Tag: Kurds
Iraqi trends
The Washington Institute on Near East Policy hosted a panel on emerging political trends in Iraq’s post-election period on November 27th. The panel featured Munqith Dagher, CEO of Baghdad-based Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies (IIACSS), Ahmed Ali, program officer at the National Endowment for Democracy, and David Pollock, Berinstein Fellow at the Washington Institute and director of its Fikra Forum.
While many Americans are tired of Iraq, Pollock reminded that it is still of strategic importance to American interests, which include preventing the country from incubating terrorism and tipping the region in a hostile, pro-Iran direction. It is also a potential demographic, economic, and religious powerhouse in the region. Iraqi oil exports are half those of the Saudis. Because of the 2003 invasion, the success of Iraq reflects on America’s political clout in the region, with many people seeing Iraq as a US responsibility.
Pollock pointed out the importance of public opinion polling in Iraq, a powerful but underutilized tool. The rise of the Islamic State in 2014 and the divisions arising from Kurdistan’s 2017 independence referendum were in line with Dagher’s polling at the time. To avoid being taken by surprise in the post-election space, public opinion-informed policy is crucial.
Dagher stated that we are at a crossroads in Iraqi attitudes, with three transformative shifts in public opinion.
1. A shift in inter-sectarian dynamics
For the first time since 2003, Sunnis are overall happier than Shi’a and Kurds. More specifically, they have more trust in the central Iraqi government than their Shi’a counterparts, an increase from 20% in 2016 to 50% today. Sunni Arabs have been reluctant to participate in the political process since Saddam’s ousting, and Dagher emphasized that this moment should be capitalized on to get them involved in the political process.
2. From inter to intra-sectarian conflicts
Iraq has a long history of sectarian politics. We are finally seeing a shift towards interest-based politics. Sectarian identity as the most important source of identity has dropped to below 10% for all three groups. It was as high as 61% in 2013 among Kurds. Iraqi citizenship as the most important source of identity has increased significantly among Shi’a. While it is still very low for Kurds at 6%, there are so signs of further decrease. Across various polling questions, namely if Iraq is heading in the wrong direction, geography is playing a more important role than ever. For example, Sunni Arabs in Mosul are significantly more likely to believe that the country is heading in the wrong direction (69%) than Sunni Arabs in general (55%), as are the Shi’a Arabs of Basra than Shi’a at large.
3. Less international polarization
The ability of regional actors to take advantage of Iraq’s traditional sectarian divisions has also diminished. Iran’s popularity, when asked if it is a reliable partner, has dropped from 75% to 44% among Shi’a Arabs in the last two years alone. The most significant drop was between 2017 (70%) and today (44%), which Dagher attributed to the protests in Basra as well as the visible interference of both the US and Iran in the recent election. Access to information has increased as a result of growing internet use among Iraqis. It jas increased from 40% in 2014 to 80% today. Ninety per cent of Iraqi youth have at least one social media account. Among Sunni Arabs, favorable views of Saudi Arabia have decreased from 90% in 2012 to 61% today.
These trends are overshadowed by more alarming shifts under the surface. The population thinks the country is heading in the wrong direction more than ever, with 80% of respondents agreeing compared to 50% in April 2012. The most recent election has been marred by the fact that less than 1 in 5 respondents thought it free and fair. Dagher warned that lack of trust in the democratic political system might explain why 66% prefer a “strong leader who doesn’t care about Parliament nor elections,” accompanied by dramatic decreases in voter turnout. Ali attributed this legitimacy crisis to the gulf between politicians’ and the public’s views. He cited the Basra anti-corruption protests, which were predictable, and the lack of serious response from the Iraqi government.
For Ali, the big area for policy makers is post-ISIS reconstruction. Addressing grievances in post-ISIS regions and reunifying the country requires institutional governance reforms. Most importantly, the electoral process needs to be transparent and accountable to improve public trust, as demonstrated by post-election fraud allegations. The new Iraqi government has its work cut out for it.
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Coup failure and civilian control
The SETA Foundation convened a panel yesterday discussing how the July 15, 2016 coup attempt has affected civil-military relations in Turkey. Panelists were:
- Sener Akturk, Associate Professor, Koç University Department of International Relations
- Edward Erickson, Scholar-in-Residence in the Clark Center for Global Engagement, State University of New York at Cortland
- Mark Perry, Author and Foreign Policy Analyst.
