Tag: Kurds
Dire
Iraq’s Kurdistan Region is making noises about conducting a referendum soon to decide its political future. A drafting committee is working on the wording of the proposition. President Barzani and his PDK are committed to conducting the referendum this year.
Whatever the wording, Kurdistan’s largely young Kurdish population will understand it to be about independence. Ditto the large Kurdish diaspora, which referendum advocates want to enfranchise. Most of Kurdistan’s now substantial Arab population of people displaced by war will not be able to vote.
The outcome is predictable: 90% and likely more will vote yes, whatever the precise wording.
The case for Kurdistan’s independence is on the face of it compelling. Saddam Hussein’s regime mistreated its population, chasing Kurds from their homes and even out of the country. Kurds were even gassed during the 1988 Anfal campaign. Kurdistan won a large measure of autonomy in the 2005 Iraqi constitution, but the relationship between Baghdad and Erbil has been at best rocky since then. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has not received all the oil revenue it is entitled to, it has had to defend its own territory from the Islamic State without help from Baghdad and it faces demands from its population, most of whom no longer speak Arabic, for complete independence. The KRG claims to be a democracy and to treat minorities well.
So why shouldn’t it happen?
The geopolitical circumstances are not favorable. While Kurdistan has vastly improved its relations with Ankara, large parts of eastern Turkey were slated at the end of World War I to become part of a Kurdish state. Turkey will not want to see independence for its southern neighbor while it represses a violent Kurdish rebellion on its own territory, for fear of the irredentist consequences. Iranians feel even more strongly on this issue: what the Kurds call “eastern Kurdistan” is inside the Islamic Republic. Iran’s population is not much more than 50% Persian. Tehran will fear the Kurds won’t be the only ones looking to get out. The Baloch have been rebelling since 2004.
Iraqi Kurds naturally look to the Americans for support. Washington was vital to their survival in the 90s, when it protected them with a no-fly zone in northern Iraq. The Kurds supported the 2003 American invasion of Iraq and happily hosted American forces. The KRG has welcomed Iraqi Christians displaced by ISIS and maintains friendly relations with the US, even welcoming American investment and admitting Americans without the visas the Baghdad government requires. My Kurdish friends ask plaintively: don’t the Americans want a new friendly ally in the Middle East? One with at least a nominal commitment to multiethnic democracy?
Washington might, but it has global concerns, which include maintaining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova, where Moscow is supporting breakaway territories in each of those countries. Independence for Kurdistan would open the proverbial Pandora’s box, strengthening Russian arguments and undermining the international consensus that has formed against independence for South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the annexation of Crimea and the rebellion in Donetsk and Luhansk, as well as the aspirations of Transnistria. China will be no less opposed to Kurdistan’s independence than the Americans, for fear of the implications for Tibet.
Even inside Iraq, there are issues. The boundaries of Iraqi Kurdistan are not agreed. While the KRG seized the so-called “disputed territories” during its offensive against the Islamic State in 2014, Baghdad has not agreed that they belong within Kurdistan. The KRG is offering to conduct referenda in these territories on whether they want to join with Kurdistan, fulfilling a provision of the Iraqi constitution. But doing that while the KRG is in control is unlikely to convince Baghdad that a free choice is being made.
At current oil prices around $30/barrel, the KRG is nowhere near having the financial resources to be independent. Baghdad isn’t providing the funding it should, but independence would leave Kurdistan even worse off. It is still an oil rentier state, despite its hopes for a more diversified economy. My guess is that oil prices in the future will have a hard time going over $70-80/barrel, because above that level massive quantities of unconventionally produced oil and gas (as well as other alternatives) will come on line. The KRG needs closer to $100/barrel to meet its financial requirements with oil production even well above current levels.
Advocates of an independence referendum are claiming that it would be prelude to a re-negotiation of the relationship with Baghdad, not necessarily a one-way street to independence. Anyone who knows young Kurds will doubt that after voting for what they think of as independence they will accept some sort of confederal arrangement to stay nominally inside Iraq. An independence referendum is far more likely to be prelude to still another war, in which Arabs (both Sunni and Shia) fight Kurds to determine the borders they have failed to agree on for more than a decade.
The implications of a referendum without prior agreement, both on the legitimacy of the process and on Kurdistan’s borders, are dire.
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Kurdistan keeps reinventing itself
On Wednesday, SAIS hosted an event entitled “Kurdistan: Re-Inventing Itself, Yet Again.” Sasha Toperich, Senior Fellow and Director, Mediterranean Basin Initiative, Center for Transatlantic Relations, SAIS made opening remarks. Hemin Hawrami, Director, Foreign Relations Office, Kurdistan Democratic Party gave a keynote address, which was followed by a panel discussion. Rebeen Pasha, WYLN Senior Fellow, Mediterranean Basin Initiative, introduced and moderated the panel. Panelists included Hawrami and Salam Mohammad Islam, Chief Executive Director, Rwanga Foundation.
