Tag: Kurds
Turkey and Israel need to compartmentalize disagreements and cooperate
Not too long ago, Turkey and Israel had a good working relationship. That changed with the rise of Erdogan in Turkey and the increasing focus on Turkey’s intended leadership of the Islamic world. After 2010, the two countries no longer have diplomatic relations, and recently discussions of Eastern Mediterranean gas pipelines became a new potential stumbling block. However, these two countries are key US allies. The importance of their cooperation only increases now that the US is slowly withdrawing from the Middle East. A recent call between Israeli president Herzog and Turkey’s Erdogan could signal a new opening.
The Atlantic Council convened a panel of diplomats and academics to discuss these issues and their implications for the future. The experts saw potential for future cooperation, but this will depend on the states’ ability to understand each others security red lines, and to compartmentalize their relationship.
The speakers were:
Jonathan H. Ferziger
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Middle East Programs
Atlantic Council
Former Middle East Correspondent
Bloomberg
Amb. Mithat Rende
Former Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Turkey to the OECD
Prof. Brenda Shaffer
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Global Energy Center
Atlantic Council
Amb. Matthew J. Bryza (moderator)
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council in Turkey; Global Energy Center & Eurasia Center,
Atlantic Council
Defne Arslan (introduction)
Director, Atlantic Council in Turkey
Atlantic Council
How we got here
Bryza explained that Israel and Turkey had what amounted to a strategic partnership until relatively recently. He and co-panelist Rende lobbied at that time to realize an Israeli-Turkish gas pipeline. With the rise of Erdogan to power this all changed. His increased focus on Islamic solidarity drew him away from Israel, which he criticized for its treatment of Palestinian rights. The relationship reached a low point with the ‘Mavi Marmara Incident’ also known as the Gaza Flotilla Raid in 2010. Turkey was attempting to break the Israeli blockade on Gaza in Ferziger‘s words, by sending a shipment with aid to the enclave by boat. Israel responded by raiding the boat, leading to the deaths of nine Turkish nationals. Afterwards, Erdogan severed diplomatic relations.
In recent times, there have been cautious signs of improvements. Most notable is the call between Erdogan and Herzog on July 12. Ferziger reminded that Herzog’s role is largely ceremonial in Israeli politics, meaning that this shouldn’t be seen as a call on the highest level. Nonetheless, it does signal willingness on both sides for some level of communication.
Current disagreements
At the core of the bilateral strife are the Palestinians. Erdogan attacks Israel frequently and supports Hamas, whose leaders are often present in Turkey itself. This support for Hamas is an absolute red line to Israel. Shaffer believes that diplomatic initiatives are infeasible if a military presence of Hamas in Turkey remains. Some sort of civilian representation might be feasible, but no more than that. Furthermore, Bryza explained that Turkey’s rhetoric angers Israelis. Erdogan has moderated his comments recently, but with (potentially early) elections coming up, Bryza questioned if he will he be able to avoid nationalist rhetoric in his battle against right-wing rivals.
Israeli domestic politics also complicate the matter. Ferziger said that it is certain that Netanyahu will do whatever he can to paint reconnection with Turkey as a bad choice, while he privately is convinced that it is a good thing. The opposition will use Turkey’s ties to Hamas to make this diplomatic development very difficult.
Ferziger explained that the Hamas connection does help Erdogan, although not as much as one might think. He is popular in Gaza. But in the West Bank he is ‘banned’ and support for him is repressed by the Palestinian Authority. In East Jerusalem, PA control is not universal, meaning that this repression is less total. Nonetheless, Erdogan isn’t the only leader attempting to woo the Palestinians. Saudi Arabia is also engaging in humanitarian and development projects in Palestine. Alongside streets adorned with images of Erdogan, there are streets with those of Mohammed bin Salman. Moreover, Turkish attempts to become involved with the al-Aqsa mosque are met with resistance from Jordan, who currently operates it.
Rende underlined an issue from the Turkish perspective. There is a perception in Turkey that Israel supports the YPG and the establishment of an autonomous territory for the Kurds in Syria. Turkey rejects this as it considers the YPG a terrorist organization linked to the PKK. Shaffer believes that Turkish support for Hamas appears similar to Israel as Israel’s support to the YPG appears to Turkey. There is a need to understand from both sides that support for the Palestinians doesn’t have to equal support for Hamas and that support for the Kurds doesn’t have to equal support for the PKK.
