Tag: Kuwait
The gulf with the Gulf
Yesterday was Gulf day. I spent part of the morning reading Christopher Davidson, who thinks the Gulf monarchies are headed for collapse due to internal challenges, their need for Western support, Iran’s growing power and their own disunity. Then I turned to Greg Gause, who attributes their resilience to the oil-greased coalitions and external networks they have created to support their rule. He predicts their survival.
At lunch I ambled across the way to CSIS’s new mansion to hear Abdullah al Shayji, chair of political science at Kuwait University and unofficial Gulf spokeperson, who was much exorcised over America’s response to Iran’s “charm offensive,” which he said could not have come at a worse time. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was already at odds with the US. The Gulf was not warned or consulted about the phone call between Iranian President Rouhani and President Obama. Saudi Arabia’s refusal to occupy the UN Security Council seat it fought hard to get was a signal of displeasure. The divergences between the GCC and the US range across the Middle East: Syria, Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen, Iraq and Palestine, in addition to Iran.
On top of this, US oil and gas production is increasing. China is now a bigger oil importer than the US and gets a lot more of its supplies from the Gulf. Washington is increasingly seen as dysfunctional because of its partisan bickering. Its budget problems seem insoluble. American credibility is declining. The Gulf views the US as unreliable. Read more
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Tilting at pyramids
Those who follow Egypt these days are discombobulated. Its military-backed government is forging ahead to exclude the Muslim Brotherhood from existence, never mind political participation. It wants to make all Islamist parties illegal. The Brotherhood is uncompromising. Former revolutionaries are touting what looked like a coup as “popular impeachment.” Secular democrats who don’t buy that are under increasing pressure.
The frequent answer to these developments is to cut off American military aid, sending a signal to the Egyptian military that the US will not tolerate its excesses and to the broader Islamic world that Washington is not willing to sacrifice democracy on the alter of security. Many of my friends in Washington believe we should have done this long ago, though they fail to put forward a serious plan for what happens next.
The latest call for an aid cut-off is more nuanced, long-term and sophisticated. Shadi Hamid and Peter Mandaville recognize that unilateral US action in the absence of a broader political and diplomatic strategy will not work. They argue instead that the US should prioritize democracy rather than security: Read more
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Leverage without a fulcrum
The International Peace Institute published this piece today on its Global Observatory under the title “With Democracy, Security at Stake in Egypt, How Should the West Respond?”:
Diplomatic efforts to de-escalate the confrontation in Egypt have so far failed. The refusal of coup leader Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, now the defense minister, to go along with diplomatic de-escalation, and the excessive force used by security agencies signal that they do not aim at repressing only the Muslim Brotherhood. The Egyptian army is trying to frighten the general population and restore autocratic rule to an Egypt that has tasted freedom and expressed itself repeatedly at the ballot box since 2011.
The US and Europe want to get Egypt back on a more orderly democratic path. This entails restraining the Egyptian security forces, maintaining relative openness, and moving towards an inclusive polity with Islamist, and, if possible, Muslim Brotherhood, participation. It also means restoring a modicum of order and stability so that ordinary Egyptians can go about their business without fear of violence or intimidation.
The security forces are continuing their violent crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, which is pledging to continue its protests against the July 3 military takeover. Some Islamists are resisting with arms. About 1,000 people have been killed. What can the United States and the international community do to mitigate the situation?
Analysis
The civilian government the Egyptian army installed after the coup has pledged an amended constitution by the end of the year, to be approved in a referendum and elections early next year. This is a fast timeline. What can the international community do to try to ensure it is met?
The United States has already postponed delivery of F16s to Egypt and canceled joint military exercises scheduled for the fall to protest General Sisi’s crackdown. Inevitably the question of America’s $1.5 billion in aid to Egypt will now arise in Washington. It would make sense to refocus the civilian assistance of about $250 million tightly on democratic objectives. Those most concerned with getting Egypt back on a democratic path are recommending suspension of the military portion ($1.2 billion).
This will be opposed by those more concerned with security issues, including maintenance of the peace treaty with Israel. A proposal in the US Senate to redirect all Egyptian aid to domestic American priorities was defeated last month by a wide margin (86-13), but that was before the worst of the crackdown. The margin would likely be much closer next month.
Even if the US Congress or the Administration acts to suspend military aid to Egypt, the financial impact will not be immediate. This year’s tranche has already been transferred. It will be the better part of another year before money can be blocked. More weapons scheduled for delivery can be delayed, but American industry will spend the year lobbying hard against a funding cut-off, as much of the money is actually spent on US contractors who supply the Egyptian military with materiel and services.
