Tag: Kurds
Shifting currents in Syria
As UN envoy Stefano de Mistura tries to reconvene Syria peace talks next week, there are important developments that could impact his prospects.
The Syrian government has continued to block aid to opposition-controlled areas, causing Stefano to abruptly curtail humanitarian task force deliberations last week. Moscow last week flew bombers from Iran, an innovation now reportedly suspended. The Russians also launched cruise missiles allegedly targeted against Jabhat al Nusra (which is generally embedded with more moderate insurgents) from the Black Sea. According to the Syrian Network for Human Rights, Russia has now killed more civilians in Syria than ISIS, though it started years earlier. Moscow has shown no visible inclination to limit Syrian government strikes on civilian areas, which it targets on a daily basis.
At the same time, the situation in northern Syria has evolved in a direction favorable to the US. Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), who are mostly Kurdish fighters, have retaken Manbij from the Islamic State and are heading for Jarablus on the border where the Euphrates crosses from Turkey into Syria. Arab SDF forces are said to be preparing the assault from inside Turkey, which wants to block the Kurds from taking over the entire northern border of Syria. At the same time, farther east in Hasakeh, US-supported Kurdish forces are fighting with the Syrian army, with which they cooperated in taking the town a year ago and had maintained a truce since. The Syrian air force last week came close to clashing with US aircraft sent to protect the Kurds, who are reportedly trying to oust President Assad’s forces entirely from their northeastern “canton.”
If successful, these operations in northern Syria will cut off the Islamic State from its supply lines in Turkey and possibly end the ambiguous relationship of the Kurdish PYD forces with the Syrian government, though the Syrian opposition is unlikely to accept the PYD into its fold, not least because of Turkey’s opposition. The possibility of an attack on the Islamic State capital at Raqqa is starting to loom on the horizon, perhaps even before an effort to liberate Mosul in Iraq.
Still John Kerry is saddled as the Obama Administration draws to a close with the unenviable task of conducting Middle East diplomacy without any serious threat of coercion. The President, supported by most Americans, simply doesn’t want to use American force against anything but the Islamic State and Al Qaeda. This means not targeting the Syrian government and Hizbollah forces, even when they attack civilians. The Iranians and Russians in Syria are following his lead in a way: they are using force on the issues they care about and ignoring diplomacy. No matter what they say about not being wedded to Assad, the Russians and Iranians are mostly fighting the Syrian opposition in an effort to prevent regime change, with few relatively few attacks on on the Islamic State.
This free for all isn’t likely to work well for John Kerry in his efforts to bring about a ceasefire in Syria. The proposition he has been flogging is this: US cooperation with Russia in targeting the Islamic State and Al Qaeda (presumably including Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, the allegedly unaffiliated successor to Al Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al Nusra) provided Russia ends attacks on the non-extremist Syrian opposition and convinces President Assad to ground his air force. The relative success of US-allied forces in northern Syria may strengthen Kerry’s hand, but there is no sign yet of any willingness on Russia’s part to meet its side of the bargain.
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The story will not end with Mosul’s liberation
A former Middle East Institute research assistant still working on Iraq offers this:
The dust is settling in Fallujah, where the Iraqi army is digging in. The center of gravity in the fight against Da’esh (ISIS) is now moving north. Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city and a Da’esh stronghold since June 2014, will now become a battleground again. D-Day remains unclear, though on Sunday Nineveh’s former governor predicted a mid-September start date for the Mosul offensive.
The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the Iraqi Federal Government in Baghdad – alongside international partners – have held months of discussions and planning sessions to prepare for what is to come. At times the discussions have been less than amicable, but it is generally understood that Kurdish Peshmerga and the Iraqi Army will work together closely to liberate the city.
The humanitarian situation arising from that liberation will be bleak. Contingency planners in Iraq and Kurdistan believe there are around 1.2 million civilians trapped inside of the city, with another 800,000 in the surrounding districts and villages in Nineveh province. This population will be directly exposed to the fighting.
This will present an unprecedented challenge for authorities. KRG reports predict that the number of new IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons) will reach around 420,000 individuals (72,000 families). The vast bulk of these IDPs will flee north and east, into the Iraqi Kurdistan.
