Tag: Kurds
Whose side would you choose?
These have been consequential days to be out of commission due to lack of a computer power supply, but Amazon delivered yesterday in Bologna, where I am meeting with students and faculty at the SAIS campus. So I’ll try to catch up.
President Trump has pulled the plug on the US presence in Syria with the expected results: a Turkish invasion from the north and a push from Syrian government forces from the south. The Syrian Kurdish YPG, formerly the core of the US-sponsored forces fighting the Islamic State, has understandably opted for allying itself with Damascus, while Islamic State personnel are busy escaping from YPG captivity. International politics abhors a vacuum and fills it with armed people.
What could have been differently? The Americans needed to negotiate their withdrawal, as they have been trying to do in Afghanistan. Rather than leaving a vacuum, they might have arranged for Ankara, Damascus, Moscow, and the Kurds to come to an understanding about areas of control, at least on a temporary basis. Without such an understanding, the parties concerned will need to fight it out, to the detriment of the effort against ISIS and other extremists. The US is moving towards imposing sanctions on NATO ally Turkey in order to get it to stop fighting the Kurds. The absurdity of that sentence tells you all you need to know about how bad the decision to pull the plug was.
The second major development in recent days is the US/China mini trade agreement. Beijing will supposedly renew massive imports of US agricultural products in exchange for a truce on tariff increases. That accords with the first law of holes: when in one, stop digging. The tariffs are having a negative effect on the world economy, and the dip in Chinese agricultural purchases is blowing a multi-billion dollar hole in the US government budget as the Trump Administration tries to compensate farmers for their losses and hold on to their political loyalty.
But the agreement does little or nothing to solve the bigger problems in the US/China trading relationship, especially theft of intellectual property and forced technology transfer while leaving in place the several waves of tariffs already levied. My guess is that Trump is happy with that: he shows no sign of wanting to get rid of the tariffs, which he views as encouraging US manufacturing despite massive evidence to the contrary. The tariffs are hitting a lot of intermediate goods needed by US manufacturers, making them less competitive in US and world markets. But Trump is a mercantilist. He’ll want to keep the tariffs, no matter what Beijing agrees to do.
The mini deal is at least a step in the right direction: an end to a trade war the US cannot win. That is not true of the President’s decision on Syria. It is prelude to a wider and even more ferocious war in northeastern Syria, where erstwhile US allies will find themselves crushed between the Turkish onslaught and the Syrian counterattack. Levying tariffs on Turkey compounds the misjudgment, as it suggests the Americans did not understand what everyone else knew would happen. Trump is proving the US an unreliable ally to both Turkey and the Kurds, to the advantage of Syrian President Assad. He now has an opportunity to retake the substantial agricultural lands and oil and gas resources of northeastern Syria.
Making America great again is proving not just an empty slogan but a menace to American friends, who will need little encouragement in the future to rely on others for protection. Russia and Iran are the big winners from US policy in Syria. China is proving that trade wars are not easy to win. Whose side would you choose to be on?
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A Kurdish view of Turkey’s invasion
Yousif Ismael is the Director of Media and Policy at the Washington Kurdish Institute. Colin Tait is a Research Assistant at the Middle East Institute.
Colin Tait: What can we expect in the coming days in northeastern Syria with this invasion?
Yousif Ismael: It’s already started. It has already resulted into the death of two civilians and the injury of one. The airstrikes are intense and covering all the bordering towns between Syria, the Kurdish region, and Turkey. We expect a lot of internally displaced people from those areas to go south. We expect massacres and we say massacres because we have experience with the same groups and the same state with Turkey and the jihadists in Afrin in March of 2018. We expect disaster and unfortunately, there’s not a lot of ears to eat.
CT: Ankara right now claims that they just planned to establish a safe zone and peace corridor along the border. Do you expect that they will go further south?
