Tag: Kurds
Parties before people
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy hosted Adnan Kocher at a roundtable discussion on Thursday. Kocher is a senior advisor on international political affairs to Lahur Talabani, Head of the Kurdistan Intelligence Service. Kocher is also chairman of the Kurdish Cultural Center in London.
What Kocher had to say about the ongoing conflict between the Iraqi Kurdish peshmerga and Da’ish (aka ISIS) was not especially enlightening. He called, as many others have in recent months, for a stronger anti-Da’ish policy, going beyond airstrikes and supply of small arms to approved groups. Noting that the jihadis still enjoy grassroots support from local Sunnis, Kocher stressed that it is necessary to work carefully with Sunni groups to defeat Da’ish and erode its support network. He also called for empowering of local fighters – including the Kurds – to combat the so-called Islamic State on the ground.
These jejune (though not inaccurate) observations came amidst thinly veiled sniping at Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which currently holds the most seats in the Kurdish Parliament and is led by the President of Iraqi Kurdistan, Massoud Barzani. Kocher’s affiliation is with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), headed by Jalal Talabani (former president of Iraq), and brother of Lahur Talabani. The apparent political divisions, and implicit nepotistic factionalism within Kurdistan highlighted by Kocher over the course of the discussion was revealing of the challenges the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) faces in both its fight against Da’ish and its quest for independence.
Factionalism and nepotism among the Iraqi Kurds is nothing new. In 2009 a US report described the KDP as a family run, mafia-like organization. A quick glance at the names of those holding high office in the KRG shows the KDP dominated by the Barzani family and the PUK by the Talabani family. The two have competed with one another for years (even going to war in the Saddam Hussein era). This ongoing feuding is weakening the Kurdish position at this difficult time.
The lack of cooperation extends to the peshmerga forces. Both PUK and KDP run their own, rather like private armies. Divided chains of command as well as differing objectives and goals challenge the unity of Kurdistan’s response to Da’ish. Kocher underlined failures by the KDP peshmerga and successes by the PUK peshmerga.
Could a lack of a united framework, and even competition between the two factions, be a contributing factor in failures to push back Da’ish? In Sinjar and around Mosul the peshmerga have lost ground and continue to struggle, while Syrian Kurdish forces (YPG) have held swathes of territory in Rojava, helped defend the Yazidis in Iraq, and withstood the brunt of the jihadist war machine in the town of Kobane. This despite the fact the YPG’s parent organisation, the PYD (Democratic Union Party), is banned in Syria and has no official government authority.
Kocher also frequently referenced the lack of supplies going to the Kurdish forces. Commenting on video footage of PUK peshmerga waiting on the frontline, he drew attention to lack of combat boots, poorly made uniforms, and lack of ammunition. This is surprising. The US has been explicitly funding and supplying the peshmerga since August. Even before that, well equipped and trained peshmerga could be seen in and around Erbil (KDP territory) wearing new and well-kept uniforms.
With the division between the two major Kurdish parties and their affiliated troops, it is possible that resources, funds, and equipment are unevenly distributed. There are also vast differences in operational capabilities of different peshmerga forces, exacerbated by lack of a clear and unified command structure and leading to reductions in the combat effectiveness of the KRG. For Western governments, this makes knowing to whom weapons and funds should be sent complicated.
There are also international actors with stakes in the Kurdish political factions. In recent years, the KDP has had strong ties with Turkey. Relations between Presidents Barzani and Erdogan are cordial. The PUK is backed by Iran. Kocher tried to dispel concerns over Iran’s influence on his party, claiming that the PUK instead considers Israel a friend (without acknowledging that one can be friends with Israel and still have ties to Iran). As Iran and Turkey continue to compete through local factions, their influence in Kurdish politics further serves to divide and polarize, as the two jostle for influence.
Kurdish leaders can ill afford to be playing politics. Though Da’ish is starting to be pushed back, jihadists continue to threaten KRG interests and operate in and around its borders. The KRG is facing skyrocketing costs even as it struggles to raise revenues after months of budgetary disputes with Baghdad over Kurdistan’s oil (the latest deal was announced on Thursday).
