Tag: Latin America
The world according to CFR
The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) survey of prevention priorities for 2014 is out today. Crowdsourced, it is pretty much the definition of elite conventional wisdom. Pundits of all stripes contribute.
The top tier includes contingencies with high impact and moderate likelihood (intensification of the Syrian civil war, a cyberattack on critical US infrastructure, attacks on the Iranian nuclear program or evidence of nuclear weapons intent, a mass casualty terrorist attack on the US or an ally, or a severe North Korean crisis) as well as those with moderate impact and high likelihood (in a word “instability” in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Iraq or Jordan). None merited the designation high impact and high likelihood, though many of us might have suggested Syria, Iraq and Pakistan for that category. Read more
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Hezbollah in Syria is at risk
Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria has captured media attention and expert analysis around the world. On Tuesday, the Center for Transatlantic Relations (CTR) at Johns Hopkins SAIS and the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS) organized Hezbollah After Assad, featuring Bilal Saab, executive director and head of research at the Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis (INEGMA) North America and Jean-Luc Marret, a Senior Fellow at FRS and CTR and associate professor and senior lecturer in multiple French universities. Ambassador Andras Simonyi, the Managing Director of CTR, facilitated the discussion.
Bilal Saab reminded that a conflict between Sunnis and Shiites in the Middle East is something that Hezbollah has warned against since its own founding. Such a conflict would not only distract Hezbollah from fighting Israel, but could also alienate the Shiite support base for the organization. Despite knowing this, Hezbollah has acted in a way that increases the likelihood of such a conflict. What explains Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria?
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Prevent what?
Most of us who work on international affairs think it would be much better to use diplomacy to prevent bad things from happening rather than waiting until the aftermath and then cleaning up after the elephants, which all too often involves expensive military action. But what precisely would that mean? What do we need to prevent?
The Council on Foreign Relations survey of prevention priorities for 2013 was published last week, just in time to be forgotten in the Christmas rush and New Year’s lull. It deserves notice, as it is one of the few nonpartisan attempts to define American national security priorities. This year’s edition was in part crowd-sourced and categorizes contingencies on two dimensions: impact on U.S. interests (high, medium, low) and likelihood (likely, plausible, unlikely).
Syria comes out on top in both dimensions. That’s a no-brainer for likelihood, as the civil war has already reached catastrophic dimensions and is affecting the broader region. Judging from Paul Stares’ video introduction to the survey, U.S. interests are ranked high in part because of the risk of use or loss of chemical weapons stocks. I’d have ranked them high because of the importance of depriving Iran of its one truly reliable ally and bridge to Hizbollah, but that’s a quibble.
CFR ranks another six contingencies as high impact on U.S. interests and only plausible rather than likely. This isn’t so useful, but Paul’s video comes to the rescue: an Israeli military strike on Iran that would “embroil” the U.S. and conflict with China in the East or South China seas are his picks to talk about. I find it peculiar that CFR does not treat what I would regard as certainly a plausible if not a likely contingency: a U.S. attack on Iran. There are few more important decisions President Obama will need to make than whether to use force to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Certainly it is a far more challenging decision than whether to go to war against China in the territorial disputes it is generating with U.S. allies in Pacific. I don’t know any foreign policy experts who would advise him to go in that direction.
It is striking that few of the other “plausible” and high-impact contingencies are amenable to purely military responses:
- a highly disruptive cyberattack on U.S. critical infrastructure
- a mass casualty attack on the U.S. homeland or on a treaty ally
- severe internal instability in Pakistan, triggered by a civil-military crisis or terror attack
It is not easy to determine the origin of cyberattacks, and not clear that a military response would be appropriate or effective. The same is also sometimes true of mass casualty attacks; our military response to 9/11 in Afghanistan has enmired the United States in its longest war to date, one where force is proving inadequate as a solution. It is hard to imagine any military response to internal instability in Pakistan, though CFR offers as an additional low probability contingency a possible U.S. military confrontation with Islamabad “triggered by a terror attack or U.S. counterterror operations.”
In the “moderate” impact on U.S. interests, CFR ranks as highly likely “a major erosion of security in Afghanistan resulting from coalition drawdown.” I’d certainly have put that in high impact category, as we’ve still got 100,000 troops in Afghanistan and a significant portion of them will still be there at the end of 2013. In the “moderate” impact but merely plausible category CFR ranks:
- a severe Indo-Pakistan crisis that carries risk of military escalation, triggered by a major terror attack
- a severe North Korean crisis caused by another military provocation, internal political instability, or threatening nuclear weapons/ICBM-related activities
- a significant increase in drug trafficking violence in Mexico that spills over into the United States
- continuing political instability and emergence of a terrorist safe haven in Libya
Again there are limits to what we can do about most of these contingencies by conventional military means. Only a North Korea crisis caused by military provocation or threats would rank be susceptible to a primarily military response. The others call for diplomatic and civilian responses in at least a measure equal to the possible military ones.
