Tag: Kurds
Kurdistan under pressure
I enjoyed a couple of hours serving on a panel this morning with Kurdistan Regional Government Representative in Washington Bayan Sami Abdul Rahman, the Atlantic Council’s Nusseibeh Younes, and SAIS second year student Yael Mizrahi. Sasha Toperich of SAIS Center for Transatlantic Relations and leader of its Mediterranean Basin Initiative moderated. I won’t even try to reproduce the nuanced and fine-grained presentations by Bayan, Nusseibeh and Yael, but here are the talking points I used:
1. I am, like most Americans, an admirer of Iraqi Kurdistan and what it has achieved, even if I wouldn’t say the democratic transition there is even near complete.
2. That’s not surprising: Kurdish national aspirations were frustrated in the aftermath of World War I. Even in recent decades, Kurdistan has seen oppression, war, expulsion, and chemical attacks.
3. It has taken a hundred years for a fraction of the Kurdish population—the part fortunate enough to live in Iraq—to gain some degree of self-governance.
4. Until recently, it looked to some people as if that self-governance might progress towards independence and sovereignty.
5. I had my doubts, not I hasten to add due to weakness in the Kurds case: they were treated at least as badly as Kosovo Albanians and arguably much worse.
6. But geopolitical pressure from Iraqi Kurdistan’s neighbors has made independence a dicey proposition. Ankara, though friendlier than ever with Erbil, does not want independence for Kurdistan. Tehran is dead set against it. Baghdad doesn’t want it either.
7. In the last year, the situation has become even more complicated.
8. Kurdistan is under pressure for three dramatic reasons:
• The fall of oil prices;
• ISIL’s successful takeover of most of Sunni Iraq;
• Its own internal political strife.
9. Let me consider these one by one.
10. Oil prices are now at less than half their level of June 2014. At $100/barrel, Kurdistan needed production of something like 500,000 barrels per day to replace its share of Iraq’s overall oil production.
11. I’m guessing, but it seems to me likely it now needs production of well over 1 million barrels per day to replace the money it expects from Baghdad.
12. Even 500,000 bpd was a stretch. A million is a much bigger stretch, even with Kirkuk production now in Kurdistan’s control.
13. Second, Kurdistan now has to defend about six hundred miles of confrontation line with the Islamic State, as well as something like two million displaced people and refugees it is hosting with international assistance.
14. That is a daunting battle front and a massive humanitarian requirement.
15. Third is the serious political strife within Kurdistan, which pits President Barzani and his PDK against Gorran and other dissenters from his desire to prolong his stay in the presidency. They want a more parliamentary and less presidential system.
16. Soldiers who are expected to fight ISIL will want to know who and what they are fighting for. There is more ambiguity and dissension about that today than there has been for many years.
17. I don’t see any of these pressures letting up soon.
18. Erbil is getting ready to return to Baghdad in an effort to restore the agreement on oil that was supposed to allow exports directly from Kurdistan in exchange for payment of what Baghdad owes Erbil.
19. Let’s hope that issue can be sorted out, but even if it is oil prices remain under $50 per barrel and are unlikely to go above $80, due to unconventional production enabled by US technology that is now spreading to other countries.
20. Oil is priced in a global market. Kurdistan now has little prospect of meeting its budgetary needs as an independent state.
21. ISIL is not going away. Even if it is forced to withdraw from Ramadi, as it has been forced to do from Tikrit and Bayji, it will be some time before Mosul is retaken. The Kurdish confrontation line with ISIL is likely to remain long for some time to come.
22. Even after ISIS is defeated, I would anticipate extremist attacks on the KRG, as have occurred in the past.
23. Nor is Kurdistan’s internal strife likely to go away. Barzani is standing his ground. So is Gorran, which has been suspended from the parliament and the coalition government. Even if things were to get patched up, the differences remain profound and the willingness to resolve them weak.
24. So Kurdistan faces some intractable problems, even without mentioning the complications that come from the war in Syria: Turkish attacks on the PKK inside Iraqi Kurdistan and the help Erbil has given to the Kurdish forces flying PYD/YPG banners, which Ankara resents.
25. So what looked like a natural slide towards independence a year or two ago now looks like a return to the 20th century: a Kurdistan hemmed in on all sides and unable to pursue the self-determination that its people unquestionably want.