Toperich explained that Iraqi Kurdistan has a 600 mile front with ISIS and 1.8 million refugees/IDPs. Baghdad has not provided the KRG with the funding it promised. Iraqi Kurdistan is a flag without a country and a safe harbor for minorities affected by ISIS atrocities. The different groups in Iraq should be able to chart their own destinies while being reconciled with each other. If Iraq must remain united, the Kurds must be able to take out their own loans and revive their economy. He strongly supports the KRG’s independence referendum.
Hawrami stated that Iraqi Kurdistan is an important actor in a chaotic Middle East. Many of Iraqi Kurdistan’s challenges are external. ISIS is a symptom of sectarianism in Iraq and developments in Syria. A military response to ISIS is a short-term solution. ISIS was a terrorist organization but became a terrorist state when it captured Mosul. The KRG warned Baghdad about ISIS, but Maliki didn’t listen. When ISIS attacked the KRG, they aimed to:
- Gain control of disputed areas claimed by the KRG.
- Stop the independence referendum.
ISIS is a combination of Takfirism and Ba’athism. The KRG has a three-phase counter-ISIS strategy:
- Stopping ISIS.
- Rolling back ISIS.
- Defeating ISIS.
Over 1,600 Peshmerga sacrificed their lives to accomplish the first two goals. The KRG remains threatened; there are still daily skirmishes. But defeating ISIS requires liberating Mosul; the Iraqi government isn’t yet finished with Ramadi. Liberating Mosul requires boots on the ground (Sunnis and Peshmerga). But they will need more equipment. The Peshmerga have been unpaid for four months but are still fighting.
Iraqi Kurdistan has experienced three shocks since 2014:
- Maliki cut the budget for the KRG in February 2014.
- The influx of 1.8 million refugees and IDPs.
- Low oil prices.
Until 2013, Iraqi Kurdistan was the only region in the Middle East and North Africa with double-digit economic growth. Had it been independent, its rank in the areas of openness and governance would have been comparable with Malaysia and Indonesia. Unemployment was at 6% but is now ~25%. The poverty rate has jumped from 3% to 13%. The KRG is still learning how to govern; more still needs to be done. Kurdistan wants dialogue with Baghdad (not military conflict) but doesn’t want to be part of another decade of sectarianism and bad governance. Dialogue with Baghdad has improved; they now have a joint committee with Baghdad that meets monthly.
That is why they are holding the referendum (hopefully this year), which is not for immediate independence but asks what people want for their future. It will be for all citizens of Iraqi Kurdistan, including those in the diaspora.
The Kurds have been victims since Sykes-Picot but the borders are now only on maps. The KRG hopes these borders can be redrawn through peaceful coexistence and wants to add to the number of functioning political entities in the region. The KRG has become a safe haven for Iraqi Christians, most of whom now live in Kurdistan. Iraqi Kurdistan is a villa in the jungle that must be protected.
Pasha stated that he sees both challenges and opportunities for Iraqi Kurdistan. He grew up under Saddam and couldn’t imagine a future without Saddam. If we detach ourselves from the current situation, we can focus on Kurdistan’s future potential. Investing in young people is key for Iraqi Kurdistan’s future since 2/3 of the population is under 30.
Hawrami, in response to a question, said the Kurds believe the disputed territories are Kurdish and have waited ten years for censuses and referenda in these areas. Since the Iraqi Army’s retreat, the KRG has provided security but won’t impose a military status-quo. The KRG will hold special referenda in these areas for them to decide if they want to be part of Kurdistan. The KRG will also not accept interference by the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs). If these areas choose to join Iraqi Kurdistan, the KRG will provide them with special status based on power-sharing and equal opportunities.
Another audience member asked about KRG-Turkey relations. Hawrami explained that Turkey and the KRG have common interests; they have strong economic ties and the KRG supports the peace process in Turkey. Out of 3,300 foreign companies working in Iraqi Kurdistan, over 1,300 are Turkish. Turkey has not publicly rejected the independence referendum and recognizes that Iraqi Kurdistan adds to the stability of the region. Iraqi Kurdistan is not a threat to its neighbors.
A third audience member asked if it has become increasingly difficult for non-Kurds in Iraqi Kurdistan. Hawrami responded that 1.4 million of the KRG’s IDPs are Arabs (Sunni and Shia) and the Kurds have provided them education. Their children are learning Kurdish. Thousands of Sunnis fled Ramadi during the military operation there and weren’t accepted in Baghdad because the PMUs feared they would change the demographics. They went to Kurdistan instead; the Kurds believe in freedom of religion. Islam has begun referring to citizens of Iraqi Kurdistan as Kurdistanis rather than Kurds, since 25% of the population is now non-Kurd.