Kadir Ustun (Executive Director, The SETA Foundation at Washington DC) moderated the conversation.
Ustun underlined that the events of July 2016 were an attack on Turkey’s democracy. Erdogan’s leadership in the coup’s aftermath allowed the Turkish people to “reclaim their democratic institutions.” Akturk furthered this point, claiming that Turkey actually faced two assaults on its democracy, one from the “bolshevik” PKK in July 2015 and the other from Fethullah Gulen’s “Messianic cult” in July 2016.
Erdogan’s reforms, Akturk said, posed an existential threat to each group by eroding the credibility of their grievances with Turkish society. The creation of a government-sponsored Kurdish TV channel in 2009 significantly reduced the PKK claim that Erdogan marginalized the Kurds. The lifting of the headscarf ban for public employees in 2013 eroded the Gulen Movement’s argument that the government limited religious freedom of expression.
As a result, both groups resorted to violence to achieve their political objectives. Akturk emphasized that these groups, not Erdogan, represent the real threat to Turkey’s democracy. While Erdogan championed Morsi’s democratically-elected government in Egypt, Gulenists encouraged the coup that brought it down in 2013. Further, the PKK’s constitution reveals its Bolshevik-leaning tendencies, while the governing style of its Syrian affiliate, the PYD, betrays the PKK’s preference for totalitarianism.
Akturk also remarked that the attempted coup shifted the Turkish civilian-military balance firmly in favor of civilian oversight over the military. As a result of the coup attempt, the military became subordinate to civilian rule, forcing the Turkish armed forces to delink themselves from politics and occupy themselves only with fighting. Finally, Akturk revealed that any doubts surrounding Turkey’s military capability following Erdogan’s dismissal of 42% of its commanders after the coup were swiftly silenced with the success of Operation Euphrates Shield in the Fall of 2015.
Erickson argued that the coup failed because of a generational change in the military. The staunch Kemalists who held the office of Chief of the General Staff during Turkey’s coup-riddled 20th century had largely been replaced by younger officers by 2016. Many of these officers received their educations abroad or had served on NATO assignments, exposing them to the view that the military should not interfere with domestic politics. Further, many had witnessed the aftermath of the 1980 coup, which resulted in over 600,000 arrests. As a result, the coup failed. Instead of siding with the plotters, the Chief of the General Staff in 2016, Hulusi Akar, sided with Erdogan.
The significance of the coup for Turkey’s democracy, Erickson argued, is that it brought about Turkey’s second republic, which began with the adoption of the presidential system this year. Importantly, the presidential system brought about one of Samuel Huntington’s key elements of a functioning democracy: civilian control over the military. In Erickson’s view, while Turkey’s politics may swing towards authoritarianism in the short term under Erdogan, the establishment of the military as a force used purely for fighting represents a gain that will strengthen Turkey’s democracy in the long term.
In his remarks, Perry cautioned against using American standards to measure the legitimacy of Turkey’s military, and to instead appreciate that Turkey’s establishing civilian control over the military is a huge accomplishment. Perry claimed that Hulusi Akar’s decision to side with Erdogan during the coup reveals that “Turkey does not need coups anymore.” But the Turkish military still has a long way to go before it is viewed as a legitimate institution by all Turks. So long as not all elements of Turkish society feel represented by the Turkish armed forces, some Turks will continue to struggle to see it as a legitimate implementer of Turkish national interests abroad.
Caveat emptor: All of the panelists agreed that the failure of the attempted coup strengthened Turkey’s democracy by paving the way to firmer civilian control of the military. The panelists, however, chose to gloss over the reality that these gains will likely only become visible after Erdogan and his authoritarian agenda leave office.
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Putin’s pet
President Trump is on his way to a meeting Monday with Russian President Putin. Along the way, he is doing precisely what Putin most wishes for.
First Trump trashed NATO. That’s the alliance Putin loves to hate. Trump not only criticized the allies for failing to meet the 2024 2% target for defense spending, he also fired a salvo at Germany for importing gas from Russia. Sitting next to him when he did that at breakfast were Secretary of State Pompeo, Ambassdor to NATO Hutchison, and Chief of Staff Kelly. All looked stunned, but Kelly did not bother hiding his discomfort. The White House spokesperson put him in his place by claiming he was disappointed in the breakfast offerings.