The potential for future cooperation
Despite these issues, the panel generally appeared optimistic on the prospect of cooperation in other fields. The potential for establishing a natural gas pipeline was often mentioned in this regard. Turkey is the region’s only growing market for natural gas according to Rende. As Shaffer opined, connecting Israeli gas to Europe is most logical by attaching to the existing pipelines in Turkey. She explained that Israel is in doubt whether to attempt a gas pipeline through Greece or through Turkey. As Shaffer put it, there is an idea in Israel that it’s either good relations with Greece or with Turkey. But Turkey and Greece have more functional relationships with one another than Israel and Turkey. “There is no reason to be more Greek than the Greeks.”
The prospect of compartmentalizing their relationship was something some panelists were enthusiastic about. Shaffer suggested Turkey should deal with Israel as it does with China. The suppression of Uyghurs in China is completely unpalatable to the Turkish population, and yet Turkey is able to compartmentalize the relationship and engages with China extensively. Iran and Turkey too have tensions surrounding the Azeri population of Iran, which Erdogan has hinted in the past should be united with Azerbaijan. Despite these tensions, Turkey engages with Iran where necessary. Rende added that Turkey has huge differences with the US as well, but that doesn’t stop from cooperating fruitfully.
Shaffer hoped the US might attempt to steer Israel and Turkey more in that direction. The role of a superpower is not only to fight its enemies but to manage its allies. Obama and Trump have done a bad job at this according to her. Having Israel, Turkey, Cyprus, etcetera bickering is not good for the US.
Rende summarized his perspective neatly. Common grounds:
- Trade
- Tourism
- Energy/natural gas
- Defense industry/technology
- Agriculture/water
But the countries countries suffer from a lack of trust and confidence in one another. They must build these up slowly again.
Good steps towards this would be:
- Re-establish ambassadors
- Stop harsh rhetoric through the media
- Establish (ad-hoc) working groups and establish an agenda for cooperation
Watch the recording of the event here:
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No good options for Syria
The Assad regime is undertaking yet one more effort to suppress resistance in the southern Syrian city of Daraa. The brutality will no doubt be extreme, as it has been through more than 10 years of war against the civilian population. The question is Lenin’s: “What is to be done?”
Syria presents Washington with a quandary: American administrations from President Obama onwards find President Assad’s attacks on his own citizens odious and criminal, but they don’t see a risk to US national security that would justify putting American troops at risk to stop it. Once in a great while, Presidents Obama and Trump have used cruise missiles, which entail no risk to Americans, in response to Assad’s egregious use of chemical weapons, but without much effect.
American troops were sent to Syria, and remain there, to fight Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, not Assad. The Americans have sent lots of humanitarian assistance, but that does nothing to weaken or punish Assad. In fact, the portion of that assistance that goes through UN agencies via Damascus helps him a good deal. The Russians have been persistent in making it hard for aid to get to Syrian opposition-held areas from Turkey.
Anyone with even a modicum of human feeling would want to do more to save Syrian civilians from Assad’s depredations. So Josh Rogin and Andrew Tabler call for more, hoping an ongoing policy review will produce at least a special envoy. But a special envoy could be meaningless without a purpose, which Andrew would like to define this way:
a coherent political strategy, supported by the U.S. intelligence community, to isolate Assad and his regime’s facilitators and limit the malign influence of Iran and Russia.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-07-27/search-syria-strategy
How realistic is that?
More sanctions can be imposed–there is rarely a limit to those, but Assad and his enablers are not wanting to travel to the US or Europe and presumably know how to keep their finances under cover. The Syrian economy is already a shambles. Even if Assad is successful militarily, he will be unable to do any significant reconstruction. Iran and Russia already own him and will use their influence in ways the US and Europe consider malign.
The Americans can cause some discomfort to both by maintaining their small military presence in eastern Syria, which supports the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) there. But the Americans have been unable and unwilling to do much to stabilize the situation even where they are present, as that requires risk-taking they want to avoid. Hope that the SDF might develop into a serious military and political challenger to Assad seems to have expired quietly.
