Tag: Kurds
Turkey’s Kurdish anxieties
The Bipartisan Policy Center hosted Cascading Conflicts: U.S. Policy on Turkey, Syria, and the Kurds Tuesday morning. This was nominally a launch of its report on Authoritarianism and Escalation: Preparing for the Worst in Turkey’s Resurgent Kurdish Conflict but ranged rather far from that excellent account of how Turkey has repeatedly turned to war when its government has become more authoritarian.
Eric Edelman, Co-Chair of BPC’s Turkey Initiative and former ambassador to Turkey, discussed the mutual misreading of priorities and interests between Turkey and the US. Amberin Zaman, Public Policy Fellow at the Wilson Institute, recalled how the peace talks between the PKK and Turkish government in February 2015 raised hopes for reconciliation that were then dashed by President Erdoğan. Ceng Sagnic, Junior Researcher at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, considered how the Kurdish situation in Syria has thwarted Turkey’s foreign policy and prompted its interventionism. Aliza Marcus, Communications Consultant for the Strategic Impact Evaluation Fund at the World Bank, assessed the relationship between the YPG/PYD (the dominant Syrian Kurdish organizations) and the PKK (the dominant Turkish Kurdish organization) as well as Turkey’s position on the question. Ishaan Tharoor, a reporter for the Washington Post, moderated a lively discussion spanning Turkish domestic politics, the fight against the Islamic State (IS), and more.
Amberin Zaman elucidated how domestic and international factors have influenced Turkey’s position on Syria and the Kurdish question. She maintained that peace talks with the PKK faltered in part because of rising tensions with the YPG/PYD in Syria and also in response to Erdoğan’s presidential ambitions. Growing Kurdish autonomy in Northern Syria has emboldened Kurds everywhere. In the words of Aliza Marcus, no matter how hard the Turkish government hits the PKK domestically, now there will always be a powerful Kurdish presence across the border in Syria.
The conversation then turned to Turkey’s descent into authoritarianism. Ambassador Eric Edelman argued that the US has a vested interest in shaping Turkey’s domestic politics. Long-term US interests and Turkey’s status as a NATO ally—an alliance intended to be a union of liberal democracies— demand that US use its position to speak out publicly and privately on Turkey’s civil rights violations.
Aliza Marcus explained how the YPG grew out of networks of support for the PKK in Syria. However, despite clear evidence of ties between the two, she said that it is unclear to what extent the PKK and the YPG/PYD are independent decision-makers. She added that, from Turkey’s perspective, the question is irrelevant. The two are one and the same, and nothing will diminish Turkish fears of Kurdish nationalism.
After hearing from audience member and representative of Rojava Cantons, Sinam Mohamed, on Kurdish governance and long-term strategy, Ceng Sagnic contended that Kurdish-controlled areas show more signs of functioning governance than the rest of Syria currently does. He also commented on current Syrian Democratic Force movements into Sunni-Arab areas in northern Syria. Marcus countered that Kurdish forces are not expanding for expansion’s sake, they are simply going where the Islamic State already is–namely Sunni areas.
