Tag: Kurds
Peace picks September 8-11
1. EES Distinguished Lecture Series: “Does the EU have a future?” with Professor Erik Jones and Sir Michael Leigh | Tuesday, September 8th | 6:00 – 7:30 | SAIS- Rome Building | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The European and Eurasian Studies Program Distinguished Lecture Series invites you to kick off the 2015-2016 series with the Director of the EES Program, Professor Erik Jones, and Sir Michael Leigh as they discuss “Does the EU have a future?”
2. WEBCAST ONLY: Hillary Clinton addresses the Iran nuclear deal | Wednesday, September 9th | 9:00 – 10:00 | Webcast sponsored by Brookings | REGISTER TO WATCH | Next week, Congress will begin debate on a resolution to disapprove of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which will lift economic sanctions on Iran in exchange for restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program. This is probably the most significant foreign policy debate that Congress has been involved in since the Iraq war in 2003. On September 9, Brookings will live stream remarks from former Secretary of State Clinton on her view of the significance of the Iran nuclear deal and its implications for the future of U.S. foreign policy in the region. Hillary Clinton was sworn in as the 67th secretary of state of the United States in January 2009, after nearly four decades in public service as an advocate, attorney, first lady, and senator. During her tenure in the Senate, she served on the Armed Services Committee and worked to launch the government’s Vital Voices Democracy Initiative. She was also a commissioner on the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Brookings President Strobe Talbott will provide introductory remarks and Brookings Executive Vice President Martin Indyk will moderate the discussion.
3. Voices From Japan: National Security Speaker Series, with the Keynote Address – “Japan’s New National Security Policy” By – The Honorable Itsunori Onodera, the 12th Minister of Defense of Japan | Wednesday, September 9th | 10:00 – 11:30 | Stimson| REGISTER TO ATTEND | As the security environment surrounding Japan rapidly undergoes changes, Japan has sought to adapt alongside it. Since December 2012, the Abe government was pushed forward changes to Japan’s defense establishment, including new principles for arms exports, a reinterpretation of Article 9 for collective self-defense, updated US-Japan bilateral security guidelines, and now potentially new security legislation for the purpose of implementing these changes. The Honorable Itsunori Onodera, drawing on his long experiences in Japanese politics, most recently as the Minister of Defense between 2012-2014, will lay out his vision for Japan’s national security policy in this dramatic period. Moderator: Yuki Tatsumi, The Stimson Center.
4. East Timor Roundtable with Dr. John Blaxland | Wednesday, September 9th | 12:30 – 2:00 | CSIS | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The CSIS Sumitro Chair for Southeast Asia Studies is pleased to invite you for a discussion with John Blaxland, senior fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University. Blaxland writes extensively on military history, intelligence and security, and Asia-Pacific affairs. He will discuss his recently-published book East Timor Intervention: A Retrospective on INTERFET, Southeast Asian security affairs, and Australia’s role in security and regional stability. Blaxland has served previously as director for Joint Intelligence Operations at the Australian military’s Headquarters Joint Operations Command, and before that, as defense attache to Thailand and Myanmar from 2008 to 2010. Blaxland earned his PhD in war studies from the Royal Military College of Canada.
5. The Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the Gulf War | Thursday, September 10th | 1:00 | Webcast sponsored by CFR | VIEWING LINK| Experts discuss the legacy of the Gulf War. Speakers include (and are listed with their titles during the war): Richard N. Haass, Senior Director, Near East and South Asian Affairs, National Security Council, Richard Kerr, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Thomas R. Pickering, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations and Paul D. Wolfowitz, U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. Presider: Deborah Amos, International Correspondent, National Public Radio.
6. Women as Victims of Terrorism | Thursday, September 10th | 3:00-6:00 | Heritage | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Showing of PBS Frontline Documentary Escaping ISIS: gripping first-hand accounts of women who escaped the brutal reign of ISIS. ISIS barbarity against women, particularly those from religious minorities, is well-documented. Media reports about a codified system of sex slavery that involves ISIS fighters regularly raping pre-teen girls and young women from the minority Yazidi community has shocked the West. ISIS relies on acts of extreme violence, particularly the brutalization of women, to consolidate control over populations and as a recruitment tool. What should the U.S. do to end the ISIS atrocities against women and girls? Come view an acclaimed documentary and hear a panel of experts discuss this disturbing yet critical issue. Followed by a Panel Discussion with Bayan Sami Abdul Rahman, Kurdistan Regional Government Representative to the United States, and Nina Shea, Director, Center for Religious Freedom, Hudson Institute. Moderated by Lisa Curtis, Senior Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center, The Heritage Foundation.
