Tag: Kurds
The Turkey/Syria conundrum
This discussion of Turkey and Syria on CCTV America yesterday went well. Mike Walter moderated with the following guests:
- Cale Salih, from Oxford, is a visiting fellow to the European Council on Foreign Relations focusing on the Kurdish people.
- Daniel Serwer is a professor in conflict management at Johns Hopkins University.
- Tulin Daloglu from Ankara is a Turkish journalist and opinion writer.
- Joshua Walker is a transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund, a non-partisan U.S. think tank.
And part 2:
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Energy markets: US up, Middle East down
Thursday, the Atlantic Council hosted a talk on energy policy entitled “The Future of Energy Markets: The Other Middle East Revolution.” The event featured Majid Jafar, Chief Executive Officer of Crescent Petroleum as the key speaker. Richard Morningstar, Founding Director of the Global Energy Center at the Atlantic Council moderated the event.
Jafar recounted the changes in the energy markets in the past 15 years. In 2000, the price of oil was in the low teens and natural gas was $10. The US was an importing country, which meant it was building LNG terminals everywhere. The Middle East was relatively stable. More than a decade later, the price of natural gas has plummeted again, but the US has become an exporting country. The shale oil and gas boom has led the US to convert its LNG terminals for export. Equally if not more importantly, the Middle East has become very unstable.
US Private Sector
Jafar also emphasized the power of US private sector. He claimed the energy breakthrough was despite rather than because of government policy and lauded the US for its long-term strategic energy planning. The US has experienced a large drop in carbon emissions while seeing huge job creation in the oil and gas sector. In contrast, European countries, such as Germany, set ambitious targets like zero fossil fuels and made a mad dash for renewable energy sources. This move stifled the Germany economy and inflicted huge costs on Germany households and industries. Ironically, Germany is experiencing rising emissions and is having to import coal from the US.
Lessons Learned
The CEO shared three lessons he had learned from his experience in the energy industry:
- Do not underestimate the power of the US private sector, especially in the energy industry. Huge innovation can drive many changes.
- Never underestimate the ability of the Chinese public sector to complete their plans. The East-West pipeline is a classic reflection of the Chinese capability in completing large-scale projects.
- Never underestimate the ability of the Middle East public sector to get things wrong.
Jafar added that the unique US ecosystem cannot be replicated elsewhere. It includes infrastructure, capital markets, energy trading hubs, many small companies and a system of mineral rights. However, other countries can learn to provide better access to finance, encourage competition and transparency, and expand their private sectors.
The Middle East
The Middle East contains half the world’s proven oil and gas resources but accounts for less than a 1/3 of global oil exports and less than a 1/6 of global gas exports. The region has experienced a declining market share due to numerous conflicts, years of Iran sanctions and poor policies. Energy subsidies in particular pose major problems. The region has lost $225 billion to subsidies, which do not even help the poor people who are supposed to be the beneficiaries. The good news is that the current low oil prices provide many countries the opportunity to reform subsidies, because the gap between the market price and subsidized price is small.
Egypt is a good example. It has committed to reforming energy subsidies, because they are unsustainable and divert money from important areas of investment that create jobs. Egypt’s spending has been divided between debt service, salaries and subsidies, which left the government with little to spend on investment, infrastructure and jobs.
Another problem with the region is the dominance of national oil companies, which hinder competition and positive performance. When an energy minister is also the chairman of the oil company, there is no difference between the regulator and the regulated, which hurts policymaking. Some countries, such as Kuwait, Iran and Saudi Arabia, have realized this and partnered with private investment companies. Jafar said he is not calling for complete privatization, merely a bigger role for the private sector in developing state assets.
Iraq
Jafar also detailed Iraq’s important role in the energy world. The failing state is responsible for 40% of global oil export growth despite failure to pass hydrocarbon legislation, a lack of internal consensus on energy policy and the ISIS presence. Iraq’s production is nevertheless at an all-time high, making it the second biggest producer in OPEC. If Iraq gets its act together, it could produce 6-12 million barrels of oil per day. Iraq may have larger oil reserves than Saudi Arabia—at least 300 undrilled structures lie in the Western desert.
The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has done well in passing legislation, working with private companies and essentially getting the policy right. But it faces implementation challenges because the Baghdad government is unable to pay the KRG for its oil. In southern Iraq, the latest market methods have been used with transparent bidding rounds involving private companies. However, the decision to sign service contracts was a bad one, because it means southern Iraq has to pay private oil companies a fixed fee regardless of the price of oil. With the oil price collapse, southern Iraq can no longer afford to pay the companies and is discouraging investment. A new contract model is needed where companies receive a percentage of the government’s oil profits, as opposed to a fixed fee. More importantly, a stable security environment is needed to encourage continued investment.