Then last night, in an interview that became public while he was at dinner with Prime Minister May in London, Trump compounded the felony. He not only blasted his host for not favoring “hard” Brexit and allowing immigrants to damage the “fabric” of British society, but also attacked the mayor of London for being soft on terrorism. The racist tone of these remarks is apparent to anyone who listens. The “special relationship” between the US and UK hasn’t known a lower moment in the past 100 years.
Then this morning we read that Trump is preparing to cut a “deal” on Syria in which Putin promises something he can’t deliver: withdrawal of the Iranians and their proxies from Syria’s border with Israel. In return, the US would withdraw from Syria, something Trump has promised publicly he would do, leaving the Kurds to cut a deal with Assad. This is an idea Netanyahu is pushing, along with relieving Russia from US and European sanctions.
The next shoe to drop will be Ukraine. Trump believes Crimea rightfully belongs to Russia, since people speak Russian there. Never mind that many people throughout Ukraine speak Russian, as well as Ukrainian. He may accept the Russian annexation, thereby putting a big smile on Putin’s face and completing an extraordinary week for the Russian president: NATO undermined, the UK/US relationship weakened, Syria won, and Crimea absorbed. What else could go right?
The pattern is clear: Trump is Putin’s pet president doing precisely what Moscow wants. The only real question is why.
I have favored the view that money is the main reason. Trump’s real estate empire, about which he cares more than anything else, is heavily dependent on Russian investment and purchases of condos. Putin could turn off the flow of rubles in an instant. No wealthy Russian would buck the president, who gets to decide which oligarchs prosper and which don’t. Trump’s finances wouldn’t survive a month without Moscow’s support.
But it is also possible that Trump himself was recruited long ago. He hired people for his campaign who were Russian intelligence assets. Special Counsel Mueller has already indicted some of them. Trump’s visit to Moscow in the late 1980s, when it was still the capital of the Soviet Union, has raised questions. The Republican attempt yesterday in Congress to discredit the former chief of FBI counter-intelligence operations, Peter Strzok, suggests how desperate they are to stymie an investigation that has already gotten to one degree of separation from Trump.
But the Congress is also beginning to react appropriately to Trump’s surrender of American interests to Putin. It has passed a strong resolution in support of NATO and against concessions to Putin on Ukraine. Republican discomfort with Trump’s “national security” tariffs on imports from Canada, Mexico, and the European Union is starting to show. The trade war with China is causing a lot of heartburn in the Middle West and other areas of the country the Republicans need to keep on their side.
But Putin is still making Trump sit and beg. He is Putin’s pet.
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Stay, but not for long
March 29 President Trump declared:
We’re coming out of Syria, like, very soon. Let the other people take care of it now. Very soon—very soon we’re coming out.
He reiterated that sentiment Tuesday. Yesterday the White House confirmed that the troops will stay, at least for now. Apart from the question of who is really commander-in-chief, and whether President Trump has any idea what he is talking about, this ambiguity (or is it vacillation?) leaves us with important questions: should the troops stay or go? What should their goals be?
The only valid purposes for staying should be US national interests, in particular vital ones. Staying only if Saudi Arabia agrees to pay–a proposition the President has floated–violates this first principle. Foreign governments do sometimes pay part of the costs of deployed American forces, but only when the deployment (to Japan, South Korea, Germany, Italy, or Qatar for example) meets the criterion of being in the US national interest. American troops should not be for sale.
What American interests can be served by extending the US presence in Syria, now that the Islamic State has lost almost all of the territory under its control? I think there are three possibilities:
- Prevent resurgence of ISIS, which will continue its insurgency despite its loss of territory.
- Counter Iran’s presence and influence.
- Prevent allied Syrian Kurdish forces from aiding the insurgency inside Turkey.*
A continuing American presence in eastern Syria is not going to bring down President Assad or otherwise hinder his depredation of the Syrian people. It will not expel the Iranians or the Russians. The US hasn’t even been willing to counter Assad’s use of chemical weapons against civilians, never mind the extensive bombing of civilian targets and abuse of those who surrender to “reconciliation” agreements.