7. Nuclear Policy Talks: The Iran Nuclear Deal | Thursday, September 10th | 4:30 – 6:00 | Elliott School of International Affairs | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Iran Nuclear Deal: The Technical Debate Clarified The US Congress is currently debating the pluses and minuses of the Iran Nuclear Deal, approval of which would mark a new chapter in the relations of the US and Iran after a long cold stand-off. ; Will the Iran Nuclear Deal prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons or establish and engrain their nuclear prowess? To shed light on the technical aspects of the Iran Nuclear Deal, currently under consideration by the US Congress, our distinguished panelists will present their views and answer questions from the audience. ; Panelists include noted physicist and arms control researcher Professor Frank von Hippel of Princeton University’s Program on Science and Global Security, radiochemist and former head of the Office of Safeguards at the International Atomic Energy Agency, Dr. Olli Heinonen, a Senior Fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, and former ambassador Dr. Hossein Mousavian, a Research Scholar at the Princeton University’s Program on Science and Global Security.
8. Reischauer Seminar – Japan, China, and the Post-Sanctions Persian Gulf: Implications for the United States and Global Affairs | Thursday, September 10th | 4:30 – 6:00 | SAIS- Rome Building| REGISTER TO ATTEND | Professor Kent Calder will examine the relationship between East Asia and the Persian Gulf and how that plays into the United States’ relations around the world. China and Japan have been Iran’s largest trading partners before sanctions– they will likely play major roles in its economic future. Japan and China are also the largest importers of oil in the world from the Gulf– both the Iranian and the Arab sides of the Gulf. Their future interaction with the Gulf will in economic terms certainly be larger than those of Europe and the US– what will that renewed reality mean for the broader world?
9. Should the United States be the World’s Policeman? | Thursday, September 10th | 5:30-7:00 | Sponsored by the McCain Institute and located at the U.S. Navy Memorial Heritage Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Challenges to global security and U.S. interests around the world are mounting – from ISIS and a disintegrating Middle East, to an aggressive and authoritarian Russia, to China’s expansionism in the Pacific. But is it the role of the United States to take on all of these global challenges? Should America be projecting power, supporting international order, and countering opponents like these, because if not, the challenges will only continue to grow? Or should the United States stay focused on rebuilding its economy, and conserving its strength to face only truly existential challenges, rather than risking over-stretch in foreign adventures? In other words, should the United States be the world’s policeman? And if not, who will? Join @McCainInstitute for a lively debate as leading experts decide if the United States should be the world’s policeman. #MIDebate
Confirmed debaters:
Pro
Tom Donnelly
Resident Fellow and Co-Director of the Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies, AEI
Julianne Smith
Senior Fellow and Director of the Strategy and Statecraft Program, Center for A New American Security
Con
Richard Burt
Chairman, National Interest Advisory Board
Elizabeth Cobbs
Melbern Glasscock Chair, Texas A&M University
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Anatomy of a possible “safe zone”
In late July, it was announced that the US would be allowed to use Incirlik airbase in Turkey to conduct airstrikes against ISIS. This move came immediately after ISIS claimed responsibility for a bombing in Suruç, Turkey that killed 33 people. It has been widely reported that the US/Turkey deal also included a provision for some sort of safe zone, or ISIS-free, zone along the Turkish-Syrian border.
US officials have denied that this zone would be a true safe zone or no-fly zone, but rather that the US and Turkey would collaborate to clear a zone from ISIS control and look to man it with moderate opposition fighters. According to Foreign Policy, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu has said that the zone will not be an official no-fly zone but will have US air support. President Erdoğan has stated that the zone could allow for 1.8 million Syrian refugees to be repatriated.
News sources are generally in agreement that the zone would extend west along the Syrian border from Jarablus on the Euphrates. Some reports state that the zone will extend as far as Marea, while others state that it will extend as far as A’zaz. The depth of the zone is less certain, but reports indicate that it will be 40-50 km deep. Assuming a depth of approximately 45 km, the zone would look like this if it extends to Marea:
Here is a larger zone extending to A’zaz:
- The red line is the Turkey-Syrian border and the yellow line is the possible extent of the zone, if it goes to A’azaz.