This could spell disaster for the KRG. The region is already suffering from the effects of years of fighting, a severe economic downturn, and a bitter ongoing dispute with the federal government in Baghdad over its share of the nationwide budget. Despite all this, Kurdistan has become a comparatively safe haven for those displaced by regional turmoil (and for economic migrants from the south). As a result the KRG now hosts close to 1.3 million IDPs, plus 245,000 Syrian refugees – around a quarter of the region’s total population.
Moreover, the 420,000 IDP figure does not represent the worst-case prediction. One briefing document produced by a KRG department presents three possible scenarios for the Mosul offensive’s IDP fallout. In the first, best-case scenario, the operation lasts only a few weeks. In this case, the number of IDPs will remain comparatively low, as Da’esh bans freedom of movement, and Mosuli civilians attempt to weather the conflict at home.
The second, middle-case, scenario gives the 420,000 IDP contingency figure. It assumes an offensive lasting more than several weeks, in which shelling and airstrikes become more intense, and the battle descends into block-by-block street fighting.
In the third, worst case scenario the offensive lasts several months. Bitter street fighting, increasing shortages of food and supplies, and inner-city chaos ensue as Da’esh slowly loses control. In this scenario, the number of people fleeing the fighting may rise to more than a million.
This third case scenario warrants being taken seriously. The operation to retake Fallujah lasted a month. The Mosul offensive could well last much longer. Mosul city is considerably larger than Fallujah, at approximately 250 square miles to Fallujah’s four square miles. Mosul’s still-resident population is also vastly larger than Fallujah’s, making it harder and more time-consuming for attacking forces to avoid collateral damage (it can be assumed that the defenders will have no such qualms). Further, Da’esh has had more than two years to entrench. The loss of Mosul, the jewel in its crown, will be a more symbolic defeat than any previous loss. Da’esh is likely to put up a determined defense.
Any of the three scenarios will put an incredible financial and logistical burden on already struggling Kurdistan. Five new IDP camps are planned, but the KRG already struggles to care for the numerous IDPs already in-region. Meanwhile, the stagnant economy has forced the domestic population to undergo painful belt-tightening.
While Iraqi Kurdistan remains relatively stable for now, tensions and resentments bubble barely below the surface. Civil service salaries have been slashed and frequently have not been paid at all. President Masoud Barzani has clung to power, even as his presidential term (and the extension he gave himself) has expired. The Kurdish parliament has ground to a halt as party relations between former coalition partners, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Gorran, have deteriorated to non-speaking terms. Politics between the major parties has become increasingly violent.
Conversations with Kurdish citizens in the region suggest that the failures of their leaders have not gone unobserved, but rather are currently being tolerated for the greater good. Popular grievances will resurface once the common enemy is defeated. Kurds will expect speedy redress from the government in return for their patience these past two years, starting the moment Da’esh is beaten.
Mosul’s fall may be seen as that moment. The domestic and international press will see it as the moment the international coalition broke the back of Da’esh in Iraq. Even as it falls, Erbil will be facing a vast influx of IDPs. It is doubtful the KRG will have the capacity or resources to process and provide for this new population, while also caring for its own.
But even if the liberation of Mosul goes smoothly, other risks will follow: ISIS fighters are likely to escape and pose as IDPs, Arabs fleeing to Kurdistan may therefore be distrusted and even mistreated. Disputes between the KRG and Baghdad will intensify, especially if the Kurds try to keep the eastern bank of the Tigris in Mosul as well as the Nineveh plain, which has a mixed Yazidi, Assyrian Christian, Kurdish, Shabak, Arab population of about 400,000.
This story will not end with the liberation of Mosul.
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The day before ISIS
Iraq’s problems were not born in 2003.
In a roundtable discussion hosted by the Middle East Institute on last Tuesday, Dr. Luay al-Khatteeb, founder and director of Iraq Energy Institute, made clear that current discussions in Washington about Iraq are lacking. The focus in DC think tanks on “the day after ISIS” neglects a century of mistreatment, mismanagement, and disregard.