Weighing against the continued US presence are many factors: the risks to the small numbers of Americans (2000 or so) spread out over the large territory east of the Euphrates, the dubious legality and legitimacy of the operation (especially once ISIS has been pulverized), the likelihood that our presence will lead to mission creep in either military or civilian directions, and the costs and domestic political sustainability of the operation. The US troops have shown they are capable of defending themselves, having fended off a Russian mercenary attack weeks ago. But sooner or later, dozens or maybe hundreds will be killed or wounded. How long will an impatient president who promised to bring American troops home from the Middle East persist in keeping them there once that happens?
The troops will at some point be withdrawn. The question is what conditions can be created to allow that to happen without imperiling vital US interests.
First and foremost is some minimal stabilization before withdrawal, so that local people will have the means and the will to resist any ISIS resurgence. That is what is going on now. The key is not physical reconstruction, which will take years, but rather clearing mines and rubble as well as establishing a modicum of legitimate governance by and for local people. Here is a lengthy discussion of the issues involved in stabilization of both Iraq and Syria Monday at USIP:
If President Trump, as some have suggested, was talking about Saudi money for the stabilization process, that would make a whole lot more sense than selling our troop presence.
Countering Iran’s presence and influence is not going to be easy. They are on the winning side in this war. They don’t really have to come through the part of Syria US and allied forces control to be present and influential there. It seems to me the best we can do is try to negotiate withdrawal of the Shia militia forces Iran has deployed inside Syria, in exchange for US withdrawal of its ground forces. It might not work of course, especially as the President has already tipped them off as to what he wants. I thought he said he wasn’t going to do stupid things like that. But it might be worth a try.
It will be difficult, to say the least, to sever the tie between the Syrian Kurdish forces (PYD) with which the US has collaborated to defeat ISIS and the Kurds rebelling inside Turkey (PKK). The two organizations are closely tied ideologically and loyal to the same leader. But if the US wants to restore its relations with NATO ally Turkey, that is what it needs to try to do. The first step should be getting the PYD out of Manbij, a mostly Arab town west of the Euphrates, as Vice President Biden promised in the summer of 2016. The US Central Command is dead set against fulfilling that commitment, as it doesn’t want to abandon its Kurdish allies. But that’s why we have civilian control of the military.
The Turks should be able to live with PYD, or at least Kurdish, dominance of the area east of the Euphrates, but the Kurds as well as their Arab allies south will need at least continuation of US air support to prevent the area east of the Euphrates from falling to a revived extremist group, the Syrian armed forces, or Shia militias. As a former colleague pointed out to me yesterday, that is precisely what the US did in Iraq for more than a decade: it enforced a no-fly zone that effectively protected Iraqi Kurdistan from Saddam Hussein. During that time, Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds found a modus vivendi, at least until the Kurdistan referendum last year. The air support would most effectively be provided from Turkey, as it is today. Turkey would expect to receive from the PYD at the very least a verifiable pledge of non-assistance to the PKK, as well as assurances about allowing pluralism in their part of Syria.
The good options in Syria evaporated long ago. The best the US can do now is use its position there to meet limited but important national interests that will endure past the troops withdrawal. That will mean staying, but not for long.
*For those keeping score, here are Secretary of State Tillerson’s deadletter objectives:
1) ISIS and al-Qaeda must suffer an “enduring defeat” and Syria must never again become a platform for transnational terror organization that targets U.S. citizens;
2) Syria’s seven year-long civil war must draw to a close through a brokered diplomatic settlement;
3) Iran’s influence in Syria must be “diminished” and its “dreams of a northern arch…denied;”
4) The conditions should be created to allow Syrian refugees and internally displaced people to return to their homes;
5) Syria must be “free” of weapons of mass destruction.
I’ve watered down 1), eliminated 2), kept much of 3), eliminated 4) eliminated 5), and added Turkey and the Kurds.
