Tag: Kurds
Syria is in good company in the Arab League
The Arab League decided yesterday in Cairo to readmit Syria. The League had suspended Syria’s membership in response to its violent crackdown on demonstrators in March 2011. President Assad will presumably attend the May 19 Summit in Riyadh. This comes on top of several bilateral normalization moves, including by the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.
Conditions aren’t likely to be fulfilled
The readmission is supposedly conditional. Though I’ve been unable to find the official statement, press reports suggest the conditions include allowing humanitarian assistance and return of refugees, clamping down on Syria’s burgeoning Captagon drug exports, and the beginnings of a political process called for in UN Security Council resolution 2254.
I’ll be surprised if much of that comes to pass. Assad could and should have done all those things long ago. Preventing humanitarian assistance, blocking return of refugees, financing his regime with drug smuggling, and blocking any transition are all part of his strategy. Readmission to the Arab League is unlikely to change his behavior, which aims at restoration of his personal authority on the entire territory of Syria.
Fighting abates but conflict continues
That is still far off. The mostly Islamist remains of Syria’s opposition control parts of northwestern Syria while Turkish troops control several border areas, where they have pushed hostile Kurdish forces farther east and south. Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces control a large part of the east, with support from the U.S. Damascus requires Iranian and Russian support to maintain sometimes minimal control over the west and south. Israel continues to bomb Syria pretty much at will, to move Iranians and their proxies away from its border and to block military supplies to Hizbollah in Lebanon.
None of these conflicts is settled, but fighting has abated from his heights. None of the forces involved has the will and the wherewithal to change the current situation. Assad no doubt hopes that normalization with the Arab world will solve his economic problems and enable him to mount the effort required to regain more territory. He may negotiate to regain territory from Turkey in exchange for promises to clamp down on the Kurds. He’ll wait out the Americans, who aren’t likely to want to remain in Syria much longer.
Autocracy restored
If Assad is successful in restoring his autocracy, he won’t be alone in the Middle East. It is a long time since the Arab Spring of 2011. Tunisia’s fledgling democracy is gone, as is Egypt’s. Bahrain’s democratic movement was snuffed out early. Yemen’s and Libya’s “springs” degenerated into civil war. Sudan is headed in the same direction. Iraq has suffered repeated upheavals, though its American-imposed anocracy has also shown some resilience. Saudi Arabia has undertaken economic and social reforms, but driven entirely by its autocratic Crown Prince. The UAE remains an absolute monarchy.
Only in Morocco and Qatar have a few modest reforms survived in more or less stable and relatively open political environments. They are both monarchies with a modicum of political participation. Though Qatar allows nothing that resembles political parties, there is limited room for freedom of expression. Morocco is a livelier political scene, but the monarchy remains dominant whenever it counts.
America has already adjusted
The Biden Administration has already adjusted. It is treating democratic values as tertiary issues with any Middle Eastern country with a claim to good relations with the US. There is no more talk of Saudi Arabia as a rogue state. Washington is silent on the restorations of autocracy in Egypt, Tunisia, and Bahrain. The Americans want to see negotiated solutions in Yemen, Libya, and Sudan. Those are more likely to restore autocracy, or something like Iraq’s power-sharing anocracy, than any sort of recognizable democratic rule.
The Americans are not joining the Syria normalization parade. They are not blocking it either. Washington no doubt figures the conditions are better than nothing. We’ll have to wait and see if that is true.
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Stevenson’s army, March 31
– Both Russia and Ukraine make recruiting push.
– DOD pushes back at unfunded priority lists.
-Iraqi Kurdistan is crumbling, FP says.
– Two former officials assess Israel’s problems today.
– In FA, an interesting case for security guarantees to Ukraine.
– Also in FA, an argument taking seriously Xi’s preparations for war.
– WaPo has a list of nations still recognizing Taiwan.
– Foreign Service union opposes declassifying Afghan dissent memo.
– NYT says DeSantis foreign policy adviser was a hawk.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, June 7
– Swedish govt survived a no confidence vote after deal with Kurdish MP.
– WSJ has more on Erdogan.
– AMLO won’t attend this week’s summit.
– India may be part of the Quad, but Walter Russell Mead notes the many differences with US
– NYT notes troubles Ukrainians have learning new weapons.