The larger population centers, as well some towns and villages where fighting has recently taken place, are marked with pins. Those marked in black are under ISIS control and those in green are under rebel control. Zahraa, in red, is a Twelver Shiite, regime-controlled city, and Aleppo, in white, is under mixed rebel and regime control. It is worth noting that the eastern portion of the zone is sparsely populated, but Manbij and Al-Bab are larger cities, with populations of ~100,000 and approximately ~60,000, respectively. The Western part of the zone is more heavily cultivated and densely populated; whether the zone would contain the sizeable towns of A’zaz (population ~30,000) and Tel Rifat (population ~20,000) is an important question.
Below is a map of areas of control created by Dutch student Thomas van Linge and updated on August 18. I have overlayed a portion of the map onto a Google Earth view of the zone:
If the zone extends to Marea it will encompass almost entirely ISIS-held territory (shown in gray). Marea itself is under ISIS siege and is controlled by a mix of the FSA, the Islamic Front and Jaysh Al-Mujahideen. A’zaz is controlled by a mix of the FSA and the Islamic Front and Tel Rifat is controlled by a mix of the FSA, Jaysh Al-Mujahideen, the Islamic Front, Faylaq Al-Sham (also known as the Sham Legion–a group of moderate Islamists who have had ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, but are trying to distance themselves from it).
Andrea Taylor and Abigail Kukura have suggested that a coalition of rebels known as the Levant Front (or Jabhat al-Shamiyya) could be at least partially relied upon as a ground force to protect the zone. The Levant Front is an alliance between the Islamic Front (which includes Ahrar Al-Sham), Jaysh Al-Mujahideen, and three other Islamist rebel groups. Ahrar Al-Sham is a hardline Islamist group, that supports the creation of a Sunni Islamic theocracy in Syria. It coordinates tactically with the Nusra Front, but also works with more moderate and secular rebel groups. Ambassador Robert Ford and Ali El Yassir have argued that the US should open a dialogue with Ahrar Al Sham, because it is one of the most powerful rebel groups. Given the composition of rebel groups in the western portion of the zone, the US will be forced to cooperate with Ahrar Al Sham, at least indirectly through Turkey.
The zone has been the scene of significant fighting in the past few weeks. In the following maps, I have once again used Thomas van Linge’s map of areas of control, and marked the sites of recent clashes with red flames. I excluded clashes in Aleppo proper. I obtained information about these clashes primarily from the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.
There are four primary hotspots:
- The area along the front lines between ISIS and the rebels, especially around Marea.
- A cluster of villages and a gas factory near the Turkish border on the front lines between ISIS and the rebels.
- Areas on the far edge of the zone where clashes have occurred between rebels and regime positions in the Twelver Shiite cities of Zahraa and Nubl.
- Clashes between the regime and the rebels in the northern outskirts of Aleppo.
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Tehran calling
Unlike many colleagues around Washington, I have decided to talk with and answer questions from Iranian media willing to publish them. I think it important for Americans to try to be understood in Iran. Certainly Tehran is making big efforts to be understood in the US. While I find some of what the Iranian media broadcast objectionable and even odious, most of the questions they ask me are straight up, like these from Hamid Bayati, published this morning in the Tehran Times:
Q: As you know Iran and Russia begin new initiative to bring peace to Syria, so how do you evaluate these efforts?
A: There really is nothing to evaluate yet. The Iranian four-point proposal, which has been public for some time, requires a good deal more detail before it can be evaluated. The key question is how the transition will be handled. No political solution will work that keeps Bashar al Assad in power, because the Syrian opposition will continue fighting.
Q: Some experts believe that after nuclear deal reach between Iran and world powers, Western countries especially the US begin to cooperate with Iran in regional issues such as Syria, and a new era begins in Middle East. Do you agree with this view?
A: Not really, even if I would like to see it happen. Iran with the nuclear agreement will have substantial resources. The question is how it will use those resources. Hardliners in Tehran will presumably argue for more support to Iran’s allies in the region: Bashar al Assad and Hizbollah, Iraqi Shia militias, Houthi forces in Yemen and Hamas. The US and Europe will not welcome moves of that sort. There will be enormous pressure on the US administration to push back, especially against Hizbollah.
Q: Turkey launches airstrikes against ISIL and PKK positions in Syria and Iraq, are these acts helpful to peace process in Middle East or not?