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Peace picks, March 5 – March 11
- Oil in Iraq: Pathways to Enabling Better Governance | Monday, March 5 | 2:00pm – 3:30pm | Middle East Institute | Register here |
Despite setbacks from the war against ISIS, Iraq remains the world’s fourth largest producer of oil, second only to Saudi Arabia among OPEC states. However, the administration of this vital natural resource has been plagued by corruption and disputes over how revenues should be allocated to promote equitable economic growth. How can Iraq harness oil revenue to strengthen institutions, grow the economy, and empower Iraqis to rebuild their society? How are relations between Baghdad and Erbil and other sectarian tensions complicated by the “resource curse,” and what can be done to overcome it? The Middle East Institute is pleased to host a panel discussion examining options and priorities for improving governance in Iraq, featuring Erin Banco (investigative reporter for the Star-Ledger and NJ.com), Alan Eyre (US Department of State), Omar Al-Nidawi (Gryphon Partners), and Jean Francois Seznec (Scholar, MEI). The panel will be moderated by Randa Slim (Director of Program on Conflict Resolution and Track II Dialogues, MEI). ___________________________________________________________
- Preventing Conflict to Create Pathways for Peace | Tuesday, March 6 | 9:00am – 10:30am | United States Institute of Peace | Register here |
Violent conflict today is surging after decades of relative decline. Direct deaths in war, refugee numbers, military spending, and terrorist incidents have all reached historic highs in recent years. Today, the consequences of failing to act together are alarmingly evident, and the call for urgent action has perhaps never been clearer. To answer this call, the United Nations and the World Bank Group are launching their joint study, “Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict” to share how defense, diplomacy, and development should work together to successfully keep conflict from becoming violent. Join the U.S. Institute of Peace to hear from experts on how the international community can promote better policies and programs to pave the way forward to peace. Featuring Oscar Fernandez-Taranco (Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support, United Nations), Franck Bousquet (Senior Director, Fragility, Conflict & Violence, World Bank), Deqa Hagi Yusuf (Minister of Women and Human Rights Development, Somalia), and Nancy Lindborg (President, U.S. Institute of Peace), among others.
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- Performance and Prospects for Russia’s Economy | Tuesday, March 6 | 2:00pm – 3:30pm | Atlantic Council | Register here |
After a difficult transition to a market-based system in the 1990s, the Russian economy experienced rapid growth into the 2000s. However, in the last few years, falling gas prices, Western sanctions and diminishing foreign investments, and a continued lack of effective structural reforms have taken a toll on the economy and the citizens of the Russian Federation. The Russian economy has been buffeted by increasing re-nationalization of enterprises and international sanctions. It remains energy-focused, and highly oligarchical. Although recovering slightly, the trajectory and sustainability of the Russian economic model is under intense scrutiny. The possibility of additional sanctions just adds to the uncertainty. This panel, entitled “Performance and Prospects for Russia’s Economy,” will explore the development of Russia’s economy, including its place in the international economic system, and its prospects for the next decade. Featuring Dr. Sergey Aleksashenko (senior Fellow, Global Economy and Development, Brookings Institution), Dr. Anders Åslund (Senior Fellow, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council), Elizaveta Osetinskaya (Fellow, University of California, Berkeley). Ambassador Clifford Bond (Former Ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Coordinator for Assistance to Europe and Eurasia, US Department of State) will moderate the discussion.
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- Governor Geraldo Alckmin of São Paulo on Brazil’s Economic and Political Outlook in an Unpredictable Election Year | Wednesday, March 7 | 9:30am – 12:00pm | Wilson Center | Register here |
Elected four times to lead São Paulo, Brazil’s richest and most influential state, Governor Geraldo Alckmin is widely expected to run in October’s presidential election. This will be a second attempt to reach the Palácio do Planalto for Alckmin, who lost to President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in 2006. Despite his low polling numbers—and widespread rejection of establishment politicians—seasoned political analysts believe the governor could emerge as a strong centrist candidate backed by the middle class and the business community, and someone who—if he wins—could build the alliances needed to govern in Brazil’s coalitional political system. However, the race is highly unpredictable and will likely remain so for months. Join the Wilson Center for a conversation with Governor Geraldo Alckmin; speakers and panelists include Paulo Sotero (Director, Brazil Institute), Cassia Carvalho (Executive Director, Brazil-U.S. Business Council), and Roberto Simon (Director, FTI Consulting), among others.
