Tag: Kurds
Iraqi Kurdistan’s independence prospects
Yesterday, the Woodrow Wilson Center convened three experts to discuss the viability of a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq and to critique and elaborate on a report on Iraqi Kurdistan by Amberin Zaman. The panel on “From Tribe To Nation: Iraqi Kurdistan On The Cusp Of Statehood” featured Amberin Zaman, a Public Policy Fellow at the Wilson Center, Abbas Kadhim, a Foreign Policy Fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute, and Aliza Marcus, author of Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence.
Zaman views the Kurds in Iraq as closer to independence than ever before. Their warming relationship with Ankara means that Turkey can assist the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in achieving independence. In exchange for access to Kurdistan’s oil reserves, Turkey would likely be willing to protect the Kurds from Iran’s ire and give them access to trade routes and ports. Though she believes that Iraqi Kurdistan is ready for independence, she noted that the KRG must resolve its internal disputes before any kind of sustainable independence can be achieved.
Kadhim listed four elements that Iraqi Kurdistan needs before independence can be realized. The KRG needs:
- a united front, which means its two main political parties, the KDP and PUK, must resolve their disputes;
- full cooperation from Baghdad, with which it must negotiate borders, financial matters, and future diplomatic relations;
- regional cooperation, since the new state will be short lived if one of their powerful and temperamental neighbors (namely Turkey or Iran) strongly opposes independence.
- reliable international alliances in order to have their statehood approved and recognized by international organizations such as the UN.
Without these four elements, Iraqi Kurdistan cannot achieve true and sustainable independence from Iraq.
More skeptical, Marcus explained that Iraqi Kurdistan’s trouble isn’t rooted in the chaos created by ISIS and the drop in oil prices. Rather, its problems are rooted in the lack of viable civil institutions within the KRG. Kurdistan is experiencing a brain drain, wherein many of the best and brightest are leaving because they see no room for advancement within the confines of the KRG.
She also disagreed with Zaman’s prediction that Turkey will assist the KRG in achieving independence. Ankara is actually quite suspicious of Iraqi Kurdistan due to the PKK’s positions there as well as the PKK’s alliance with the PUK. Given Erdogan’s militant opposition to Kurdish autonomy in Eastern Turkey and Northern Syria, it is unlikely that he would support Kurdish independence in Iraq.
During the Q&A session, Zaman explained that Iraqi Kurdistan has a small window of opportunity for independence, due to the KRG’s warm relationship with Turkish President Erdogan and the respectability of Iraqi Kurdistan’s President Barzani. Once Barzani is no longer in power, the KRG’s ability to achieve independence will be diminished.
Kadhim said that Iran is opposed to the formation of a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq, since Iran does not want to deal with ‘two Iraqs’. They would likely be more amenable to a division of Iraqi Kurdistan into a Shiite region and a Sunni region, wherein Iran would be allied with the Shiite region and focus on keeping the Sunni region and Iraq-proper weakened.
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After Mosul: military victory won’t suffice
As the Iraqi military and its allies prepare for a campaign to take back Mosul from ISIS, it is important to examine the strategic importance of the city and how the dynamics in Iraq might change once it is back in the state’s possession. This was the topic of a September 9 panel at the Hudson Institute After Mosul: The Imperative of Bolstering US Allies.
The panel was moderated by Eric Brown, a fellow at Hudson, who explained that much of the conversation surrounding Mosul is concentrated on a military defeat of ISIS and overlooks the potentially chaotic aftermath. Iraq, the US and their allies have no plan for keeping the peace after Mosul is taken back. The power vacuum that ISIS will leave behind will give other extremist groups the opportunity to throw their weight around to the detriment of citizens of Mosul.
Michael Pregent, also a scholar at the Hudson Institute, agreed. The current US strategy of punishing ISIS-held towns essentially recreates the situation that made ISIS strong in the first place. The disproportionate US focus on military victory leaves potential Iraqi allies without the support they need to establish sustainable democratic institutions. Pregent suggests that we focus on taking out high ranking ISIS individuals in Iraq and concentrate the majority of our resources on empowering Iraqi communities. By doing so, ISIS will begin to fade and Iraqi civil society will grow stronger and more sustainable.
In regards to Mosul specifically, Dylan O’Driscoll, a research fellow at the Middle East Research Institute in Erbil, explained that Mosul is too fractured to survive any sort of power vacuum. While the liberation of Mosul would be an excellent political boon for both Baghdad and Washington, the Iraqi army isn’t militarily prepared to undertake the task. Without a strong political agreement, Mosul will not stay liberated for long, as it will likely be torn apart by factional violence, leaving room for a neo-ISIS group to take control.