A: The Americans think more Turkish help against ISIL is vital. The US and Turkey have different opinions about the Kurds in Syria, though at this point PKK attacks inside Turkey are making that irrelevant.
Q: How do you evaluate the US-led Coalition against ISIS after one year of its creation? Does this Coalition reach its goals?
A: The Coalition has not reached its goals, but it has blocked ISIS advances and has rolled them back in some areas (Tikrit, Kobane, Tal Abayd). Without a better formula for who will govern in ISIL-controlled territory, I don’t see how the Coalition can “win.”
Q: As you know US congress is reviewing the Iran nuclear deal and it is possible US lawmakers will kill this deal. If this event happen what will we have after that?
A: It is possible but not likely that US lawmakers would kill the deal, but in order to do so they would need a 2/3 majority in both houses of Congress. That will be difficult to get. If they do kill the deal, Iran and the P4+1 will have some important decisions to make. Do they abandon the deal completely, or do they implement it without the US? If the deal is abandoned, what will Iran do?
Q: In an interview aired Sunday on CNN’s “Fareed Zakaria GPS,” Obama said the United States’ role in global politics could be affected by the deal, how do you explain this sentence?
A: Defeat of the deal would separate the US from its allies and undermine confidence in American leadership in many countries. It would be like the Senate’s rejection of the League of Nations almost 100 years ago, a move that isolated and weakened the US.
Q: If US congress kills the deal, is it possible United States and EU continue a different strategy toward Iran? I mean is it possible they have different relations with Iran and EU that don’t follow US policy?
A: It is possible, though the US might try to apply “secondary” sanctions by barring European companies from doing business with the US if they do business with Iran. That would create big problems with America’s closest allies.
Q: It seems European countries have been more eager than US to revive their relations with Iran, how do you explain this view?
A: Europe needs Iranian oil and gas much more than the US does. Our companies are far less interested in doing business with Iran than some European countries. Geography is destiny I’m afraid.
As I failed to respond adequately to his question about the PKK, Hamid sent more, which were not published with the rest of the interview:
A: What do you think about Turkey military attacks on PKK positions? Some experts said these attacks are because the AK party lost in elections. Some experts said Turkey attacks the PKK because Turks don’t want Kurds to be strong, what do you think about it?
Q: The PKK made the mistake of ending the ceasefire with the Turkish government, which reacted forcefully. Some think this was the result of a split among the Kurds between those who did well in recent elections and the military component, which feared irrelevance.
It might have been better for the Turks to escalate more slowly; some think Erdogan may be seeking to regain some of the popular support he has lost recently by vigorously responding to every Kurdish provocation. But the PKK is a terrorist organization that attacks the Turkish state and can’t expect safe haven in Iraq or Syria. Iranian support for the PKK is a big concern for Turkey.
The complication of course is that the most effective Syrian fighters against ISIL include Kurds affiliated with the PKK. The Americans prioritize the fight against ISIL, which is an international threat. The Turks prioritize the fight against the PKK, which is a domestic threat. Iran does likewise when it faces a domestic threat of the PKK variety. The US and Turkey will work out their differences in dealing with the Kurds. I’m less sure that Iran and the US, or Iran and Turkey, will do likewise, though it would be desirable.
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The Iran deal’s regional impact
On Monday, an all-MEI panel discussed After the Iran Deal: Regional Repercussions and Dynamics. Panelists included Robert S. Ford, senior fellow and former US Ambassador to Syria, Thomas W. Lippman, scholar, Gönül Tol, director of the Center for Turkish Studies, and Alex Vatanka, senior fellow. Paul Salem, vice president for policy and research moderated.
Vatanka stated that reformists, moderates, the Iranian public and most of the Iranian media are in favor of the deal. Some hardliners criticize the deal, but they’ve opened a previously taboo debate about the pros and cons of Iran’s nuclear program.
Khamenei has been vague, but this shouldn’t be taken as opposition; Khamenei rarely unequivocally supports anything. Those close to Khamenei are defending the deal. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) hasn’t come out against it but they and their subsidiaries worry that the deal will hurt them financially. Rouhani needs to reassure them that they won’t lose out as foreign firms enter the market.