Taking a longer vie, al-Khatteeb focused on the origins of Iraq’s present problems. Sectarianism has been a virulent force in Iraq since before the Ottomans; it didn’t suddenly appear in 2003. Al-Khatteeb points to the 12 successful coup d’états in Iraq’s recent history as a major source of instability in Iraqi politics. If Turkey’s week is any indicator, coups shake the foundation of a society to its core, and their reverberations continue to affect societies long after their conclusions.
The strong centralism that dominated Iraq for most of the 20th century didn’t prepare Iraq’s political class or citizenry for federalism. According to al-Khatteeb, the Kurds had an 11-year head start; enjoying self-government for a decade before the fall of Saddam gave them a huge advantage going into the post-2003 political process.
Miscommunication about federalism in the establishment of the new Iraqi state is one of the major factors contributing to Iraq’s current governance failures. Many political participants came to the negotiating table talking about federalism, but were still grounded in the centralism of previous decades. Kurds adopted the language of federalism, but had independence in the back of their minds throughout the negotiations.
Because of this lack of meaningful consensus, Iraq never established functioning governing institutions. How then, did Iraq survive for 10 years ? Al-Khatteeb says sheer luck. Oil prices were high enough that the Iraqi government could muddle along without thinking of the future. People in government looked at oil money as a supermarket—taking as they pleased to finance any number of special projects. Currently there are 7 million Iraqis on government payroll. Those constantly expanding public salaries drained surpluses during high oil prices and are now dragging Iraq down into deeper deficits. In 2013, Iraqi foreign reserves were at 80 billion. Total is down to 40 billion today.
On the Kurdish question, al-Khatteeb predicts that the now dominant KDP would lose to the PUK and Goran alliances if an election was held today. They are clearly winning at the constituent level, and are negotiating with Baghdad to ask what’s in it for them to remain in the Iraqi state.
Right now, the answer is quite a bit. The KRG gets $100 billion per year from Baghdad. It also gets to keep somewhere around $40 billion in its own production, although exactly how much oil is produced and exported from Kurdish regions is not publicized. However, Kurdish production is dependent on Kirkuk, and Kurdish hold there is tenuous at best given the competing claims for the territory. Even still, oil production in the Kurdish area has fallen from 800,000 barrels to 550,000.
Everything comes back to government mismanagement. There are 1.4 million people on government payroll in Kurdish areas. The Iraqi federal government was encouraging governorates to hire as many people as possible, and threatened to withhold funds if hiring demands weren’t met. The salaries of government officials are criminally high, in al-Khatteeb’s mind. MPs make $20,000 monthly, each of their dozens of advisers each make $10,000, on top of the president and PM making $50,000 each month. If Iraq is going to overcome its centuries of neglect, they need to start paying some attention where it matters.
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Iraqi Kurdistan’s future
Some colleagues asked me to offer my view of the future of Iraqi Kurdistan. Here is what I told them:
- A Martian could be forgiven if he arrived today on earth and concluded that Iraqi Kurdistan will be independent by November.
- President Barzani has promised a referendum by then and even the Martians know that Iraqi Kurds would vote overwhelmingly for independence if given free choice and opportunity.
- The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) case for independence is strong: Iraqi Kurds have been brutally treated by their own government, chased from their country and even attacked with chemical weapons; they have governed themselves sort of democratically for decades and treated minorities well by regional standards; they have fought the Islamic State courageously and welcomed people of all ethnicities displaced by the fighting.
- One of my pro-independence friends argues that Iraq is like former Yugoslavia: a failed state that has disappointed all its inhabitants and needs to dissolve into its constituent parts.
- Another friend asks why Washington would not welcome another stalwart and more or less democratic friend in the turbulent Middle East.
- So why do I think independence won’t happen?
- To make a long story short: the KRG lacks well-established borders, the means to defend itself, the needed internal political cohesion, the required economic resources, the good relations with its neighbors and the required support of the world’s great powers to become a sovereign state.
- Before explaining in depth, let me make an important distinction: political independence is something you declare. It is an expression of political will, sometimes unilateral.