Islam spoke about how effectiveness depends on efficiency. Since 1991, when Kurdistan achieved some self-governance, it has been at best effective but could have been more efficient and could have dealt with its challenges better. Instrospection is healthy for societies and Iraqi Kurdistan is still learning. In the early 1990s, CSOs in Iraqi Kurdistan were focused on humanitarian relief. They moved in the direction of democratization and development in the late 1990s, and especially post-2003.
The Rwanga Foundation’s vision is for education for all. They provide services, build capacity and design policies. They work on entrepreneurship and encourage youth to believe in themselves; youth are not only the leaders of tomorrow but also of today. Partnerships between CSOs, the government and the private sector will be important. Rwanga also provides humanitarian assistance in Sinjar. So far, Rwanga has completed 80 projects and has helped about 1 million people.
In the panel discussion, Pasha asked what is needed to rebuild liberated areas. Hawrami argued that ensuring security is paramount. The Peshmerga can do this, but more international assistance is needed for economic reconstruction. Islam noted that Sinjar needs more services for people to return.
Asked what Iraqi Kurdistan is doing to invest in good governance, Hawrami responded that the democratic process in Kurdistan began in 1992, but democracy also requires a culture of accountability and transparency. Iraqi Kurdistan was rural until the 1960s but the Ba’athists destroyed villages and moved people to urban camps. This transformed the people from producers to consumers. To increase productivity, the KRG has encouraged investment and boosted the private sector. The Kurds have institutions for accountability but democracy is an ongoing process. Many flaws remain. Fighting ISIS has made the Peshmerga stronger and the economic crisis will make the economy stronger because Kurdistan will enact reforms.
Hawrami noted that Iraqi Kurdistan looks to increase its trade relations with Iran, but won’t take sides in the regional sectarian conflict and won’t accept Iranian intervention in the disputed areas. Islam asserted that Kurdistan is on the right track, but there have been ups and downs. Developing the mentality of democracy takes a generation.
To conclude, Hawrami stated that the US must accept that the “one Iraq” policy is a failure and that Iraq is already divided. Washington must protect Kurdistan as a stable force in the region. Islam reiterated the importance of focusing on youth.
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Peace picks February 1-5
- Fifteen Years of Fighting Terror: Lessons for the Candidates | Monday, February 1st | 1:00-2:30 | Open Society Foundations | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Despite a significant investment of personnel and money, current policies have mostly failed to stop violent extremism and instability from spreading across the Middle East and North Africa. Saferworld, a London-based NGO that works for peace in more than 20 countries, will release three reports analyzing lessons from 15 years of counterterror and stabilization efforts in Afghanistan, Somalia, and Yemen. The reports conclude that the U.S. approach to counterterrorism, stabilization, and state building has been counterproductive—and could be improved by focusing strategically on peace, relying less on the military, taking a tougher line on bad governance, and working more closely with civil society. An expert panel will discuss the policy and operational impacts of the recommendations derived from these case studies. The panel discussion will be followed by Q & A. Speakers include Larry Attree, Head of Policy for Saferworld, Sarah Chayes, Senior Associate for the Democracy and Rule of Law Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Richard Fontaine, President of the Center for New American Security. Scott Shane (moderator) is a national security reporter for the New York Times.
- Pin-Down Diplomacy: How Wrestling Promotes US-Iran Ties | Tuesday, February 2nd | 9:30-11:00 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Much as “ping-pong diplomacy” helped break the ice between the United States and China in the 1970s, “pin-down diplomacy” between the wrestlers of the United States and Iran has been instrumental in changing perceptions about Iranian and American society, and building bridges between sports communities and ordinary citizens. The Atlantic Council’s Future of Iran Initiative invites you to a discussion about athletic exchanges between the United States and Iran and the role they have played and can continue to play in promoting better understanding between the peoples of these two long-time adversaries. Speakers include Greg Sullivan, Senior Adviser for Strategic Communications and Public Diplomacy in the State Department’s Office of Iranian Affairs. James Ravannack has been President of USA Wrestling, the national governing body of amateur wrestling in the United States, since August 2006. Christina ‘Kiki’ Kelley is Team Leader for the US Men’s Greco-Roman wrestling team for the Olympic cycle culminating in Rio 2016. Bahman Baktiari is Executive Director of the Salt Lake City-based International Foundation for Civil Society, an organization that explores fundamental social and political shifts underway throughout the Middle East and North Africa and focuses on bridging cultural gaps and fostering a discourse of understanding. Barbara Slavin, Acting Director of the Future of Iran Initiative at the Atlantic Council will moderate.
- Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz on Iran’s Nuclear Agreement | Tuesday, February 2nd | 11:00-12:00 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The International Atomic Agency (IAEA) has certified that Iran has curbed its nuclear program by taking a number of steps including dismantling two-thirds of its installed centrifuge capacity, reducing its stockpile of enriched uranium and removing the core of its Arak heavy water reactor. As a result, the U.S. has lifted nuclear-related sanctions. Please join us for a discussion with Secretary Moniz on exactly what steps Iran has taken, how the United States can be confident that Iran’s breakout time to a nuclear weapon has been extended to at least one year, what lies ahead for the nuclear deal and what challenges remain.
- Implications of the Collapse of Oil Prices for the Middle East | Tuesday, February 2nd | 3:00-4:30 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The collapse of the oil prices has shocked both producers and consumers worldwide. As the most important producing region of the world, the Middle East has been particularly affected; state revenues are down, and cutthroat competition for market share and low global demand translates into greater challenges and uncertainty. The regional economic outlook is unclear, and questions remain about the potential long-term impact of sustained low oil prices. Three experts will analyze the geopolitical and financial aspects of the sharp decline in oil prices on both importing and exporting countries in the Middle East. Speakers include David Gordon, Senior Advisor at Eurasia Group, Aasim M. Husain, Deputy Director of the Middle East and Central Asia Department at the International Monetary Fund, and Franziska Lieselotte Ohnsorge, Lead Economist at the World Bank. Henri J. Barkey, Director of the Middle East Program at the Wilson Center, will moderate the event.
- Iranian Public Opinion on Foreign Affairs on the Eve of Parliamentary Elections | Wednesday, February 3rd | 10:00-11:30 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Ebrahim Mohseni, Senior Analyst at the University of Tehran Center for Public Opinion Research will present findings from a new study of Iranian public opinion on the upcoming Iranian parliamentary elections, regional security issues, and expectations from the JCPOA. Three experts on Iran will comment on the survey results and discuss prospects for the February 26 elections, highlighting possible domestic, regional, and international implications. Panelists include William Miller, Senior Scholar at the Kennan Institute and the Wilson Center, Paul Pillar, Researcher of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University, and Robin Wright, Wilson Center-USIP Distinguished Fellow. Henri J. Barkey, Director of the Middle East Program at the Wilson Center will moderate.
- Kurdistan: Re-Inventing Itself, Yet Again | Wednesday, February 3rd | 10:00-11:30 | Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins SAIS | REGISTER TO ATTEND | This year will be a difficult year for the people of Kurdistan. The crash in oil prices, the unrelenting war against ISIS, and the presence of 1.8 million Syrian refugees and displaced Iraqis have precipitated a dire financial crisis for the Kurdistan Regional Government. Join us for a discussion on how to move forward, both regionally and internationally, in light of these challenging times facing Kurdistan. Sasha Toperich, Senior Fellow and Director of the Mediterranean Basin Initiative CTR SAIS will make opening remarks. Hemin Hawrami, Head of the Kurdistan Democratic Party Foreign Relations Office, will offer the keynote address. Panelists include Salam Mohammad Islam, Chief Executive Director at the Rwanga Foundation, and Awat Mustafa, Senior Board Member and Head of Operations and Projects at the Barzani Charity Foundation. Rebeen Pasha, WYLN Senior Fellow at the Mediterranean Basin Initiative will moderate.
- North Korea’s fourth nuclear test: How will Pyongyang’s neighbors and the U.S. respond? | Wednesday, February 3rd | 10:00-11:30 | Brookings | REGISTER TO ATTEND | North Korea’s recent nuclear test and possible upcoming satellite launch underscore the increasing dangers posed by North Korea’s weapons development program and its implications for international security and the integrity of the non-proliferation regime. The United States and its partners in Northeast Asia must develop and execute a coordinated strategy to address these ever larger risks, but will differences among the relevant countries prevent realization of a shared strategy? What are the longer-term implications should North Korea sustain its weapons development? On February 3, the John L. Thornton China Center and the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at Brookings will host an event to assess the wider implications of North Korea’s recent nuclear test, weigh the possible responses by the Republic of Korea, Japan, and China, and then consider the impact on U.S. policy. The event will be moderated by Senior Fellow Richard Bush, and the panelists include Senior Fellows Katharine H.S. Moon, Jonathan Pollack, and Sheila Smith of the Council on Foreign Relations. After the discussion, the panelists will take audience questions.