YI: First of all, the peace corridor or whatever they call it is based on a war propaganda. This is not reality. Sometimes they claim to fight ISIS but there is no ISIS over there whatsoever. The Kurds secured that region and the Kurds have never shot a bullet against Turkey from that region. It’s safer than the bordering points that Turkey has with the opposition groups and with Assad elsewhere. So, this is just a war propaganda. They are talking about a safe zone of 30 kilometers deep that basically is the Kurdish region of Syria. What people need to understand is that the Turkish ambition is historical against the Kurds. They are against any Kurdish entity rising up. They did the same thing in Iraqi Kurdistan, but then there was an imposed no-fly zone against Saddam which helped the Kurds create the entity. The same thing with Syria, they’re fighting with Turkey. Inside Turkey, the Kurds of course are suffering since 1923 when the Turkish state was built. We are worried it is not going to be only that but the 30 kilometers is good enough for Turkey to destroy the Kurdish region.
CT: The US removal of troops has caused a lot of short-term disasters that are occurring in the region. What is the long-term blowback you think for the region as a whole as well as the damage to the relationship between the Kurds and United States?
YI: Now the Americans as people, as lawmakers, as media, and as think tanks have showed their true feelings, which is about supporting the Kurdish and avoiding massacres and genocide. It mostly itself is based on the humanitarian situation. We love and we appreciate what America has showed to us except President Trump. He is the only one who is convinced to allow Turkey to invade and commit massacres. In the short-term, the US doesn’t have good policy in Syria. They gave up the West during the Obama Administration and now, they’re giving up East to Turkey during the Trump Administration. The relationship will always be great between the two Nations. However, the Kurds right now are obligated to go to our enemies and the enemies of the US as well, which is Iran, the Assad regime, and Russia to get some source of some protection. It is a fight for survival.
To be fair and far from emotions, the Syrian regime and Russia also don’t offer much to the Kurds. They don’t give them any entity or any rights. But to surrender the entire region to Assad, which is basically going back to pre-2012, the Kurds were persecuted without citizenship and had no rights. We didn’t have many options.
Going back to the cooperation between the US and Kurds, the Kurds wanted to defend their land and not become refugees and stay in their homeland. And the only people to help them they were the US and the US-led Coalition which was great. The Kurds defended their land thanks to the US but also the Kurds fought with US on behalf of the world against terror organizations. It’s two sides of the argument here and we are very disappointed that this big threat to the national security of the US and elsewhere is not affecting the president’s decision making because ISIS is on the verge to come back. Al-Qaeda is only becoming stronger and nobody’s even talking about it. They even have schools. They have thousands of troops in Syria. Then we’re talking about Iran, yet we’ve given them another strategic part which affects the allies of the US.
CT: Going back to the Kurds and the US and Trump harming the relationship. Congress on both sides of the spectrum have said that they want to impose sanctions and push back on President Trump’s decision. Do you think sanctions are enough? And what can US policymakers do to backpedal and reverse this decision.
YI: Just a side note. The only bipartisan non-binding resolution that took place by the Senate was in January or December of last year when Trump wanted to withdraw. That was the only bipartisan movement. The Kurds united the two sides, the Democrats and Republicans. This same thing is repeating itself, which is amazing because national security should be a bipartisan issue. It should not be a Democratic or Republican. But yes, sanctions are not enough. There’s always a veto by the president and there are always ways to get away with it. Turkey got away with breaking the sanctions of the US against Iran. Turkey got away with buying Russian weapons. Turkey got away with helping the Venezuelan dictatorship by trading gold between Iran and Venezuela and this is all on record on a media publicly. I think that a good immediate solution is to shut down the skies on Turkey to stop these massacres against the Kurds. The Kurds then could figure out how to resist or just to survive better than allowing them to use the sky. A no-fly zone would be ideal and that should be the priority of Congress.
CT: I met with a former Syrian diplomat and he discussed how the Autonomous Administration of North Eastern Syria is the best model for the future of a stable Syria. What can be done to preserve this idea as Turkey starts to invade Northeastern Syria?
YI: The US built this multi-ethnic Kurdish majority and now Arab majority multi-ethnic force that defeated the most brutal organization of ISIS. After that, Kurds helped the other communities, with the help of the US DOD and Pentagon to be specific, to help these civilian councils to manage. This is a very secular decentralized system that is pro-human rights and women rights. They have a different vision and they’re not calling for independent Kurdistan. They want to remain in Syria.