Dlawer Ala’aldeen, the president of the Middle East Research Institute, echoed the sentiments of the previous two panelists. He predicts that once Mosul is liberated, the US will shift its focus to Syria and will totally disengage from Iraq, leaving ISIS and its descendants to flourish. He emphasized the importance of intelligent decision making in Iraq. If the US does not learn from the mistakes of its previous forays into Iraq, it and its allies will be paying for it for decades to come.
The final panelist, Bilal Wahab, the Soref fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, agreed with the other panelists and offered insight specifically on Iraqi Kurdistan. While Kurdistan has largely been a safe haven for stability and freedom, the Kurdish moment for independence is slipping away as a result of internal fissures within the KRG. There is no force to unite the Kurds. Disunity makes it difficult for the US or Baghdad to work with them. Their lack of unity in combination with their rising debt, stalled income as a result of low oil prices, and lack of sustainable infrastructure makes the KRG a less-than-ideal ally.
During the Q&A, Ala’aldeen suggested that the US use its leverage over the KRG and Baghdad to encourage democratic institution building, humanitarian aid and reduction of corruption. Both governments financially depend on the US and will respond positively to American pressure. He concluded by saying that the only long term solution to terror is good governance. In Iraq, good governance requires Western pressure.
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Peace picks September 12-16
- US Leadership and the Challenge of State Fragility | Monday, September 12th | 9:00am – 12:00pm | US Institute of Peace | Click HERE to RSVP |
For more than two decades, addressing fragility has been an evolving bipartisan priority for U.S. policymakers. Yet growing understanding and consensus about the problem has failed to generate the strategic, unified, and long-term policies required to achieve solutions. Despite some progress, the United States and its international partners still struggle to prevent and reduce fragility.
With the next U.S. administration and Congress taking office in January, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Center for a New American Security, and the U.S. Institute of Peace this year formed an independent, non-partisan Fragility Study Group to improve the U.S. government’s approach to reducing global fragility. The group was advised by more than 20 former U.S. government officials, members of Congress, academics, and private sector leaders. Its report concludes that the incoming administration will have to exhibit remarkable discipline and imagination in choosing where and how to exert U.S. leadership. The study group offers recommendations for the next administration and Congress on ensuring more coherent policy responses among U.S. agencies, strengthening international partnerships, and developing the capabilities required to help fragile societies build more resilient, and thus stable, states. Following the discussion of the report by the study group’s chairs on September 12, scholars from each institution will preview several of a series of policy briefs to be released in coming months on specific portions of the new approach.
On panel one, William J. Burns, President, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Michèle Flournoy, CEO, Center for a New American Security, Nancy Lindborg, President, United States Institute of Peace, moderated by David Ignatius, Columnist and Author, The Washington Post. On panel two, Rachel Kleinfeld, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Loren Schulman, Deputy Director of Studies and Leon E. Panetta Senior Fellow, Center for a New American Security, Maria J. Stephan, Senior Policy Fellow, United States Institute of Peace - African Politics, African Peace | Monday, September 12th | 2:00pm – 3:30pm | US Institute of Peace | Click HERE to RSVP |
More than 100,000 peacekeepers deployed in Africa make up three-quarters of such United Nations troops worldwide, and they illustrate the frequent response of the African Union to defuse violent conflict with military forces. But the AU has another strength: political power. Join the U.S. Institute of Peace with researchers Alex de Waal and Mulugeta Gebrehiwot of the World Peace Foundation on September 12 for recommendations from their new report on how the AU can harness its unique advantage to advance peace and security. Their new report for the AU argues that the Union must move away from its reactive approach to violent conflict and draw on its inherent political strengths. Their extensive research includes case studies of the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Somalia and South Sudan. The authors, joined by AU representatives, will share major findings and offer policy recommendations for how the African Union can best harness its political expertise to reduce violent conflict on the continent and advance its mission of lasting stability. Featuring Alex de Waal, Executive Director, World Peace Foundation; Research Professor, The Fletcher School, Tufts University, Mulugeta Gebrehiwot, Program Director of the African Security Sector and Peace Operations Program, The Fletcher School, Tufts University, moderated by Princeton Lyman, Senior Advisor to the President.
