Tag: Lebanon
Trump and anti-regime protests worldwide
Notable protests against ruling regimes are occurring these days in Iraq, Lebanon, Iran, and Hong Kong. Recent months have seen similar protests in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Sudan. These are not your garden variety protests for more jobs or better wages, against police abuse and corruption, or in favor of improvements in education and health care. They are “regime change” protests: cases in which citizens have concluded that the social contract between themselves and their government no longer serves their interests. Rather than asking for reform, the protesters are asking for fundamental changes in the way they are governed.
Most of these protests are against regimes the US doesn’t much like. Washington is happy to see the Islamic Republic targeted not just inside Iran but also–despite good relations with Baghdad and Beirut–in Iraq, where Iranian consulates have been burned, and Lebanon, where Hizbollah is suffering criticism. The Bolivian president demonstrators chased from power, Evo Morales, was no friend of the US. Washington would like the same thing to happen to Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela. In Sudan the Americans helped broker the agreement that deposed President Omar al-Bashir, whom the International Criminal Court indicted for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide in Darfur.
Hong Kong is a case of its own. There the protests are in favor of preserving the justice system’s autonomy and expanding democratic representation. President Trump, engaged in a massive tariff war with China, has been hesitant to criticize Beijing for fear of the cost to his trade agenda. But Congress compelled him to sign a bill providing for the possibility of sanctions against Chinese and Hong Kong officials responsible for repression of protests. The bill passed both Houses with veto-proof majorities. It will be difficult, however, to convince Trump to use the authority provided, unless he feels it will help in some way his trade agenda.
With that exception, the protests seem good to President Trump. But take another look.
These protests are without exception in favor of more liberal democracy and rule of law, not less. In Iran, demonstrators want the fall of a regime that is an anocracy: it mixes democratic forms like elections and a parliament with a dictatorship of the Supreme Leader, backed by security forces loyal to him and not the elected President. In Lebanon and Iraq, the protests have targeted systems that share power on the basis of ethnicity rather than equal rights. Bolivian President Morales’ cardinal sin was tampering with election results, Venezuelan President Maduro has resisted yielding power to a constitutionally elected successor, and Sudanese President al-Bashir was a dictator ousted by the military but in response to popular demand.
Looked at this way, the protests are all antithetical to Trump’s ambitions inside the US:
- he seeks less participation in US elections, not more, and re-election not with the popular vote but with the vote in the Electoral College;
- he is refusing to cooperate with Congress’ constitutionally authorized impeachment proceedings;
- he has sought to enhance presidential power, not limit it;
- he has appealed to his base in blatantly ethnic, white nationalist terms; and
- he is seeking to insulate the US military from accountability and to make it beholden exclusively to him.
The goals of the regime-change demonstrators worldwide point precisely in the opposite directions.
Bottom line: the world the demonstrators want is not Trump’s world. It is the liberal democratic world ruled by law that he is seeking to destroy. You know whom I am rooting for.
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A bad barometer reading
On June 26 the Atlantic Council held a panel to discuss the release of opinion poll data collected by the Arab Barometer about the state of the economy, migration, governmental performance, corruption, and other topics in the Middle East. Survey data was collected in Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan. Presentation of data was followed by a panel discussion that included Mark Tessler, professor of political science at University of Michigan, Kathrin Thomas, Research Associate at the Arab Barometer, Abbas Khadim, director of the Iraq Initiative at the Atlantic Council, and Faysal Itani, Senior Fellow at Atlantic Council. Vivian Salam, reporter at the Wall Street Journal, moderated.
There is little optimism about the economy improving in the Levant. In Jordan, 70% of respondents cite the economy as a primary concern. In all three countries, (Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon) more than 85% percent of respondents perceived the governments of their respective states to be corrupt.
Survey data also noted a slight upwards trend in desire to emigrate from the Levant region. An uptick in a desire to emigrate can be explained by the “brain drain” phenomenon in which highly educated youths seek to leave their home countries due to lack of high-level employment opportunity. Respondents indicated that “economic reasons”, “political reasons” and “security reasons” were the primary drivers for the choice to emigrate.
The survey catalogued a slight increase in support for women’s rights and prominence in politics and business. 60% of respondents would support a female head of state, with Lebanon the most supportive of the notion at a rate of 77%. Despite this, 66% of respondents in the Levant said that men inherently make better political leaders than women.
Since 2016 there has been a decline in the belief that the Middle East and North Africa would benefit from stronger relations with the United States. Survey data revealed that people in the Levant widely believe that Iraq is a proxy of Iran, despite the fact that the Shia in Iraq have not sided with Iran.
Itani notes that the economic anxiety present in the region, specifically in Lebanon, is a reminder to Western policy makers that issues of chief importance to the West (Hezbollah, etc), do not necessarily take precedence in the region. The expectation of poor economic performance will have implications for future investment and growth. Itani attributes Lebanese decrease in willingness to strengthen ties with Washington to US policy in region, specifically US dealings with Israel and the change in American leadership in 2016.