Kurdistan has been one of the few success stories of the Middle East in the past decade. Its people have grown wealthier, its infrastructure improved, and it has enjoyed stability in a volatile region. However, much of its leadership is composed of families and their followers who are mistrustful of one another. They put their parties ahead of their people. No one would deny the bravery of the peshmerga soldiers as they fight against a better armed enemy – but the political class is letting them down.
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ISIS strained
The ISIS leadership may at last be beginning to feel the pinch of concerted international efforts against it, both militarily and through diplomatic channels. It seems that the group is facing increasing resistance in the territories it holds: last week it executed fifty Sunni tribesmen and women in a mass killing in al-Anbar province. Meanwhile the Iraqi government claims that 322 tribesmen have been executed in recent days in the north-west provinces of the country.
Losing the tacit support of the Iraqi Sunni tribes would be devastating to the Islamic State. They have been able to take and hold swathes of territory in Anbar province and around Mosul at least in part because of the enmity felt by Sunnis in the north toward the Shi’ite dominated government of Nouri al-Maliki, and the fury in response to their lands effectively becoming occupied by a Shi’ite army comprising soldiers almost entirely from another part of the country. One expert speaking in Washington last week compared the Iraqi army mission in the north to a foreign occupation, noting the difference in religion, ethnicity, and even dialect between the soldiers and civilians.
The docility of the tribes has made administering and holding captured territory much easier for ISIS. It allows resources to be allocated to keeping the pressure on Baghdad, while continuing the siege on Kobani and making advances on Aleppo. If ISIS begins to face trouble in its ‘heartland’ it will find it much harder to maintain its momentum and keep lines of supply and reinforcement open.
In places that momentum is already being halted. It has suffered (and is continuing to suffer) a setback in Kobani, which has turned into a symbolic fight. The town is not strategically important in military terms, but by inflicting defeat after defeat on the ISIS war machine the Kurds (and their western allies) have shown the Middle East that Islamic State is neither invincible nor unstoppable. The jihadis’ determination to not lose the fight for Kobani has dictated the coalition’s strategy in the area: jihadi fighters are concentrating themselves in a tiny area where normally they are dispersed. This makes airstrikes much more devastating. It seems hard to believe that not taking Kobani would be a strategic disaster for ISIS in military terms. However, by continuing to concentrate their forces, ISIS has shown a ‘revealed preference’. It would rather suffer a pyrrhic victory than lose the territory but preserve its military strength.
The preference is understandable. Such a high profile loss will show both potential recruits and sympathizers that an Islamic State victory is not guaranteed. Perhaps more importantly, it will demonstrate to those living inside of the self-proclaimed Caliphate that ISIS might not be here to stay after all.
This comes back to the Sunni tribes. The timing of the Islamic State’s mass executions in Anbar, coinciding as it does with a loss of momentum, points to two possibilities. Either members of the Sunni tribes have realized that ISIS is on the back foot and have become more active in resisting, or the leadership of the Islamic State is afraid they might begin resisting and is attempting to cow any dissent. They have good reason to be afraid: back in 2006 the Sahwa (Awakening) movement pushed al-Qaeda out of Anbar. A second awakening could spell the end of the Islamic State as a viable force in Iraq. By executing tribesmen, ISIS may be risking pushing Sunnis further towards active resistance.
It is clear that cracks are now appearing on the inside of the Caliphate. Now is the time to exploit those cracks to the full. Close support for local forces, both those fighting the jihadis and those living in occupied territory, combined with ongoing military action by the coalition might turn the tide. Fighting the Islamic State can never just be about number of bombs dropped and militants killed. Local peoples must be helped, both to oust the extremists and to rebuild a stable state. Let us hope that moving past the midterms a decisive strategy will be implemented.
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Peace Picks November 3-7
- Kurdistan: From Pawn to Player | Monday, November 3rd | 10:00 – 11:00 | Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Falah Mustafa Bakir, head of the Department of Foreign Relations for the Kurdistan Regional Government, will discuss this topic. Note: The question and answer portion of this event will be off the record.
