Tag: Latin America
Nothing new
President Obama said a lot more about foreign policy in last night’s State of the Union message than many of us expected. But did he say anything new?
His first entry point to international affairs was notable: he got there via exports and trade, pivoting quickly to TTP, the Trans-Pacific Partnership and TTIP, the Trade and Investment Partnership with Europe. Though he didn’t name them, that’s what he was referring to when he appealed for Congress to provide him with what is known as trade promotion authority to negotiate deals with Asia and Europe that are “not only free, but fair.” Nothing new here, just an interesting elevation of economic diplomacy to pride of place. Ditto the plea to close tax loopholes that encourage American companies to keep their profits abroad.
But after a detour to the internet and scientific research, the President was soon back on the more familiar territory of national security. He plugged smart leadership that builds coalitions and combines diplomacy and military power. He wants others to do more of the fighting. But there was little or no indication of how collapsed states like Syria, Yemen and Libya might be governed in the future.
Leaving it to their own devices hasn’t worked out well, but this is a president who (like all his predecessors) doesn’t want to do nationbuilding abroad and who (unlike many of his predecessors) has been disciplined enough to resist it. He talks non-military means but uses force frequently and says he wants an authorization from Congress to use it against the Islamic State, which he is doing anyway.
Russia is isolated and its economy in tatters, the President claimed, but it also holds on to Crimea and a large part of Donbas in southeastern Ukraine. He offered no new moves to counter Putin but rather “steady, persistent resolve.” On Cuba, the Administration has already begun to restore diplomatic ties. The President reiterated that he wants Congress to end the embargo, which isn’t in the cards unless Raul Castro gets converted to multi-party democracy in his dotage.
Iran is the big issue. The President naturally vaunted the interim Joint Plan of Action and hopes for a comprehensive one by the end of June. He promised to veto any new sanctions, because they would destroy the international coalition negotiating with Tehran and ruin chances for a peaceful settlement. All options are on the table, the President said, but America will go to war only as a last resort. Nothing new in that either, though I believe he would while many of my colleagues think not.
Trolling on, the President did cybersecurity, Ebola, Asia-Pacific, climate change and values (as in democracy and human rights), stopping briefly at Gitmo and electronic surveillance along the way. Nothing new here either, just more of that steady, persistent resolve.
Notable absences (but correct me if I missed something): any mention of the Israel/Palestine “peace process,” Egypt, Saudi Arabia (or the Gulf), India (where the President will visit starting Sunday), Latin America (other than Cuba), North Korea.
What does it all add up to? It is a foreign policy of bits and pieces, with themes of retrenchment, reduced reliance on US military power (but little sign of increased diplomatic potency), prevention of new threats and support for American values woven in. The President continues to resist pronouncing a doctrine of his own but wants to be seen as a moderate well within the broad parameters of American internationalism. He is wishing to get bipartisan action from Congress on a few things: trade promotion authority, the authorization to use force, dismantling the Cuba embargo, closing Guantanamo. But none of this is new ground.
He is also prepared to forge ahead on his own. As I’ve noted before, this lame duck knows how to fly.
In case you didn’t watch it last night and have more patience than I do, here is the whole thing:
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The Cuba saga is far from over
Political responses to President Obama’s Cuba opening have been predictably partisan: most Democrats support it, most Republicans oppose it. Democrats are right that the embargo hasn’t worked, but Republicans are right that this opening will bestow some political legitimacy on an authoritarian regime. All of that is well rehearsed.
Politically, the President is likely to win this round on points. Attitudes in the Cuban American community, and in the general population, have been tilting his way for some time. Marco Rubio may nevertheless gain prominence and conservative support from blocking key aspects of the opening–like the naming of an ambassador and dismantling of the embargo–in Congress. It won’t help in Congress that Cuba continues to harbor American fugitives.
