Tag: Latin America
Still righting the balance
These are my speaking notes for the talk I gave last night at the DC World Affairs Council on my book,
Righting the Balance (Potomac, 2013). I’ve added a bit about Ukraine, which is in part an instance of state weakness. It also illustrates the limited usefulness of conventional military instruments in meeting asymmetrical challenges, a key theme in the book. Click there on the right to order your own copy!
1. It is truly an honor to present here at the World Affairs Council. The 98 World Affairs Councils throughout this country play a key role in generating and sustaining the kind of citizen engagement in foreign policy that I think is so important in today’s increasingly interconnected world.
2. As I am going to say some harsh things about the State Department and USAID, and even suggest they be abolished in favor of a single Foreign Office, I would like to emphasize from the first that I have enormous respect for the Foreign Service and the devotion of its officers to pursuing America’s interests abroad. I feel the same way about the US military.
3. But I don’t think the Foreign Service is well served by the institutions that hire, pay and deploy our diplomats and aid workers. And I don’t think our military should be called upon to make up for civilian deficiencies.
4. My book, Righting the Balance, is aimed at correcting those imbalances. But it does not start there.
5. It starts with the sweep of American history, which has given our military a leading role in America’s foreign affairs since at least the French and Indian war.
6. Americans think of their country as a peaceful one, but in fact we have had troops deployed in conflict zones for more than a quarter of our history—not even counting wars against native Americans and pirates—and every year since the fall of the Berlin Wall.
7. With each of those wars, we improved our technology and expanded our reach, becoming by the end of the 20th century the world’s only remaining superpower.
8. We have a strong, well-exercised military arm for projecting power. It is so strong that it is reaching a point of diminishing returns: every additional dollar buys miniscule improvement.
9. But our civilian capacities are more limited. This was glaringly apparent in Iraq and Afghanistan, where State and AID struggled, and all too often failed, to meet the requirements.
10. It has also been glaringly apparent during the Arab uprisings, which not only caught our diplomats by surprise but left them puzzled about what to do.
11. These failures are more important than ever before. The enemies who cause us problems today are not often states: Saddam Hussein’s Iraq fell quickly, as did the Taliban government in Afghanistan.
12. We won the wars. We lost the peace.
13. The main threats to America today come not from other strong states but from non-state actors who find haven and support in fragile, weak and collapsing states.
14. Even in Ukraine, the Russians are not using the full weight of their armed forces but rather relying on disruption in challenging the legitimacy of Kiev’s government and its control over territory in the east and south.
15. National security, always more than a military mission, now requires conflict prevention and state-building capacities that are sorely lacking in both State and AID. They have scrambled hard to meet the needs in Bosnia, Kosovo, South Sudan, Iraq and Afghanistan, but they are not much better configured than when I arrived in Sarajevo for the first time in November 1994.
16. Some of you will be thinking, that’s OK, because we never want to do this state-building stuff again.
17. It’s not only my colleague Michael Mandelbaum who thinks that way. Each and every president since 1989 has resisted getting involved in other countries’ internal politics, and each one has discovered that it is far easier to go to war and kill enemies than it is to withdraw, leaving behind a collapsed state that will regenerate those enemies.
18. Unless you are willing to fight on forever—even longer than the “long war”—you need to build capable states that protect their citizens reasonably well.
19. We are discovering this today in Yemen, where the drone war appears to have created more terrorists than it has killed. This is one of the main reasons President Obama has avoided military intervention in Syria, but the post-war effort there will still be a major one, even if is not primarily a U.S. responsibility. The same is true in eastern DRC and in Colombia, where peace is threatening to break out after decades of war.
20. America won’t be able to avoid being engaged when North Korea or Cuba collapses. Nor will we stay aloof if nuclear-armed Pakistan starts coming apart. Let’s not even think about Iran. If Ukraine is to be kept whole and independent, it will need a far better state than the one that has performed so badly since the Orange Revolution of 2005.