The Rouhani Administration is a Western-educated team with cohesive thinking on the country’s direction. Like China, they may try to open up economically and deal with political reform later. Zarif believes that Western companies must invest in Iran to render the deal more stable. Khamenei appears to accept economic reform but has made the resistance economy part of his legacy. It is unclear what he wants from the deal. Is he looking to prevent the possibility of war, eliminate sanctions, or make new friends? If many reformists lose their seats in the next Majlis elections, it means that Khamenei is unwilling to let a reform agenda go farther. If the Majlis accepts the deal and Congress rejects it, Iran can portray themselves as the good guys.
There are contradictions regarding Iran’s regional relations. The deputy foreign minister recently stated that Iran wanted to talk with the Saudis about Yemen and Bahrain, but then an ayatollah at a Friday sermon put Saudi Arabia, Israel and ISIS in the same category. If the reformists reconcile too much with the Saudis, the hardliners will brand them as pro-Saudi agents.
Lippman said that despite US declarations of an unshakeable commitment to the Gulf, Gulf Arabs were publicly skeptical until recently. Now the GCC countries publicly (if not privately) believe the US commitment. Beginning at Camp David, they decided that the Iran deal was done and that they weren’t going to do “a full Bibi.” They will work with the US and each other to confront regional problems.
The Saudis won’t race to a bomb; they care about self-preservation, which includes full integration into the world economy. The Saudis can’t afford to become nuclear outlaws.
Tol stated that understanding Turkish fear of the Kurds is key to grasping Turkish politics. It also plays a role in Turkey’s stance vis-a-vis Iran. Turkey shares the West’s objectives regarding Iran’s nuclear program but has promoted engagement rather than isolation, voting against UN sanctions in 2010. Iran is a large market for Turkish goods and the two countries have close energy ties. However, Turkey worries that a nuclear Iran could change the regional balance of power. All political parties in Turkey welcomed the deal and the sanctions relief.
Turkey has three main concerns about Iran:
- Iran is a destabilizing force in Iraq and opposes Turkey in Syria.
- Closer ties between Washington and Tehran could come at Turkey’s expense, focusing too much attention on the fight against ISIS and undermining Turkey’s anti-Assad efforts;
- Iran’s support for the PKK and PYD.
Ford asserted that the problems in Iraq and Syria don’t revolve around the US and Iran but around local grievances. The pressures against the Iraqi state are increasing. Low oil prices are contributing to the Kurdish drive for independence. Progress on Sunni-Shia reconciliation is lacking. Iran is partially responsible because of its ties to militias that are considered terrorist organizations by the US. Iran is unlikely to give up these allies, whose political leaders are ruthless and capable. It is unclear if the US and Iran can work together in Iraq. ISIS can recruit as long as the conflict between the Sunnis and the militias continues. If Iran cedes control of the militias to President Abadi, that could help.
Assad is losing and the opposition is advancing on the Alawite homeland. There are diplomatic visits between Syria, Russia, and Iran; Syria’s foreign minister recently visited Tehran and likely
also Oman, which serves as an intermediary with the Saudis. There are also reports that Iran is about to put forward a peace plan with a unity government, constitutional amendments to protect minorities, and future internationally supervised elections. Ford thinks this won’t succeed because the Turks haven’t signed on and their closeness with the armed opposition gives them a veto.
The Russians and Iranians are urging the US to stop pushing against Assad and start working with him, but Assad is about to lose his supply lines. There were recent anti-Assad protests in Alawite-majority Latakia province. Assad doesn’t have the capacity to take on ISIS if it can’t hold the Damascus suburbs. The Iranians have to recognize that Assad is losing but they will almost certainly use at least a small portion of the money from sanctions relief to shore-up Hezbollah and Assad. This will cause a short-term increase in violence.
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Limits of US-Turkey cooperation in Syria
On Thursday, the SETA Foundation hosted a talk entitled The U.S.-Turkey “Safe Zone” Agreement: What does it mean?. Panelists included: Sabiha Senyucel, research director of the Center for Public Policy and Democracy Studies (PODEM), Mark Perry, independent author, Melissa Dalton, fellow and chief of staff at the CSIS International Security Program, and Kadir Ustun, Executive Director of the SETA Foundation. Kilic B. Kanat, research director of the SETA Foundation, moderated. The panelists believe that the recent US-Turkey cooperation in Syria will remain limited because Turkey and the US continue to have divergent interests.