- Sovereignty is something you acquire, largely through recognition by other states, which sometimes requires the defense or conquest of territory. The KRG already has a large measure of independence. What it lacks is sovereignty.
- President Barzani’s proposal is a classic process for achieving independence: a referendum followed by a unilateral declaration.
- It would do little or nothing to establish sovereignty.
- For that, the KRG would need to have in the first place well-established borders that none of its neighbors would contest.
- That is simply not the case. Baghdad has not and will not accept the KRG’s right to all the disputed territories the peshmerga seized in the confusion of 2014, when the Iraqi Army collapsed in Mosul and other parts of the north under Islamic State attack.
- The Iraqi Army today is in no condition to contest KRG control of Kirkuk, parts of Diyala and parts of Ninewa province, but Baghdad won’t accept the fait accompli either. A declaration of independence now would leave a giant unresolved border problem that sooner or later would likely be resolved by force.
- I don’t really see how the KRG will ever be able to defend itself from the rest of Iraq if Baghdad gets its act together, which to some degree it seems to be doing. In fact, there might be nothing so likely to unite Shia and Sunni Arabs in the rest of Iraq than a KRG declaration of independence.
- How does a KRG with a population of 5.2 million defend itself from an Arab Iraq of perhaps 28 million? Only by reaching an agreement that would likely involve the surrender or compromise of Kirkuk and other disputed territories.
- The KRG lacks the internal political cohesion for a deal of that sort and many other requirements of sovereignty and independence. Just last month a Sulamaniya delegation was in Baghdad forswearing any intentions to go for independence.
- The PUK and Gorran have no intention of letting President Barzani be the George Washington of the KRG, or even allow him an unconstitutional third term. He has locked the opposition Speaker out of parliament, which is unable to meet even to decide how the referendum will be organized.
- Kirkuk’s governor wants his province to become a region, separate at least initially from the KRG. Some in Sinjar are resisting incorporation into the KRG. One observer even sees signs of Balkanization of Kurdistan.
- Resources are also a problem. At oil prices of $100/barrel or above, KRG officials thought production of 500,000 bpd might enable them to replace all the money Baghdad was supposed to be sending. At $50/barrel, the production required is presumably close to 1 million bpd. Current exports are a bit more than 500,000 bpd.
- The KRG is an oil rentier state. Even with recent tax increases and reductions in subsidies, it has precious little revenue other than from oil.
- The consequences for the KRG economy are dramatic. Civil servants are going unpaid, the economy is in crisis and the enormous influx of people displaced by the Islamic State has increased the stress. The 1.4 million people on the government payroll, including those fighting the Islamic State, are being paid erratically.
- Kurdistan’s difficult neighborhood is an additional problem. All the KRG’s oil is exported to Turkey, which has greatly improved its relations with the Iraqi Kurds. But Ankara under current conditions is still unlikely in my opinion to welcome a KRG declaration of independence, for fear of incentivizing the Syrian Kurds or its own to head in the same direction.
- Iran is even harder over against KRG independence, for fear of what it would mean for its own province of Eastern Kurdistan, where the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps is chasing Kurdish guerrillas and occasionally shelling across the border into the KRG.
- Syria no longer counts for much in regional politics, but KRG independence would not be a welcome move there either. The KRG could expect none of its neighbors to offer it diplomatic recognition and exchange of ambassadors.
- Most of the great powers will be even more resistant than the KRG’s immediate neighbors. The United States will fear that a referendum and independent Kurdistan would strengthen Russia’s case for the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as well as the annexation of Crimea and eventual annexation of Ukraine’s Luhansk and Donetsk provinces, not to mention Bosnia’s Republika Srpska.
- Europe, in particular Germany, is hard over against independence.
- China would agree: it wants no precedents that Tibet might want to follow. Russia might be more amenable, though Moscow would be wise to contemplate the issue, since an independent Kurdistan is likely to be strongly pro-Western (and its own constituent republics might be getting ideas).
- To summarize: if you can’t expect recognition by any of your neighbors or your best friends, if you don’t have the money to pay the bills, if your internal politics are divisive and you will not be able to defend the borders you claim, my best advice is don’t try it.