- From Hizbullah to the Islamic State | Monday, November 3rd | 3:00 – 4:30 | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | REGISTER TO ATTEND | From humble beginnings in the 1980s, Hizbullah’s political clout and public perception have trended upward, thanks to a communications strategy that has adapted to changes in the local and regional environment. There will be a discussion of the recently released book, The Hizbullah Phenomenon: Politics and Communication by Lina Khatib, Dina Matar, and Atef Alshaer. Carnegie Middle East Center Director Khatib will join Carnegie’s Joseph Bahout to discuss how Hizbullah’s strategic communication has influenced other Islamist movements in the region, including the Islamic State. The speakers are Lina Khatib, the director of the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut and Joseph Bahout, a visiting scholar in the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Moderating is Frederic Wehrey, senior associate in the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- The Challenges of Chemical Weapons Proliferation and Use | Tuesday, November 4th | 12:30 – 2:00 | Stimson Center| REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons is now 17 years old and the recipient of the 2013 Nobel Peace Prize “for its extensive efforts to eliminate chemical weapons”. The OPCW, the United States and other member states explored new territory with the Syrian demilitarization effort, and are still digesting lessons learned. The Syrian government continues to use chemical weapons, and there are other outliers from the CWC and its obligations. Even so, the CWC has helped to strengthen norms against the use of chemical weapons. The panel will discuss chemical weapons proliferation, norm-building, and the challenges ahead. The speakers are Ambassador Robert Mikulak, Andrew Weber, John Parachini, Amy Smithson and Michael Krepon.
- A Time To Act: Combating Sexual Violence in Syria and Iraq | Tuesday, November 4th | 10:00 – 1:00 | Elliott School of International Affairs | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The purpose of this event is to shed light on pressing issues regarding International Humanitarian Law, complex emergencies, and sexual violence, with a particular focus on the atrocities committed by ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Our goal is not only to bring these issues to the forefront of the public debate but also discuss potential solutions to address them. The speakers are Aisling Swaine, associate professor of practice of international affairs at George Washington, Sucharita S.K. Varanasi with Physicians for Human Rights, Stephen J. Rapp, Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues and Sunjeev Bery, advocacy director for Middle East and North Africa issues, Amnesty International USA
- The Islamic State and Beyond: US Military Strategy in the Middle East | Thursday, November 6th | 11:00 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | A conversation with General Lloyd J. Austin III who assumed his duties as commander of US Central Command on March 22, 2013. Prior to that, he served as the thirty-third vice chief of staff of the Army from January 2012 to March 2013. He also commanded US Forces – Iraq from September 2010 through the completion of Operation New Dawn in December 2011. Finally, from August 2009 to August 2010, he was assigned to the Pentagon as the director of the Joint Staff.
- Searching for Solutions to the Ebola Epidemic | Thursday, November 6th | 4:30 – 6:00 | REGISTER TO ATTNED | Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies| Pia Wanek, director of humanitarian assistance at Global Communities, and Dougbeh Chris Nyan, director of the secretariat for the Diaspora Liberian Emergency Response Task Force, will discuss the international response to the Ebola epidemic, health system capacity, and the broader implications on food security, economic development, and stability in the region.
- Turkey’s Syria Predicament: Finding a Way Forward | Thursday, November 6th | 5:40 – 7:00 | Turkish Policy Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The ongoing civil war in Syria is having a significant impact on its neighbor Turkey: the UN estimates that over 1.6 million Syrian refugees have escaped to Turkey, a tragedy which has resulted in massive social and economic ramifications. Additionally, Turkey’s actions (or lack thereof) vis-à-vis fighters and weapons allegedly crossing its borders have come under scrutiny. Most recently, the developments in Kobane have resulted in Ankara drawing criticism from the international community, and an explosion of violence on Turkish streets, threatening the government’s peace process with its Kurdish population. How will these developments affect Turkey’s relations with the United States? Will there be a Turkish military incursion into Syria? How will Turkey’s standing in the region be affected? What is Turkey’s economic status quo, and how is it being impacted by the Syria crisis? What implications are there for next year’s elections? What is the fate of the Syrian refugees? Is the Kurdish-Turkish peace process stalled, and if so what is the way out? How can Turkey find a way forward with Kurds in neighboring Syria and Iraq? The panel discussion at the Goethe-Institut Washington will focus on developments pertaining to Turkey’s predicament regarding Syria. They will assess economic, political, and foreign policy developments in this context, with a prognosis of things to come.The speakers are Ambassador Robert Pearson, Former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, Dr. Soner Cagaptay, from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Dr. Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan from the IMF and University of Maryland, Dr. Denise Natali from the National Defense University and Cenk Sidar from Sidar Global Advisors.