21. So my view is that we need to prepare for the day, not continue to delude ourselves that we will never do it again.
22. But I would be the first to admit that post-war state-building, a subject I teach at SAIS, is hard and expensive. Anticipation is cheaper and better. We need civilian foreign policy instruments that will take early action to prevent states from collapsing and help initiate reforms.
23. We’ve been reasonably successful at allowing this to happen in much of Latin America and East Asia, where recent decades have seen many countries turn in the direction of democratic transition. Brazil, Chile, South Korea, Indonesia are sterling examples of transitions that the United States allowed, nurtured and encouraged.
24. That’s what we failed to do effectively in the Arab world, with consequences that are now on the front pages every day. We failed to anticipate the revolution in Tunisia. In Libya we failed to help the new regime establish a monopoly on the legitimate means of violence. That failure cost us an ambassador and three of his colleagues and has left Libya adrift.
25. In Egypt, we’ve been inconstant, supporting whoever gains power. The result, as I observed during the constitutional referendum in January, is a restoration of the military autocracy, with voters intimidated into staying home rather than voting against the new constitution and human rights advocates imprisoned along with the Muslim Brotherhood leadership.
26. In Syria, we failed to support moderates, only to see them displaced and replaced by extremists. The result is a daily catastrophe of truly genocidal dimensions.
27. The specific areas I describe as lacking in today’s State and AID are these:
• Mobilizing early, preventive action
• Reforming security services
• Promoting democracy
• Countering violent extremism
• Encouraging citizen and cultural diplomacy
28. These are all efforts at the periphery of traditional diplomacy, and I readily admit that the last three are better done mainly outside government while the first two are more inherently governmental.
29. But I don’t think we can get them done with our current institutions, which were designed for different purposes in other eras. Inertia and legacy are too strong.
30. The State Department, originally the Department of the State, is now a conventional foreign ministry with a 19th century architecture: most Foreign Service personnel serve abroad in static embassies and other missions servicing agencies of the US government other than the State Department. Legacy and inertia, not current needs, dictate where it has people stationed and a good deal of what they are doing.
31. USAID was founded with a poverty alleviation and economic development mission to help fight the Cold War. Few of us still think that US government programs can fix poverty at home, much less overseas.
32. There have been a lot of proposals for reform. Let’s recall Condoleezza Rice’s transformational diplomacy and Hillary Clinton’s Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, now being reprised. None of these efforts have gained more than temporary traction.
33. What we need to do is conduct what scientists call a thought experiment: knowing what we do about the challenges we now face, what kind foreign policy instruments do we need?
34. The answer is nothing like what we’ve got.
35. My book doesn’t offer a detailed design, but it does suggest that we need a single Foreign Office with a national security focus as well as a much-enhanced nongovernmental effort, operated at arms’ length from officialdom but with much greater Congressional funding than it has today.
36. I am not however prepared to propose, as so many have before me, that this new Foreign Office be funded by passing up an F22 or two. I think State and AID have the resources needed, but unfortunately tied up in those elephantine embassies supporting other US government agencies.
37. Shrinking these dramatically would provide the funds for a much sleeker and more effective Foreign Office, including a corps of several thousand people able and willing to deploy, with or without US troops, to difficult environments to take on the hard work of conflict prevention and state-building where required.
38. What we need is a far more agile, anticipatory and mobile Foreign Service, one built for a world in which virtually everyone will soon be connected to worldwide communications at reasonable cost and ordinary citizens, including you, count for much more than ever before in world history.
