own policies without clarification from Washington. That is proving the toughest nut to crack in the Middle East.
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In the box can be good too
I enjoyed 90 minutes today with SAIS’s Mike Lampton and CSIS’s Michael Green commenting on Amitai Etzioni’s Foreign Policy: Thinking Outside the Box, a recent Chatham House publication. Here are my speaking notes, though I should note much of the event focused on China, which was not within my remit:
- First let me say it has been a privilege to be required to read this book. It is a model of precision and intelligibility. Professor Ezioni says what he means clearly and concisely, marshaling the evidence with skill and erudition.
- My doubts have to do mainly with the title: it advertises thinking outside the box, but much of the book is devoted to ideas I would regard as well inside the box, even if some of them might be labeled “new normal.”
- Take, for example, the chapter on “defining down sovereignty.” A good deal of it is spent pooh-poohing the Westphalian notion of sovereignty and arguing in favor of a more contemporary alternative: sovereignty as entailing rights as well as responsibilities.
- This leads naturally to Responsibility to Protect, which is well within the box these days, and another, new to me notion, “responsibility to counter terrorism.” If states fail or refuse to do this, intervention might be justified, Professor Etzioni says.
- It’s an interesting idea that even explains some current behavior, in particular the anti-ISIL intervention in Syria, which the host government has not unauthorized.
- The downsides are all too clear: the slippery slope that leads to an unjustified excuse for invasion or other intervention, as in George W.
- The chapter on spheres of influence is not so much outside the box as it is outside the realm of academic discussion, as Professor Etzioni himself documents. Spheres of influence are a well-established practice in international affairs, even if the concept has not attracted much scholarly attention.
- Professor Etzioni sees spheres of influence, Russia’s “near-abroad” for example or Iran’s influence in Iraq, as providing space for rising regional powers and buffer zones that bolster a feeling of security.
- The trouble with that notion is that it discounts the will of those who live in these buffer states. The limits of his approach are all to evident in Ukraine, where Etzioni admits Russia used force to try to prevent the Ukrainians from choosing their alignment with Europe.
- People just aren’t always content to serve the purposes of other powers.
- When it comes to self-determination, I would quibble with Amitai’s characterization of Kurdistan as more democratic than the rest of Iraq, but more importantly he ignores the negative regional and internal political contexts for any independence move by the Iraqi Kurds. I doubt it will happen, or that it will be democratizing if it does.
- I would agree however with Amitai’s main conclusion: decentralization rather than secession is far more likely to produce positive outcomes in democratic societies like Spain, where unfortunately the central government has been unwilling to concede even that. That however is a conclusion well inside the box, not outside it.
- One concluding thought: Professor Etzioni repeatedly doubts the applicability of liberal democratic notions outside the family of liberal democratic states.
- As an American, I feel condemned to believe in universal rights, as our founding documents are all too clear on this subject.
- But I would also say that I’ve virtually never met someone outside the liberal democratic world who didn’t aspire to those rights.
- We don’t need to export the notion that all people are created equal. We only need to help people find ways of institutionalizing equal rights in ways that are appropriate to their particular contexts.
- All in all, a good and interesting read, even if the novelty is overblown.
I made two points in the discussion period worth recalling:
- Liberal democracy is not congruent with secularism, since we have liberal democratic states (where rights are in principle equal) like Italy and the UK with established churches (not to mention the penetration of religion into government in the US).
- Russia’s behavior in Ukraine cannot properly be attributed to NATO expansion. Putin has made it clear that he is trying to re-establish Moscow’s hegemony in what he considers Russia’s near-abroad. That is not a reaction to NATO expansion but rather an aggressive program vital to his view of Russia’s historic and cultural role, as well as to his domestic political standing.
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