- 20 Years Later: The United States and the Future of the CTBT | Tuesday, September 13th | 9:00am – 7:00pm | The Stimson Center | Click HERE to RSVP
Twenty years ago, the United States took a leading role in negotiations for a verifiable ban on the explosive testing of nuclear weapons. The result was the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which opened for signature September 24, 1996. Although the treaty has widespread domestic and global support, the CTBT has not yet entered into force because the United States and seven other key states have failed to ratify the treaty. This month, the Obama administration, along with other U.N. Security Council member states, are considering a resolution that reaffirms support for the global norm against nuclear testing and the eventual ratification of the CTBT. Please join the Stimson Center and Arms Control Association for a briefing on the security value of the treaty in the 21st Century and the purpose and status of the U.N. Security Council initiative. Featuring Rose Gottemoeller, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, U.S. Department of State, Ambassador Adam M. Scheinman, Special Representative of the President for Nuclear Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of State, Ambassador Mitsuru Kitano, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Japan to the International Organizations in Vienna, Ambassador Kairat Umarov, Ambassador of Kazakhstan to the United States, Michael Krepon, Co-Founder of the Stimson Center, will convene the meeting. Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director of the Arms Control Association, will lead the question and answer session following the presentations of our panelists. - Mitigating Electoral Violence: Lessons from Nigeria’s 2015 Election | Tuesday, September 13th | 12:00pm -2:00pm | School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University | Email Ernest Ogbozor at eogbozor@gmu.eduto RSVPUncertainties characterized the period before Nigeria’s 2015 election, with many people predicting a possible outbreak of the worst election violence in the country. This led to different initiatives to mitigate potential violence during and after the election. This included the signing of a peace pact, referred to as the “Abuja Peace Accord” by the leaders of the two largest political parties. The 2015 election is now history, but many African countries have not learned from the Nigeria’s experience. As some African nations prepare for elections in the coming months; like Somalia, Gambia, and Ghana, the events unfolding in Gabon where a presidential candidate declared victory in an unannounced result of an election and further asked his opponent to call and congratulate him is of concern. Professor Attahiru Jega, a former Chair of the Nigeria’s Independent National Electoral Commission during the 2011 and 2015 elections, and a current visiting scholar at the George Mason University will share his experience from the Nigerian elections and its implications for other countries. Featuring Professor Attahiru Jega, Former Chairman, Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), and a Visiting Scholar at the George Mason University, Professor John Paden, Clarence Robinson Professor, George Mason University, Professor Terrence Lyons, School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University
- From Tribe to Nation: Iraqi Kurdistan on the Cusp of Statehood | Wednesday, September 14th | 9:30am – 11:00am | The Wilson Center | Click HERE to RSVP |
There is growing recognition that after decades of dogged, if at times unorthodox, efforts to build their own state, the Iraqi Kurds are on the cusp of formally declaring independence. It is no longer a matter of “if” but “when.” And the United States, as much as Iraq’s neighbors—Iran, Turkey, and Syria, which have restive Kurdish populations of their own—needs to be ready when Iraqi Kurdistan, the first real Kurdish state in the modern sense, is born. Most importantly, so do the Kurds. Join us for the launch of Amberin Zaman’s latest paper “From Tribe to Nation: Iraqi Kurdistan on the Cusp of Statehood.” Featuring Amberin Zaman, Public Policy Fellow, Woodrow Wilson Center; Columnist, Dikenand Al-Monitor Pulse of the Middle East, Abbas Kadhim, Senior Foreign Policy Fellow, Foreign Policy Institute, SAIS-Johns Hopkins University, and President, Institute of Shia Studies, Aliza Marcus, Author of Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence and moderated by Henri J. Barkey, Director, Middle East Program, Wilson Center
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No risk it will happen soon
The High Negotiations Commission (HNC), which represents the non-extremist Syrian revolution and opposition forces in UN-hosted talks to bring an end to the war, issued its “Executive Framework for a Political Solution in Syria” today. It lays out how the opposition foresees a political transition away from Bashar al Assad’s rule to the transitional governing body (TGB) with full executive authority foreseen in a 2012 UN communique, and eventually to a full-fledged democracy.
There is no risk any of this will happen soon. But it is good to see the HNC, which has taken over political leadership of the non-extremist opposition, articulating a plan that is an excellent response to those who claim there are no moderates in Syria. They start with a six-month truce to allow for humanitarian relief, lifting of sieges, release of prisoners, negotiations, and preparation of a temporary constitution. There follows a 1.5 year transition that starts with the exit of Bashar al Assad and proceeds with the formation of the TGB, preparation of new election laws, and writing of a new, secular and pluralist constitution. The third phase sees adoption of the new constitution and elections. The document is studded with reference to inclusion, human rights, a 30% set aside for women, independence of the judiciary, separation of powers, and lots of other good things.