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Not a hopeless mess
I spent a week yesterday talking with well-informed, Syria opposition-sympathizing people in Istanbul. I heard some interesting things.
While the reelection of Ahmad Tomeh as prime minister of the Syrian Interim Government (SIG) has been bumpy due to a boycott by some members of the Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC), it is a done deal. The issue now is who the ministers will be. Their number will shrink to eight or nine. They are supposed to be capable technocrats but will come through a committee of the SOC, which will shift its role to that of a legislative body with oversight responsibilities, instituted through new bylaws. So the ministers will have to pass political muster, and be politically balanced, even if they are supposed to be technocrats. Executive functions will reside with the SIG, whose staff has been getting a lot of training over the past year. Its capacity to govern is improving.
The SIG’s priorities at the moment are clear. Number 1 is food security. Syria faces a massive grain shortfall this winter, due to a dramatic drop in production (by 75% since the year before the war) and a cut in funding to the World Food Programme. Opposition areas need close to 250,000 (presumably) metric tons. Less than this will risk starvation, which would not only be a humanitarian disaster. It means people will flee opposition areas. The war can be lost in many ways, including by losing the population to regime- and Islamic State (ISIS)-controlled areas and to Syria’s neighbors.
Number 2 priority is getting the SIG back into Syria. Already three-quarters of its personnel are said to be there, but the leadership is still in Istanbul and Gaziantep, on the Turkish/Syrian border. It won’t do any good to get them back in unless they, and the people who work for them and benefit from the SIG’s limited services, are reasonably safe.
Here things get complicated. The SIG and SOC want a safe area inside Syria, presumably along the border with Turkey but possibly also in the south. This would require the Americans to lead a coalition effort committed to enforcing it, by pledging to attack anyone or anything that bombarded the safe zone. A no-fly zone is really not sufficient, since a safe area along the Turkish border would also be vulnerable to artillery bombardment. It was a Serb mortar attack on the Sarajevo safe area that precipitated the air attacks on Serb military installations and led to the end of the Bosnian war in 1995. The no-fly zone had not been violated.
The Americans know that the significance of safe areas resides mostly in their failure. An attack on a designated safe area initiates broader military action. They don’t want to start down that slippery slope in Syria. But the SIG and the Turks want the safe area, the former so they can start governing within Syria and establishing their credentials as a serious institution and the latter to slow the massive influxes of refugees (Turkey is now hosting more than 1.5 million).
There is a deal to be had here, because the Americans want the Turks to take up the cudgels against ISIS, in addition to supporting the rebellion against Syrian President Assad. Ankara hasn’t wanted to do as much as it might to support the fight against ISIS, mainly because the people fighting ISIS at the moment along the border with Turkey are Kurds allied with Assad who have also supported a rebellion inside Turkey.
So let’s make a deal: the Turks and the SIG/SOC get their American-protected safe zone, but only if they agree with the Americans to help the Kurds they don’t like to push ISIS away from the border.
In this scenario, Washington would have to twist the Kurds’ arm hard to get them to disassociate from the Assad regime and join the anti-Assad coalition, also pledging not to support insurgency inside Turkey. Otherwise the Turks could find themselves moving into Syria and having to fight both ISIS and the Kurds, which would make a real hash of things.
Washington is still refusing, claiming that it has no ally on the ground in Syria to fight Assad, so it has to limit itself to attacks on ISIS. This is specious. There is even less of an ally on the ground to fight ISIS. Washington is apparently planning to fight a war of attrition against ISIS exclusively from the air, while training a new Syrian opposition force from scratch over the next couple of years. That is not a formula for a quick end to this agony. And I wonder how ISIS, the Kurds and the Free Syrian Army are going to greet the newcomers if and when they finally arrive?