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Peace picks May 5 – 9
1. Russia in East Asia: History, Migration, and Contemporary Policy Monday, May 5 | 9 – 11am 5th Floor, Woodrow Wilson Center; 1300 Pennsylvania Ave NW REGISTER TO ATTEND This talk explores Russia’s ties with East Asia through the lens of migration and policy. Russia spans the Eurasian continent, yet its historic and present connections with East Asia are often forgotten. At the turn of the 20th century, thousands of Asian migrants arrived in the Russian Far East, spurring fears of a “yellow peril.” A century later, the recent influx of new Asian migrants to Russia has generated similar sentiments. The talk discusses Asian migration in the context of cross-regional attempts to strengthen trade ties and diplomatic relations in the 21st century. SPEAKERS Matthew Ouimet, Public Policy Scholar Senior Analyst, Office of Analysis for Russia and Eurasia, U.S. Department of State. Alyssa Park, Kennan Institute Title VIII Supported Research Scholar Assistant Professor of Modern Korean History, University of Iowa 2. The Democratic Transition in Tunisia: Moving Forward Monday, May 5 | 10 – 11:30am Kenney Auditorium, The Nitze Building, Johns Hopkins University; 1740 Massachusetts Ave NW REGISTER TO ATTEND Mustapha Ben Jaafar, president of the National Constituent Assembly of Tunisia, will discuss this topic. Sasha Toperich, senior fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations at SAIS, will moderate the event. Read more
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Obama’s foreign policy can still surprise
Monday President Obama defended his foreign policy by emphasizing his reluctance to use force, except as a last resort. Here is the press conference at which he spoke in the Philippines (the relevant remarks begin about minute 33 and go on for six more):
Knowledgeable defenders are also out in force: Steven Cook and Michael Brooks absolve him of responsibility for what ails the Middle East, while Heather Hurlburt ponders his legacy.
I think it is too early to make definitive judgments about Obama’s foreign policy. As we know only too well from the history of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, early judgments of success or failure are often premature. The President is right to emphasize that foreign policy requires lots of singles and doubles (not to mention walks) as well as home runs. It also takes the full nine innnings. Certainly on Ukraine it will be a decade or more to see how things work out. Ditto Egypt.
But that doesn’t mean I’m prepared to suspend judgment when the Administration strikes out. That’s what is happening in Syria. Somehow the President sees no viable options there besides American boots on the ground and arming the opposition. The former he correctly rules out as unacceptable to virtually everyone. The latter he pooh-poohs, but there are ample signs he is doing it, or at least more of it, than in the past.
But that does not exhaust the options in Syria. As Fred Hof points out, we could recognize the Syrian Opposition Coalition as the legitimate government of Syria and provide the resources required to help it govern. We could play a stronger role in coordinating and marshalling international assistance. We could also ground the Syrian air force, which is a major factor in preventing liberated areas from governing effectively.
In Egypt, too, the Administration is swinging and missing. It continues to pretend that there is a democratic transition in progress. That is far from true. Egypt’s election next month will coronate Field Marshall Sisi as president, restoring the military autocracy. His secular and Islamist opponents are jailed, hundreds condemned to death in one-day trials for which “show” would be a compliment. The media is under his control. The election, while “free and fair” at the polls, will be conducted in an atmosphere that does not allow open political competition. The Administration needs to find a way to acknowledge reality, even if it thinks continuing aid to Egypt is necessary for national security reasons.
The much-predicted failure of John Kerry’s efforts to revive the Israel/Palestine peace process does not, in my way of thinking, count heavily against the Administration. He was right to try. The stars were not well aligned on either side: the split between Hamas and the Palestinian authority as well as the heavy representation of settler and other right-wing interests in Netanyahu’s coalition militated against an agreement from the first. The supposed unity coalition on the Palestinian side–yet to emerge–will not improve the situation, so long as Hamas refuses to recognize Israel and Netanyahu insists that the recognition be of an explicitly “Jewish” state.
One key to Obama’s foreign policy legacy lies in the talks with Iran. If he is able to push Tehran back from nuclear weapons, putting at least a year between a decision to make them and an actual bomb, that will be a big achievement, provided there is iron-clad verification. Whether the Congress will go along with lifting sanctions in exchange is still a big question.