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House of Kurds
On Wednesday, the Middle East Institute hosted a talk by Hemin Hawrani, a member of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) Leadership Council and the head of its foreign relations office, entitled Dynamics in Iraqi Kurdistan. Randa Slim (director of the Track II Dialogues initiative at The Middle East Institute and an adjunct research fellow at the New America Foundation) moderated. Hawrani gave a comprehensive presentation about the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)’s role in the fight against ISIS, Iraqi Kurdistan’s prospects for independence, and internal KRG politics.
Hawrani asserted that the war against ISIS will be lengthy because ISIS is the symptom of the problem, not the problem itself. The KRG has a three- phase strategy to counter ISIS:
1. Stop ISIS- this has been accomplished on the ISIS-KRG front.
2. Roll back ISIS- this has been largely accomplished on the ISIS-KRG front, as the Peshmerga have liberated 20,000 km2 from ISIS control.
3. Defeat and destroy ISIS- Still a long way off. Over 1,200 Peshmerga have died in this fight. ISIS continues to gain ground on other fronts. ISIS has managed to almost fully replenish its killed fighters with new recruits.
Hawrani stated that the KRG is a reliable partner in the fight against ISIS, but they need more assistance because ISIS outguns them. The fighting is different that the Peshmerga has encountered in the past because the majority of casualties are from IEDs and suicide bombers. The Peshmerga need more armored personnel carriers, tanks, and high power rifles. They only have 40 MRAPs but need approximately 400 to deploy their forces. They also need transport aircraft, as well as advisory support to modernize their forces. The KRG needs direct arms shipments to avoid delays in Baghdad as well as more help supporting 2 million refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).
Baghdad, Hawrani said, is doing little to help. Iraq is broken and cannot go back to the pre-2014 situation. The KRG supported Abadi to be Prime Minister for all Iraqis and concluded an agreement with him to receive a portion of Iraq’s budget in exchange for oil from Kirkuk. Baghdad has not kept its side of the agreement, or its promises to Sunni Arabs. Baghdad claims it lacks cash, but it has money for the Shi’ite PMUs. Baghdad must either commit to helping the KRG or not interfere with the KRG.
Hawrani stated that the independence for Iraqi Kurdistan is a process and that it will happen. The KRG plans to hold an independence referendum for all citizens of Iraqi Kurdistan (Kurds and others) in the next couple of years. The options posed by the referendum will include:
1. A fully independent Iraqi Kurdistan.
2. An independent Iraqi Kurdistan in a confederation with Iraq.
3. The status quo.
The Kurds will discuss independence with Baghdad before any other capitals because they want to pursue this amicably. The KRG seeks to reassure Ankara and Tehran that their desire for independence is not a threat. The KRG does not have a pan-Kurdish agenda and seeks a peaceful, internal solution to the Kurdish question in Turkey and Iran.
The KRG has done its part to be part of a pluralistic Iraq, but the Iraqi state has failed and Kurds no longer want to be part of an uncertain future. Even a fully independent Iraqi Kurdistan would not fully break with Iraq because there would still be economic and defense ties. There might also be a shared currency and shared oil resources. An independent Iraqi Kurdistan would add to the number of functioning states in the region. A referendum will also be held in Kirkuk and other disputed areas to determine if they want to join Iraqi Kurdistan. Hawrani stated that the capture of Kirkuk and other areas is not territorial expansion because the Iraqi Army abandoned these areas.
With regard to internal KRG politics, Hawrani said that the KDP (his and President Barzani’s party ) is on the same page as its rival, the PUK, with regard to ISIS. The KDP has proposed three solutions to the dispute regarding the duration of Barzani’s presidency:
1. Barzani could serve for four more years and hold an independence referendum during this period.
2. Barzani could serve until the end of the current parliament’s term in 2017, at which point there will be elections for both the presidency and parliament.
3. The government could resign and call for early elections.
Hawrani also spoke about KRG policy vis-a-vis the Syrian Kurds (PYD). The KRG does not wish to interfere in Syrian Kurdish affairs or copy and paste Iraqi Kurdistan’s experience onto Syria. Its main stipulation is that Syria’s Kurds act in a unified fashion. The KRG and PYD had agreed that there would be a unified force of all Syrian Kurds and a unified political administration. The PYD has not abided by these terms.
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Two unexpected wars
On Tuesday, the International Institute for Strategic Studies hosted a talk entitled Two Unforeseen Wars: A Military Analysis of the Conflict in Ukraine and the Campaign against ISIS with Brigadier Ben Barry, the Senior Fellow for Land Warfare at the IISS.
Barry discussed the conflicts separately but drew some parallels between them on the level of military strategy.
Both the conflict in Ukraine and the war against ISIS came as a shock to the US. The conflict in Ukraine began with a Russian campaign in Crimea led by elite units and complemented by propaganda. The Russians made good use of special forces, electronic warfare and deniability. In Crimea, both sides sought not to use lethal force. The ability of the Russian military to restrain its use of lethal force shows that it is better trained than when it fought in Afghanistan or Chechnya. The Russian military has a cadre of strategic planners and an aptitude for deception.