There is some good news. Small but important water, agriculture and energy projects are beginning to take root in opposition-controlled parts of Syria. The multi-donor Syria Recovery Trust Fund is beginning to move money to infrastructure projects that will bring electricity, water, health care and food to liberated areas. Its short life hasn’t been easy, but it is up and running faster than previous trust funds, which have had the benefit of World Bank and EU expertise and have not faced the same conflict conditions or the same political uncertainties in the host country.
Syria is a mess. But it is not a hopeless mess. Defeating both ISIS and Assad will however require a good deal more cooperative commitment from the Americans, the Turks and the Syrian opposition.
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Not doing something is also doing something
Tuesday’s Bipartisan Policy Center event – ISIS, the Kurds and Turkey: A Messy Triangle – was a timely discussion of the difficulties facing coalition efforts in Syria, while shedding light on Turkey’s reluctance to become involved in the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) raging along its southern border. BPC’s Foreign Policy Director Blaise Misztal moderated the panel of Eric Edelman, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and former Ambassador to Turkey, and Henri Barkey of BPC’s Turkey Initiative.
The problems surrounding provision of Western support to the Kurds in the north of Syria stem from tensions between the Turkish government and Turkish Kurds – particularly supporters of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Though Turkey under Prime Minister Erdogan has developed good ties with the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq, Barkey believes that the possibility of a second autonomous Kurdish statelet in Syria on Turkey’s border is too much to bear for the Turks.
The Democratic Union Party (PYD) is the strongest Syrian-Kurdish player in the conflict today. The PYD has close links with the YPG (People’s Protection Units), which are the militia that are so effectively holding off ISIS against the odds in Kobani and earlier this year helped rescue Iraqi Yazidis from the siege on Mount Sinjar. The strength of the PYD in Syria is troubling for Ankara, because in the event of Syria fracturing it could form a new Kurdish state. This would provide further impetus to Kurds within Turkey calling for independence.
The PYD’s links to the PKK help explain Turkish inaction in the ongoing current fighting in Kobani. Last week a former Turkish Deputy Prime Minister went as far as to label the PKK worse than ISIS on Twitter. Although the PKK’s long running guerrilla campaign against the Turks was suspended with a ceasefire in 2013, the subsequent peace process is looking increasingly fragile. Turkey yesterday again bombed the PKK.
Edelman believes Turkey wants to ensure the ongoing negotiations with the Turkish government are the only option the Kurds have for meeting any of their demands. Ankara fears military success in Syria might provide impetus for stronger calls for independence from Kurds inside Turkey. By not aiding the PKK, Turkey hopes to cut the group and its offshoots down to size. But as recent violent riots in response to the government’s inaction have shown, this strategy may well produce unintended consequences.
Perhaps more concerning to the coalition, Turkey is allowing its concerns about the Kurds to permit the spread of the Islamic State. Because Turkey is not intervening or aiding Kurdish fighters in Kobani, ISIS has gained repeated opportunities to take the town. ISIS success would open the border further to foreign jihadist hopefuls, who already use Turkey as a final staging point before entering to join extremist groups.
That porous border – and the networks designed to funnel recruits from Istanbul airport to the Syrian border – are yet more examples of Turkey’s attempts at realpolitik throughout the Syrian civil war. Edelman notes that while Erdogan’s government was initially supportive of Assad, once Damascus turned to bloody repression the Turkish government, embarrassed by its choice of friends, decided to topple the Syrian regime as quickly as possible.
This led to a period of tacit Turkish support for jihadist groups (notably Jabhat al-Nusra) for two reasons. First, the Free Syrian Army, which Turkey trained and supported, proved unable to deliver quick victories. Second, Turkish policy became increasingly oriented towards Sunni majoritarianism. The desire for a quick toppling of Assad led to Turkish aid and arms – at least for a time – for groups like Jabhat al-Nusra.