Senyucel said that the recent bombing in Southeast Turkey pushed Turkey to take a more active role in the anti-ISIS coalition. Now the coalition can use İncirlik for bombings. The Kurdish issue is no longer just a domestic Turkish issue. The Turkey-PKK peace process is finished for now, but Senyucel hopes it can restart soon. The roles of the PKK, the PYD and the Syrian Kurdish entity are all linked. YPG fighters fought ISIS in Kobane, giving the Kurds international legitimacy. This changed the Kurds’ thinking about what they could achieve regionally.
After Kobane, the YPG and PKK demonstrated that they could fight ISIS on the ground and US airstrikes helped them take Tel Abyad. This concerned Turkey, which has good reason to distrust the PYD because of its links to the PKK. After the Gezi Park protests, the PKK stopped honoring its commitments and asserted de facto control over some parts of Eastern Turkey. There may have been mistakes from the Turkish side, but the Turkish government also displayed restraint. The PKK’s mid-July announcement that they were returning to arms was unjustified. Turkey is now reminding the PKK that they won’t achieve their ambitions. The US has agreed to support Turkey in this, but Senyucel isn’t sure how long this will last.
Kadir asserted that the US and Turkey can’t agree on the big picture in Syria. Obama believes the US only has limited interests; he isn’t trying to fix Syria. The PYD is a local actor that can contribute to the US’s non-strategy strategy. Turkey has tried to protect its border, host refugees, prevent the spillover of the conflict and resolve the Kurdish question. Necessity has limited Turkish actions. Turkey can’t ally with the PKK-linked PYD; the PKK has asserted de facto control over some towns in eastern Turkey and hasn’t fully committed to withdrawing guerrillas.
Turkey will allow the US to use İncirlik and will work to create a safe zone in Syria for the moderate opposition. Ankara wants a broader strategy from the US, but the US is uninterested. Will planes taking off from İncirlik help the PYD? The PYD has been reluctant to distance itself from the PKK and stop expelling Arabs from its territory. The PYD also allows Assad’s air force to overfly the territories it controls. If these things continue, the US and Turkey won’t come to a real agreement, but both sides need a broader strategy to make lasting progress.
Dalton agreed that the US and Turkey have divergent objectives. The Turks have called the recent agreement a safe zone, but the US has avoided this term. The agreement will involve enhanced border cooperation. The length of this cooperation area will be ~65 miles, but other elements are unknown:
- How deep into Syria will it go?
- Will Assad’s air force be excluded?
- Will there be cover for civilians in nearby cities outside the zone?
Broader US-Turkey cooperation will be needed for a long-term solution, but the anti-ISIS fight and border cooperation are likely to be the focus for now.
Perry highlighted the fact that there is unlikely to be any well-articulated US strategy from this administration, but there are three observable US policy principles:
- We maintain relations with allied regional states despite difficulties.
- Our enemy is Islamic extremism.
- There is no appetite for strong anti-Assad action.
We want Assad to lose, but don’t want his opponents to win. This is a tough line to walk with Turkey. The use of İncirlik will allow the US to gather better drone intelligence. Assad is unlikely to launch air operations in the area of the proposed safe zone because Assad doesn’t want to tangle with the US Air Force. The Obama administration’s vagueness may not be bad. The US has made many foreign policy mistakes; doing nothing is a viable option since Syria is so complex. We can protect our friends, maintain our strength, assist the victims, and remain friendly with Erdogan, without further intervention.
Barbara Slavin, nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council South Asia Center, asked about the US train and equip program. Many of the 54 rebels that we have trained have reportedly been captured by Jabhat Al-Nusra. Slavin asked whether the possible safe zone could be an injection point for these rebels. Dalton stated that it could be used for this purpose, because there is currently no other logical injection point. However, questions about how and at what cost the US and Turkey plan to protect such a zone remain. Kadir took a similar position, noting the slowness of the program. Perry discounted the program entirely, noting that the last successful US train and equip program was in the Philippines in 1899. The US is keeping the fiction of train and equip so that we can keep our hand in the game in Syria.
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Insider views on ISIS in Iraq
On Thursday, Stimson hosted a discussion in cooperation with the American University of Iraq, Sulaimani (AUIS) entitled Threat Of ISIS In Iraq: Views From The Ground. Speakers included: Stimson Middle East Fellow Geneive Abdo, , Brookings Non-resident Fellow Christine van den Toorn, AUIS Director of the center for Development and Natural Resources Bilal Wahab. Three AUIS students, Noaf, Anas, and Khusai were featured in recorded videos. Lukman Faily, Iraqi Ambassador to the US, also spoke. Stimson President Ellen Laipson moderated.