According to Barry, the insurgency of pro-Russian separatists in Eastern Ukraine has exploited grievances against the Ukrainian government. The Ukrainian military is suffering from a lack of investment in recent years. They have made little effort to conduct a counterinsurgency campaign against the separatists. Last summer, they had some success in pushing the separatists back, but were stopped by Russian intervention, including professionally applied indirect fire. Both the separatists’ own artillery, as well as the Russian artillery that intervened, are skilled. The Ukrainian Air Force has been stymied by the separatists’ air defenses. The separatists have also made effective use of SIGINT and drone intelligence to call in strikes. Russia has improved its military readiness, as the conflict in Ukraine attests.
With regard to the fight against ISIS, according to Barry, Maliki’s 2010 election victory was followed by his attempt to consolidate power by marginalizing Sunni and Kurdish politicians. Meanwhile, the remnants of Al Qaeda in Iraq fought Assad in Syria and renamed themselves ISIS. They rebuilt their networks in Iraq among discontented Sunni tribes and used sophisticated propaganda to gain volunteers and donations. They then launched their assault on Fallujah, followed by their capture of Mosul. In Mosul, the majority of 3 or 4 Iraqi divisions disintegrated in the face of ISIS’s onslaught. The Iraqi army had suffered from Maliki’s attempt to assert direct control over it and replace capable commanders with politically loyal ones.
ISIS has used both insurgency tactics and conventional forces. The high water mark of ISIS offensives in Iraq came in the fall of 2014. After this point, ISIS still counterattacked at vulnerable spots and conducted offensives in Syria simultaneously. ISIS is now on the strategic defensive in Iraq, but this has been an active defense. To take Ramadi, ISIS used diversionary attacks to distract the Iraqi forces. They may have also conducted the attack under the cover of a sandstorm to stymie coalition airstrikes.
Barry described the sequence of an ISIS attack:
1. Indirect fire.
2. En masse suicide bombings.
3. Captured armored bulldozers are used to breach Iraqi army berms.
4. Close assault including cameramen to document the carnage and subsequent executions.
The fall of Ramadi played into ISIS’s narrative of defending the borders of the Caliphate and mounting counterattacks. These facts on the ground inspire recruits and cause other groups to declare allegiance to ISIS.
According to Barry, ISIS has two main vulnerabilities:
1. In a successful, sustained offensive against it, ISIS would have to move a large numbers of fighters, unmasking them and rendering them vulnerable to attack.
ISIS could, however, move large numbers of civilians at the same time to complicate an attack.
2. If the Sunni tribes in Iraq turn on ISIS, this would be a significant blow.
At first glance, these two conflicts have little in common but Barry drew a few parallels between them:
1. Both conflicts show the importance today of winning the information war. Military operations will increasingly be used for their propaganda effects.
2. The Russian separatists and ISIS leverage superior military leadership against the Ukrainian government and the Iraqi military, respectively.
3. Without airpower, the anti-ISIS coalition would be far worse-off than it is. In Ukraine, we can see how the Ukrainian military is suffering from a lack of airpower.
4. Artillery is key in both conflicts. Indirect fire is normally the cause of the majority of casualties in war, and this is likely true in both Iraq and Ukraine. Western militaries have reduced their use of indirect fire, but Russia and China still have extensive indirect fire capabilities.
5. Both conflicts demonstrate the need for the US and NATO to assess which of their allies are vulnerable to hybrid warfare.
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Coalition as the Syrian Kurds’ air force
My friends at peopledemandchange.org have put together the data to show it (and I’ve made a few minor editorial changes):
The international coalition members conducting airstrikes in Syria include the United States, Bahrain, Canada, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. According to information provided by the Pentagon in daily briefing a total of 1077 airstrikes were conducted in Syria in the first six months of 2015. More than half of the airstrikes targeted the ISIS targets in the area around Kobani.
The attacks were conducted as part of Operation Inherent Resolve which has as its mission “to eliminate the ISIL terrorist group and the threat they pose to Iraq, Syria, the region, and the wider international community.” In September 2014 the campaign of airstrikes started with the US taking out multiple Khorassan Unit targets in the wider Aleppo area, a place where al-Qa’ida had been operating a series of safe houses since 2003. The airstrikes conducted by the coalition in 2015 did not target the Syrian army, Jabhat al-Nusra or the Khorassan unit.
This analysis is based on the daily Department of Defense statements about the airstrikes:
In total 924 airstrikes where in support of the Kurdish YPG militia in Northern Syria. Around Kobani 603 airstrikes took place and in Hasakah 284. In June 2015, 37 strikes took place near the border town Tel Abyad, where the YPG started an offensive, with support of the FSA, to push back ISIS in their main province Raqqah. Also in June the Coalition air forces bombed 35 targets near Raqqah, the same amount of air raids as the five months before.