- The Kurds would be wise to wait for a more auspicious moment. It may well come, possibly within the next five years. They will know the time is right when they have Washington and Baghdad’s concurrence, recognition by Iran and Turkey, revenue to cover their expenses, a functioning parliament and a leader who attracts support from Sulamaniyah as well as Erbil. Stranger things have happened.
What, my colleagues asked, if the KRG went ahead despite the circumstances. What would happen?
I answered maybe nothing, since without recognition of sovereignty declarations of independence evaporate pretty quickly. Kosovo’s in 1991 didn’t work, nor did the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad declared in 1946, another colleague noted. But it is also possible a Kurdish declaration of independence would spark a wider war in the Middle East, involving Iran and Turkey even more directly than the current conflict. That would not be good news.
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No end in sight
How can Daesh (that’s the Islamic State, ISIS or ISIL to the uninitiated) be defeated and what will happen thereafter? If you want the more upbeat official story, read Brett McGurk’s testimony. Here are some thoughts that have crossed my screen lately.
Everyone should expect a generational fight. Though Daesh is losing territory rapidly in Iraq (47% of its maximum) and Syria (20%), it is good at what it does, resilient and adaptable. It has recruited at least 40,000 foreign fighters from 120 other countries. It has overt affiliates in more than half a dozen countries as well as a covert worldwide network devoted to smuggling, finance and terror, as illustrated all too clearly in this week’s Istanbul airport bombing. Even after it has lost all its territory, Daesh will go to ground and continue terrorist attacks of that sort.
The Coalition arrayed against Daesh is large (nominally 66 countries) and organized but still clumsy and far from fully integrated. It will hold a July 20 “summit” in Washington focused on its five “lines of effort”: political/military coordination, blocking foreign fighters, Daesh finance, stabilization of areas retaken from Daesh and counter-messaging. This is in addition to the nine US “lines of effort.”
There are contrasting narratives that avowed opponents of Daesh espouse, leading them to opposing conclusions.
The Russians view Daesh as the product of destabilization of Syrian government institutions, whose maintenance is vital to stem the extremist tide. In order to ensure the survival of state institutions, they support Assad and want reconciliation between him and at least some portion of the opposition. They also think their military intervention has gone pretty well, delivering some Western respect and easing Western pressure on Ukraine. But they are concerned, based on the Chechen precedent, about the enormous cost and difficulties of an Assad victory in Syria. They have flatly refused to pay for any reconstruction when approached by a government-linked expert.
The Saudis have an almost diametrically opposed narrative. They believe Daesh is the product of Iranian-sponsored sectarianism in both Iraq and Syria. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki helped the Islamic State to revive in Iraq after the American withdrawal by governing in a blatantly sectarian way dictated by Iran. ISIS’s ability to gain ground in Syria is attributable to the regime, which released extremist prisoners, has bought oil from Daesh, and focused its military attacks against moderates, all with backing by Iran. The Saudis take the threat of Daesh seriously and believe the fate of Iran’s effort to establish itself as the Middle East hegemon will be determined in Syria. The Kingdom recognizes that its own Wahhabi ideology has contributed to Daesh‘s appeal and is committed to reforms that will change that in the decades to come.
Iraqis are fighting and dying to take turf from Daesh, but the aftermath of victory is a big and unsolved problem. Inclusive governance is what the country needs but seldom gets, in particular in Baghdad. Shia militias were too active in Tikrit in the wake of victory there over Daesh, rendering the town unsafe for Sunni returnees initially. Only once local leaders and reconciliation mechanisms were put in place was the stabilization effort more successful. At Ramadi, the governor has been doing well but there is much more damage and a lot of demining to be done. At Fallujah, there is less destruction but a serious humanitarian crisis, with 85,000 civilians fleeing from the city and living in unacceptable conditions in the desert. UNDP resources are grossly inadequate to the stabilization effort it has been tasked with.
Little planning has been done for stabilization in Syria. What is needed there is a political settlement. Sunni alienation and grievance are the the problem, enormously aggravated by the presence of Hezbollah. Ignoring it gives the impression that the West will support “ABS”: anyone but Sunnis. Post-Daesh, governance needs to be far more inclusive.