It is a very good model to follow. The only way to preserve it is to stop Turkey because sooner or later, if this continues, Iran, Russia, and the Syrian regime will pounce at the towns because the Kurds cannot fight everyone and all the Kurds are asking for is peace and talks with Turkey.
Nobody wants war. Nobody wants to be killed. 11,000 YPG members have been killed and 22,000 injured as the SDF. This is affecting 200 thousand families. Look how many families are affected by this. The economy there is stable. All of these displaced people are in that region. Turkey is complaining about the refugees, but that region also has refugees. The Kurds were welcoming them even though they are under blockage of Syria, Turkey, and sometimes even by Iraq. It is not just a Kurdish problem. It is a Syrian problem.
CT: Can you talk about how the International Community aside from the United States can help with this crisis?
YI: To be fair, it is European responsibility even before the US to prevent this. Europe is closer to Turkey and the terrorists will eventually make their way to Europe before the United States. The Europeans should definitely do more, and I urge them and beg them and ask them to stop this invasion because this is not in their interest and not in Turkey’s interest, meaning the economy and the authoritarian regime of Turkey. This is having the Turkish soldiers ordered to go fight for something that is not his problem. This is something that is personal to Erdogan and his dictatorship ideology to resolve this Islamic Empire of Ottomans and this and that. It’s against the interest of everyone. I hope the Europeans will be serious and finally step up their game and prevent what is to happen in the coming days.
CT: What are you and other Kurdish organizations here in DC and around the country plan to do about this issue?
YI: We do our job as raising awareness. We defended the political, the culture, and the human rights of the Kurds in all parts. Today, Syrian Kurdistan is really in trouble and they’re facing massacres by Turkey. We will continue raising awareness, but we are again thankful for every voice from actors to think tanks to the media to lawmakers that they came up and spoke the truth and stood against the bad decision of President Trump.
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A skimpy breakthrough
Today’s announcement of an agreement between Turkey and the US on a “safe zone” inside northeastern Syria is being described as a breakthrough. But skimpy would also be accurate:
From August 5-7, 2019, U.S. and Turkish military delegations met at the Turkish Ministry of Defense to discuss plans to coordinate the establishment of a safe zone in northern Syria.
The delegations agreed on the following:
a) the rapid implementation of initial measures to address Turkey’s security concerns;
b) to stand-up a joint operations center in Turkey as soon as possible in order to coordinate and manage the establishment of the safe zone together;
c) that the safe zone shall become a peace corridor, and every effort shall be made so that displaced Syrians can return to their country.
It is not clear what this really means. At the least, it suggests President Erdogan will not risk a unilateral Turkish intervention inside Syria, with the attendant risk of clashes that injure or kill American troops. That is no small thing.
But it is not clear whether the months of quarreling over how wide the “safe zone” should be and how it will be protected and managed have ended. It sounds more like the issues have been delegated to a joint operations center. No harm in that if it succeeds, but why should it if higher level officials are still at odds? Particularly important is the question of who will be in charge: Turkey, the US, or some sort of consortium? Turkish/American cooperation at Manbij, just on the other side of the Eurphrates from the proposed safe zone, has not been easy, not to mention the bigger issues (F35s, Russian air defenses, Gulen) roiling he relationship between Washington and Ankara.
The third point–the safe zone or peace corridor–is enormously problematic. Will Ankara, under pressure from Turks to reduce the gigantic refugee population, be forcing people back into Syria to populate that area? How will the Kurds who live there–and have their own armed forces–react to Arab returnees, many of whom may never have lived in the now supposedly safe zone? How will security be maintained? How will people who move there be fed, sheltered, clothed, and provided with health care? How will the territory be governed? Under what laws? What will happen with the Kurdish-led governing institutions already established in that area?
The history of safe zones is spotty. Sometimes, as in northern Iraq in the 1990s, they have been successful. Iraqi Kurdistan grew to maturity under a no-fly zone that protected it from Saddam Hussein. At other times they have been unsuccessful: witness the safe zones in Bosnia that suffered attacks from Serb forces that led to the NATO military intervention there.