Just maintaining Assad’s current isolation requires a good deal of diplomatic heavy lifting. Some Arab countries–most notably Jordan and the United Arab Emirates–have wanted to ease up on Assad. To bolster its lagging economy, Jordan would like to open its border and allow trade with Syria. The UAE sees Assad as a bulwark against the Islamists that Abu Dhabi dreads and loathes. Greece, anxious to avoid another outflux of Syrian refugees, has sent its Ambassador back to Damascus as an “envoy.” Other Europeans may be tempted, or blackmailed, to do something comparable.
The UN political process for Syria, focused on a committee that is supposed to be writing a new constitution, is essentially moribund. Initiative for years has fallen instead to the “Astana powers” (Iran, Russia, and Turkey), none of which are prepared to push for a political solution. All three are relying on their military forces to get what they want in Syria. Iran gets a bridge to Lebanese Hizbollah as well as a new confrontation line with Israel, Russia gets its bases and a foothold in the Middle East, and Turkey gets to repress the Syrian Kurds, some of whom have supported insurgency inside Turkey.
I am not appealing for inaction, just highlighting how difficult it is to think of anything that can be done to affect the situation in a serious way. That is even before we come to discussing Biden Administration priorities, which include reentering the Iran nuclear deal, withdrawing at least some US forces from the Middle East, and refocusing on strategic competition with Russia and China while managing the challenges posed by North Korea, Venezuela, and other bad actors. Never mind the domestic priorities. Syria looks distant in Biden’s perspective.
So sure, a special envoy if you like, but what will s/he do? Talk is cheap, and not bad. But there are no good options for Syria.
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Independence is relative and takes a long time
The Continental Congress voted a resolution of independence on July 2, 1776, the day John Adams thought should be celebrated, but the Declaration in its final form was not presented until July 4. Adams and his rival Thomas Jefferson both died on that day 50 years later, so I suppose Adams would have to be content with losing that round. July 4 is the date we celebrate, even if we do it by taking off from work July 5 when the 4th falls on a weekend.
But independence doesn’t come just because you declare it. The British Crown nominally accepted it 7 years later in the Treaty of Paris, but even then things weren’t settled. The war of 1812(-15) witnessed the British burning of Washington DC. During the Civil War (1861-65) the British, fearful of growing Union industrial might, remained formally neutral but sympathized with the Confederacy. After the war, the Brits and Americans quarreled over fishing and tariffs. It was only with the arbitration of a British Guyana/Venezuela (backed by America) boundary dispute in the 1890s that a more friendly relationship between Britain and America emerged, boosted by America’s growing naval power. The “special relationship” often referenced today was a product of World War II.
Post-World War II decolonization, which created dozens of newly independent states within a few decades, may appear an exception, but it isn’t. Many of Europe’s colonies had fought long and hard for independence, and few have entirely severed their ties to their former metropoles. At the very least, language and culture often remain strong links, as they did for the United States. German was the second most commonly spoken language in the thirteen colonies, but it was the pre-independence colonial power, not Berlin, that prevailed in the newly independent United States. Francophone and anglophone Africa show similar patterns: no matter the loathing towards the former imperial power, its culture and language often remain dominant.
So do other ties: education, trade, investment, politics, and diplomacy. Many former colonies export people and products to the former metropole, which provides investment and often diplomatic support. The export of people becomes a political factor: witness African francophones in France and South Asian anglophones in the United Kingdom. Latinx, Filipinos, and Vietnamese have likewise become political factors in the US, even if some of their countries of origin were not formally colonies. But there is no denying the close ties that come from prolonged US political involvement and military presence.
Here is where Kosovo differs substantially from other newly independent states. There is no risk of an influx of Kosovo Albanians into Serbia. Many young Kosovars are choosing to learn English rather than Serbian as a second language. While some aspects of Albanan and Serbian culture are similar (cuisine and music, in my view), Kosovo looks more to Tirana and the United States than it does to Belgrade for cultural and political guidance. This is not attributable a more general Albanian/Slavic divide. Albanians in Macedonia have made their peace with a Slavic majority and most speak Macedonian. In Albania, there are Orthodox Albanians.
The most important potentially independent state on earth today is Taiwan, which is a sovereign, democratic state that does not claim independence, fearing the consequences of China’s possible military response. Taiwan has intense economic relations with the People’s Republic and most Taiwanese speak Mandarin, but few Taiwanese would welcome the repressive treatment to which Beijing has subjected Hong Kong. China is ratcheting up the pressure on Taiwan and shows no sign whatsoever of willingness to accept its independence.