The Kurds in both Iraq and Syria are getting a lot of Western support because they are willing to fight Daesh. The support should be more conditional. The US should insist that Iraqi Kurdistan reach a pact with Baghdad and that the Syrian Kurds help with peace talks between Turkey and the PKK, which is closely tied to the Syrian Kurds.
Looking ahead, there is a real risk that with Russian and Iranian support the Syrian regime will manage to capture Aleppo as well as Raqqa, form some sort of “national unity” government with elements of the loyal opposition and rewrite parts of the constitution. The US might then declare victory and abandon the field entirely, leaving reconstruction inadequately resourced. This would not really solve anything and would allow grievances to worsen, ungoverned spaces to grow and the conflict to spread, possibly to Lebanon and Jordan.
There is a glimmer of hope for Iraq, but even that is limited. Splits in both the Sunni and Shia communities are opening the possibility of cross-sectarian mobilization in Baghdad. The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) are often viewed as under Tehran’s control, but some of them are not and might join with Sunnis who have also fought against Daesh. The Kurdish issue would still be unresolved, however, which will create problems for the liberation of Mosul. Kurdistan Regional Government President Barzani is entirely dedicated to consolidating his own power, both vis-a-vis other Kurdish political forces and vis-a-vis Baghdad. Without clearer definition of the political end-state, defeat of Daesh could lead to a follow-on civil war pitting Kurds against Arabs.
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Peace Picks June 27-30
- Restoring NATO’s Power And Purpose| Monday, June 27th | 1:30 | Atlantic Council | 1030 15th St NW, Washington, DC 20005, USA| Register HERE | After Britain’s historic vote to leave the European Union, the NATO Alliance has become more important than ever as a platform for European cooperation and security. What the Alliance achieves at its upcoming Warsaw Summit will be integral in defining NATO’s role in the new Euro-Atlantic security environment and strengthening international peace and stability in a turbulent world. Framing a critical conversation about the Alliance’s strategic priorities, this event will present the final conclusions of an Atlantic Council-chartered study on the future of NATO co-chaired by Ambassador R. Nicholas Burns and General James L. Jones. The study is premised on the belief that the Alliance is facing its greatest set of internal and external challenges since the Cold War. The report calls for renewed leadership by the United States and key European allies to restore NATO’s power and purpose in the face of an entirely different security landscape. Featuring a panel discussion with Nicholas Burns, Roy and Barbara Goodman Family Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Relations at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government and Former US Ambassador to NATO; and General James L. Jones, Chairman and Board Director, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at the Atlantic Council; the event will convene key transatlantic officials and leaders to discuss what the US, UK, and crucial European Allies must do to bolster NATO’s strength and solidarity in a post-Brexit Europe.
- Challenges And Opportunities For The U.S. Government To Improve The Protection Of Civilians In Armed Conflict| Monday, June 27th | 3:30-5:00 | Stimson Center | 8th floor, 1211 Connecticut Ave NW, Washington, DC 20036 | Register HERE | To mark the Washington, D.C. launch of Protection of Civilians, a comprehensive volume published by Oxford University Press, the Stimson Center will host a discussion examining how the U.S. government can advance the protection of civilians agenda. Panelists from inside and outside the U.S. government will explore how the government has engaged through bilateral diplomatic channels and multilateral institutions to prevent and respond to violence against civilians in conflict zones. The panel discussion will be followed by a reception with drinks and hors d’oeuvres. This event will be held under the Chatham House Rule. Speakers include: Victoria K. Holt, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State; Bruno Stagno Ugarte, Deputy Executive Director at Human Rights Watch, Lise Grande, Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General to the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, Tamara Guttman, Director General, Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START).