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Peace picks June 13 – June 17
- Authoritarian Resilience and Revision after the Arab Uprisings. Monday, June 13. 3:30 PM – 5:00 PM. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Register to attend. Five years after the 2011 uprisings, authoritarianism remains a deeply embedded feature of the Arab state system. Countries in the region are caught between the competing impulses of fragmentation and two equally unsustainable authoritarian visions—that of the self-proclaimed Islamic State, or classic autocratic regimes. Robert Worth and Joseph Sassoon will discuss these dynamics, sharing from their recent books. Carnegie’s Frederic Wehrey will moderate. Following the discussion, copies of the book will be available for sale with signing by the authors. Joseph Sassoon is an associate professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and is the author of Anatomy of Authoritarianism in the Arab Republics. Robert Worth writes for the New York Times Magazine and is the author of A Rage for Order: The Middle East in Turmoil from Tahrir Square to ISIS. Frederic Wehrey is a senior associate in the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Cascading Conflicts: U.S. Policy on Turkey, Syria, and the Kurds. Tuesday, June 14. 10:00 AM – 11:30 AM. Bipartisan Policy Center. Register to attend. In the fight against ISIS, U.S. policymakers have been increasingly confounded by the fact that two crucial allies, Turkey and the Kurds, are locked in a violent conflict on both sides of the Turkish-Syrian border. While Washington’s plans for defeating ISIS rely on airbases in Turkey and Kurdish troops in Syria, the Turkish government continues to insist that Washington’s Syrian Kurdish partners are no different from the Kurdish terrorists against which it is fighting at home. In the absence of a more effective U.S. plan for addressing the situation, Turkey’s domestic conflict now threatens to not only undermine the war against ISIS but also destabilize Turkey, damage U.S.-Turkish relations, and prolong the Syrian conflict. Join the Bipartisan Policy Center for an expert panel discussion that will address the evolving relationship among Turkey, Syria and the Kurds, with a focus on the implications for U.S.-Turkish relations and U.S. policy in Syria. As an already complicated situation risks causing a major crisis between Washington and its allies, understanding the dynamics has become more important than ever. Panelists: Eric Edelman, Co-Chair, BPC’s Turkey Initiative, Former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey. Aliza Marcus, Author, Blood and Belief. Ceng Sagnic, Junior Researcher, Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies. Amberin Zaman, Public Policy Fellow, Wilson Institute. Moderated by:Ishaan Tharoor, Reporter, The Washington Post.
- Youth, Peace and Security: New Global Perspectives. Tuesday, June 14. 2:00 PM – 4:00 PM. U.S. Institute of Peace. Register to attend. Today’s generation of youth, at 1.8 billion, is the largest the world has ever known. Many of these youth are living in countries plagued by violent conflict and extremism, such as Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Nigeria. The goal of SCR 2250 is to recognize youth as partners for peace rather than solely viewing young people as perpetrators of violence—a shift in mindset that responds to the call to action of 11,000 young peacebuilders in the Amman Youth Declaration. The resolution, sponsored by the Government of Jordan, is a direct follow-up to the Global Forum on Youth, Peace and Security held in August 2015, as well as the Security Council’s Open Debate on the Role of Youth in Countering Violent Extremism and Promoting Peace held in April 2015. Join USIP and the Interagency Working Group on Youth and Peacebuilding for a discussion on SCR 2250 with the U.N. Secretary-General’s Envoy for Youth H.E. Ahmad Alhendawi of Jordan, young leaders from countries affected by violent extremism and armed conflict, and other experts. Speakers Include: Manal Omar, Associate Vice President, Center for Middle East and Africa , U.S. Institute of Peace; H.E. Dina Kawar, Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations; H.E. Ahmad Alhendawi, United Nations Secretary-General’s Envoy on Youth; Saji Prelis, Co-chair of the Inter-agency Working Group on Youth and Peacebuilding, Search for Common Ground; Soukaina Hamia, Youth Peacebuilder, Deputy Director of Sidi Moumen Cultural Center of Casablanca, Morocco; Saba Ismail, Youth Peacebuilder, Executive Director of Aware Girls, Representative of the United Network of Young Peacebuilders (UNOYP); Victoria Ibiwoye, Youth Peacebuilder, Founder of One African Child of Lagos, Nigeria; and Oscar Fernandez-Taranco, United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support.
- The Economic Decline of Egypt after the 2011 Uprising. Wednesday, June 15. 1:00 PM. The Atlantic Council. Register to attend. Five years after the 2011 revolution, Egypt’s economy is floundering and remains far from recovery. Successive Egyptian governments since 2011 have struggled to develop a vision for a new economic model for Egypt, while simultaneously implementing populist policies to appease the immediate demand of the public. This lecture is also the launch of the Rafik Hariri Center’s Mohsin Khan and Elissa Miller’s new report, “The Economic Decline of Egypt after the 2011 Uprising,” and a discussion on the trajectory of Egypt’s economy since 2011 and what the current Egyptian government should do to arrest the economy’s downward slide. A discussion with: Prime Minister Hazem Beblawi, Former Prime Minister, Arab Republic of Egypt; Executive Director, International Monetary Fund; Caroline Freund, Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics; Mohsin Khan, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, Atlantic Council; and Mirette F. Mabrouk, Deputy Director & Director of Research and Programs, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, Atlantic Council. Introduction by: The Hon. Frederic C. Hof, Director, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, Atlantic Council.