CFR lets two “moderate” impact contingencies languish in the low probability category that I don’t think belong there:
- political instability in Saudi Arabia that endangers global oil supplies
- renewed unrest in the Kurdish dominated regions of Turkey and the Middle East
There is a very real possibility in Riyadh of a succession crisis, as the monarchy on the death of the king will likely move to a next generation of contenders. Kurdish irredentist aspirations are already a big issue in Iraq and Syria. It is hard to imagine this will not affect Iran and Turkey before the year is out. Neither is amenable to a purely military response.
Most of the contingencies with “low” impact on U.S. interests are in Africa:
- a deepening of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo that involves military intervention from its neighbors
- growing popular unrest and political instability in Sudan
- military conflict between Sudan and South Sudan
- renewed ethnic violence in Kenya surrounding March 2013 presidential election
- widespread unrest in Zimbabwe surrounding the electoral process and/or the death of Robert Mugabe
- failure of a multilateral intervention to push out Islamist groups from Mali’s north
This may tell us more about CFR and the United States than about the world. Africa has little purchase on American sentiments, despite our half-Kenyan president. All of these contingencies merit diplomatic attention, but none is likely to excite U.S. military responses of more than a purely emergency character, except for Mali. If you’ve got a few Islamist terrorists, you can get some attention even if you are in Africa.
What’s missing from this list? CFR mentions
…a third Palestinian intifada, a widespread popular unrest in China, escalation of a U.S.-Iran naval clash in the Persian Gulf, a Sino-Indian border crisis, onset of elections-related instability and violence in Ethiopia, unrest in Cuba following the death of Fidel Castro and/or incapacitation of Raul Castro, and widespread political unrest in Venezuela triggered by the death or incapacitation of Hugo Chavez.
I’d add intensification of the global economic slowdown (high probability, high impact), failure to do more about global warming (also high probability, delayed impact), demographic or financial implosion in Europe or Japan (and possibly even the U.S.), Russian crackdown on dissent, and resurgent Islamist extremism in Somalia. But the first three of these are not one-year “contingencies,” which shows one limit of the CFR exercise.
I would also note that the world is arguably in better shape at the end of 2012 than ever before in history. As The Spectator puts it:
Never has there been less hunger, less disease or more prosperity. The West remains in the economic doldrums, but most developing countries are charging ahead, and people are being lifted out of poverty at the fastest rate ever recorded. The death toll inflicted by war and natural disasters is also mercifully low. We are living in a golden age.
May it last.
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Not a good idea
Governor Romney will no doubt repeat tonight that he will label China a currency manipulator on his first day in office. This is what he won’t say:
1. The Chinese have already revalued their currency a good bit (yuan/dollar), much of it during the Obama administration:
2. The designation of currency manipulator is one provided for in U.S. law, not in international agreements. Labelling China one would only require that the U.S. government negotiate with Beijing about their sin, something it has been doing for years (with the results portrayed above). There is no other legal consequence in domestic legislation. Washington could file a complaint with the International Monetary Fund or the World Trade Organization, but the consequences of doing that are unclear. Neither organization has tried in the past to provide a remedy for currency manipulation.
3. The Brazilians have been accusing the U.S. of manipulating its currency downwards (through the Fed’s “quantitative easing,” which injects dollars into the world economy), in order to compete more effectively. Any success we have in pursuing a remedy against China will pave the way for a Brazilian complaint against the U.S.
4. The most likely immediate Chinese reaction would be to halt the appreciation of the renminbi in preparation for a difficult negotiation with Washington. This would certainly harm U.S. exports. The Chinese could also retaliate in other ways: not buying U.S. bonds or blocking U.S. investment.
Bottom line: we have a lot more to lose than gain from a rhetorically stirring but ineffectual declaration that China is a currency manipulator. Maybe that’s why the Bush and Obama administrations have both passed on the option Romney is pushing?