- Is China’s Door Closing? | Tuesday, June 28th | 2:30-4:00 | Woodrow Wilson Center | 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. 20004 | Register HERE | Ever since Deng Xiaoping launched his reforms in 1978, “openness” (对外开放) has been a central tenet of Chinese policy. While the actual degree of China’s openness has varied from time to time and sector to sector over the past 38 years, the trend toward greater liberalization of society, institutions, and the economy has been clear. Until recently. The passage of China’s foreign NGO law raises doubts about Xi Jinping’s commitment to further opening and reform. The law, which places foreign NGO’s under the supervision of the Ministry of Public Security, is the latest in a series of regulations meant to control “hostile foreign forces.” Surveys indicate that foreign companies are concerned about tightening business regulations in China and wonder whether they are as welcome as they were in recent decades. International journalists and publishers, too, are finding it difficult to obtain visas and to reach Chinese audiences. Is China’s door closing to foreigners? Why are conditions changing for international actors in China? How should the United States respond? Please join us for a discussion of the future of American NGO’s, corporations, and media in Xi’s China. Speakers: Erin Ennis, Senior Vice President, US-China Business Council Isaac Stone Fish, Asia Editor, Foreign Policy Shawn Shieh, Deputy Director, China Labour Bulletin.
- Changing Tides: The Road To Reconciliation And The Future Of Turkish – Israeli Relations | Tuesday, June 28th | 4:00-6:00 | Turkish Heritage Organization | Carnegie Endowment Conference Center | 1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW | In light of these recent developments and the possibility that a deal between Turkey and Israel is imminent, the Turkish Heritage Organization is hosting a roundtable discussion on Tuesday, June 28th from 4-6pm at the Carnegie Endowment Conference Center to explore and discuss the prospects for reconciliation between Turkey and Israel, the final stages of a deal and what the future might look like for both countries. Spakers include: Dr. Brenda Shaffer, Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council; Dan Arbell, Nonresident senior fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings and Former Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy of Israel in Washington, DC; and Moran Stern, Georgetown University, Center for Jewish Civilization. The moderator will be Dr. Mark Meirowitz, Assistant Professor at SUNY Maritime College.
- Media Activism Amid Civil War: The Role of Syrian Women Journalists | Wednesday, June 29th | 12:30-1:45 | Middle East Institute | 1761 N Street NW Washington, DC 20036 | Register HERE | Syrian citizen-journalists, bloggers, and media activists have played a critical role covering one of the world’s most dangerous conflicts. They do so in the face of significant challenges – from fear for their safety, to overcoming international indifference to the story of an unending conflict. Women journalists face even greater challenges and yet many continue to work in the field. Non-profit initiatives like the Syrian Female Journalists’ Network are providing training and support while promoting a better understanding of the important role of women in the Syrian uprising. The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to host the founders of the Syrian Female Journalists Network, Rula Asad and Milia Eidmouni, and radio journalist Caroline Ayoub for a discussion of their work in promoting the roles of Syrian women in journalism and civil society. Kate Seelye will moderate the discussion with the activists, who are visiting Washington as part of an Asfari Foundation-backed program to highlight the ongoing role of Syrian civil society.
- Kurdistan Rising? Considerations For Kurds, Their Neighbors, And The Region | Wednesday, June 29th | 3:00-4:30 | American Enterprise Institute |1150 Seventeenth Street, NW Washington, DC 20036| Register HERE | Two decades ago, many US officials would have been hard-pressed to place Kurdistan on a map, let alone consider the Kurds as allies. Today, Kurds loom large on the Middle Eastern stage, highlighting their renewed push for independence amid the chaos in Iraq. In his new monograph, “Kurdistan Rising? Considerations for Kurds, Their Neighbors, and the Region,” AEI’s Michael Rubin examines the effects of Kurdish independence and unresolved questions that would follow an independent Kurdistan, including citizenship, political structures, defense, economic systems, and renegotiation of treaties to include the Kurds. Lukman Faily, Iraqi ambassador to the United States; James F. Jeffrey, former US ambassador to Iraq and Turkey; and Michael Rubin, resident scholar at AEI, will speak.
- Congo Crisis: Getting to Good Elections in a Bad Neighborhood | Wednesday, June 29th | 4:00pm | Institute of World Politics | 1521 16th Street NW Washington, DC | Register HERE | Charles Snyder, Former Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Professor of African Affairs, IWP, will speak about prospects for Congo.
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