26. What should the U.S. do?
27. It should certainly support the Kurds, both Syrian and Iraqi, in the fight against ISIS, so long as they are prepared to treat Arabs and other non-Kurds well.
28. It should also continue to provide generous humanitarian assistance.
29. And Washington should do what it can to help Erbil and Baghdad resolve their dispute over the distribution of oil revenue.
30. On the internal Kurdistan issues, we should want to see them resolved sooner rather than later, since later could mean disrupting the fight against ISIS.
31. But we also need to nudge our Kurdish friends in a direction that respects the rule of law and democracy.
32. No president is forever. No governing party is forever. Adherence to the constitution as well as fair and free competition for votes is what we should expect of our partners, no matter what the outcome for longstanding friends.
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The nine lives of Erdoğan
The day after the Turkish parliamentary elections last Sunday, the Brookings Institution hosted a panel to discuss the results, ‘Turkey’s Snap Elections: Resuscitation or Relapse?’ The panel featured Ömer Taşpınar, professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College and nonresident fellow at Brookings; Kadir Üstün, executive director of the SETA foundation; Gönül Tol, director of the Center for Turkish Studies at the Middle East Institute; and former congressman Robert Wexler, currently president of the S. Daniel Abraham Center for Middle East Peace. Kemal Kirişci, director of Brookings’ Turkey Project, moderated the discussion.
The election results proved a surprise to most observers, with the AKP winning nearly 50% of the vote after they had been expected to gain perhaps 43-44%. As Kirişci established, they took back about 4.5 million votes in 5 months, including 2-2.5 million from nationalist party MHP and 1 million from the ‘Kurdish’ party, HDP. This places the AKP in a position of strength similar to that of 2011.
Taşpınar highlighted the disappointment that followed the June elections upset, including the failure to negotiate and build a coalition. It had been thought that disappointed voters for the MHP would migrate to the other nationalist party, CHP, but instead they switched to the AKP. Taşpınar stated that the surge in AKP voters from all parties stemmed from Erdoğan’s strategy of ‘controlled chaos,’ demonstrating that failure to vote for the AKP would mean instability, violence, and economic decline.
Üstün agreed that the electorate decided only the AKP, out of all available options, could deliver on the central concerns of Turkish voters today: security, stability, and economic development. No other party presented a positive platform, only setting themselves up as anti-Erdoğan. The HDP in particular, as a Kurdish party, had promised to the people to become an all-Turkey party, but failed after June to distinguish itself from the PKK insurgency, especially after the ceasefire ended and conflict resumed.
Tol discussed the Kurdish dynamic of the elections: after Kobani, observers had assumed the Kurdish vote had deserted Erdoğan and the AKP. However, it is now clear that the current security situation, AKP’s local electoral strategies in Kurdish areas, and conservative Kurds’ disappointment in the HDP resulted in a resurgence of Kurdish votes for the AKP. The standing conflict with the PKK, Tol observed, hurts local Kurdish civilians the most. Nevertheless, these elections are still a win for the HDP, as they attained the 10% threshold for participation in parliament.
Wexler opined that Erdoğan had the chance, during the Gezi protests in 2013, to exhibit become a transformational leader for Turkey, but he failed. Now, Wexler believes that he has a second chance, but Erdoğan must improve his relationships with Israel and other US allies in the region before the US can offer more support.
Taşpınar sees the elections as free but not fair, since media expression is increasingly restricted and opposition voices curtailed. Indeed, just two days before the election several opposition newspapers’ offices were raided. However, Wexler disagreed outright that access to information through free media had any effect on voters’ opinions, stating that voters simply had come to the conclusion that the AKP was the best party to deliver on their central interest, security. Üstün saw a more general ‘sea change’ in public opinion, but he also disagreed that the media played a large role in the election and did not support Taşpınar’s view that censorship today is comparable to the situation under previous military dictatorships.
The unexpected election result refocuses attention on consolidation of AKP rule, with potential for a renewed push for a referendum to create a stronger executive power under a presidential regime, as Taşpınar sees it. Reconciliation with the PKK is crucial to the stability of the country, but Tol does not believe the AKP is interested in giving up the fight yet. Until that happens, it is also unlikely there will be new developments in Turkey’s foreign policy towards Syria especially.