In Syria, the odds are not good. The Americans have only about a thousand troops left in the northeast. President Trump is not going to want to increase their number. So the safe zone will be under the protection mainly of Turkish and Turkey-allied forces that are hostile to the governing authorities the Kurds have established there. The Kurds reciprocate: they are hostile to Turkey, where their PKK confreres have been in violent rebellion for decades. The Islamic State, while not holding territory in northeast Syria, is still present and conducting terrorist attacks. It will of course seek to aggravate any frictions between Kurds and Arabs as well as Kurds and Turks, which shouldn’t be difficult.
So yes, a breakthrough of sorts but still a skimpy one that will require a great deal of time, manpower, money, and effort to merit the “peace corridor” label. At this point, it is just as likely it will make that appellation the subject of future derision.
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What next for the US in Syria
I spoke today at SETA with Charles Lister, Bassam Barabandi, Geoffrey Aronson, and Kadir Ustun on Syria. Here are the talking notes I prepared. I started at number 13 and didn’t use them all. The video of the event is below:
- I find it difficult to know what to say about Syria.
- I could of course just repeat what many others have rightly said: the war is not over, Assad has not won because the country is in ruins and he lacks the means to fix it, it is all tragic and more tragedy impends because the underlying drivers of conflict have not been resolved.
- I could even go further and say that President Trump’s decision to withdraw was foolish, the US must stay in Syria, because otherwise we will have no say in its future, and that those who are trying to at least partially reverse that decision are correct.
- But I really don’t believe much of that: the policy implications for the US merit deeper examination.
- Assad has defeated any chance for a transition to democracy in Damascus: who in Syria would trust others to govern them today? Assad is demographically engineering the part of the country he controls to ensure regime security and has for most practical purposes won.
- He will keep most of the refugees out of regime-controlled Syria because he knows full well he cannot allow them back. He lacks the resources for reconstruction and fears they will threaten his hold on power.
- The Americans are not going to have much say over what happens in Syria, partly because they don’t want to. Neither President Obama nor President Trump thinks Syria is worth a candle.
- They cared about ISIS and Iran, not Syria.
- It is the Astana three that will determine Syria’s fate.
- Iran is there to stay because they have to. They think propping up Assad responds to threats from Israel and from Sunni extremists. Only regular bombing will limit Iranian power projection into the Levant. The Americans should prefer that the Israelis do it.
- The Russians are there to stay because they want to. Syria has given them not only an important naval base and now an air base, but also a toehold in Middle East geopolitics. At the very least, they can now cause trouble for the Americans in most of the region.
- The Turks are there to stay because they want to chase the PKK/PYD away from their borders and enable at least some of the refugees they host to return to Syria.
- The Syria Study Group in its interim report suggested that the Americans stay in northeastern Syria and do what is needed to enable civilians to stabilize it.
- But before a decision like that can be made, the Americans need to ask themselves what it would take. The Study Group put the cart before the horse.
- The six American civilians working there on contracting for rubble removal and a few other basic necessities like demining, water and electricity before being withdrawn by the Trump Administration were nowhere near what is required for a serious stabilization operation.
- That’s what you need if you ISIS is to be prevented from returning: governance and justice decent enough to be preferable to the caliphate.
- Experience, as Frances Z. Brown suggested in Monkey Cage last week, demonstrates that much more will be needed.
- How much more?
- Jim Dobbins is the best guide I know on this subject. For a “heavy peace enforcement” operation in a territory with, let us assume, 2.5 million people, which is my guess at how many are in northeastern Syria (and at least that many in Idlib), Jim suggests a force of more then 35,000 internationals and 13,000 locals costing almost 8 billion dollars per year.
- On top of that, you’ll need dozens if not hundreds of civilians supervising and guiding the disposition of stabilization funding.
- Sure, you can skimp or trade off locals for internationals, but not without consequences. I’ve heard little about Raqqa that suggests reconstruction there is going well there.
- The Turkish reconstruction efforts in the Euphrates Shield and Olive Branch territories, which are said to be “comprehensive” in SETA’s recent description of them, suggest Dobbins’ numbers are not far off.