There is still a lot of uncertainty about the political impact of what the President is doing inside Cuba. My own visit there last spring suggested that Cubans are really not sure what they want politically. Most treasure their socialist education and health systems and would like their economic plight eased, but beyond that their aspirations are far from well-articulated. That’s no surprise: they have lived in a tightly controlled one-party system for a long time. Thinking about alternatives has not been encouraged.
The President’s Republican critics are correct when they say it is not clear how his diplomatic and economic opening will lead to political change in Cuba. The Castros have demonstrated that they are not fools. They wouldn’t be doing this if they thought it would bring regime change. The dissident community, which has been unable for more than 50 years to take advantage of the economic pressure the American embargo brought to bear on the Castro regime, wants Western-style human rights and democracy. While they will try to exploit the opportunity, they are not overjoyed with what President Obama has done.
How things turn out will depend on the Cuban people. The dissidents do not seem to have deep roots there, but the regime doesn’t either. The state-controlled part of Cuba’s economy is on its last legs. Government employees are paid a pittance. Lots of people already have second jobs in the more or less private sector, from which they earn 10 times and more than from their nominal government employment. The state is withering away. Its capacity to maintain the health and education systems that Cuban citizens treasure is in doubt.
The government also faces a difficult immediate issue: how to unify the two currencies the country uses. Raul Castro has promised to do this before the end of 2014. The Cuban peso, in which most government salaries are paid, is all but worthless. The CUC, a convertible currency in which most transactions are now conducted, dominates the economy. Presumably the Cuban regime hopes the opening with the US will help it garner hard currency and smooth the transition to a single currency, which will have to be called “Cuban peso” but be valued closer to the CUC. If that process goes awry, Cubans could get very unhappy with their political system very quickly.
It is not only the Cuban regime that would be at risk. The United States can ill afford an economic and political collapse in Cuba that brings another million or more Cubans to Florida. It is in our interest that the transition to democracy happen, but also that it be smooth and not disruptive. President Obama has opened a new chapter, but the saga is far from over.
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The troubles we see
This year’s Council on Foreign Relations Preventive Priorities Survey was published this morning. It annually surveys the globe for a total of 30 Tier 1, 2 and 3 priorities for the United States. Tier 1s have a high or moderate impact on US interests or a high or moderate likelihood (above 50-50). Tier 2s can have low likelihood but high impact on US interests, moderate (50-50) likelihood and moderate impact on US interests, or high likelihood and low impact on US interests. Tier 3s are all the rest. Data is crowdsourced from a gaggle of experts, including me.
We aren’t going to be telling you anything you don’t know this year, but the exercise is still instructive. The two new Tier 1 contingencies are Russian intervention in Ukraine and heightened tensions in Israel/Palestine. A new Tier 2 priority is Kurdish violence within Turkey. I don’t believe I voted for that one. Ebola made it only to Tier 3, as did political unrest in China and possible succession problems in Thailand. I had Ebola higher than that.
Not surprisingly, the top slot (high likelihood and high impact) goes to ISIS. Military confrontation in the South China Sea moved up to Tier 1. Internal instability in Pakistan moved down, as did political instability in Jordan. Six issues fell off the list: conflict in Somalia, a China/India clash, Mali, Democratic Republic of the Congo Bangladesh and conflict between Sudan and South Sudan.
Remaining in Tier 1 are a mass casualty attack on the US homeland (hard to remove that one), a serious cyberattack (that’s likely to be perennial too), a North Korea crisis, and an Israeli attack on Iran. Syria and Afghanistan remain in Tier 2 (I think I had Syria higher than that).
The Greater Middle East looms large in this list. Tier 2 is all Greater Middle East, including Libya, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Turkey and Yemen (in addition to Tier 1 priorities Israel/Iran, Syria, Afghanistan and Palestine). That makes 11 out of 30, all in the top two tiers. Saudi monarchy succession is not even mentioned. Nor is Bahrain.
Sub-Saharan Africa makes it only into Tier 3. Latin America and much of Southeast Asia escape mention.