Another big piece of Obama’s foreign policy legacy could come from an unexpected direction: trade talks. In his first term, the president contented himself with ratification of free trade pacts that had been negotiated by his predecessor (with the Republic of Korea, Colombia and Panama). That was small beer compared to the two massive free trade negotiations he has pursued in the second term: the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Dwarfing even the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement, these are giant trade deals, involving dozens of countries with potentially big impacts on trade, economic growth, and international relations.
Trade folks agree that President Obama has not yet demonstrated the kind of strong commitment to these negotiations that will be required to complete them and get them approved in Congress. But if he wants to have a serious legacy, he will turn to them as soon as the mid-term elections are over in November and try to conclude at least TTIP well before campaigning starts for the 2016 presidential contest. That would shore up America’s alliance with Europe (among other things by facilitating US energy exports), make the TTP more likely to happen, and align most of the world with the US as challenges arise from Russia and China.
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Cuba is an island, but…
Though in many respects isolated, Cuba is like most countries–especially small ones–in depending for its fate on the rest of the world. It was once a Soviet satellite that agreed to host nuclear weapons targeted against the US and tried to export its revolution throughout Latin America (including Puerto Rico) and to Africa, where they say 2400 Cubans died in what they consider liberation wars. Judging from my visit to Havana last week, Cuba is now more interested in its relationship with Venezuela and the United States, the two most important sources of its vital hard currency.
The relationship with Venezuela echoes Cuba’s revolutionary past. The Castros shared with Hugo Chaves, whose face still graces more than one wall in Havana, a belief in social revolution and a “Bolivarian” alternative to capitalism. Caracas still helps to keep Cuba financially afloat with subsidized oil supplies, payments for Cuban doctors, and other less transparent transfers. Cubans understand this reliance on cash-strapped Venezuela is likely coming to an end. That generates at least part of their sense of urgency about economic reform.
The relationship with the United States is far more fraught. Opposite my favorite Cuban jazz bar in Obispo stands a Western Union office, where Cubans line up to get transfers from relatives in the US and elsewhere. Like this young woman in American flag tights:
The sign in the window shows Fidel and Raul under the heading
The Revolution, thriving and victorious, goes forward.
Pardon the poor photography:
It doesn’t get a lot more ironic than that: powered by US dollars sent from Miami.
It wasn’t supposed to be this way. The original idea of the American embargo, which the Cubans call a blockade, was to starve the regime of the resources it needed to survive, causing collapse of the Castro regime. Various presidents have tightened and loosened the embargo, depending not only on what is going on in Cuba but also on American politics. Even in its current relatively loose form, the embargo certainly hurts the Cuban economy. Because of US legislation restricting access to ports and banks by non-American (as well as American) companies that do business in Cuba, many cruise and cargo ships don’t call at Cuban ports and many companies don’t officially transact business with Cuba.
Cubans are resourceful though and one way or another manage to get access to most of the US equipment they need, including Apple computers and sophisticated sound boards for their recording studios. It is expensive and difficult, but possible. Along the way, a good deal of illicit money presumably changes hands.
The question is what purpose this serves. Most Americans, and most Cuban Americans (even in Florida), believe the policy should change. It is an older generation of members of Congress who keep the embargo in place. It is unclear to me at this point what Cuba would have to do to get it removed, though I suppose the issue of property claims is close to the top of the list.
A US Foreign Claims Settlement Commission has certified 5911 claims worth $6.4 to $20.1 billion, depending on whether you compound the interest or not. Even if he has lived rent-free, I can only imagine how a Cuban who has lived 55 years under the Castro regime will feel when a foreign claimant arrives to take possession of her house. Or how the successor regime will feel about digging into its empty pockets to compensate the claimants, plus 6% interest accumulated over 41 years (I don’t know why 41).