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This week’s peace picks
The dog days of summer are over as far as DC events are concerned
1. A Conversation with Rudwan Dawod on his Incarceration in The Sudan, Tuesday September 4, 2:00pm-3:30pm
Venue: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. 20004, fifth floor conference room
Speakers: Rudwan Dawod, Tom Prichard, Michael Van Dusen
The Africa Program of the Woodrow Wilson Center would like to invite you to a presentation by Rudwan Dawod on Tuesday, September 4. Rudwan has been the facilitator for reconciliation and humanitarian projects with Sudan Sunrise since 2009, and is the project director for a reconciliation project in which Muslims from Sudan, South Sudan and the U.S. are rebuilding a Catholic Cathedral in Torit, South Sudan. In late May, Rudwan left his wife and home in Springfield, Oregon to travel to South Sudan to direct this inter-faith reconciliation project. During a lull in the project, Rudwan took a side trip to visit family in Sudan, and renew his Sudanese Passport. Concerned for the future of his country, and dedicated to peace and democracy, Rudwan attended a peaceful demonstration on July 3rd to protest the Sudanese government’s recent austerity policies, and ongoing violence in the Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile, and Darfur. Subsequently, Rudwan was arrested, beaten until unconscious, tortured, charged with terrorism, and retained in prison for 44 days. With the help of the advocacy community, the US government, and the media, Rudwan was eventually acquitted and released. Please join us to welcome Rudwan home and hear him tell his remarkable story.
Register for this event here.
2. Organizing the U.S. Government to Counter Islamist Extremism, Wednesday September 5, 12:00pm-2:00pm
Venue: Hudson Institute, 1015 15th Street, N.W. 6th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20005
Speakers: James Glassman, Will Marshall, Douglas J. Feith, William A. Galston, Abram N. Shulsky
Lunch will be served. For all the progress the United States has made in fighting terrorist networks, there has been a general failure to confront the terrorism problem’s ideological center of gravity. A new Hudson Institute study examines how the U.S. government could mount an effort to address this failure by working to change the ideological climate in the Muslim world. The study identifies which types of governmental and nongovernmental organizations should be created to conduct this effort. Produced by Douglas J. Feith and Abram N. Shulsky of Hudson Institute and William A. Galston of Brookings, the study argues that the various Islamist terrorist groups around the world are linked by ideology— common beliefs about their duties as Muslims that spawn and intensify hostility to the United States and to the West in general. You are invited to a panel discussion in which two distinguished commentators will discuss the report with its authors: Commentators: James Glassman, Executive Director of the George W. Bush Institute and former Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs in the George W. Bush Administration Will Marshall, Founder and President of the Progressive Policy Institute Authors: Douglas J. Feith, Hudson Institute Senior Fellow and former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in the George W. Bush Administration William A. Galston, Brookings Institution Ezra K. Zilkha Chair in Governance Studies and former Deputy Assistant to President Clinton for Domestic Policy Abram N. Shulsky, Hudson Institute Senior Fellow and former Defense Department official.
Register for this event here.
3. An Egyptian Point of View about the Arab Uprisings, Wednesday September 5, 7:30pm-9:00pm
Venue: Al-Hewar Center, 120 Cherry Street, S.E., Vienna, VA 22180
Speakers: Ashraf Al-Bayoumi
A conversation with Dr. Ashraf Al-Bayoumi. Egyptian professor and activist, about “An Egyptian Point of View about the Arab Uprisings.” (in Arabic)
Register for this event here
4. Infrastructure and Business Opportunities in North Africa, Thursday September 6, 8:30am-11:ooam
Venue: City Club of Washington, DC, 555 13th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20004
Speakers: Carl Kress, Randa Fahmy Hudome, Steven Mayo, Deborah McCarthy, Cenk Sidar, Curtis Silvers, John Duke Anthony
A discussion on “Infrastructure and Business Opportunities in North Africa” featuring Mr. Carl Kress, Regional Director for the Middle East, North Africa and Europe Region, U.S. Trade and Development Agency; Ms. Randa Fahmy Hudome, President, Fahmy Hudome International; Mr. Steven Mayo, Business Development Officer, Project and Structured Finance, Export-Import Bank of the United States; Ms. Deborah McCarthy, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary and Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Finance and Development, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, U.S. Department of State; Mr. Cenk Sidar, Founder and Managing Director, Sidar Global Advisors; and Mr. Curtis Silvers, Executive Vice President, National U.S.-Arab Chamber of Commerce; moderated by Dr. John Duke Anthony, Founding President & CEO, National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations; Member, U.S. Department of State Advisory Committee on International Economic Policy and its subcommittees on Sanctions and Trade and Investment.
Register for this event here.
5. CISSM Forum: ‘The Future of Indo-Pak Relations,’ Thursday September 6, 12:15pm-1:3opm
Venue: University of Maryland, College Park, 7950 Baltimore Avenue, College Park, MD, 1203 Van Munching Hall
Speakers: Stephen P. Cohen
‘The Future of Indo-Pak Relations’, Stephen P. Cohen, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution
Register for this event here.