- The simple conclusion is that nowhere near the required resources are likely to be available for a serious American stabilization effort in northeastern Syria.
- What about the Turks? They want a buffer zone of 30 km or so inside Syria. Could they be relied upon to do the necessary stabilization and reconstruction all across their southern border?
- The answer is likely yes, but not without consequences.
- Upwards of 600,000 Kurds live in northeastern Syria. A significant percentage of them would likely flee, as many did from Afrin during and after Olive Branch, and the PKK fighters so vital to the effort against ISIS would be forced back into the arms of the Syrian regime, which would no doubt expect them to do what they were created to do: attack Turkey.
- US troops remaining in northeastern Syria while the Turks repress the Kurds they think support the PKK and the Syrian regime supports the same Kurds to attack Turkey is not my idea of a place I would want US troops to be.
- What about Idlib? It looks to me as if Assad is determined to retake it, with massive consequences: millions might seek to leave. There is no real ceasefire.
- Maybe these two dire scenarios lead to a standoff? The regime might hold off in Idlib fearing that Ankara would use the occasion to go into northeastern Syria? Maybe Ankara will hold off in northeastern Syria for fear Damascus will go after Idlib in a serious way?
- Might it be possible to deploy Arab peacekeepers to both areas? Now I’m in fantasyland.
- Whatever happens, I don’t think the US presence in Syria, even if doubled or quadrupled, is adequate to the task of enabling stabilization of the territory the SDF now controls, especially as ISIS reconstitutes and the Iranians decide to test our mettle.
- We can’t get out for fear of the consequences. And we don’t want to put enough effort in to make a real difference in repressing ISIS and repelling Iranian-backed proxies. That’s not a good place for America to be.
- My recommendation would be just this: go big and fix Syria or get out and let the chips fall where they may. But neither is likely to happen.
- That will reduce us to putting US troops at risk for the sake of a possible future role in some imagined UN-sponsored peace negotiation. I argued in favor of that 18 months ago. Today it is hard to justify.
- It is fitting that Hulu has revived Catch-22 at this fraught moment.
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The disgrace
A presidency that has known few happy days is at a nadir, though it may well go lower. Russia and Iran are celebrating the American withdrawal from Syria, which President Trump decided to please Turkey. Ankara will now attack the Kurds who allied themselves with the US to fight ISIS successfully. The President has consequently lost a universally respected Defense Secretary as well as a capable lead for the diplomatic campaign against ISIS.
The economy is shaky. The stock market is correcting and the Fed is raising rates. Recession before the 2020 election is increasingly likely. The trade wars with China and Europe continue with no end in sight, devastating American agriculture and some American manufacturing. The budget deficit is exploding due to an ill-conceived tax cut for the very wealthy. Trump hasn’t spent already appropriated funds for border security, but he is demanding more for an unnecessary and extraordinarily expensive wall on the Mexican border, partly closing down the government through Christmas.
This is a record of unparalleled chaos and failure, even without mentioning the new North Korean missile sites and the Iranian refusal to discuss either their missiles or Tehran’s regional power projection until Trump reverses his decision to exit the Iran nuclear deal. Pyongyang and Tehran represent serious threats to US interests that Trump has no strategy to counter.
Nor has he been any more effective in changing Russian behavior, which the Congress and his Administration continue to sanction without any admission by the President of Moscow’s wrongdoing. The “deal of the century” Trump promised on Palestine his negotiators have botched completely. America’s diplomacy and international reputation have rarely known worse, more incoherent and less effective, moments.
What can be done?
Little is the serious answer. Even when the Democrats take control of the House little more than a week from now, they will have no ability to fix 90% of what ails the country. Their main role will be oversight: making clear to the public what the real situation is through hearings and reports. Beyond that, they can refuse to sign on to stupidities like the border wall, but no legislation can pass the Senate without a good bit of Republican support, especially if overriding a veto will be necessary. The Democrats cannot force the US back into the Iran nuclear deal, the Paris climate change agreement, or the Trans Pacific Partnership, all of which held substantial advantages for the US.