– US is bombing al-Shabaab again. When the class talks abut Congress, I’ll want you to devise a new AUMF to handle this situation.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, May 21
– FT notes that Sweden’s government won power by the single vote of a Kurdish MP.
– CNN says both Ds and Rs are unhappy with House Freedom Caucus for forcing votes on minor issues, sometimes preventing fundraisers.
– The Hill says census undercount won’t change House distribution.
– FP notes how reliant Russian military is on minority regions.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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What terrorism tells us about northeast Syria
Former Syrian diplomat Bassam Barabandi sounds the alarm about support for Kurdish governance in northeast Syria:
In Syria, people differ dramatically on the attack the Islamic State carried out in Hasakah last week. Those affiliated with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) believe that Turkey was behind it. Pro-Turkey Syrians believe that the battle was a ploy serving SDF. Opposition not affiliated with SDF or Turkey believes the regime is behind the attack. Anti-imperialists think the US remote-controls ISIS. Regime supporters blame Turkey, the SDF, the US, the Gulf States and NATO.
What is clear
Some things are clear. US and British commandos managed the anti-ISIS operations and partook in them, exposing SDF weakness and the likelihood it is infiltrated. ISIS has the ability to surprise. That raises many questions about how the terrorists got past checkpoints in large numbers, with their weapons. Northeast Syria is just not a priority for the Arab opposition. It is keen on nothing but continuing to receive funds from donors; it did not even issue a statement condemning ISIS or calling for civilian protection.
No Arab voice in the northest has publicly condemned the terrorist attack. There are several reasons:
- SDF has failed to build trust with the Arab majority.
- Failure of the SDF to eliminate, or provide protection from, terrorist sleeper cells.
- Lack of leadership by elders, groups of elders, leaders of local councils.
All are fearful of their interests at home or in the countries where they live. Their real influence doesn’t go beyond the boundaries of their homes.
The missing ingredient
None of the international actors in the northeast have an interest in dealing with heavyweight Arab leaders. Those who claim to be representing Arabs and other local populations know that they are in their positions only so long as they have no real weight or influence. This has led to the Arab majority feeling marginalized.
Marginalization promotes instability. All powers – the Assad regime, Russia, Iran, terrorists – are working to fill the void. They make promises of a better future if the Arabs cooperate against the Kurds and the Americans. Fortunately, the population does not trust these countries or the terrorists. The local Arabs for years have raised their complaints with Amerrican and Western officials at every meeting. They still hope that the international coalition will be more positive in dealing with them, despite the SDF’s behavior.
Nearly a year ago, the SDF announced it had released the ‘less dangerous terrorists’ upon a request from local leaders, elders and others. Now we need to know who those elders were. Who came forward with those demands? Who submitted lists of names? Who claimed to represent the people of Deir Ezzor, Raqqa and Al-Hasakah? Their identities should be published.
Arab leadership is needed
All the projects of restoring stability, governance, building social peace, and the international initiatives aimed at enhancing Arab-Kurdish communication are useless in achieving real, longterm stability if it does not address the local political questions. They may be good for building the region’s economy, creating jobs and establishing infrastructure, but the principal problems are political—not the lack of services. None of the projects will achieve the essential goal of restoring stability to the region and fighting terrorism.
A new social contract between Kurds and Arabs is needed, one that achieves political, economic and social balance. This will require genuine elections, at least among Arabs, to produce real political leaders who can run their communities and bear responsibility. Otherwise, the northeast will remain unstable. The regime, Russia, and Iran will take advantage of the situation. The Arabs and Kurds of the northeast will miss the opportunity created by the presence of the international coalition forces.
Everyone would benefit
The Americans – including politicians, lawmakers, and think tanks, even those run by Arabs – want to establish a Kurdish entity with special status (an independent region or a federalist unit). They exaggerate the strength of SDF in all fields (military strength, protecting minorities, economy, social service, promoting democracy, and equal representation). The reality is different. More than 60% of the SDF are Arabs. They represent the largest number of dead and wounded during the battles to liberate the region from ISIS. Continuing with the illusion that the Kurds are responsible for the defeat of ISIS is unrealistic.