Khadim spoke more specifically to the Iraqi data. Surveys confirm sentiments Iraqis usually express only through social media or encrypted messengers. There is a divergence of opinions held regarding the United States government and US citizens. Iraqis view American citizens more favorably than the American government, which Khadim says can open avenues in the realm of public diplomacy and good faith action between the two countries. On the Iraq-Iran relationship, he says GCC media have ascribed an affinity between Iraq and Iran that does not necessarily exist. Iran does have influence over certain discrete groups in Iraq, but that influence is not as widespread as many believe.
Tessler and Thomas, the administrators of the data collection, focused on the ways in which the data can be used to determine if there are links between different variables. Specifically, they expect a link between corruption perceptions and education levels as well as support of Iran depending on religion. While they had not yet conducted the analysis on these variables, they expect to confirm Khadim’s assertion that support for Iran in Iraq is contained to certain demographics and is not a widespread sentiment. Tessler further notes that the trend of declining support for strengthening relations with a United States dates to 2006.
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The Middle East wants reform
On Tuesday the Middle East Institute (MEI) hosted the presentation of the latest Middle East Public Opinion poll by James Zogby. Polling was conducted in 10 countries: Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Turkey and Iran. Zogby, Co-founder and President of the Arab American Institute and Director of Zogby Research Services, presented a summary of the data and key points before a panel discussion that featured Paul Salem, President of MEI, Kate Seelye, Vice President of MEI, Alex Vatanka, an MEI Senior Fellow, and Steven Cook, Eni Enrico Mattei Senior Fellow for Middle East and Africa Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Throughout the Middle East citizens expressed discontent with the policies of their governments. Only in the UAE did a majority of respondents indicate that their country was on the right track. This discontent spanned the rough divide opened by the Arab spring. Egypt and Tunisia both followed the “democratic track” after successful revolutions in 2011, but a majority of respondents there believe their countries to be on the wrong track, joining Iraq and Palestine as states with majority disapproval. In Egypt the drop included the military, whose confidence levels have fallen 50 points since 2013. Government reform was ranked 3rd overall in the list of political priorities, topping extremism, foreign enemies, health care, and personal rights. This contradicts a common narrative, which justified the failure of the Arab Spring by claiming that the people desired only improved economic and security conditions and cared little for political reform as long as those conditions were met. Downplaying the desire for reform may have been simply wishful thinking by authoritarian leaders in the region. The survey conveyed a sense of foreign policy pragmatism. Regarding Syria there was growing support for a national unity government with participation of Bashar al Assad. Regarding Iran, while majorities supported the Trump administration’s move to pull out of the nuclear deal, in every country except Tunisia and Egypt the majority believe that peace between Iran and the Arab world is “very possible” or “somewhat possible.” Eight out of ten countries, including Iran, held the majority view that it is important to bring Iran into a regional security arrangement with the Arab countries to help bring peace to the region. One exception to this pragmatism is the the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A growing majority in 5 out of 7 Arab states were opposed to a partnership with Israel, even if Israel returns occupied Palestinian lands and fulfills the terms of the Arab Peace Initiative. Palestinians themselves remained overwhelmingly prepared for peace with Israel if the refugee issue is solved and Israel returns to its pre-1967 borders, but a growing number believe the Israelis would never agree to those terms. Given the growing struggle between Saudi Arabia and Turkey for regional influence, the polling reflected just how close the competition is. Turkey surpasses the Saudis for favorability in Tunisia, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan and Iraq, and tightened the gap in Egypt. A majority of Arab countries view Turkey as playing a more positive role than Saudi Arabia in both Iraq and Syria. Public opinion of America has fallen in the region. The EU, Russia and China all fared better than America. The panel believed that this drop in opinion was largely due to the perception of the American government as inept. The polling indicates a continued sense of unrest in the region. With little faith in their own institutions, the people of the Middle East remain largely uninspired by the jingoistic foreign policies of their governments and continue to seek an end to costly civil wars, in order to focus on domestic reforms and economic improvement.Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Israel’s “center”
On Monday, the Brookings Institution hosted M.K. Yair Lapid, founder of the centrist Yesh Atid party, the largest opposition party in the Knesset. Lapid shared his views about current Israeli domestic and foreign policy, including its relationship with the US, as well as his vision for the country’s future. John R. Allen, president of the Brookings Institution, gave introductory remarks, and Tamara Coffman Wittes, senior foreign policy fellow at Brookings Center for Middle East Policy, moderated the discussion. Below, I discuss key takeaways from Lapid‘s remarks.
Foreign Policy Flashpoints
At a time when regional conflict threatens Israel’s relative stability, Lapid described how his country and the international community should approach Israel’s main foreign policy challenges to ensure future Israeli security. On the Palestinian front, Lapid stressed the importance of breaking the silence that has stalled negotiations on a two state solution since the Trump embassy move. A return to dialogue represents the only road to peace. A Palestinian Jerusalem, however, is off the table. Lapid stated that “Jerusalem is a capital; if someone came to DC and asked [the US] to share it with Mexico, they would refuse.” Lapid also criticized UNRWA, arguing that having a refugee agency solely for Palestinians allows Arab countries to maintain a false moral high ground in the conflict.