6. When ‘Ordinary People’ Join In: Understanding Moments of Mass Mobilization in Argentina (2001), Egypt (2011), and Ukraine (2004), Thursday September 6, 4:00pm-5:00pm
Venue: Elliot School of International Affairs, 1957 E Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20052, Voesar Conference Room
Speakers: Olga Onuch
Olga Onuch, Newton Prize Fellow in Comparative Politics, University of Oxford This presentation examines the differences between moments of mass-mobilization and the long term process of activist mobilization that precedes them. Ukraine in 2004, Egypt in 2011, and Argentina in 2001 represent cases where a history of activist coordination was the basis for, and key instrument in, the mobilization of ‘ordinary’ people. The presenter will argue against the predominant focus on exogenous and economic factors and instead emphasize local actors and political variables in explaining the presence or absence of mass-mobilization. Part of IERES Petrach Program on Ukraine. Sponsored by the Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies.
Register for this event here.
7. The Arab Awakening and its Implications, Thursday September 6, 6:oopm-7:oopm
Venue: Georgetown School of Foreign Service, 37 St NW and O St NW, Washington, DC, ICC Auditorium
Speaker: Dennis Ross
Returning PJC faculty member, Ambassador Dennis Ross, will present a lecture on ‘The Arab Awakening and its Implications’.
RSVP requested. A light reception will follow.
Register for this event here.
8. Will the Ongoing Nuclear Talks with Iran Yield Better Results than Past Efforts? Friday September 7, 10:00am-12:00pm
Venue: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. 20004
Speakers: Trita Parsi, Mustafa Kibaroglu, Monica Herz, Michael Adler, Robert S. Litwak
The pursuit of an agreement on Iran’s nuclear program remains at the top of the nonproliferation agenda. The unsuccessful mediation effort led by Brazil and Turkey in May 2010 was followed by the adoption of more economic sanctions by the international community. Last April, the government of Iran resumed negotiations with representatives of the five permanent members of the Security Council, plus Turkey and Germany. Four meetings have taken place in Switzerland, Turkey, and Russia. Talks are expected to continue after the U.S. presidential elections. Five experts will take stock of the negotiations in comparison with earlier efforts. Experts who participated in a February 2011 seminar on the Brazilian-Turkish mediation will return to the Wilson Center to assess the ongoing negotiations and possible outcomes.
Register for this event here.
9. Road to a Free Syria: Should “Responsibility to Protect” Apply to the Syrian Conflict? Friday, September 7, 12:00-2:00
Venue: Hudson Institute, 15 15th Street, N.W. 6th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20005
Speakers: Marah Bukai, Naser Khader, Nasser Rabbat, Kert Werthmuller
‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P)—a widely acknowledged principle of international relations—holds that the State carries the primary responsibility for the protection of its population from mass atrocities and, moreover, that the international community has a responsibility to assist States in fulfilling this responsibility. A panel of distinguished experts will discuss the applicability of R2P to the Syrian conflict while shedding light on current events inside Syria, international reactions to those events, and projections for securing a stable and prosperous post-Assad Syria. Panelists: Marah Bukai, Syrian poet, Consultant, U.S. Department of State, and political activist involved in the Syrian revolution
Naser Khader, Adjunct Fellow, Hudson Institute, and former Member of the Danish Parliament
Nasser Rabbat, Aga Khan Professor and the Director of the Aga Khan Program for Islamic Architecture, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Moderator: Kurt Werthmuller, Research Fellow, Hudson Institute’s Center for Religious Freedom
Register for this event here.
10. Stabilizing the Sinai, Churches for International Peace, Friday September 7, 12:00pm-1:30pm
Venue: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, D.C. 20036
Speakers: Art Hughes, Geoffrey Aronson
Rising lawlessness and violence and an increasing death toll in the Sinai Peninsula by terrorist and criminal elements since the fall of the Mubarak regime threaten the security of Egypt, Israel, and their 1979 peace treaty. The unresolved competition over governance in Egypt between the Muslim Brotherhood government led by President Mohammed Morsi on one hand and the Egyptian army on the other are complicating factors, as is the continued Israeli closure of Gaza, whose Hamas government has strong ties to the Egyptian Brotherhood.
Ambassador (ret.) Art Hughes and Geoffrey Aronson will discuss the stakes for all the parties, including the U.S., and suggest what is needed to restore peace in the Sinai.
Register for this event here.
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On course for war with Iran
Ilona Gerbakher reports from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies:
Yesterday’s Middle East Institute panel at SAIS presented a report on “Prospects for US-Iran Relations on the Nuclear Issue in the Year Ahead.” The predominant mood was tempered pessimism. War is a real possibility, so it behooves us to redouble diplomatic efforts.