There is a question in my mind whether the exclusively country-by-country approach of this survey makes sense. It is true of course that problems in the Middle East vary from country to country, but there are also some common threads: Islamic extremism, weak and fragile states, exclusionary governance, demographic challenges and economic failure. From a policy response perspective, it may make more sense to focus on those than to try to define “contingencies” country by country. If you really wanted to prevent some of these things from happening, you would surely have to broaden the focus beyond national borders. Russian expansionism into Russian-speaking territories on its periphery might be another more thematic way of defining contingencies.
One of the key factors in foreign policy is entirely missing from this list: domestic American politics and the difficulties it creates for a concerted posture in international affairs. Just to offer a couple of examples: failure to continue to pay Afghanistan’s security sector bills, Congressional passage of new Iran sanctions before the P5+1 negotiations are completed, or a decision by President Obama to abandon entirely support for the Syrian opposition. The survey ignores American “agency” in determining whether contingencies happen, or not. That isn’t the world I live in.
For my Balkans readers: no, you are not on the list, and you haven’t been for a long time so far as I can tell. In fact, it is hard to picture how any contingency today in the Balkans could make it even to Tier 3. That’s the good news. But it also means you should not be looking to Washington for solutions to your problems. Brussels and your own capitals are the places to start.
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Lame duck flies again
Like just about everything else in Washington today, how you feel about the President’s action on immigration depends on how you feel about the President. He has become the political touchstone for everyone.
Dislike him? You are likely to think it is a mistake for him to act without Congress, he doesn’t have or shouldn’t use the authority needed, and the Republicans in Congress should teach him a lesson by holding up confirmations or screwing with the budget, maybe even causing a government shutdown, suing the bastard or impeaching him.
Like him (as I do), you are likely to think it is a good move, both politically and administratively. We are never going to be able to deport five million people, the Congress has failed to act, and this move will solidify the Democrats’ link to the Hispanic and Asian communities. If Republicans don’t like it, they can up the ante in the next session, when they will have majorities in both houses.
So we are at loggerheads one more time. Unlike most others, I’m not prepared to bemoan that. It seems to me immigration is an important issue that should be subject to the full force of political contestation. Who is allowed into the country does determine who we are.
The outcome of the political debate is of course uncertain, but I am betting that the Republicans in Congress will up the ante. They cannot afford to have the Democrats walk off permanently with the lion’s share of Hispanic, Asian and Silicon Valley votes, as they did during the Roosevelt era with black votes.
A lot of people are going to be surprised if the Republicans turn around and offer a path to citizenship (which the President’s action will not). But it is their best political move, provided they can gather enough of their own party’s votes to back it. When you have lemons, make lemonade.
In the wake of the drubbing the Democrats got earlier this month in the mid-term election, it has become popular to pronounce their inevitable decline. I’ve been through too many cycles of that media trop with both parties to believe it likely true this time. But keeping the President and his views under wraps during the last election did nothing to help the Democrats stem the tide of Republican success. Getting him out front and firm about what he believes in and what he wants to do strikes me as more likely to fix the Democrats’ ailing fortunes.
Polarization may not produce the paralysis everyone expects. On immigration, Atlantic and Pacific trade, the response to the Islamic State, preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, engaging with China and other truly priority issues there are large measures of agreement and strong pressures for serious progress. A lame duck president is also a free-wheeling president. He did well in Asia last week. This week looks good too. The lame duck flies again.
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Nothing settled, but progress
There were several important elections yesterday in sharply divided countries. In Brazil, incumbent president Dilma Rousseff barely squeaked past her more business-oriented challenger. Secularists in Tunisia beat Ennahda, the Muslim Brotherhood affiliate, in a parliamentary contest (the presidential election is scheduled for November 23). Pro-Europe figures led in Ukraine, where voting was impossible in Crimea (now controlled by Russia) and those parts of the southeast Russophile separatists control. With that important exception, the electoral mechanisms appear to have functioned well, with relatively few allegations of fraud.