- Turkey’s politics and foreign policy: Bridging the populism/realism gap | Thursday, February 4th | 3:30-5:00 | Brookings | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Under the leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), populism has become a pervasive feature of the “new” Turkey. In the latest Turkey Project Policy Paper, Nora Fisher Onar of George Washington University’s Institute for Middle East Studies explores the tension between populism and realism as a driver of uncertainty in Turkey’s domestic and foreign affairs. The paper examines the sources, evolution, and consequences of AKP populism since 2002, including the problematic disconnect between anti-Western domestic rhetoric and the recent need for pro-Western pragmatism as Turkey’s regional ambitions have been confronted by the disorder spilling across its borders. On February 4, the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings (CUSE) will host a panel discussion to explore the tone and substance of Turkey’s politics and foreign policy as the country emerges from a polarizing electoral cycle. Fisher Onar will present the conclusions of her new paper, “The Populism/Realism Gap: Managing Uncertainty in Turkey’s Politics and Foreign Policy.” Following her remarks, Soner Cagaptay of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Alan Makovsky of the Center for American Progress, and Kadir Ustun of the SETA Foundation will offer their perspectives. The discussion will be moderated by Brookings TUSIAD Senior Fellow Kemal Kirişci. After the program, panelists will take questions from the audience.
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What to do about Syria?
On January 5, CFR hosted a panel discussion entitled “What to do About Syria” which also aired on HBO. The discussion was designed to resemble a National Security Council meeting. Panelists included Philip Gordon, Senior Fellow, CFR, Paul Pillar, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Center for Security Studies, Georgetown University, and Michael Doran, Senior Fellow, the Hudson Institute. Richard Haass, President, CFR, moderated the discussion.
Paul Pillar stated that none of the multiple sides in the Syrian conflict appears poised to win in the near future. The Russian military intervention that began in September has shored up the regime. The regime still controls roughly 1/4 of the country in a North-South strip. There are non-ISIS opposition areas, largely in the northwest but also near the Golan, as well as large areas of ISIS control in the east and Kurdish control in the north. There are hundreds of opposition groups and many coalitions. Over the past year, ISIS has had neither a net loss or a net gain of territory in Syria, but has lost territory on balance when Iraq is included.
Pillar explained that on the diplomatic front, the Vienna process led to the International Syria Support Group, whose members agree on the need for a ceasefire and political settlement. The Saudis held a meeting in Riyadh in December and agreed that Assad did not have to leave until after negotiations are held. The US adopted UN Security Council Resolution 2254, which calls for a ceasefire. The recent suspension of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran shouldn’t have a huge impact beyond the enmity we already knew existed.
Philip Gordon described the current situation as a dynamic stalemate. The attrition of regime forces is unlikely to cause the regime’s collapse because of outside support from Russia, Iran and Hezbollah. The main battle in Syria doesn’t involve ISIS; it’s between the regime and the non-ISIS opposition. The Vienna Process is a positive step. However, the diplomatic gaps between the Saudis and the Iranians remain large.
Michael Doran believes that the US has essentially dropped its demand that Assad leave by pushing his departure so far into the future that it will not happen on Obama’s clock. This frees up the Obama administration to discuss deconfliction with Russia and Iran, a shift the Saudis dislike.
Gordon summarized US policy in Syria as such: since 2011, when Obama declared that Assad must go, US policy has been to strengthen the moderate opposition, in order to pressure the regime to negotiate. So far that hasn’t worked, but it remains US policy. Doran is right that the
definition of what a political transition would look like has evolved. As it became clearer that Russia and Iran would prop up Assad, diplomats examined other types of transitions that might be more feasible. There has been an effort to unify the opposition but it remains fragmented because our partners support different groups. We have tried to build the capacity of the opposition groups, but it has not been enough; they are fighting a professional military backed by Russia and Iran. The president has authorized force against ISIS, using the legal basis that ISIS threatens the Iraqi government; Obama lacks a legal basis to target the regime.
Doran spoke of the limits of our support for the non-ISIS opposition. Iran and Russia have backed the regime and there has not been comparable activity from our side. The train and equip program failed because we found few recruits willing to fight ISIS exclusively. We also work with the Kurds who are aligned with the PKK. We have alienated our Sunni allies. Our position on Assad is critical to mobilizing Sunni support against ISIS. The US would also need ground forces, perhaps in a 1:5 ratio with our allies.
Gordon clarified that the US does support the opposition militarily and politically. We just don’t provide specifics.
Pillar stated that even though the US is a superpower, it may not be able to satisfactorily solve Syria. It’s not in the US’s interest to take sides in the Sunni-Shia conflict. We should place more emphasis on the diplomatic track because tamping down the war is most important.