Alan Keiswetter (a scholar at the Middle East Institute, senior consultant at C&O Resources and an adjunct professor at the University of Maryland) thought the nuclear negotiations stalemated and likely to remain that way until after the U.S. election. The parameters of a possible agreement are clear: enrichment allowed up to a low level (3.5-5%) combined with strict safeguards and shipment out of Iran of its more highly enriched uranium.
But it is unclear whether Iran wants a negotiated solution or is just stringing along the negotiations to gain more time. Sanctions alone are unlikely to force agreement, as Iran is ready to hunker down as necessary. Some kind of meatier inducement is going to be needed.
Calls in the Israeli government for military action are growing louder and more strident. Israel perceives an Iranian nuclear capability as an existential threat. The debate among Israelis is no longer “will we strike” but “will the strike be effective enough.” It would be a serious mistake to dismiss the possibility of a unilateral Israeli attack. Some Israel watchers say Prime Minister Netyanyahu thinks he can do what he wants without U.S. concurrence; others feel he is bluffing, to force the U.S. to take a hard line and scare Iran into concessions.
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is more united in fear of Iranian pretensions in the Gulf than the Iranians imagine.
Next year will be a real turning point in US-Iran relations over the nuclear issue. Without significant diplomatic progress, the trajectory we are on will lead to military confrontation.
Geneive Abdo, director of the Iran Program at the Middle East Institute, contrasted the current tense diplomatic situation with Iran-US relations in 2003, when Tehran cooperated on Afghanistan and was more open to negotiation but Washington was not. Supreme Leader Khamenei sent a letter to then-President Bush proposing a diplomatic breakthrough. Today even a minimal goal of building trust with Iran seems hard to reach. Iranian leaders are convinced that the ultimate U.S. goal is regime change. Khamenei’s hardline conspiratorial beliefs about the U.S. are self-fulfilling prophecies.
The Revolutionary Guard, which has grown powerful under Khamenei, no longer bothers to hide its regional interventions in Iraq, Syria and elsewhere. Although arguably they stand the most to lose from sanctions, a military attack on Iran would serve their interests by reaffirming their ideological position.
Also troubling is the decline of Iran’s educated middle class. Those who once called for reform and might have questioned the nuclear program are marginalized. They were our best hope for breaking three decades of hostility but their voices have been silenced. An attack led by the U.S. or Israel would stifle prospects for democratic reform even further.
Israel is not helping matters with its increasingly hardline rhetoric. The way is being paved for it to appear that all options except an Israel-led attack have been eliminated. Don’t expect President Obama to take action until after the election. The best diplomatic option for the moment seems to be to buy more time.
Roby Barrett, the president of a consulting firm specializing in defense and security technology applications, was dismissive of the possibility of a diplomatic solution because “Iran is not really interested in negotiation.” For Iranian leaders and citizens the nuclear program has become a point of national pride. Iran sees nuclear capability as a part of its destiny as a regional power in the Gulf.
The GCC has resigned itself to the fact that Iran will not give up nuclear weapons capability and that the U.S. will need to do something about it. The alternatives are either a nuclear Iran or war. Despite the consequent global economic disturbance, the GCC wants the Iranian nuclear program stopped by hook or by crook. The idea of a nuclear Iran is a redline issue for most Arab states.
We should “never say never,” but diplomatic efforts will probably not stop the march towards war. Given the calcifying hardline between the Israeli and Iranian positions and the distance between America and Israel on this issue, there is a high probability an Israeli attack will go forward. It is unlikely that the U.S. will initiate a strike or engage cooperatively with Israel.
Israel knows they don’t have the military capacity to cripple Iran’s nuclear program. If they strike, it will be in desperation, with the objective of bringing the U.S. into the conflict. That is possible if Iranian retaliation makes the mistake of striking back at the U.S.
In closing, Genieve Abdo raised a vital point: what will happen the morning after? What will be the economic and military fallout of an attack? Will an attack have to be repeated to prevent an intensified Iranian effort to gain nuclear weapons? What are the implications of repeated attacks on Iran?
Daniel Serwer, a scholar at the Middle East Institute and a senior research professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, acted as moderator. He noted that some countries have stood back from nuclear programs, including Brazil and Argentina. Iran is a more difficult case, because Israel will not give up its nuclear weapons and there are several other potential nuclear powers in the region. But if Iran thinks hard about what nuclear weapons might mean for its own security as well as long-term regional and economic stability, it may conclude they are not a good idea.
PS: The video of the event can be downloaded from C-Span.
PPS: Bennett Ramberg comes to similar conclusions.
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