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- The Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership: Implications for Global Trade | Wednesday, March 7 | 2:00pm – 5:00pm | Wilson Center | Register here |
On March 8, representatives of eleven countries will meet in Chile to sign the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), creating a massive free trade bloc connecting 500 million people and economies with a combined GDP of over $10 trillion. Signatories include Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. The current agreement includes several major economies that will have a profound influence on the future of global trade and investment. The United States withdrew from negotiations in January 2017. Join the Wilson Center to discuss the economic impact of the agreement for member and non-member countries and the future of integration of the Asia-Pacific region and the Western Hemisphere. Featuring the Honorable Carlos Pareja (Ambassador to the United States, Peru), the Honorable Ashok Kumar Mirpuri (Ambassador to the United States, Singapore), and Jeffrey J. Schott (Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics), among others.
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- Regional Cooperation in the Middle East: The Baghdad Declaration | Wednesday, March 7 | 2:30pm – 4:00pm | Middle East Institute | Register here |
Since 2014, the Middle East Institute has convened the Middle East Dialogue, a Track 1.5 initiative involving current and former officials and senior experts from across the Middle East as well as from China, Europe, Russia and the United States. These meetings focus on the conflicts in Syria and Iraq, and on the principles and architecture of a new regional cooperation framework in the Middle East. At the Dialogue’s most recent meeting in Baghdad, the group issued a consensus document outlining Good Neighborhood Principles for the Middle East. Is a new regional cooperation framework possible in today’s Middle East? What are the principles and institutional architecture that would underpin this framework? What are the obstacles? What are realistic interim confidence-building measures? How can the international community assist in moving this process forward? MEI is pleased to host a panel discussion involving participants from the Middle East Dialogue. Featuring Naufel Alhassan (Deputy Chief of Staff to the Prime Minister of Iraq), Abdallah Al-Dardari (Senior Advisor on Reconstruction in the MENA, World Bank), and Paul Salem (Senior Vice President for Policy Research and Programs, MEI). Randa Slim (Director of Program on Conflict Resolution and Track II Dialogues, MEI) will moderate.
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- How Film Captures the Roles of Women in War and Peace | Thursday, March 8 | 9:30am – 12:00pm | United States Institute of Peace | Register here |
Ten years ago, the film Pray the Devil Back to Hell premiered at the Tribeca Film Festival, where it won the award for Best Documentary for its powerful depiction of the nonviolent women’s movement that helped bring an end to Liberia’s bloody civil war. Since its release, producers and directors have taken up the challenge to tell the stories of the often-invisible lives of women in conflict. These films have brought forward women’s critical voices to the stories of war and peace, and amplified the global agenda of Women, Peace and Security. Join USIP on International Women’s Day to discuss how film has been an innovative tool for translating policy frameworks into social change. This event will bring together the worlds of film and policy to celebrate the progress that has been made in advancing women’s roles in peace and security, and spreading their stories. Featuring Abigail Disney (Filmmaker & President and CEO, Fork Films), Michelle Bekkering (Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator, USAID), and Suhad Babaa (Executive Director, Just Vision), among others.
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- Japan-Korea Relations 20 Years After the Kim-Obuchi Summit | Thursday, March 8 | 2:00pm – 7:00pm | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | Register here |
Nearly twenty years ago, the leaders of Japan and South Korea raised hopes for “a new Japan-Korea partnership for the twenty-first century,” backed by an action plan to foster broader cooperation and closer people-to-people ties. Although progress has been made, disagreements over history have stymied the desired transformation in their relationship, even as North Korean nuclear threats grow. This half-day conference—featuring scholars and former officials of that time from Japan, South Korea, and the United States—combines a look back with a look ahead, reflecting on what types of polices and initiatives have succeeded or failed since 1998 and why. Speakers and panelists include Douglas H. Paal (Vice President for Studies, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), Carol Gluck (George Sansom Professor of History, Columbia University), and James Zumwalt (CEO, Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA), among others.
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- US-Sudan Relations: What’s Next? | Thursday, March 8 | 2:30pm – 4:00pm | Atlantic Council | Register here |
Following the Trump administration’s October 2017 decision to lift most economic sanctions against Sudan, the Atlantic Council sent task force members to Sudan in January 2018—the third delegation in two years—to conduct research in three critical, related areas: governance and political reform; economic reform and impediments to investment; and prospects for greater cultural engagement. The resulting issue briefs put forward recommendations for the United States and Sudan to continue their positive engagement in a way that serves US interests but also supports peace, security, and inclusive governance for the Sudanese people. Featuring Dr. J. Peter Pham (Vice President for Research and Regional Initiatives, Atlantic Council), Ambassador Tim Carney (Former US Ambassador to Sudan), and Dr. Jeffrey Herbst (Co-Author, Making Africa Work & former CEO of the Newseum), among others. Kelsey Lilley (Associate Director, Africa Center, Atlantic Council) will moderate the discussion.