Meanwhile, Special Counsel Mueller’s investigation has produced indictments, guilty pleas, and convictions of high-ranking Trump campaign and administration officials as well as Russian intelligence operatives. There is no longer even a slight doubt that Moscow campaigned in 2016 in favor of Donald Trump, likely tipping the balance in his favor in key Midwest states and Pennsylvania. Trump is obsessed with legitimacy, as well he should be. He is not a fairly elected president, even if we accept the inequities of the Electoral College. He is the product of blatant, widespread, and illegal foreign assistance. We need barely mention Trump’s own illegal campaign contributions as well as his criminal use of Trump Foundation resources.
I doubt though that we have reached bottom. Still to come are revelations about massive Russian and Saudi financing for Trump real estate, as well as indictments of his co-conspirators in stealing and publishing emails. Trump really hasn’t hidden these things, but a report from Mueller that details them will be more than interesting. It will raise questions about whether a felon should be sleeping and watching TV in the White House, where he does little else except brood. If his former National Security Adviser can go to prison for years, why can’t the President be indicted and tried?
The short answer is that the toadies he picks as Attorney General won’t allow it, claiming that Justice Department regulations they could change prohibit it. Trump can no longer, with a Democratic majority in the House, avoid impeachment, if the Mueller report suggests it. But in the Senate he still has not only a majority, but one that hesitates to criticize, never mind convict. Trump has humiliated Mitch McConnell and his cohort repeatedly, but the Senate Republicans remain steadfastly loyal. It is hard to picture how conviction would gain a 2/3 majority it needs in the upper chamber.
The only remedy for this shambolic and bozotic presidency is likely at the polls, less than two years hence. There are no guarantees, but Trump’s path to re-election is narrowing, especially if recession happens. The disgrace is in the White House, not in the country.
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Fubar squared
Donald Trump’s unanticipated (at this particular moment) but still not surprising (because we all knew he wanted to do it) announcement of quick withdrawal of US troops from Syria has consequences:
- The vacuum the Americans are opening in eastern Syria will be filled, with the Turks coming from the north and Syrian government forces (with Shia allies) from the south and west. The result could be still another major clash in Syria, unless Ankara and Damascus come to some sort of mutual accommodation.
- The Syrian Kurds and Arabs who have been fighting ISIS with US support under the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) rubric now have to run for shelter. Best bet is that the Arabs seek safe haven with the Turks, who will be willing to support them. The Kurds, who are affiliated with Kurdish rebels inside Turkey, will seek shelter with the Syrian regime.
- The Kurds have already indicated they may release several thousand ISIS prisoners they hold, thus ensuring problems for whoever gains control over the SDF territory or part of it. The Kurds will also presumably try to hold on to the oil production facilities in the east, to use as a bargaining chip with the regime.
- Moscow is gleeful, Ankara pleased, and Iran satisfied, even if President Trump is tweeting that they are unhappy because now they will have to fight ISIS without the Americans. Each for different reasons disliked the US role in Syria, and now their diplomatic leverage has been vastly improved. None were as concerned about ISIS as the US was.
- What remains of the Syrian opposition is dismayed and demoralized. Many had some hope the SDF territory would provide a viable and even attractive alternative to Assad’s Syria.
- American allies in Europe and elsewhere are horrified that a presidential tweet announced a major policy decision without any consultation or advance notice and in contradiction to what Washington has been telling them for months. This will be particularly galling to the French (pun intended) and make the British croak (also intended), since both have special forces in eastern Syria fighting alongside the Americans.
- Trump’s national security apparatus may be even more undone, as National Security Advisor Bolton, Secretary of State Pompeo, and Secretary of Defense Mattis had all advised against this move. Republican national security stalwarts in Congress are beside themselves.
- Jim Jeffrey, the very capable retired foreign service officer who had finally put in place a coherent American policy on Syria that depended for its negotiating leverage on keeping Syria’s northeast, will be feeling vertigo as his platform falls out from under him.
It is entirely possible that Trump will reverse or mitigate this disruptive decision, perhaps by continuing the American air campaign against ISIS, which contrary to the President’s tweeting has not been defeated completely. But that will only compound the confusion that friends and adversaries are feeling.
The situation is fubar squared.
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