Gordon outlined two policy options going forward. First, the US could take out Assad militarily, but this could generate more refugees and cause a power vacuum. The better option is to prioritize a ceasefire to stop the war; this is more important than a political transition. Gordon clarified that he is not proposing an alliance with Russia and Iran, but ending the conflict roughly along the lines of the current reality on the ground. Local areas would gain autonomy, but this would stop short of a partition, so as not to set a precedent of carving out new states in the region.
Doran questioned Gordon’s attachment to the integrity of Syria, but largely agreed with his vision for an end state. However, he reiterated that such an arrangement wouldn’t be possible without ground forces. Haass proposed that the US think seriously about supporting an independent Kurdistan as part of a deal, since the Kurds are the most effective fighting force against ISIS.
Pillar highlighted potential positive effects of the Russian military intervention. Russia will draw the ire of radical Sunnis, and Russia will gain more leverage over Assad. Russia also has an interest in tamping down the conflict; it doesn’t want to prop up a beleaguered Assad forever.
An audience member asked how we might prevent revenge attacks once the conflict ends. Pillar pointed out that under Gordon’s autonomous regions proposal, groups would have a diminished ability on the ground to carry out revenge attacks. Haass contended that, contrary to Western notions of pluralism, a future map of Syria must reflect more homogeneity than heterogeneity.
Gordon addressed an audience question about why the US sees fighting ISIS as in its national interest versus fighting the regime. The US has identified ISIS as a threat because it kidnaps Americans and seeks to destabilize regional partners. We have identified discrete steps we can take to degrade and destroy ISIS. Taking out Assad would require an effort like the invasion of Iraq; we should not minimize the cost and consequences of such an effort. The notion that taking out Assad would yield a positive outcome requires a larger suspension of disbelief than the notion that the Iranians and Russians might agree to a ceasefire if the US drops its demand that they abandon Assad.
Another audience member asked whether we need the Saudis to agree that ISIS is a fundamental threat to their existence. Pillar contended that it would be ideal if the Saudis would follow their own interests more intelligently. In the past, the Saudis have faced the threat posed by Al Qaeda; persistent diplomacy and tough love talks will be required to get them to do the same with ISIS. Gordon noted that it is difficult to explain to countries what we think their interests should be. Saudi Arabia is more concerned about Iran than ISIS and Turkey is more concerned about the Kurds. Doran contended that the Saudis and the Turks have defined their interests correctly; we are wrong about what their interests are.
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Opposition turmoil
Since our last post on the situation in northern Syria, everything has changed and nothing has changed. The world has witnessed terrorist attacks in Sinai, Paris, Beirut, San Bernardino, and elsewhere, which have contributed to increased international attention focused on ISIS and the crisis in Syria. Accusations, threats, ultimata fill the air, competing for space with French, Russian, British, US, and Turkish jets. Last week, in advance of the proposed next round of “Vienna” talks, an opposition conference was held in Riyadh, with representatives from a broad range of armed and political groups. The representatives agreed on a transition plan, following six weeks of negotiations and Assad’s departure, but it remains to be seen how much of it the regime and internationals will accept.
Neither the Kurdish PYD nor any of its affiliates were invited to Riyadh. They staged their own conference promising to begin a ‘Syrian Democratic Front’ in its liberated territories. Christian, Arab and Turkmen representatives also participated in the heavily Kurdish conference.
Meanwhile, on the ground in Aleppo, things continue to grind on. Villages have been taken and lost by all sides. Regime forces made gains under Russian air cover, taking the towns al-Hader and al-Eis south of the city, one day after they finally broke the siege on Kweiris airport to the east. Aleppo city’s opposition administrative council held elections mid to late November, with few problems and little disgruntlement. It continues to strain on a daily basis to provide services, especially water, with the limited resources available.
The Kurdish-dominated SDF has advanced in ISIS-held territory in the northeast, in a push toward Raqqa. But they are also operating in the countryside around Aleppo, reigniting tensions with opposition forces there. One analyst has called the stage on which these tensions are playing out, the A’zaz corridor, ‘the epicenter of the war’.
On November 18, fifteen groups allied themselves with SDF. Most are small and without much influence, but a couple stand out: Kurdish units local to Afrin Canton and an umbrella grouping named Jaysh al-Thuwwar now operate under the SDF banner. Jaysh al-Thuwwar is an amalgam including Jabhat al-Akrad (the Kurds’ Front), remnants of the Syrian Revolutionaries’ Army and the Hazm Movement, a few FSA brigades, Northern Sun, and the Turkmen Seljuks Brigade.