Another important potentially independent state is Tigray, which has successfully fought off the Ethiopian Army in recent weeks but still faces occupation of part of its territory by Eritrea and by fighters from the neighboring Ethiopian state of Amhara. It is unclear whether the Tigrayans are looking for independence. They say they want the violence to be ended with a political settlement consistent with the Ethiopian constitution, which however includes provisions for secession. The political leadership of Tigray is resentful of neighboring Eritrea, an autocracy with which Ethiopia fought a devastating boundary war 1998/2001. But the most widely spoken language in Eritrea and in Tigray is Tigrinya. If Tigray were to secede from Ethiopia, Eritrea could certainly be at risk. A state that includes both Tigray and Eritrea would have a far better chance of survival than either state on its own.
There are other potentially independent states out there: Western Sahara (claimed and partially occupied by Morocco), northern Mali (scene of rebellions by several different groups), Israeli-occupied Palestine of course, Balochistan, Kurdistan in one form or another, and others I’ve missed. All have seen longstanding struggles that, even if they succeed, will entail continuing interaction with their current rulers, if only because the geography dictates it. Independence is relative and takes a long time.
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Women who fight to be free
In this conversation, taking place on International Women’s Day (March 8), wNew York Times bestseller Gayle Tzemach Lemmon, discussed her newest book Daughters of Kobani. The book delves into the story of a group of Kurdish women who battled ISIS on the frontlines from 2014 to 2017. It is about the strength and adversity that women overcome, the respect they gain, and the power that they find in standing up to the Islamic State.
Speakers:
Gayle Tzemach Lemmon: Author, Journalist, and a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations
Beverly Kirk: Fellow and Director for Outreach, International Security Program, CSIS
Nina Easton: Non-resident Senior Associate
Gayle Tzemach Lemmon wrote her newest book to share the untold and under-reported stories of a group of women bearing arms in Syria. Prior to the publication of Daughters of Kobani, the Syrian border town was relatively unknown to many outside of Syria and Turkey. Tzemach Lemmon describes in detail the uniqueness of this part of Kurdistan, where women are treated as equal and actively engaged in community matters at all levels. She shared small vignettes from the book, including courageous stories of women, but describes these experiences as “the universal quest for human dignity, that has nothing to do with any geography or any ethnic group, or any one gender.”
The Women’s Protection Unit (YPJ) follow the teachings of Abdullah Öcalan, a Kurdish political activist and founder of the PKK currently imprisoned in Turkey. He described women as a pillar in society and has long been a strong advocate of women’s rights: “The Kurds cannot be free until women are free.” This was one of the foundations for the YPJ’s confidence in their capabilities and their role in combat, a field that is overwhelmingly male dominated. However, because of their political affiliation with the “terrorist”-designated PKK, the YPJ was in a precarious situation during the debates in Washington DC concerned with the fight against ISIS. The State Department was at times reluctant to cooperate with the YPJ .
Tzemach Lemmon’s mission to inspire women, share their stories, and encourage women to share stories on their own account. She notes the extraordinary bravery of the women in the YPJ, but also grounds them as real people, who experience life and loss like others. The book, Daughters of Kobani, has already been picked up to be transformed into a television series, which will be an opportunity to engage with people who experienced life under the Islamic State.
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Stevenson’s army, February 16
– CNN has a typical day.
– WSJ’s Seib says he’s blending economic and foreign policy.
– WSJ says DOD is going big on robotics.
-CNAS writer has good to-do list for SecDef Austin.
– Erdogan blasts US for support to Kurds.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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The problem no one really wants to solve
Ten years after its internal conflict started, Elizabeth Thompson of American University hosted a panel on what the the Biden Administration might be able to do about Syria. Conditions there are dire. US policy has been disappointing. What can a new president do to establish a legitimate government able to rebuild? Mustafa Gurbuz, also of American University, moderated.
Hadeel Oueis of BBC Arabic reminded what has gone wrong in Syria. The Assad regime responded brutally to protests, which pushed them in the the direction of militarization and Islamicization, as militia groups and Islamists had advantages in financing and organization. Peaceful change was quickly ruled out. Today, the best prospects are in the Northeast, where the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) control security and the autonomous administration governs in a decentralized way, with strong participation by women as well as checks and balances.