Europe provides much more assistance to Egypt than the United States. Its 5 billion euro (more than $6 billion) mainly economic package is now under review. This was intended to support the transition to democracy, which is now in doubt. Europeans concerned with their own economic problems may well see suspension of aid to Egypt as an opportunity.
The international financial institutions are another important part of the picture. Egypt has been negotiating for many months a $4.8 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund. The US and Europe can block or delay that loan.
But both Europe and the United States need to consider the broader international context in deciding what to do about bilateral and IMF assistance. They are not the only players on the world stage. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait have already pledged $12 billion, dwarfing both the American and European assistance packages. Russia will likely try to take advantage of any opening and provide military aid if the Americans suspend theirs.
Egypt clearly has alternatives to Western assistance, even if the Gulf states are notoriously slow and unreliable, and the Russians significantly less attractive to a military that has been getting advanced American weapons. If they want to see a democratic outcome in Egypt, the Americans and Europeans will need to convince the Gulf states—no paragons of democracy—to back the timeline for a return to democratic governance.
Widening the aperture farther, the Arab and Muslim worlds are watching what the international community does about Egypt. Will it insist on a return to a democratic path and an inclusive polity that allows Islamist participation on the timeline that Egypt itself has defined? Or will it settle for delay or a security solution that allows the army to remain the arbiter of Egypt’s fate? A lot depends on the skillful use of diplomatic and assistance leverage in a context where there are many players with diverse and even conflicting objectives.
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Peace picks August 5-9
Summer doldrums, but some good pickings:
1. Dissecting the Pentagon’s Strategic Choices and Management Review, Brookings Institution, Tuesday, August 6, 2013 / 10:00 AM – 11:30 AM
Venue: Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave, NW, Washington, D.C. 20036
Speakers: Marvin Kalb, Michael E. O’hanlon, Mackenzie Eaglen
Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel recently summarized the results of his Strategic Choices and Management Review (SCMR), an internal Pentagon process designed to assist the Department of Defense as it plans for a future period of uncertain and significantly constrained defense spending. Deputy Secretary Ashton Carter also provided Congressional testimony on the subject. The review explored how the Pentagon might deal with at least two possible budget scenarios: the president’s own long-term plan, which calls for another $150 billion in ten-year defense savings beyond those mandated initially in the 2011 Budget Control Act, and the possibility that sequestration will stay in effect for a decade, requiring a full $500 billion in additional defense cuts relative to the same baseline.
On August 6, the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence at Brookings will host a discussion on the usefulness of the SCMR as an analytical product which clarifies the kinds of changes that will be needed in the future, while also examining plans within it that may not be prudent. Panelists, among others, will include Mackenzie Eaglen of the American Enterprise Institute and Brookings Senior Fellow Michael O’Hanlon, author of Healing the Wounded Giant: Maintaining Military Preeminence While Cutting the Defense Budget (Brookings, 2013). Marvin Kalb, nonresident senior fellow at Brookings, will moderate the event.
After discussion, the panelists will take audience questions.
Register for the event here:
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“Il potere logora chi non ce l’ha”
As I am about to risk denunciation for drawing unreasonable parallels, let me state up front that Turkey is not Egypt, Egypt is not Libya, Libya is not Tunisia, Tunisia is not Syria, Syria is not Yemen, Yemen is not Morocco or Kuwait. If there is one thing we’ve learned from the Arab awakenings, it is that each finds its own course within a particular historical and cultural tradition. Distinct political, economic, social and religious conditions are like the soil and rocks through which a river finds its way to the sea. It is difficult to predict the water’s course as gravity pulls it in the inevitable direction.
That said, it seems to me we are seeing in the Middle East a common factor, perhaps a bit like the granite that forces water to find another difficult-to-predict direction. That common factor is the difficulty all of the “democratically elected” leaders are having in adjusting to politics with an opposition. Tunisia is struggling with a Salafist opposition that is stronger than many expected. Islamist militias in Libya have forced its parliament into a harder line on purging Qaddafi-era officials than its leadership found comfortable. Egypt is facing a summer of discontent as President Morsi runs into criticism and street demonstrations by his erstwhile non-Islamist allies.
Now it is Turkey’s turn, where protest against destruction of a park in Taksim square has turned into a much broader challenge because of overreaction from the security forces and Prime Minister Erdogan’s arrogant response. Now the theme is “everywhere is Taksim, resistance is everywhere.” I hardly need mention that in Syria Asad and his security forces managed by overreaction to turn a few teenage graffiti artists into a civil war.