Neither Edelman nor Barkley believe Turkey’s government has intentionally or directly supported ISIS itself. According to Edelman, the current inaction against ISIS is not just rooted in a wariness of the Kurds, but also a realization that actions against ISIS will have direct consequences for Turkey’s security. The kidnap of 47 Turkish diplomatic personnel after the fall of Mosul exemplifies this reason for caution. The hostages were released last month, but the details of the negotiations are murky. It remains unclear what prisoner exchanges or promises were involved.
Turkey’s priorities are fundamentally different from those laid out by the Obama administration in forming a coalition to degrade and destroy ISIS. Turkey was willing to topple Assad as fast as possible, even at the expense of aiding jihadis. Now with ISIS on the border, Ankara is worried about the possibility of a Kurdish state in Syria. It is more interested in countering the PKK and PYD than in fighting ISIS.
But if Turkey allows ISIS to take Kobani, the result may yet strengthen the Kurdish movement. Barkey compared the siege to Iraqi Kurdistan’s Halabja. The Iraqi town Saddam Hussein gassed has become a potent symbol, complete with folkloric defenders. Both speakers believe Kobani will be a defining moment regardless of the outcome. Turkey is hoping by its inaction to prevent an unfavorable future. But that inaction may be making it more likely that it will eventually have such an unfavorable future forced upon it.
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Peace picks October 14-17
I’ll be in Istanbul, but the week in DC will be a busy one after a welcome but gray three-day weekend:
- Conflict Prevention and Resolution: Ebola, Health Security, Conflict and Peacebuilding Tuesday 14 | 9:30 am – 11:00 am Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies; Rome Building 1619 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington DC REGISTER TO ATTEND Richard Garfield, emergency response and recovery team lead for Assessment, Surveillance, and Information Management at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and Deborah Rosenblum, executive vice president of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, will discuss this topic. There will be a live webcast of this event.
- Boko Haram, ISIS and the Caliphate Today Tuesday 14 | 9:30 am – 10:45 am Georgetown University, 37 St NW and O St NW, Washington DC, Edward B. Bunn, S.J. Intercultural Center, 270 REGISTER TO ATTEND ISIS in Iraq and Syria, and Boko Haram in northern Nigeria continue to use an overlapping language of political Islam and references to the caliphate and the Shariah. This event brings together Brookings fellow Shadi Hamid, visiting professor at Georgetown University Emad Shahin, and visiting assistant professor at Georgetown, Alex Thurston, to discuss these complex issues.
- ISIS, the Kurds and Turkey: A Messy Triangle Tuesday 14 | 10:00 am – 11:30 am Bipartisan Policy Center; 1225 I Street, Washington DC REGISTER TO ATTEND The Kurds have been on the front lines against ISIS for the better part of two years. During recent fighting in Kobani, Turkey has tried to block Syrian Kurdish refugees escaping ISIS from crossing the border, and fighters from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party from entering Syria to join the fight. Eric Edelman, former ambassador to Turkey, and members of BPC’s Turkey Initiative Henri Barkey and Svante Cornell will discuss the complicated relations between ISIS, the Kurds, and Turkey. They will also consider the role that the Kurds and Turkey might be able to play in confronting ISIS and what US policy towards each group should be.
- The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Has the US Failed? Wednesday 15 | 9:30 am – 12:00 pm Middle East Policy Council; The Phoenix Park Hotel, 520 North Capitol St NW, Washington DC REGISTER TO ATTEND Speakers at this conference will include Daniel Kurtzer, former Ambassador to Israel and Egypt and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs; Matthew Duss, President of the Foundation for Middle East Peace; Natan Sachs, Fellow at the Brookings Institution; and Yousef Munayyer, Executive Director of the Jerusalem Fund and the Palestine Center. Omar Kader, Chairman of the Board at MEPC will moderate, and the discussant will be Thomas Mattair, Executive Director at MEPC.
- Fighting ISIS: The Future of American Foreign Policy in the Middle East Wednesday 15 | 3:00 pm – 5:00pm American University; 4400 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington DC EVENT WEBSITE Moderated by David Gregory of AU’s School of International Service. The panel will consist of David Ignatius, Washington Post; Susan Glasser, Politico; and Akbar Ahmed, Professor at SIS.