- Desert Storm after 25 years: Confronting the exposures of modern warfare. Wednesday, June 16. 3:00 PM – 5:00 PM. SEIU Building. Register to attend. By most metrics, the 1991 Gulf War, also known as Operation Desert Storm, was a huge and rapid success for the United States and its allies. The mission of defeating Iraq’s army, which invaded Kuwait the year prior, was done swiftly and decisively. However, the war’s impact on soldiers who fought in it was lasting. Over 650,000 American men and women served in the conflict, and many came home with symptoms including insomnia, respiratory disorders, memory issues and others attributed to a variety of exposures – “Gulf War Illness.” On June 16, the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence at Brookings and Georgetown University Medical Center will co-host a discussion on Desert Storm, its veterans, and how they are faring today. Representative Mike Coffman (R-Col.), the only member of Congress to serve in both Gulf wars, will deliver an opening address before joining Michael O’Hanlon, senior fellow at Brookings, for a moderated discussion. Joel Kupersmith, former head of the Office of Research and Development of the Department of Veterans Affairs, will convene a follow-on panel with Carolyn Clancy, deputy under secretary for health for organizational excellence at the Department of Veterans Affairs; Adrian Atizado, deputy national legislative director at Disabled American Veterans; and James Baraniuk, professor of medicine at Georgetown University Medical Center. Following discussion, the panelists will take audience questions.
- Can the US Work with Iran: Challenges and Opportunities. Thursday, June 16. 9:00 AM. The Atlantic Council. Register to attend. Nearly a year after the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany signed a landmark nuclear deal with Iran and nearly six months after the agreement was implemented, the nuclear aspects of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) appear to working smoothly. But other challenges potentially imperil the agreement. There are questions about whether the JCPOA can serve as a template for additional regional and international cooperation or whether domestic politics in the US and Iran and Iran’s continuing difficulties re-entering the global financial system will put those opportunities out of reach for the foreseeable future. To discuss these vital issues, the Atlantic Council’s Future of Iran Initiative and the Iran Project invite you to a half-day symposium.
9:00 a.m. – The progress and problems of sanctions relief
Featuring: Christopher Backemeyer, principal deputy coordinator for sanctions policy at the Department of State, Teresa Archer Pratas, deputy head of the sanctions divisions at the European External Action Service, andGeorge Kleinfeld, a sanctions expert at the law firm Clifford Chance, and moderated by Elizabeth Rosenberg, director of the Energy, Economics, and Security Program at the Center for a New American Security.
10:15 a.m. – The JCPOA’s effects on US-Iran relations
Featuring: Suzanne DiMaggio, director of the US-Iran Initiative at New America, Suzanne Maloney, deputy director of the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution and a senior fellow in the Brookings Center for Middle East Policy and Energy Security and Climate Initiative, and Negar Mortazavi, an Iranian-American journalist and analyst, and moderated by William Luers, director of the Iran Project.
11:30 a.m. – The impact of the JCPOA on Iran’s role in regional conflicts
Featuring: Ellen Laipson, a senior fellow and president emeritus of the Stimson Center and former deputy chair of the National Intelligence Council, J. Matthew McInnis, a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a former senior analyst in the US Department of Defense and Intelligence Community, and Bruce Riedel, director of the Intelligence Project at the Brookings Institution and a former senior director for the Near East and South Asia on the National Security Council. Barbara Slavin, acting director of the Future of Iran Initiative, will moderate.
12:30 p.m.– Keynote by Ben Rhodes, deputy national security advisor for strategic communications, on the legacy of the JCPOA. Stephen Heintz , president of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, will introduce and moderate.
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A step down the slippery slope
Juan Cole is predicting long-term repercussions from the move of Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) with US support into the 90-mile stretch just south of the Turkish border known as the “Manbij pocket” and heretofore under Islamic State (ISIS) rule. At the same time, Turkish President Erdogan is saying that most of the SDF force is Arab, allowing him to welcome the US-supported move. A lot depends on who is right.
Turkish and American interests potentially converge in the Manbij pocket, which has been the subject of Washington/Ankara discussions for months if not years. Ankara wants to ensure that the Kurds do not take over the area, which would give them contiguous territory all the way from Hasakah in Syria’s northeast to Afrin in the west. Washington wants to defeat ISIS in the Manbij pocket, as it is an important route for recruits and supplies. Attacking Manbij will also relieve pressure on Azaz, where ISIS is challenging relatively moderate opposition rebels defending a vital supply route of their own.