AUIS was founded in 2006. Students come from many religious backgrounds and Iraqi regions, as well as from neighboring countries.
Van den Toorn, explained that Iraq is more complicated than the discourse in DC. The students from AUIS explained the situation in their regions.
Noaf is from Sinjar. He and his 6 brothers all finished college. He was supposed to study in Mosul after high school but had worked as a translator for US troops and is Yazidi, so he feared for his safety. He got a scholarship to study at AUIS and graduated with a degree in Business Administration.
ISIS still threatens Sinjar and tried to take back his village, Hanasour, two days ago. The northern part of Sinjar was liberated from ISIS five months ago and many different actors are defending the area. Military leaders believe a unified force could liberate the rest of Sinjar in 3-4 days. Noaf wants autonomy for Sinjar with NATO protection. The people of Sinjar have lost trust in both Iraqi and KRG security forces; an international force would allow the IDPs to return. Sinjar has agriculture and oil, so it could have its own economy.
Anas was born in Samarra, Saladin Governorate. His father had refused to join the Ba’ath Party, was forced into the military, and died. He graduated with an engineering degree from AUIS.
The economy in Samarra is bad because Samarra is controlled by the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs). Last year, ISIS entered half of the city, but left the next day. ISIS is now 20 km away. Samarra is 100% Sunni, but about 90% of the security forces are Shia. Some PMUs are good; others are criminals. Locals are hesitant to join the PMUs because some of those who fought Al Qaeda in 2006 were later arrested by the government. The PMUs should transfer control to the local police. Tikrit has been liberated, but most residents haven’t returned because the PMUs have arrested some returnees. The PMUs, not the government, decide who can and cannot return to liberated areas. Returnees to some villages have found homes and shops destroyed and Shia flags flying. There is a misconception that Sunnis support ISIS, but ISIS destroyed Sunni regions. ISIS killed two of his uncles. The problem is that Iraq’s central government treats Sunnis as enemies.
Khusai was raised in Baghdad, but his parents are from Najaf. He finished high school in 2008 when the security situation was terrible. He went to AUIS to study in a safe environment. He works in finance in Baghdad.
The security situation was very bad before Ramadan in Baghdad. During Ramadan, the situation improved and the curfew was lifted. ISIS will not invade Baghdad because it is protected by the PMUs. But Baghdadis fear the PMUs because they are armed criminals. Fortunately, their presence in the city center has recently decreased.
Southern Iraq remains safe, but some residents resent the costly war. Additionally, the IDPs in the south are causing higher prices and competition for jobs. But most southerners still believe in one Iraq, and want to liberate the northern cities, because of Ayatollah Sistani’s fatwa.
Wahab said that centralization in Iraq has been a failure. There have been attempts to create an Iraqi identity, through both force and co-optation using oil wealth. The 2003 invasion offered the opportunity to decentralize, but centralization has been stronger. In response, the KRG is pushing for statehood. Basra is also looking for more autonomy and some in Kirkuk talk of a distinct Kirkuk region.
The government controls 50% of the economy. The economic power of the executive branch makes it hard to hold it accountable. The collapse of oil prices hurt the economy, which suffers if the government cannot inject enough cash into it. Government expenses have also increased because of military costs.
Without a comprehensive, international strategy to defeat ISIS, regional powers and domestic players will continue to use the crisis to their advantage, e.g., the PMUs. Kurdish society is less united than before as it argues over who deserves the credit for holding back ISIS. Within Iraq, both political and economic reform are needed.
Abdo spoke about how religious identity in Iraq has nearly replaced the identity of Iraqi citizenship. The fight for a united Iraq is true more in theory than in reality. Religion is being used for political gain in Iraq, as it has been in Lebanon and Bahrain. Ayatollah Sistani’s fatwa asking his followers to take up arms is rare in Shi’ism and shows urgency, but Sistani can no longer control the PMUs. The Shia have been radicalized too.
Ambassador Faily noted that all sides in Iraq blame others. This is a vicious cycle, with no magic solution. Everyone has agreed to decentralization, but getting there necessitates a dialogue towards a common strategy. ISIS is an existential threat to Iraq and is a problem for all of Iraq’s communities. Dealing with ISIS will take time, but respect for the integrity of the state is key. Those who want power at the state’s expense will harm everyone. The US plays an important supportive role but should give Iraq breathing space to improve its politics.
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