- Terrorist Financing Networks in the Middle East and South Asia: A Comparative Assessment Thursday 16 | 12:00 pm – 1:00 pm Middle East Institute; 1761 N Street NW, Washington DC REGISTER TO ATTEND The ascent of the Islamic State has raised critical questions about how terrorist organizations are being financed. A comparison of terrorist financing networks in South Asia and the Middle East can offer insights into the differences and similarities in the funding of global terrorist efforts and how money is making its way into the hands of violent terrorist groups. Amit Kumar, fellow of the Center of National Policy at Georgetown University will discuss the methods, motivations, and efficacy of terrorist financing networks. He will also examine implications for policy, and will consider whether current countermeasures effectively prevent the funding of terrorist networks, or whether there are other strategies that can better curb this global threat. Marvin Weinbaum, scholar at MEI, will moderate.
- Parliamentary Elections 2014: Tunisia’s Political Landscape Thursday 16 | 12:00 pm – 1:30 pm Atlantic Council; 1030 15th St NW, Washington DC REGISTER TO ATTEND On October 26, Tunisians will cast their ballots to choose a parliament, marking the first major step out of the interim phase of the democratic transition. However questions remain as to the leading political parties’ ability to translate rhetoric into action and address serious security and economic challenges. To discuss this, and the importance of the elections to Tunisia’s progress, Atlantic Council will hold a conversation with representatives from the two main political parties in Tunisia: Zied Mhirsi of Nidaa Tounes and Osama Al-Saghir of Ennahda. They will offer insights about their respective parties’ platforms. Joining them will be Scott Mastic, director for Middle East and North Africa programs at the International Republican Institute. Karim Mezran, Senior Fellow at Atlantic Council will moderate.
- Stabilizing Iraq: Lessons for the Next Chapter Thursday 16 | 4:45 pm – 6:30 pm Center for Strategic and International Studies; 1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW, Washington DC REGISTER TO ATTEND Bob Schieffer, Chief Washington Correspondent at CBS News will host a discussion between Kathleen Hicks, Senior Vice President of CSIS, Stuart Bowen Jr. Senior Adviser at CSIS and former Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, and Karen DeYoung, Senior National Security Correspondent at The Washington Post.
- Can the Obama Administration’s ISIS Strategy Work? Friday 17 | 12:00 pm – 1:30 pm Hudson Institute; 1015 15th Street NW, Washington DC REGISTER TO ATTEND Criticism of the Obama administration’s Middle East strategy is growing, and many believe current actions to curb ISIS are not enough. Will a strategy limited to aerial bombardment and ancillary assistance to local fighters be sufficient to defeat ISIS, or are US military officials and regional allies arguing for ground troops correct? In either case, to what extent are longstanding, region-wide issues a fundamental obstacle to complete success against ISIS? To address these questions Hudson Institute will host a discussion with Lee Smith, Hudson Institute Senior Fellow, Andrew Tabler, Senior Fellow at the Washington Institute, Faysal Itani, Fellow at the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, and Hussain Abdul-Hussain of the Kuwaiti al-Rai newspaper.
- A Citizens’ Coalition for Peace – US/Jordan Valley Sister Cities Friday 17 | 3:00 pm – 5:00 pm Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington DC REGISTER TO ATTEND Eco Peace/Friends of the Earth Middle East’s Good Water Neighbors (GWN) project has brought together Palestinians, Israelis, and Jordanians to cooperate over trans-boundary water resources and jointly advance sustainable development in the region, notably in the Lower Jordan Valley. The project has led to common problem solving and peace building among cross-border communities, even in the midst of conflict. EcoPeace/Friends of the Earth Middle East has recently worked to create sister city partnerships between American cities and the partnering communities of the GWN project. These will build on the previous successes of GWN to create and empower a broad, international citizen coalition for peace in the region. The Wilson Center will host a discussion on environmental peace-building, the mutual benefits of cross-border cooperation in the midst of conflict, and the role of American citizen diplomats in Middle East grassroots peace-making. The event will feature presentations by the organizations involved in building these international partnerships and a panel discussion with mayors from Jordanian, Israeli, and Palestinian communities in the Lower Jordan Valley.
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