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Kurdistan is simmering too
Last Wednesday I had the pleasure of discussing developments in Iraqi Kurdistan with Mustafa Gurbuz of George Mason University and the Rethink Institute and Namo Abdulla of Rudaw. Here is how it came out:
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New Turkish elections
On Wednesday, the Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research in DC (SETA) hosted a conversation, ‘Turkey Ahead of the November Elections’, featuring Kılıç Kanat, research director at SETA; Ömer Taşpınar, non-resident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution; and Andrew Bowen, senior fellow and director of Middle East Studies at the Center for the National Interest. The executive director of SETA, Kadir Üstün, moderated the discussion. Kanat has just published an analysis paper on the new elections, which have been called for November 1 because of the failure to form a ruling coalition after the June polling.
The June elections were the first in 13 years when no single party won enough votes to create a ruling majority government. Kanat laid out the reasons this occurred and the issues for the upcoming elections. In his view, the causes behind the decline of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) include:
- The ‘Kobani effect’: the battle for the northern Syrian town had a galvanizing effect on Kurds and non-Kurds who voted against Erdoğan, who was seen as wanting ISIS to win;
- Mobilization by smaller parties to pass the 10% threshold for inclusion in parliament;
- For the first time, diaspora Turkish nationalists were allowed to vote in general elections;
- Tactical voting: voters were certain the AKP would win the most votes, but attempted to decrease the margin in order to force a coalition.
Kanat evaluates the shift as a turn to the nationalist parties, whether Turkish or Kurdish: the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), the conservative Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), and the Republican People’s Party (CHP). The HDP saw the biggest gains in support, from those dissatisfied with Erdoğan’s position vis-à-vis Kobani, and the Kurdish resolution process in general, as well as from diaspora voters.
The middle class has also been increasingly worried in a time of slowing economic growth, losing some confidence in the AKP. The AKP since the Gezi Park demonstrations has had to work hard to keep its support base, but the constant effort at mobiliztion may have resulted in election fatigue among some voters.
Going forward, Kanat stated, the upcoming elections will be determined by voters’ perception of who holds the responsibility for three things: resolving the Kurdish question, as well as dealing with PKK terrorism; maintaining public stability on a nation-wide level; and economic growth or decline.
Taşpınar zoomed out, examining two long-term trends that have contributed to the current political situation. First is the personalization of political power: political analysis and action stems from an understanding of Erdoğan’s plans. There are fewer enduring institutions in this post-Kemalist era, and no unified ideology undergirding the state.
Second, there is increasing polarization in Turkish politics. This has been driven by personalization, as well as the Kurdish question and the identity of Turkey as a country – will it be democratic or autocratic? The Gezi protest was a very real demonstration of this polarization, as was the failure after last weekend’s terrorist attack in Ankara for political leaders to produce a unified vocabulary to bring the nation together.
The theme of personalization ran through Bowen’s comments as well, in particular because of the personalistic nature of foreign policy decisions, for Obama as well as for Erdoğan. Theirs is a bad marriage. One of the key sticking points is the difference in the way they prioritize threats: for Erdoğan, the PKK takes pride of place, with ISIS far behind. Obama, on the other hand, urgently prioritizes defeating ISIS.
The Syrian crisis has drawn out many of the tensions in this relationship, which will be difficult to repair, even after the July agreement on air bases in Turkey. The US is perceived in Turkey as not standing by its allies, but new political leadership in both countries could change the situation, especially if the US focuses again on the Middle East.
According to polls, 15% of Turkish voters are still undecided about the November 1 elections. Only a few percentage points are required to re-cement the AKP’s position of power. The Ankara terror attack, depending on who is understood to be the perpetrator and how the government deals with the aftermath, could be decisive.
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Tatters
American policy in Syria has supported the “moderate” opposition and sought the removal of Bashar al Assad. Four and a half years into the rebellion there, extremists have largely sidelined the moderate opposition in the center of the country. Russia and Iran are doubling down on their support for Bashar al Assad, who is well on towards fulfilling his prophecy “either me or the jihadis.”