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- Anti-Corruption and the Fight for Democracy in Russia | Friday, March 9 | 10:00am – 11:30am | Wilson Center (co-organized with Freedom House) | Register here |
Russian activists Nikita Kulachenkov and Mikhail Maglov will talk about their work exposing corruption in Russia from abroad and the impact that these investigations have on the Kremlin’s legitimacy. They will also discuss how illicit financial flows from Russia, including real state and luxury goods, reach the West and what can be done to stop them. Featuring Charles Davidson (Executive Director of the Kleptocracy Initiative, Hudson Institute), Nikita Kulachenkov (Forensic Investigator, Anti-Corruption Foundation), and Mikhail Maglov (Former Activist of “Solidarnost”).
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Serious diplomacy needed
Turkish President Erdogan is wrong about many things: the post-coup-attempt crackdown, his flirtation with Russia, his inattention to widespread corruption, and his effort to rule Turkey without a serious opposition. Turkey has clearly moved away from the promising European path he started out on and turned instead to its Middle Eastern roots, which are much less salubrious for both its citizens and its leadership. Nationalism and despotism have bad records, even if they build nice palaces. Freedom and respect for minority rights has a far better record, even if they don’t always win elections.
That said, Erdogan is not wrong about everything. His concern about the Kurdish insurgency inside Turkey, and the assistance it gets from Syria, is well-founded. The insurgency’s main protagonists, the PKK and its PYD Syrian allies, have long frustrated the Turkish security forces and would be glad to do it again if given an opportunity. This is no peaceful uprising. The PKK is well-armed and kills lots of people. The US, as well as Turkey and the European Union, regard it as a terrorist group.
The United States has equipped and trained the PYD fighters (known as the YPG) to fight the Islamic State inside Syria, where the Kurds have been remarkably successful with American air, intelligence, logistic and other support. That fight, however, is now largely completed. The task now is to stabilize the areas taken from the Islamic State, many of which are predominantly Arab, not Kurdish. One is a particular bone of contention with Turkey: Manbij, which lies west of the Euphrates river less than 25 miles south of the Turkish border.
Secretary of State Tillerson spent the better part of the past two days talking with the Turks. He now has likely heard more about Manbij than he would want to remember, as did National Security Adviser McMaster on a recent visit. Ankara wants the Kurds out of Manbij, a mostly Arab town of about 100,000 before the war. That is what Vice President Biden promised the Turks in the summer of 2016. He said the Kurds would move east of the Euphrates and stay there, thus preventing them from moving westward to link up Afrin, a majority Kurdish enclave, with the rest of what the Kurds call Rojava, the PYD-dominated parastate that extends along the Turkish order from the Euphrates eastward.
The Turkish view is that the US made a commitment on Manbij to a NATO ally that has to be fulfilled. The American generals, to whom the President has delegated so much authority, aren’t interested in pushing too hard on their Syrian Kurdish friends, who want to control as much of Turkey’s southern border as possible. To add insult to injury, some of those Kurdish friends have been moving westward through Syrian government controlled territory to confront the Turkish forces in Afrin.
It is difficult for Americans to see Erdogan in a positive light these days, but restoring good relations with Turkey should now be a priority. Quite apart from any promises made about Manbij, the Turks are allowing the Americans to use their bases from which to fly the combat support they need in eastern Syria, including the planes that last week blunted an Iranian/Russian/Syrian attack on US forces and their Kurdish friends. Loss of access, or even new limitations on US use of Turkish bases, could change the military situation in eastern Syria dramatically.
Can we solve the Kurdish puzzle in a way that meets Turkey’s needs? We should certainly try, by getting the Syrian Kurds to leave Manbij, ending the flow of their fighters to Afrin, and extracting from them a serious commitment not to support attacks inside Turkey. The Turks would have to pitch in by ending their offensive in Afrin, which isn’t going well, re-establishing the ceasefire with the PKK, and restarting peace talks.
That’s a tall order. Tillerson needs to stop gutting the State Department and get busy trying to deliver some serious diplomatic results.
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