Like many documents of this sort, it is the missing pieces that are most interesting. On the Syrian Kurds, the Framework says:
The Kurdish cause shall be considered a national Syrian cause and action shall be taken to ensure their ethnic, linguistic, and cultural rights in the constitution.
There is no promise of territorial separation or autonomy, as in Iraq. In fact, the first of its “general principles” is this:
Syria is an integral part of the Arab World, and Arabic is the official language of the state. Arab Islamic culture represents a fertile source for intellectual production and social relations amongst all Syrians of different ethnic backgrounds and religious beliefs as the majority of Syrians are Arabs and followers of Islam and its tolerant message which is distinctly moderate.
That isn’t likely to please the Kurds, who have been trying to carve out their own sub-state entity called Rojava along the border with Turkey. But it will please the Turks, who have been resisting emergence of a new Kurdish state (or sub-state) on their border.
Also missing is any clear idea of what happens to Assad. This is a virtue, since the people who wrote this document would like nothing better than to see him held accountable in a Syrian court, where the death penalty is still available. But that wouldn’t serve current purposes. Even in the wildest dreams of the Syrian opposition, Assad is not going to agree to his own execution. Implicitly, the HNC is prepared to see him escape Syria to go to wherever someone will have him, most likely Iran or Russia.
The HNC is proposing that fighting “sectarian militias, mercenaries, and terrorist groups designated as such by relevant Security Council Resolutions” should continue even after the political transition begins. That means the fight against the Islamic State and al Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al Nusra (and its successor Jabhat Fateh al Sham?), both designated by the UNSC as terrorist, would continue. But it leaves ambiguity about other Islamist groups. The reference to sectarian militias and mercenaries is presumably to various Alawite National Defense Forces as well as Lebanese Hizbollah and other imported Shia militias from Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere.
The TGB would incorporate
…all components of the High Negotiations Commission, as the body responsible for managing the negotiation process…and representatives of the regime whose hands have not been stained with Syrian blood, in addition to ensuring the representation of all strata of Syrian society.
Therein lies a good part of the diplomatic trick: choosing who will have power, even if exercised collectively, after Assad. No one associated with the regime who doesn’t have Syrian blood on his hands will be acceptable to the regime, which has tried to ensure that as many people as possible have participated in the repression, one way or another. Representation of all strata of Syrian society is a nice sentiment, but what it means in practice is in the eye of the beholder. Witness the difficulties Libya has faced in forming and giving authority to its Government of National Accord.
So the overall message of this elaborate document is positive: the HNC understands what a transition to democracy entails and the need for broad inclusion. But for the moment its finely crafted document is a dead letter. The opposition will have to do better on the battlefield, with help from its friends, to impose anything like this admirable solution.
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Talk but little progress
The Middle East Institute published my brief on the G20 summit yesterday:
The weekend’s G20 meeting in peaceful and prosperous Hangzhou, China focused on the world economy, especially trade and finance, as well as climate change. But President Barack Obama met on the sidelines with presidents Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, while Secretary of State John Kerry tried and failed for the umpteenth time to hammer out an agreement on Syria with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. The war-ravaged Middle East is never far from world leaders’ priorities these days, but progress is proving elusive.
The American proposal for Syria would renew the cessation of hostilities, allow delivery of humanitarian assistance, and enable joint U.S./Russian targeting of extremists while grounding the Syrian air force. The Russians ran out the clock in Hangzhou, enabling the Syrian army with Russian, Iranian, and Hezbollah support to cut off access again to Aleppo, where opposition forces had managed to breach the siege of several hundred thousand civilians. The Russians may eventually agree to a cease-fire, while Syrian government forces pursue the “starve and surrender” tactics they have used successfully elsewhere. Without a rebalancing of the military situation in favor of the opposition, President Bashar al-Assad is likely to regain control of Syria’s largest city, by foul means.
Obama’s meeting with Turkey’s president focused on responsibility for July’s coup attempt, which the Turkish government blames on an erstwhile Erdogan ally who lives in Pennsylvania. While Obama lauded the survival of Erdogan and Turkish democracy and also promised cooperation on determining responsibility for the failed coup, he is unwilling to short-circuit the extradition procedures, which can be lengthy and complex. Erdogan was undoubtedly disappointed.