What the embargo has not done is cause the collapse of the regime. Quite to the contrary, the Castros seem to revel in isolation and hostility, which helps them to claim a legitimate role as defenders of Cuba’s independence. One loyalist told me that in the end the Revolution is mostly about “dignity,” which he associated with Cuba’s ability to make its own way in the world, and “respect,” which he associated with pride in its uniqueness. This should sound familiar to those who have been following the Arab uprisings. Vague as they are, these sentiments are not to be trifled with.
But dignity and respect won’t go far without a stronger economy, which is where I started this series of posts on Cuba. What the Cubans want from the United States above all is more tourism, which will depend I imagine on building far better hotels. The shabbiness and poor management of the once fashionable Plaza, where we stayed at a cost of about $150 per night, is almost unbelievable, even for someone who travels as much as I do in poor countries and conflict zones.
Increased tourism will also depend on simplifying the process for going there. This is a Washington issue, not a Havana problem. At least for those on group tours, the Cubans issue tourist cards easily and require you to fill out a simple health form. Procedures at passport control both entering and leaving were not onerous (certainly not as onerous as some instances non-American friends recount about entering the US). There are charter flights, including some operated by American Airlines, non-stop from Miami (and Tampa) to Havana. Based on the experience of my fellow travelers, those are far more reliable and no more expensive than flying from Cancun (avoid Cubana!).
It’s the US government that requires you to read complicated licensing rules and threatens you with exorbitant fines if you violate their less than clear provisions. More than one Cuban asked who we think we are punishing. They have a point, especially as the tourist industry is the leading edge of capitalism in Cuba.
The Cubans would also like the US to use the monster container port they have built at Mariel, once the jumping-off point for so many Cubans to leave the island because it is so close to Florida. The odds of that seem low at this point, but importing goods into the US from Cuba would somehow be a fitting end to an embargo whose logic and purpose seem lost.
The United States is no more an island than Cuba when it comes to interacting with its neighborhood. Cuba will be a major issue for us as it transitions, if only because of geography, family ties and property claims. We need to be thinking now about how to help enable post-Castro Cuba to achieve a dignified and respectful outcome for the island’s more than 11 million inhabitants.
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The Cory Remsburg metaphor
The President’s State of the Union speech last night broke little new ground on foreign policy. He is pleased to be finishing two wars and will resist getting the United States involved in other open-ended conflicts. He may leave a few troops in Afghanistan to train Afghans and attack terrorists. Al Qaeda central is largely defeated but its franchises are spreading in Yemen, Somalia, Iraq and Mali. He will limit the use of drones, reform surveillance policies and get us off a permanent war footing. He wants to close Guantanamo, as always, and fix immigration, as always.
He will use diplomacy, especially in trying to block Iran verifiably from obtaining a nuclear weapons and in resolving the Israel/Palestine conflict, but also in destroying Syria’s chemical weapons capability. He will support the moderate Syrian opposition. He will veto new Iran sanctions in order to give diplomacy a chance to work, maintain the alliance with Europe, support democracy in Ukraine, development in Africa, and trade and investment across the Pacific. America is exceptional both because of what it does and because of its ideals.
The President didn’t mention Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan, Russia or Japan. He skipped North Korea too. His mother must have taught him that when you don’t have anything nice to say you shouldn’t say anything at all. Those countries might merit mention, but all have in one way or another been doing things that we prefer they not do. He mentioned China, but only as an economic rival, not a military one. He skipped the pivot to Asia as well as Latin America. For my Balkans readers: you are not even on his screen. Read more
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A decent Syrian election: result, not prelude
Jimmy Carter and Robert Pastor propose an election to resolve Syria’s civil war. They suggest three principles that would have to be accepted as preconditions for negotiating the war’s end:
● Self-determination: The Syrian people should decide on the country’s future government in a free election process under the unrestricted supervision of the international community and responsible nongovernmental organizations, with the results accepted if the elections are judged free and fair;
● Respect: The victors should assure and guarantee respect for all sectarian and minority groups; and
● Peacekeepers: To ensure that the first two goals are achieved, the international community must guarantee a robust peacekeeping force.
And they spell out first steps: Read more
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