The details remain murky, but from November 27 clashes broke out between Jaysh al-Thuwwar and Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham, and FSA groups near A’zaz. Shots fired happened to coincide with Russian airstrikes, giving the advantage to Jaysh al-Thuwwar and intensifying the conflict, leading the Ahrar Syria Brigade to declare the Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhood in Aleppo a military zone and shell Kurdish positions there.
There ensued clashes in the countryside, some villages exchanged hands and some civilians were killed before a ceasefire was signed in Kashta’ar at the urging of Aleppo’s Consultation and Reconciliation Council. It does not seem to have held. Afrin Canton in particular is in a tense position, isolated as it is from the rest of Kurdish-controlled Rojava, but the hostilities are mutual and simmering. The Kurdish security service, Asayish, on December 8 arrested several activists in Afrin.
PKK! set the civil activists and white helmets free #Syria #Kafranbel pic.twitter.com/PmZrbnNo7r
— Raed Fares (@RaedFares4) December 12, 2015
Some argue that the Russian intervention and subsequent increased support for rebel groups from the US and others is inducing the rebel factions to unite. But in the past five years rebel groups have created and disbanded alliances, operations rooms, and joint commands frequently. Some last longer than others. In the north, Ahrar al-Sham and the Levant Front have proved relatively effective.
But the ongoing hostilities in Aleppo province highlight the tenuous nature of these unions. Last week there were two mergers that bear mention. First, the brigades Fursan al-Haqq and 101 Infantry Division have joined together as the Northern Division (al-Firqa al-Shamaliyya). Second, the existing Sultan Murad Brigade, already heavily populated with Syrian Turkmen, expanded to include several other Turkmen groups, including Sultan Mehmet Fatih. Both fall under the nebulous umbrella of the FSA.
The latter merger in particular highlights the surprising re-entry of Syrian Turkmen groups into the battlefield. The ISIS advance through Aleppo province in 2014 had dispersed many of the Turkmen forces and caused most to retreat from the province. Now the Turkmen could be reasserting themselves; at the very least, they have become a useful rhetorical card for Turkey in opposing both Russia and the Kurds. Erdoğan has cautioned Russia about bombing Turkmen areas of the northwest, such as Jabal al-Turkman in Latakia. After Turkey shot down the Russian jet, some posited it was done to protect Turkmen populations.
The conflict among opposition forces in the north is not drawn on clear-cut ethnic or sectarian lines. Though armed groups and political parties often try to represent the situation as black-and-white, ethnic and sectarian categories still bleed into each other. Jaysh al-Thuwwar and the SDF count fighters from all three ethnicities in their ranks. In Hasaka, they are also allied with Assyrian and Syriac Christian groups. The FSA, though largely Sunni Arab, likewise includes Kurd and Turkmen fighters. The FSA has a nebulous quality – yet their presence and their effect in battles against the regime is nevertheless real. Both Jaysh al-Thuwwar and the SDF, as well as their current opponents, include members who have been or still count themselves as part of the FSA.
It was rumored that the commander of Jabhat al-Nusra, Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, in an interview released on December 12th, claimed that there was no such thing as the FSA. (In fact, he stated ‘it is a group of factions that join under a name without any organizational links between them …. [the FSA] is not an army and it is not a group, but a banner and a name that have become common among the people’.) This sparked a reaction on a local level, as seen in the video below. No matter how nebulous, many Syrians on the ground are rooting for the FSA and identify with it.
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Beware the monopoly of power
To many in the West, the Kurds have long seemed the sanest group left in Syria, as well as the safest and most effective option as an ally in the fight against ISIS. They appear organized, united, secular, and pluralist, standing out against the backdrop of the fragmented factions of the Syrian opposition, including Islamist groups like Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham.
However, the political situation within this community, and their ties to the rest of Syrian society, are more complex than this image suggests. Their dominance of the new ‘coalition’ of the Syrian Democratic Forces engaged in the offensive against Raqqa makes it important to elucidate this complexity.
The Syrian Kurdish party PYD (Democratic Union Party) is the entity that makes the news. It is running the show throughout the north and northeast of the country. Their affiliated militia, the People’s Protection Units (YPG, and the women’s equivalent, the YPJ), made headlines last summer in their battle for Kobani against ISIS, and then again in another border town, Tel Abyad, this summer.
The YPG is also leading the fight against ISIS in Raqqa now, with grudging cooperation from Sunni Arab groups. After the US decided to suspend its train and equip program, it airdropped ammunition with the intention of supporting an offensive against Raqqa, but the Sunni Arab groups participating in the newly-formed coalition, Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), say they have seen none of this material aid. The YPG dominates the SDF.