None of these elections produced a solid one-party majority. Coalitions will be required to govern. This is good. All three of these countries are polarized. Elections accentuate differences. Formation of a governing majority in parliament provides incentives for moderation and compromise. The incentives may not be strong enough. In Kosovo a winning party and its opposition coalition, which controls more seats in parliament, are quarreling over who will get first dibs on forming the government months after the election. But in the three countries that held elections yesterday there is an opportunity to overcome divisions and form governments committed to resolving difficult problems.
In Brazil, the main issue is the economy. After a long stretch of growth and investment with low inflation, Latin America’s largest country (yes, 78 million more than Mexico’s 122 million) is facing a slowdown and rising prices. Brazilian expectations have been rising with incomes. Rousseff now has to find a way to reconcile her popularity among the poor and her support for a strong social safety net with the reforms needed to reignite growth.
Tunisia is the one “Arab spring” country seemingly headed in a good and peaceful direction. It managed to write a constitution most of its Islamists and non-Islamists can live with. Now it has managed a second post-revolution parliamentary election, one that displaces the Islamists from their previously dominant position. Peaceful alternation in power based on electoral results is one of the key indicators of progress in a democratic direction. Tunisia is too small and marginal to the Arab world to be regarded as a model. But if government formation goes smoothly, it will become a lodestar in a part of the world that needs one.
The Ukrainian election cannot be expected to overcome the division between pro-Kiev and pro-Moscow forces, which are locked in a continuing political and military struggle even if currently there is a nominal ceasefire. Pro-Moscow forces in parliament will be much weaker than in the past, but some of the more extreme Ukrainian nationalists will be as well. President Poroshenko and Prime Minister Yatseniuk led parties that did well at the polls. They have no hope of winning back southeastern Ukraine by military force so long as Russian President Putin is prepared to commit Russian troops to the fight, as he did this summer and fall. They need to negotiate a new constitutional arrangement that will “make unity attractive” (in the Sudanese formulation, which failed) and win over the majority of the Russian speakers to Kiev’s legitimacy.
None of these elections settled anything. But they open up possibilities that did not exist two days ago. That’s progress.
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Peace picks June 16-20
1. Fifth Annual Conference on Turkey Monday, June 16 | 9:00 am – 5:00 pm National Press Club 529 14th Street, NW, Washington, DC. REGISTER TO ATTEND The Center for Turkish Studies at The Middle East Institute presents its Fifth Annual Conference on Turkey. This year the conference will assemble three exceptional panels to discuss the country’s tumultuous domestic politics following recent elections, the future of democracy in the country, and Turkish foreign policy. The event will feature a keynote speech by Efkan Ala, Turkey’s Minister of the Interior. SPEAKERS Amb. Robert Ford, Ibrahim Kalın, Amb. Robert Pearson, Judith Yaphe, Gönül Tol, and more.
2. What to Expect from the Al-Sisi PresidencyMonday, June 16 | 12:00 pm – 1:00 pm Woodrow Wilson Center 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi was sworn in on June 8. In his inauguration speech, al-Sisi spoke of his intent to lead Egypt in an inclusive manner. Following the resignation of the interim cabinet, al-Sisi will form a new cabinet. Marina Ottaway of the American University in Cairo and Emad Shahin of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace will share their opinions of what the future of Egypt will hold.
3. U.S. Middle East Policy and the Region’s Ongoing Battle over the Muslim Brotherhood Monday, June 16 | 12:30 pm – 2:00 pm Center for American Progress 10th floor, 1333 H St. NW, Washington, DC. REGISTER TO ATTEND In the three years since popular uprisings swept across the Middle East, the status of the Muslim Brotherhood has become a deep point of contention among regional states. Key countries in the Middle East and North Africa are sharply divided over the status of the Muslim Brotherhood and political Islam. During this time, U.S. policy has been hesitant as the United States has sought to define its position in reaction to both the uprisings themselves and the new era of competition among regional states they produced. The uneven U.S. responses to the Arab uprisings and the regional competition that has been sparked offers several important lessons learned for U.S. policy in the future. SPEAKERS Peter Mandaville, Professor, George Mason University, Haroon Ullah, State Department Policy Planning Staff, and Brian Katulis, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress.