Despite the differences in context, there is a common theme here: the inability of rulers, even democratically elected ones, to govern in an inclusive way that provides opposition with a legitimate role. The flip side of the coin is the inability of opposition forces to figure out how to influence those who govern them without resorting to violence, disruption and rebellion. There is an exception to the rule, but a limited one. Yemen, of all places, is proceeding with a national dialogue that appears for the moment serious, though it has failed to include the southern secessionists and may eventually fail on that score.
Widening our aperture a bit, I would submit that we are seeing something similar in Iraq, where Prime Minister Maliki has managed to keep a few Sunni elites in the tent but seems to have driven large numbers in Anbar and Ninewa into an increasingly disruptive opposition that extremists are exploiting to challenge the security forces and may lead to further division of the state. In Bahrain, the monarchy and its opposition have driven each other into mutual polarization. Only in Morocco, where the king has tried to get ahead of the reform curve, and in Kuwait, where parliament plays a modestly more serious role than in most other Arab monarchies, have we seen the opposition developing as a possible alternative governing elite: loyal but with its own program and leadership cadres.
So the common problem I see is the failure to develop in many places an opposition that is serious about presenting a governing alternative. In dictatorships of course the regimes don’t want such a thing to happen and do everything they can to prevent it. But even in newish democracies that instinct remains. And opposition behavior all too often confirms that there is no viable alternative, or that there are many, no one of which has enough political omph to merit gaining power in a relatively free and fair election. Knowing this, fragmented oppositions do little to gain credibility as governing forces but focus instead on gaining adherents and influence through street demonstrations.
It will take time to get past this stage of things. Maybe a decade. It is not easy to turn a street movement, even a successful one, into a political force with real governing potential. In Giulio Andreotti’s immortal words, “il potere logora chi non ce l’ha.” Power wears out those who haven’t got it.
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George W. Bush’s playbook
I can do no better in summing up Mitt Romney’s foreign policy speech today than he does himself in the penultimate sentence:
The 21st century can and must be an American century. It began with terror, war, and economic calamity. It is our duty to steer it onto the path of freedom, peace, and prosperity.
Here’s the problem: the terror, war and economic calamity Romney refers to occurred not on Barack Obama’s watch, but on George W. Bush’s. And Governor Romney’s foreign policy prescriptions, like many of his domestic policy prescriptions, are drawn from George W. Bush’s playbook.
The few innovations in Romney’s speech at Virginia Military Institute today are hardly worth mentioning. He wants to see the Syrian revolutionaries get more arms, in particular anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons, but he fails to say how he will prevent these from being used against us, except to say that those who receive them will have to share our values. That should fix everything in the arms bazaars of the Middle East.
He says he will support a two-state solution for peace between Palestine and Israel. Nice to see him return to the mainstream from the extremist wings of Israeli and American politics, which is where he was during the “47%” fund-raising dinner in Florida when he suggested we would kick the can down the road and maybe skip the two-state solution altogether. Trouble is, the people he pitched that line to are supporting his campaign with fat checks. He says there will be no daylight between America and Israel, which is code for saying that the Jewish settlements will continue to expand, since that is what Netanyahu’s Israel wants. I fail to understand an American presidential candidate who outsources U.S. policy on the Palestinians to Israel.
In Libya he’ll track down the killers of our personnel, which is exactly what Obama promises to do. I’d just be curious how those 15 Navy ships he plans to build each year will help in the effort.
He pledges to condition aid to Egypt but makes the conditions both vague and easy to meet: build democratic institutions and maintain the peace treaty with Israel. There are lots of problems with President Morsy’s Egypt, but you won’t be able to hang him for either of those offenses, yet.
In Afghanistan, he calls the withdrawal the president has pledged a retreat but makes it clear he is not proposing anything very different.
Then there is this on foreign assistance:
I will make further reforms to our foreign assistance to create incentives for good governance, free enterprise, and greater trade, in the Middle East and beyond. I will organize all assistance efforts in the greater Middle East under one official with responsibility and accountability to prioritize efforts and produce results. I will rally our friends and allies to match our generosity with theirs.
The trouble here is that the Ryan budget guts the foreign affairs budget, including foreign assistance. There won’t be any American generosity to be matched with theirs if Romney is elected. This is where Romney departs definitively from Obama and shows his reliance on George W.’s playbook.
I hasten to add that I’d be all for organizing our assistance efforts in the greater Middle East under one official. That would be a good idea.
One last issue: with all this overload of American values as the basis for our foreign policy, I’m curious what Romney plans to do about Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, Kuwait, Jordan, Morocco and other less than fully democratic friends in the region? They get no mention in this speech, but of course they really can’t be mentioned in a speech that gives unequivocal backing to both our friends and our values. What would Romney do when there is a choice between the two? Keep silent would be a good guess.
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