The Turkish and American presidents likely also discussed Syria. The Americans want to target the Islamic State and minimize Turkish and C.I.A.-supported Arab opposition clashes with Pentagon-supported Syrian Kurds—only making the contradictions in U.S. policy all too apparent.
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Middle East and Europe: impact and prospects
I had the privilege this morning of speaking today by Skype to the Ambassadors’ Council convened at the Macedonian Foreign Ministry in Skopje. These are the notes I used:
- First let me thank the organizers, in particular Ambassador Abdulkadar Memedi and Edvard Mitevski, for this opportunity. It is rare indeed that I get to talk about my two favorite parts of the world: Europe and the Middle East.
- My focus today will be on the latter, as I am confident that Europeans—a category that in my way of thinking includes all the citizens of Macedonia—know more than I do about the impact of the refugee crisis on your part of the world.
- But big as it looms for you, the influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees and migrants from the Greater Middle East is a fraction of a much larger problem.
- There are 4.8 million refugees from Syria in neighboring countries, the largest number in Turkey but millions also in Lebanon and Jordan. Upwards of 8.7 million will be displaced within Syrian by the end of the year. 13.5 million are said to be in need of humanitarian assistance inside Syria.
- The number of refugees leaving Syria has leveled off, but asylum applications in Europe are well above 1 million and still rising, albeit at a declining rate.
- The U.S. is committed to taking only 10,000 Syrians. I don’t anticipate that our politics will allow a lot more anytime soon, though eventually we will have many more arrive through family reunification and other modalities.
- The 1.5 million people you saw flow through Macedonia over the past year or so were the relatively fortunate Syrians, not the most unfortunate. Moreover, most who have arrived in Europe are male. If their asylum applications are successful, that will lead to large numbers of family members eventually joining them.
- The vital question for me is this: what are the prospects for ending the wars that are tearing Syria to shreds? And what are the prospects for other potential sources of migrants and refugees from Iraq, from Afghanistan, Yemen, and Libya?
- More than five years after Bashar al Assad’s attempted violent repression of the nonviolent demonstrations in his country, prospects for peace still look dim.
- The Russians and Iranians, whose support to Assad has been vital to his survival, show no signs of letting up and have in fact doubled down on their bad bet.
- The Iranians have committed Lebanese Hizbollah, Iraqi Shia militias and their own Revolutionary Guard to the fight, not to mention Afghan and other Shia fighters.
- The Russians have not only redoubled their air attacks but also added flights from Iran, now suspended, as well as cruise missiles fired from the Black Sea. Moscow has now killed more civilians, according to the Syrian Network for Human Rights, than the Islamic State.
- The Americans continue to refuse to fight Assad, Iran, or Russia. President Obama lacks both legal authorization and popular support to attack them. Americans want him to focus exclusively on the Islamic State and Al Qaeda, which is what he is doing, apart from assistance to some Syrian opposition forces willing to join in the fight against extremists.
- Donald Trump would certainly follow the same policy, perhaps redoubling efforts against the Islamic State and looking for opportunities for cooperation with Russia. Hillary Clinton has pledged to look at other options like protected areas or no-fly zones, but it is not clear that she will pursue them.
- The space for moderates in Syria is shrinking. Violence always polarizes, as you know only too well. In addition, the Americans are restraining the forces that they have equipped and trained from attacking the Syrian army. They want moderates focused exclusively on fighting the Islamic State.
- This morning, Turkish forces entered Syria at Jarablus on the Euphrates, in support of Arab and Turkman forces aiming to deprive the Islamic State of its last border point and block the expansion of Kurdish forces from taking the last stretch of the Turkish/Syrian border they don’t control.
- When will it all end? I don’t know, but I think it likely to end at best not in a clear victory of one side or another but rather in a fragmented and semi-stable division of areas of control.
- The Syrian government will control most of what Assad refers to as “useful Syria”: the western coast and the central axis from Damascus through Homs and Hama, with Idlib and Aleppo still in doubt.
- The opposition will likely control part of the south along the Jordanian border as well as a wedge of the north, including a piece of the border with Turkey stretching from Azaz to Jarablus.
- The Kurds will control the rest of the border with Turkey. Raqqa and Deir Azzour are still up for grabs, with the likely outcome opposition in the former and government in the latter.
- That is the likely best. Will that end the refugee problem?
- I think not. Nothing about this fragmented outcome is likely to make it attractive for Syrians to return home. Security will remain a serious problem and little funding will be available for reconstruction. Syria will remain unstable for years to come.
- What about other parts of the Greater Middle East?
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