The big issue is not only about who will fight for the Manbij pocket but rather who will control it after the fact. The Americans say the Kurds are relatively few and will not stay, which is reassuring to the Turks. Instead, they will withdraw and presumably refocus again on Raqqa. That would be ideal, but it also cuts against the grain. Forces that take territory usually keep it, especially if they perceive strategic benefits from doing so. Only vigorous American insistence will convince the Kurds to give up what they no doubt see as vital to their prospects for a clearly defined Kurdish-ruled territory within an eventual post-war Syria.
That is precisely what Erdogan wants to prevent, as he views the Syrian Kurds as a wholly owned subsidiary of the Kurdish PKK rebellion inside Turkey. Having re-initiated the war against the PKK, the Turkish President will not be able to accept Syrian Kurdish gains that he views as directly threatening to his country. There is no sign he is willing to make his peace with the Syrian or Turkish Kurds, as seemed likely only a few years ago. He is determined to ride the wave of Turkish nationalism his crackdown on the Kurds has generated as far as it will take him. He aims to change the constitution and enhance the powers of the presidency.
The Americans have a great deal of say about who will control the Manbij pocket if and when ISIS is defeated there. They will need American air power to protect them. This will enable, or extend, a de facto no-fly zone in northern Syria. The SDF invasion of the Manbij pocket is a hesitant step down a slippery slope that President Obama has tried to avoid.
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Hope fades
The Syria peace talks, never substantial, are evaporating. The chief negotiator for the opposition has quit. The Russians and the Syrian government continue to bombard pretty much whomever they like in dozens of raids every day, though Administration officials assure me that the Russians insist on some restraint. That wasn’t apparent yesterday in a bombing near Idlib’s main hospital.* Sieges have not been lifted, prisoners have not been exchanged and most humanitarian supplies are still blocked.
On the main issue in the talks–the formation of a transitional governing body with full executive authority (TGBFEA)–there is no progress reported, despite a looming deadline of August 1 for beginning the transition. The Syrian government and the Russians continue to insist that Bashar al Assad preside over the TGBFEA. The opposition rejects that proposition, but its deteriorating military situation gives it little leverage in the negotiation. The Americans have been unable to convince the opposition to yield. Even if some moderates do, they will be unlikely to be able to deliver the armed groups–moderates as well as extremists–to a political solution that leaves Bashar al Assad in place.
The question of Assad is a secondary one for the Americans, who are mainly concerned to pursue the fight against the Islamic State (ISIS). Pentagon equipped, trained and advised Syrian Democratic Forces (mainly Kurdish but partly Arab) are making progress in investing Raqqa, ISIS’s more or less capital. But ISIS has responded with attacks farther west aimed at cutting off a main supply route from Turkey to relatively moderate forces in Aleppo and farther north. If Kurdish forces prove necessary to block this move, Ankara will have apoplexy, since that could give them control of the last remaining portion of the Syrian/Turkish border that they do not already own. ISIS knows how to drive a wedge between the supposed Coalition partners fighting against it.
Things are going a bit better in Iraq, where more or less government-controlled forces have surrounded Fallujah, which ISIS has been using to launch suicide attacks in Baghdad, and are beginning the effort to liberate it. Kurdish forces have also moved towards Mosul, though any effort to liberate what was once Iraq’s second-largest city still seems far off.
Sectarian strife increasingly threatens military success in Iraq, with Iranian-backed Shia militias prominent in investing Fallujah and apparently determined to play a role in its liberation, despite the express wishes of Prime Minister Abadi. He remains under political pressure in Baghdad but has been unable to assemble the parliamentary quorum and majority needed to approve a new, more technocratic government and much-needed anti-corruption reforms.
With the Syrian regime refusing to allow humanitarian convoys into besieged cities, talk has grown of airdropping aid. That’s an expensive and ineffective proposition that should be used only in limited and extreme circumstances. It is no substitute for the truckloads required in major population centers. Nor will it do anything to end the war. Bashar al Assad is happy to tie up the international community in interminable discussions of humanitarian access because it helps him to avoid the search for a political solution and the inevitable end to his rule it would entail.