Amy Austin Holmes of the Council on Foreign Relations suggested we don’t know what to expect from Biden about Syria specifically, a subject neither he nor his people have addressed except for humanitarian imperatives, but if he wants to reclaim US credibility and moral authority bold steps are needed on three issues concerning vulnerable people:
- ISIS still a big problem, especially at the Al Hol camp. Washington should take back its own citizens from there for trial in the US and establish a timeline for other countries to take back theirs.
- Christians and Yezidis still under threat. Hundreds of thousands have fled the Turkish intervention in northern Syria intervention and should be enabled to return home.
- Kurds, and in particular Kurdish women, have been excluded from diplomatic talks on Syria. They play strong roles in northeastern Syria in both the SDF forces and in the civilian autonomous administration. Biden has given women important roles in his own cabinet, and it has been demonstrated repeatedly that women’s participation in peace talks leads to improved outcomes.
US forces are likely to remain in northeastern Syria to work by, with, and through the SDF, which has demonstrated significant capacity to overcome Arab/Kurdish tensions.
Dafne McCurdy of CSIS underlined that Syria will not be a top priority for Biden but that its humanitarian crisis ranks high, especially with Samantha Power at USAID. The situation is dire, but the US can have a positive impact because it is the biggest donor. It will need to focus on two priorities:
- Renewal of cross-border assistance in western Syria: The UN Security Council will vote in July on whether to keep open the one remaining authorized border crossing for aid to Idlib. If it fails to do so, the US may still be able to use nongovernmental organizations to ship aid across the border, but not at the scale that the UN is capable of.
- Reform of aid to regime-controlled areas, which Assad has used to reward supporters.
Humanitarian aid is not political, but stabilization assistance is, especially in an area of geopolitical competition. The US needs to buttress local authorities who stand up to outside meddling. But US goals have not been clear, because they are limited to one part of Syria and therefore disconnected from a nation-wide strategy. President Trump’s erratic policy did not allow stabilization to play its proper role in geopolitical competition.
Aaron Stein of the Foreign Policy Research Institute agreed that Syria is not a high priority for the Biden administration. The Syrian opposition won’t be a strong factor in its decisionmaking. The main issues will be humanitarian assistance and counter-terrorism. Washington needs to be talking with the Russians, who are in a strong position in Syria. Sanctions work to impoverish the Syrian regime, but they have been ineffective in producing a sustained political outcome. Some eventual sanctions relief in exchange for release of political prisoners is a possibility. The proliferation of arms and the large numbers of fighters will be problems for many years.
Idlib is essentially a stalemate, with Russia and the regime on one side and Turkey on the other, along with the HTS al Qaeda offshoot who are trying to soften their image. The best outcome is the status quo from the US perspective, but it leaves the US dependent on designated terrorist groups in both northwestern (HTS) and northeastern Syria (the PKK, which is the core of the SDF). The US is stuck with bad options.
Joshua Landis, University of Oklahoma, views Assad as having won militarily, as he now controls 65-70% of Syria’s territory but he wants it all. Washington wants political change and has used aid as a tool to feed the opposition as much as regime has used it against the opposition. Assad will focus in the immediate future not on Idlib, which is hard, but on northeastern Syria, because it is a soft spot. He may go after Tanf, which is important to trade links with Iraq and Iran. The Syrian people are pawns in larger geopolitical struggle
Trump used Turkey against Iran and Russia, thus limiting what Assad could do in the north. Biden is likely to be less friendly to Turkey but won’t want to undermine the Turks in Syria. Some Americans are talking about a federal Syria, with Idlib and the northeast remaining outside Damascus’ control as the US presses for regime change there. But in the end the big issues for the Americans are pulling Turkey out of Russia’s orbit and dealing with Iran. Biden might toughen on Iran in Syria because of the nuclear deal, where he will need to soften.
Bottom line: Syria is not a problem Washington will focus on, as there are no good solutions. But they are likely to keep troops there. If the Americans were to withdraw, the Kurds would be sitting ducks and would have to make a deal with Damascus. Their civilian and military organizations would crumble. At least now in the northeast there is a military command under a civilian government. In the northwest, military and Islamist forces rule under Turkish control.
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