The Assad regime, not the Syrian people, persecuted the Syrian Kurds for the last 60 years. No one should believe that Assad will give the Kurds their political rights. Neither political pressure nor oil will be persuasive. It would be a dangerous misadventure for which Arabs and Kurds will pay its price. Real decisions should be taken to enhance stability by empowering serious Arab leaders—for the sake of all parties.
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Syria: no attractive propositions, so Biden is staying the course
Secretary of State Blinken at a press conference with the Israeli and UAE foreign ministers today said more about Syria than I remember since the beginning of the Biden Administration, in response to a question about normalization that other countries are indulging in:
…let me talk about Syria first and then come to the second part of the – the first part of the question second.
First, to put this in focus, these initial nine months of the administration we have been focused on a few things when it comes to Syria: Expanding humanitarian access for people who desperately need that assistance, and we had some success, as you know, with renewing the critical corridor in northwestern Syria to do that; sustaining the campaign that we have with the coalition against ISIS and al-Qaida in Syria; making clear our commitment, our ongoing commitment to demand accountability from the Assad regime and the preservation of basic international norms like promoting human rights and nonproliferation through the imposition of targeted sanctions; and sustaining local ceasefires, which are in place in different parts of the country. So this has been the focus of our action for these last nine months.
As we’re moving forward, in the time ahead, keeping violence down; increasing humanitarian assistance and focusing our military efforts on any terrorist groups that pose a threat to us or to our partners, with the intent and capacity to do that. These are going to be the critical areas of focus for us, and they’re also, I think, important to advancing a broader political settlement to the Syrian conflict consistent with UN Security Council Resolution 2254.
What we have not done and what we do not intend to do is to express any support for efforts to normalize relations or rehabilitate Mr. Assad, or lifted [sic] a single sanction on Syria or changed [sic] our position to oppose the reconstruction of Syria until there is irreversible progress toward a political solution, which we believe is necessary and vital.
https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-israeli-alternate-prime-minister-and-foreign-minister-yair-lapid-and-united-arab-emirates-foreign-minister-sheikh-abdullah-bin-zayed-al-nahyan-at-a-joint-press-availab/
This is a restatement of well-established US priorities: humanitarian assistance, reduction in violence, counter-terrorism, and irreversible progress toward a political solution before reconstruction or normalization.
So nothing new. What’s missing? should always be the next question.
Tony fails to deal with the threat of a serious military clash between NATO ally Turkey and the Kurdish-led forces that are conducting the campaign against both terrorists and the regime in northeastern Syria, with American support. He is silent on concerns about Iran using Syrian territory to threaten Israel. Nor does he indicate that the United States opposes normalization by others, in particular Jordan and the UAE. And he is silent on brutality-laced Russian and Iranian support for the Syrian regime, which in due course may become capable of challenging the Kurdish presence in the northeast and the Turkish presence inside Syria’s northern border. So yes, continuity of a policy that is silent on important issues and has so far failed to produce substantial results.
Is there a better approach? We could certainly tighten sanctions so that jet-setting scions of the Syrian elite don’t roam Los Angeles in Ferraris, but that won’t change anything in Syria. We could help the Germans mount a “universal jurisdiction” case against President Assad himself, in absentia, but that would set a legal precedent that might boomerang on prominent Americans. We could try harder to mediate some sort of accommodation between the Syrian Kurds and Turkey, as we did once with a modicum of success between the Iraqi Kurds and Turkey. Or we could try to negotiate autonomous status for the Kurds within Syria in return for US withdrawal, though the regime would be no more likely than the Taliban to stick to the terms of a withdrawal agreement. The Kurds would likely revert to attacking inside Turkey as well as Turkish-controlled Syria in order to curry favor with Assad. It suits the Kurds and Turkey to have the Americans remain in Syria.
I won’t even bother with military options against the Russians or the regime. The Americans take some shots against the Iranians and their proxies in Syria, but they aren’t going to risk war with Russia or the civilian casualties that taking on the regime would entail.
So no, there are not a lot of attractive propositions in Syria. Especially after the botched withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Administration can ill afford a comparable mess in Syria, never mind an influx into the US of tens of thousands Syrian Kurds and Arabs who helped the US during the past decade and have legitimate claims to asylum. No wonder Biden is staying the course.
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