Hope for the peace talks is fading. Syria is headed for more war. It is at moments like these that sometimes someone does something fundamental to alter the equation. What that might be, and who will act, isn’t at all clear to me.
*I originally said “of Idlib’s main hospital.” Later reporting suggests that was inaccurate.
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The ISIS war and Iraq’s politics
The Turkish Anadolou news agency asked me some questions about the war against the Islamic State in Iraq. Then the International Business Times asked questions about the political situation in Iraq. I answered:
Anadolou agency on the war against ISIS
Q: The Pentagon has recently announced that it has built up a fire base where American Special Operation Forces operates artillery against Daesh and a few weeks later the Department said that it may establish more fire bases ahead of Mosul offensive and just yesterday we heard that the Pentagon is also authorizing deployment of 200 additional troops alongside combat helicopters to the help the operation.
First of all what does this tell us about Obama administration’s policy in Iraq?
A: Obama wants to do what he can to destroy the Islamic State before leaving office. Recent progress in getting ISIS to give up territory is making the Americans want to accelerate the process. They are prepared to take some additional risk in order to do so.
That said, I think one of the important decisions recently has been increased funding for the Kurdish peshmerga, who have proven among the most effective troops fighting IS.
Q: Is the US involving more and more in the swamp in Iraq?
A: Yes, though I’m not sure it is really a swamp. IS lacks the popular support that made Vietnam a quagmire.
Q: Do you think that Obama’s no boots on ground policy is over?
A: It is clearly over. The American troops on the ground will certainly be defending themselves as the need arises.
Q: Without the US isn’t it possible for Iraqi forces to retake Mosul?
A: I don’t know that it is possible with the US. Mosul will be a big and difficult operation. I imagine the Americans and Iraqis are hoping that it will fall without a major battle.
Q: Why does the administration feel compelled to involve itself in the Mosul operation in a combat role?
A: The Americans want to accelerate the process and have important means–like the Apaches–that the Iraqis lack.
Q: How is this troop build-up in Iraq tied into the election process? And what does it tell us about post-election term or next president?
A: I doubt it is tied to the election process itself, because ISIS has really not been a big issue, yet. But it is certainly tied to the approaching end of the Administration.
The next president will be under the same pressures Obama is. Cruz, Trump, Kasich or Clinton might be inclined to respond by doing more. There is lots of pressure from the American public to finish with the Islamic State as soon as possible and to get American troops out of harm’s way. Sanders would want to do less.
International Business Times on the political situation in Iraq
Q: Abadi said his goal is to fill his cabinet with technocrats. What does that mean in reality and why have so many people refused their appointments?
A: What it should mean is the appointment of people based more on their technical competence than on party or sectarian affiliation. You have to ask the people who refused appointments why they did so, but clearly any new minister would like to be sure that he or she will have the kind of political support required to get the job done. That will be especially true for more “technical” types, who can’t by definition assume political support.
Q: Who pressured Abadi into reshuffling his cabinet? Shiite clerics or the US? How much do you think the Americans were involved in this decision?
A: I think the Americans are supportive of Abadi in general and his decision to reshuffle the cabinet with more competent people in particular. You’ll have to ask the Shiite clerics about their views, though one of them–Muqtada al Sadr–clearly played a key role in the demand for a “technical” government. It seems to me Shiites in Iraq in general are demanding more competent and accountable governance. That is not a bad thing.
Q: How does what is happening now in Baghdad compare to what happened under Maliki? Seems like the US keeps repeating its mistakes when it comes to advising Baghdad.
A: Maliki became increasingly autocratic and sectarian. Quite the opposite is true of Abadi: it seems to me he is trying hard to move in a less sectarian and less autocratic direction. It isn’t easy.
Q: Parliament has always been dysfunctional. What makes this current political crisis different?
A: Different from what? In parliamentary systems, getting approval for a ministerial reshuffle when the governing party does not have a clear majority is often difficult. Iraq is not a consolidated democracy like the UK or Germany. Baghdad is also under enormous pressure from the war against IS, the fall in oil prices, Kurdistan’s growing appetite for independence and Sunni discontent.