4. Transparency, Oversight and Accountability in the UN System: Problems and How to Fix Them Monday, June 16 | 12:00 pm – 1:30 pm Heritage Foundation; 214 Massachusetts Ave NE, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND The Associated Press reported this year that that the UN’s Office of Internal Oversight Services failed to pursue a number of cases of corruption over the last five years. How emblematic are these incidents of the UN system? What has changed, what still needs doing, and what levers are effective in pushing reform? SPEAKERS Robert Appleton, former Chairman of the United Nations Procurement Task Force, and Special Counsel to the UN Iraqi Oil for Food investigation, Edward Patrick Flaherty, Senior Partner, Schwab Flaherty & Associates, and James Wasserstrom, Senior Advisor on Anticorruption, U.S. Embassy in Kabul.
5. How to Unwind Iran Nuclear Sanctions Monday, June 16 | 2:00 pm – 3:30 pm Atlantic Council; 1030 15th St NW, Washington, DC. REGISTER TO ATTEND With the deadline for an Iran deal fast approaching, a key element will be how to coordinate US and European sanctions relief with Iranian confidence building measures. The Atlantic Council’s Iran Task Force invites you to the launch of two papers outlining options for unwinding nuclear-related sanctions against Iran. Authors Kenneth Katzman of the Congressional Research Service and Cornelius Adebahr of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace will explore US and EU sanctions, respectively, looking at the evolution of sanctions over the past decade and the most feasible path to providing meaningful relief in the event that Iran agrees to significant curbs on its nuclear program.
6. Whistleblowers: A Critical Anti-Corruption Tool & Challenge Tuesday, June 17 | 11:45 am – 2:15 pm AU Washington College of Law; 4801 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Whistleblower laws, incentives and protections are critical to fighting corruption, but implementation in practice is a challenge. Professor Robert Vaughn, noted scholar and author of “The Successes and Failures of Whistleblower Laws” and James Wasserstrom, Anti-corruption Advisor, US Embassy Kabul Afghanistan and a whistleblower on corruption in Kosovo, will discuss best practices and pitfalls.
7. Is the US AWOL in the ‘war on drugs’ in Latin America? Tuesday, June 17 | 12:00 pm – 1:30 pm AEI; 1150 17th Street, NW Washington, DC. REGISTER TO ATTEND Mexico and Central America are struggling with rampant organized crime, fueled by US demand for illegal drugs. Central American nations are too weak or too complicit in criminality to confront the powerful, multibillion-dollar criminal enterprises that collaborate with Colombian cocaine smugglers, a Venezuelan narcostate, illegal arms smugglers, and Hezbollah to threaten the security and well-being of the Americas. Rep. Matt Salmon (R-AZ), chairman of the House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, will assess the threat to US interests and recommend policy options, and a panel of experts will discuss. SPEAKERS Jerry Brewer Sr., Criminal Justice International Associates LLC, Richard J. Douglas, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics, Counterproliferation, and Global Threats, and Iñigo Guevara, CENTRA Global Access.
8. 2014 Global Peace Index: Measuring Country Risk and Opportunity Wednesday, June 18 | 9:30 am – 11:00 am Center for Strategic and International Studies; 1616 Rhode Island Ave NW, Washington, DC. REGISTER TO ATTEND What is the state of global peace in 2014? What are the risks that threaten the peacefulness of nations and communities? How can our foreign policy and aid interventions better prioritize the mitigation of risk? The 2014 Global Peace Index discussion will explore these questions, detailing recent trends in militarization, safety and security, and ongoing conflict. It will also include a presentation of a new country risk framework, which quantifies current knowledge around the structural drivers of peace and conflict to identify countries most at risk today of falls in peacefulness. SPEAKERS Gary J. Milante, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Paul B. Stares, Council on Foreign Relations, Alexandra I. Toma, Peace and Security Funders Group, Daniel Hyslop, Institute for Economics and Peace. Moderated by Robert Lamb, Center for Strategic and International Studies.