Washington has also wanted to protect Syria’s neighbors from its civil war. Efforts to contain the war’s effects have been no more successful than the efforts to win it. With more than 4 million refugees unsettling Syria’s neighbors and 7 million displaced inside the country, it will take decades to restore the region to some semblance of order. The Islamic State has taken over one third of Iraq. The war has embroiled Turkey in renewed conflict with its own Kurds. Lebanon and Jordan hang by threads to a semblance of order. Israel faces extremists just a few miles from the Syrian territory it occupies on the Golan Heights.
Attention in the press is focused on the Pentagon’s failed efforts over the past year to train and equip viable “moderate” forces to fight against the Islamic State in Syria. Few Syrians sign up. They prefer to fight Assad. The vetting process is long and arduous. Of the few who have gone back to Syria, most have ended up dead, captured or intimidated into turning over equipment and weapons to extremists. The rebalancing of the military equation that John Kerry had rightly recognized as necessary to altering the outcome in a direction the US would find agreeable is simply not occurring.
Enter the Russians. Moscow’s deployment of fighting forces, including attack aircraft, to Latakia would not be necessary if the Assad regime were doing well. Moscow’s immediate military goal is to block the advance of opposition forces towards western Syria, where both the heartland of the Alawite population and Russia’s naval base lie. Its bigger purpose is to protect the regime and foil America’s intention of replacing it with something resembling a democracy. Moscow won’t distinguish in its targets between extremists and moderates but will seek to rebalance the military equation in a direction opposite to what Kerry had in mind.
The advancing opposition forces in the center of the country are mostly Sunni extremists, not moderates. Extremists have agreed to a population exchange with Hizbollah that will clear Sunnis from near the strategically important border with Lebanon and Shia from extremist-held areas farther north. Population exchange aids cantonalization: Syria will soon be a patchwork of areas of control: the regime in Damascus and the west, Kurds along much of the northern border with Turkey, relatively moderate opposition in the south and some Damascus suburbs, assorted Islamist extremists in the center and the Islamic State in the center east. Enclaves will be overrun or traded. Confrontation lines will congeal. Stalemate will ensue.
None of this is good news for either Syrians or Americans. But it is not the worst news.
The viability of the patches will depend on two factors: the strength of the military forces that control them and how effectively they are governed. The regime has been protecting and governing the areas it controls well enough that they have attracted a significant inflow of people, including many whose sympathies are with the opposition. The Islamic State governs brutally in the territory it controls, but has lost some in the north to Kurdish forces, who have set up representative governing structures that include Arabs and appear to be functioning relatively well, their lives made easier by the de facto truce between the Kurds and the Assad regime.
The relative moderates have arguably been less effective than the regime, the Islamic State and the Kurds in governing the areas they control. This is important. The war can be lost on the battlefield. But it has to be won in city hall. The local councils that have formed more or less spontaneously in many “liberated” areas are not doing well. Strapped for cash and untended by the opposition Syrian Interim Government, in many areas they are unable to deliver much except political squabbling among themselves. While unquestionably better than nothing, they lack both legitimacy and technical capabilities as well as connections to a broader political framework. Western aid to local councils has sometimes done more harm than good.
The US military effort in Syria is visibly in tatters. But it won’t matter much if the less visible civilian effort conducted in areas controlled by relative moderates doesn’t improve dramatically.
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Uncensored
Iran’s Fars News Agency asked me some good questions. Parts of the interview were included in this article, but parts were also cut, as one might expect. I am publishing here the full text, which I hope will find its way into print also in Iran:
Q: What is your opinion about Iran’s plan to resolve the Syria tension?
A: As I understand Iran’s “plan,” it involves 1) a ceasefire, 2) formation of a national unity government, 3) a rewritten constitution and 4) national elections. This is an outline many can accept, even if some might quarrel with the order.
But “the devil is in the details” we say in English:
1) How does the ceasefire come about? Who monitors and enforces it? What sanctions are there against those who violate it? What if some armed groups refuse to participate in it?
2) Who participates in the national unity government? Does Bashar al Assad step aside or remain as president? How is the security of opposition people participating in a national unity government ensured?
3) Who rewrites the constitution? Within what guidelines? How is a new constitution approved?
4) Who calls elections? Who supervises them? Who ensures a safe and secure environment for the campaign as well as the elections? Who counts the votes?
I suspect there will be many more differences over these questions than over the four-point “plan.”
Q: The UK recently announced that the conflict in Syria will not be resolved unless Russia and Iran use their influence on Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to help reach a political solution. What do these signals mean?