Certainly the Americans would be happy to see a new government in place focusing its attention on defeating IS and governing effectively on the territory regained from it.
Q: What is at stake here? Are we seeing this trickle down to the local population? Have any affects on the economy?
The Iraqi economy is already on the ropes due to low oil prices. I don’t think the political situation comes near to that as a depressing influence.
A: How much of what is happening in Baghdad is a result of U.S. policy failures?
Q: I see it more as a result of US success in installing a parliamentary semi-democracy in Iraq. I don’t really regret the fall of Saddam Hussein, even if some Iraqis and Americans do. But not everything in Iraq is a consequence of what the US does. There is an Iraqi political dynamic over which Washington has little real influence.
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Tin cupping
A friend dropped this piece in my in box:
Iraqi Kurdistan is in trouble. Last week its Deputy Prime Minister Qubad Talabani visited Washington, along with a Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) delegation of officials, including Interior Minister Kareem Sinjari and head of foreign relations Falah Mustafa Bakir, to convince the US Administration to release more funds. The delegation pitched a stark message to policy makers: Kurdistan is the most effective force fighting ISIS, but it faces a greater existential threat–the economy. That economy has come unstuck as oil and gas prices have tanked, and the Iraqi government has refused to release Kurdistan’s share of the federal budget.
Meanwhile Kurdistan’s peshmerga fighters have been spearheading the war on ISIS, even as the Iraqi-Kurdistan region plays host to 1.8 million refugees. The KRG cannot keep up with these pressures.
But the KRG’s woes are, at least in part, of its own making. The budgetary dispute with Baghdad came after repeated failures to uphold the KRG’s side of an oil production agreement. In a provocative move, the KRG signed an oil supply deal with Turkey in an attempt to further bypass Iraq, and at the end of 2015 seized deposits at two branches of the Iraqi central bank. The money went mainly to pay a vast public sector. Once Baghdad pulled the plug, the KRG was forced to make up the deficit by selling off oil. When the price of oil dropped the government fell four months in arrears for civil service salaries and three months in arrears for peshmerga soldiers. Salaries have been cut to enable payments.
Now Qubad says the KRG is running a $100 million deficit per month, down from a high of $400 million thanks to pay cuts and austerity measures. Even so, Kurdish officials know this is a huge hole to plug. The recent delegation ominously warned policy makers that if the KRG continues at this rate it will fall behind on payments again, including to its peshmerga fighting ISIS.
This is why the Kurdish delegation was in Washington. It needs money, badly. The public sector employs over 1-in-5 in Kurdistan, so the failure to pay salaries is felt broadly. The KRG has justified pay cuts to its employees as a necessary measure to allow those reduced salaries to be paid on time. If the government falls behind again, workers may reach new levels of unrest.
Given the problems the region is beset with, one might expect the KRG to shelve its long-held ambitions for independence. The US is unlikely to support an independence bid at this time: US policy has long supported a united Iraq, and that position is unlikely to change while the Kurdish economy remains a mess and ISIS remains at large.
It is surprising then, that last month President Barzani reaffirmed his support for an independence referendum, setting the timeline for “before October.” Officials and experts have suggested that Barzani is creating a distraction, trying to draw attention away from his refusal to stand down after his term expired last year. But Qubad appeared to support President Barzani when speaking at the Wilson Center in DC last Thursday. While stopping short of naming a date, he unequivocally denied that the referendum issue was a distraction.
Talabani is a member of the opposition Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Former Kurdish officials and those who know him describe him as pragmatic on the independence issue. He understands that Kurdistan cannot expect to transition to independence while all of its prospective neighbors remain skeptical, if not outright hostile to the prospect of a Kurdish nation. It certainly cannot expect a smooth transition while its economy is already on its knees, and it is fighting a war with a frontline less than 50 miles from its capital at Erbil. His decision not to play down independence suggests Kurds may be hoping to use it as threat, if attempts to secure aid are met with uncertainty, if not outright rejection.
US aid, if it comes, will almost certainly require the KRG to drop its independence bid for now. If Kurdish officials are digging in on the issue, it bodes ill for the prospects of a swift resolution. It is possible Talabani’s decision to talk up the issue is evidence of failed negotiations with the administration and with Congress. That means there may be worse to come for Kurdistan, and US-Kurdish relations.
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