Most of the targets are ISIS assets like tanks, armored vehicles, AAA guns and ISIS tactical units. Other targets include ISIS fighting position and headquarters.
Deir Ez-Zur
As most of the targets are in direct support of defending or supporting YPG forces, there is a real difference with airstrikes by Coalition forces in the eastern province of Deir Ez-Zur. In the first six months of 2015 the province of Deir ez-Zur, including the border town Abu Kamal, got 57 coalition airstrikes. Most of the airstrikes took place in the months of January (17 airstrikes) and June, with 18 airstrikes. The airstrikes in the Deir ez-Zur province are different from other areas where the air strikes are directly linked to ongoing fighting. More than half of the airstrikes in Deir ez-Zur are linked to economic infrastructure. The Coalition targeted oil collection points, well heads, a refinery, oil pumps and pipelines and storage and staging facilities.
To specify the 57 airstrikes even more in-depth:
In total 31 of the 57 airstrikes in Deir Ez-Zur were economic targets, including 26 attacks on oil collection points, two wellheads, one on oil pumps, one refinery and one storage facility. The second group of targets was tactical in nature and included ten tactical ISIS units, two ISIS checkpoints and one fighting position.
The third group of targets, ten in total, were ISIS vehicles, including armored vehicles, a tank, an excavator, a piece of artillery and a MRLS system. Finally the last group of targets were ISIS buildings including two bunkers.
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Talking with terrorists
“The United States does not negotiate with terrorists” is a phrase engraved in every American’s mind because of its common use in the media and government statements. Replete with the idea that Americans will not lower themselves to the terrorists’ level, the phrase has created an implicit international standard that negotiation with terrorists is unacceptable. On Wednesday, June 24, Jonathan Powell, former Chief of Staff to Prime Minister Tony Blair, challenged this notion at a talk with Ian Wallace, Senior Fellow of the International Security Program at the New America Foundation. The talk was based on Powell’s new book, Terrorists at the Table.
According to Powell, every government claims it will not negotiate with terrorists, but ultimately does so. He finds this “collective amnesia” frustrating when government actions clearly show there’s value in talking to terrorists. Powell asserted that people’s opposition to negotiation stems from three beliefs—talking to terrorists appeases, legitimizes and rewards terrorists for their behavior.
These beliefs, however, are completely unfounded. Powell argues that talking to terrorists is not equivalent to agreeing to their terms and only legitimizes them in the short-term, which is a worthwhile sacrifice if the result is long-term peace. Moreover, the idea that talking to people is a reward and not talking to them is punishment is a childish approach. Powell emphasized the importance of an “adult” approach towards such a grave issue.
Powell’s call for communication stems from a desire to reduce the common mistrust between the governments and terrorists. A conversation allows terrorists to share their stories and grievances and opens a process that can lead to a resolution. Otherwise, the vacuum fills up with more violence.
These insights are partly a result of Powell’s experience negotiating with the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland, which culminated in the Good Friday Agreement. The 1998 Agreement followed three failed negotiations, which Powell used as an example to highlight the importance of persistence. Initial setbacks shouldn’t deter governments from pursuing channels with terrorists, because failed agreements serve as building blocks for a successful future agreement.
Conditions for fruitful negotiations are a “mutually hurting stalemate” and strong leadership within opposing parties. The former refers to the point at which both parties have exhausted the will and resources to continue fighting, which gives them to communicate with each other in nonviolent ways. Reaching this point can take a while, even with increased military engagement between the two parties. But Powell urged governments to initiate communication channels, because history shows that leaving communication too late renders it useless. Powell cited General Petraeus who admitted that in Iraq, the US government delayed too long before talking to those “with American blood on their hands.”
Powell also mentioned the value of third parties in negotiations. Often governments are reluctant to involve a mediator, because they don’t want to lose control of the discussion. The UN can be the third party in situations demanding conflict resolution, but Powell thinks it has little success. Instead, he pointed to the effectiveness of smaller governments and NGOs, which can be more discrete.
Powell believes there is potential to negotiate with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Critics of this belief make the distinction between old terrorists and new terrorists, claiming that the latter’s religious drive precludes them from being rational counterparts in a negotiation. But Powell is convinced there’s room for communication, especially because the alternatives are bleak. The Kurdish and Shia’ forces have gained ground in Iraq and Syria, but they can’t make a transformative difference without foreign boots on the ground, which is not an option. This means there is no effective strategy unless a negotiating channel is opened.
PS: Powell was preaching to the about to be converted, as President Obama announced yesterday a policy allowing (but not requiring) talking with terrorists about hostage issues. But it will be hard to confine the talks to only those.
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