A: I’m not sure what the UK meant. It is certainly the consensus in Europe and the US that there is no political solution in Syria if Bashar al Assad insists on staying in power. His opposition won’t stop fighting as long as he is there. Iranian and Russian support enables him to remain. I see no sign that either Moscow or Tehran is prepared to risk losing their influence in a post-Assad Syria, which will surely resent the enormous support they have provided him.
Q: What are Turkey’s roles in Syria and the region? Do you confirm its policy in the Middle East?
A: Turkey has four main interests in Syria: it wants Bashar al Assad gone, it wants Kurds in Iraq and Syria to stop supporting the Kurdish rebellion in Turkey, it wants defeat of the Islamic State, and it wants Syrian refugees to return to Syria. The proposed “safe zone” in northern Syria and the Turkish attacks on the Kurds and Islamic State aim to achieve all four objectives, though success is still a long way off.
Q: We know that Turkey had zero foreign policy sometime and it had gains some achievements but today it has taken distance from that. What were and are their problems?
A: As noted above, it has problems with Bashar al Assad, with the Kurds, with the Islamic State and with refugees.
Q: Why is the west silent on Turkey’s support for Daesh?
A: The West has longed implored Turkey to close its border to Daesh fighters and supplies. They have tightened up a lot since ISIS attacked inside Turkey.
It is a figment of Tehran’s imagination that the West is silent. Or maybe a creation of Iran’s propagandists. One of the things most resented in the West is Iran’s implication that the West is not really opposed to Daesh. Nonsense is the polite word we use for that allegation.
Q: Has the US-led coalition succeeded against Daesh?
A: No, but it has had some successes, taking back about one-quarter of the territory Daesh once controlled, depriving it of some of its revenue and killing quite a few of its commanders.
That one-quarter is mostly Kurdish-populated territory. Taking back Sunni-populated territory, especially in Iraq, is proving far more difficult.
Q: How can Muslim countries across the region led by Iran stand against Daesh?
A: The Sunni Muslim countries of the region don’t want to be led by Iran. They are fighting Daesh, but as part of a Western-led Coalition. Iran is also fighting Daesh, but coordination is difficult so long as Iran fails to distinguish between Daesh and more moderate Syrian fighters. From the Western and I think Arab perspectives, it looks like Iran is fighting to defend Assad for sectarian reasons more than it is fighting Daesh.
Q: Let’s go to Iraq. How do you evaluate the ongoing Iran/ Iraq relation? What about the future?
A: Iran has supported Iraq’s response to Daesh quickly and effectively, fearing Daesh success in Iraq would mean trouble sooner or later also for Iran.
But it has used the opportunity in particular to support Shia militias (Hashd, Popular Mobilization Units). That is a mistake, because it exacerbates sectarian tensions in Iraq and increases the likelihood of a breakup of the Iraqi state that Tehran says it does not want.
It seems to me that a strong but non-threatening and unified Iraq is what Iran should be aiming for. I don’t see it doing that at present. Instead the IRGC is pursuing a less wise policy of arming and otherwise supporting sectarian forces that will make keeping the Iraqi state together very difficult.
Q: What is your opinion about latest Russia military developments and build up in some parts of Europe and the Arctic? I do not mean Ukraine at all.
A: The Russians have legitimate interests in the Arctic. But past experience suggests they will try to bite off more than they can chew. They are already overextended in Ukraine and the Middle East. Putin has strong domestic political support, but he lacks the money and military capacity to sustain his aggressive foreign policy.
Q: And thank you for your participating. Could you please explain about Iran/West relations after the deal?
A: I don’t see Iran/West relations much changed, except for the prospect of much greater trade and investment, especially between Europe and Iran, once sanctions are lifted. But Iranian authorities have reiterated their hostility to the United States, which always gets a lot of coverage here.
Washington doesn’t care much about that but wants Iran to stop threatening Israel’s existence and subverting Gulf neighbors through a highly sectarian policy of supporting Shia forces (sometimes political, sometimes military), especially in Syria, Iraq, Bahrain, Yemen, Lebanon and Kuwait. Iran and the US share an interest in defeating Daesh, but active cooperation on that requires that Iran stop subversion of American friends and allies in the region. As we know only too well, subversion breeds resentment, not influence.
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