Taking advantage of their military successes, the PYD established the Democratic Autonomous Government of Western Kurdistan (i.e. within Syria, as opposed to the well-established Kurdistan Regional Government inside Iraq) in January 2014, consisting of three cantons under a federated ‘Rojava’ government. Afrin canton lies to the northwest of Aleppo, Kobani on the Turkish border east of the Euphrates, and the third canton, Qamishli, falls in the northeast corner of Syria, bordering Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkey. The PYD in addition claims towns in the region between Afrin and Kobani, including A’zaz, Manbij, al-Bab, and Jarablus, as parts of historical Kurdistan.
The PYD administers health, education, security, and the judiciary within their cantons. They operate under an umbrella coalition TEV-DEM (Movement for a Democratic Society), which runs civil society organizations and ‘peace councils’ – civil courts – in Kurdish population centers, and aids local poor. The ‘peoples’ courts’ in the cantons are staffed by PYD members and take an eclectic approach to established and codified law, like other opposition groups, selecting from Syrian criminal law, Swiss or German legal codes and customary law.
Though the PYD has been consolidating its control of these cantons, they deny that they are seeking an independent Kurdish state, stating their aim of remaining within a whole and united Syria, though one with a higher degree of regional autonomy than before. They have publicly expressed tolerance and inclusion of other ethnicities and sects.
Bassam Barabadi and Faysal Itani reported in August that both ‘Kurdish and Arab senior sources in northern Syria’ confirmed ‘joint or divided Arab-Kurdish rule’ in liberated territories, evidencing some degree of cooperation, which is crucial for stability. The recent move to annex Tel Abyad reflects the PYD’s intentions to unite the three cantons and maintain control throughout the contiguous territories along the Turkish border.
Divisions in the Kurdish community and antagonisms with other Syrians remain. TEV-DEM is not the only coalition on the Syrian Kurdish political scene. Other less militant or nationalist parties have combined to form the Kurdish National Council (KNC), which has joined the Syrian National Coalition (SNC) and is politically closer to the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in Iraq than the radical Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey. The PYD accepts the PKK’s founder, Abdullah Öcalan, as their ideological leader.
One of the more prominent of the KNC parties is Yekiti (Kurdish Democratic Unity Party in Syria), which has often criticized the PYD. In May, for instance, the PYD are alleged to have told two Yekiti members to leave their homes in Qamishli canton because they had criticized the PYD on TV.
In addition to earlier allegations of press intimidation and aggression against other Kurdish parties, last month the Rojava Student and Youth Union, also in Qamishli, raised concerns to local and international human rights organizations about the PYD using Kurdish-language instruction in primary schools for political and ideological indoctrination. Indeed, on Tuesday the KNC called for demonstrations in Hasaka governorate against PYD educational policies. The resulting turnout in Malikiyya (Derek) was forcefully dispersed by PYD’s internal security arm, the Asayış, which also made several arrests.
Meanwhile, Sunni Arabs and Syrian Turkmen have levelled accusations of ethnic cleansing and property confiscation directed at the YPG, after their battles with ISIS in the Kobani and Tel Abyad countryside and their consequent control of new territories. An investigation conducted by Amnesty International affirmed war crimes committed by the PYD in razing Sunni Arab villages.
Cooperation between the Kurdish cantons and rebel-held territories, or the YPG and rebel militant forces, is generally low. Rebel groups distrust the PYD and YPG because their primary goal is driving ISIS out of their territories – showing, in the rebels’ view, lack of dedication to the revolution. The YPG command has stated that they would work with Russia to combat ISIS if Russia were to present the opportunity, which garners further distrust from other opposition groups.
Kader Sheikhmous is the co-founder of an NGO, Shar for Development, which focuses on enhancing civil society, governance, and economic development in Kurdish areas of Syria. Much of its work promotes the unity and good relations of the Kurdish and Sunni Arab communities, including a bilingual magazine that is distributed in the towns of Hasaka.
Sheikhmous highlights the dangers of the international and regional actors offering support exclusively to armed groups, such as the YPG, without investing in civil society actors and economic development. USAID, for example, in 2014 sharply diminished support to Kurdish NGOs in Syria. That risks creating dependence on the YPG not just for security but for other services, in the absence of civil society, will increase the YPG’s tendency toward authoritarian behavior.
These concerns raise the question of the viability of PYD-run autonomous cantons, their suitability as a military or security ally for the US, and their role in a future Syrian state. Exclusive or excessive support for one party in the Syrian Kurdish regions will allow it to consolidate its monopoly on power and violence.
Syrians generally endorse the unity of their country and its people, regardless of ethnic or sectarian background. Kurds, Turkmen, Alawis, Sunnis, and others want to regain their normal lives and continue living together. Though the Kurdish autonomous regions have provided measures of stability and security for the civilians of the north, it will be counterproductive if it comes at the price of single-party rule and exacerbated social divisions.
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