9. Assessing Threats Facing the U.S.-Korea Alliance Wednesday, June 18 | 12:00 pm – 6:00 pm Woodrow Wilson Center; 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Daniel Russel will deliver the keynote address of the second annual U.S.-Korea dialogue hosted jointly by the Wilson Center and the East Asia Foundation of Seoul. Register for this half-day conference, where opinion leaders from Korea and the United States will discuss their concerns for the future and seek ways to increase cooperation and mutual political, economic, diplomatic, and security benefits. SPEAKERS Daniel Russel, Jane Harman, Ro-Myung Gong, Thomas Fingar, Cheol-hee Park, and more.
10. Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War Thursday, June 19 | 10:00 am – 11:00 am Heritage Foundation; 214 Massachusetts Ave NE, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Pakistan’s army has dominated the state for most of its 66 years, locking the country in an enduring rivalry with India over Kashmir. To prosecute these dangerous policies, the army employs non-state actors under the security of its ever-expanding nuclear umbrella. Based on decades of the army’s own defense publications, Christine Fair’s book argues that the Pakistan military is unlikely to shift its strategy anytime soon, and thus the world must prepare for an ever more dangerous future Pakistan. Other speakers include David Sedney, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia, and Michael G. Waltz, President of Metis Solutions and former Special Advisor to Vice President Dick Cheney.
11. Mideast Shi’ites Defy Iranian Domination? Thursday, June 19 | 12:00 pm – 2:15 pm American Enterprise Institute; 1150 17th Street NW, Washington D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND Iran’s Islamic Revolution unleashed a wave of sectarianism, which has flooded the Middle East. But while many have characterized Middle Eastern Shi‘ites as under the sway of the Islamic Republic, Shi‘ites from countries like Lebanon, Bahrain, Iraq, and Azerbaijan have worked to resist Iranian influence. Join analysts from the United States and across the Middle East to discuss strategies to preserve communal independence and how the United States can successfully work with Shi‘ite communities outside Iran. This event will coincide with the release of a new report based on firsthand fieldwork in the Persian Gulf, Iraq, and Azerbaijan. SPEAKERS Abbas Kadhim, Brenda Shaffer, Michael Rubin, Ahmed Ali, Ali Alfoneh, Kenneth M. Pollack, and more.
12. How to Bring a Dictator to Justice: The Hissen Habré Trial Thursday, June 19 | 3:00 pm – 4:00 pm National Endowment for Democracy; 1025 F Street NW, Suite 800, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND From 1982 to 1990, Chad witnessed thousands of political killings under the regime of its former president, Hissen Habré. Twenty-four years after the end of his rule, litigation against Habré has finally gained critical momentum in Dakar. As a member of the international team of lawyers prosecuting the case, Delphine Djiraibe is well placed to tell the story of how Habré was brought to trial and to explore the potential impact on transitional justice in Chad. She will reflect on the legal process thus far, discuss where the trial stands today, and consider next steps in Senegal and beyond. Her presentation will be followed by comments by Dave Peterson, of the National Endowment for Democracy; the discussion will be moderated by Sally Blair of the International Forum for Democratic Studies.
13. The Solution to the Cyprus Problem: Famagusta, Energy, and Public Relations Friday, June 20 | 12:00 pm – 1:45 pm Hudson Institute; 1015 15th Street NW, 6th Floor, Washington, D.C. REGISTER TO ATTEND 2014 marks the 40th anniversary of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. Following numerous failed attempts to reach a settlement, a Joint Declaration agreed to in February has galvanized new reunification efforts. The Hudson Institute hosts an important conversation on this situation with Alexis Galanos, Mayor of the city of Famagusta and former Speaker of the Cyprus House of Representatives. As the mayor of a city in the northern, Turkish-occupied part of the island, Galanos will share his unique perspective on current and future prospects for the reunification of Cyprus. Hudson Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for American Seapower, Seth Cropsey, will moderate the discussion.
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