Lapid blamed Hamas for the recent killing of hundreds of protestors in Gaza by Israeli snipers, saying that the violent protests threatened national security. Although it is not at fault for the violence, Israel must work quickly to solve the humanitarian crisis; after all, Gazan sewage contaminates Israeli water. However, any Israeli efforts to solve the crisis must be predicated by Hamas’ fall from power, clearing the way for humanitarian aid to reach Gazan hands without funding terrorist activities.
Lapid also used national security to defend his country’s controversial position in the Golan Heights. In addition to their strategic importance in fending off the rising Iranian and Hizbollah threat, giving the Golan Heights back to Assad is simply not an option, as it would put 22,000 Jewish lives at risk. Similarly, opening the northeastern border to Syrian Arab refugees also represents an unacceptable security risk. Instead, Lapid called on the US to recognize Israeli sovereignty over the Heights, arguing that this move would allow the US to send the message that it does not tolerate Assad’s human rights abuses.
Israeli-US Relations: Troubling Times Ahead?
While Lapid lauded the Trump administration’s goodwill towards Israel, he expressed concern that positive relations on the executive level are papering over fissures that will emerge after Trump leaves office. Chief among these is American Jewry’s increasing disinterest in Israel. Orthodox Jews in Israel have criticized American Reform Jews too much, causing them to feel alienated. Increasing anti-Israel discourse on US college campuses has prevailed over American Jews’ ties to their ancestral homeland. Lapid also linked heightened partisanship under Trump to the erosion of the bipartisan support Israel has enjoyed in the past. As a consequence, bilateral relations could deteriorate during the next democratic administration, leaving Israel more exposed than ever to national security threats from within the Arab world.
Careful Optimism: A Winning Call?
As he discussed his chances for beating Netanyahu in the next parliamentary elections, Lapid emphasized that Israelis are more hesitant about large political shifts than US voters. For that reason, Lapid argued that emphasizing satisfaction with the status quo while calling for gradual crackdowns on corruption and moving towards a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict will be a winning call in 2019. In addition, Lapid advocated for a move away from using empty rhetoric to avoid confronting issues head-on, saying that “we need a government that actually does stuff, not [one] that just eloquently describes the problem.” While his strategy of emphasizing continuation and subtle changes might mean that Yesh Atid does not differentiate itself enough from Likud enough to win in 2019, Lapid hopes that centrist success in Germany and France might bode well for Israel.
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Peace picks, May 14 – May 20
- The Fallout from Trump’s Decision on the Iran Deal | Monday, May 14 | 12:00pm – 1:30pm | Atlantic Council | Register here |
May 12 is the deadline for President Trump to renew sanctions waivers under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). In January, he vowed to pull out of the JCPOA unless European nations met his demands for new pressure on Iran’s ballistic missile program, more stringent inspections of Iran’s military installations and a commitment to extend curbs on the Iranian nuclear program beyond the terms of the nuclear deal. The Future of Iran Initiative, the Global Business and Economics Program, and the Middle East Security Initiative invite you to a discussion of the ramifications of Trump’s decision on the likely responses of Iran and US European allies as well as the consequences for non-proliferation and conflict in the Middle East. A conversation with Axel Hellman (Policy Fellow; European Leadership Network), Elizabeth Rosenberg (Director, Energy, Economics and Security Program; Center for a New American Security), Ali Vaez (Iran Project Director; International Crisis Group), and David Mortlock (Nonresident Senior Fellow, Global Energy Center; Atlantic Council). Moderated by Barbara Slavin (Director, Future of Iran Initiative; Atlantic Council), with keynote remarks by David O’Sullivan (Ambassador and Head, European Union Delegation to the United States).
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- How to Talk to North Korea | Monday, May 14 | 10:00 am – 11:00 am | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | Register Here |
As a possible Trump-Kim summit draws closer, join Carnegie for a conversation about what negotiating with North Korea is really like. Previous U.S. negotiators and experts will talk about what lessons have been learned in previous rounds of talks, and what the United States should know going forward. The New York Times’ Mark Landler will moderate. Panel includes Suzanne DiMaggio (Director and Senior Fellow, New America), Robert L. Gallucci (Professor, Georgetown University), Christopher Hill (Professor, University of Denver), and Daniel Russel (VP for International Security and Diplomacy, Asia Society Policy Institute)
- US Policy Towards Iran: Strategic Options | Monday, May 14 | 10:00 am – 11:30 am | Bipartisan Policy Center | Register Here |
The president’s decision on the future of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) has dominated the discussion in Washington. But recent events also reinforce the need for an American strategy for the broader challenge posed by Iran. Returning some measure of stability to the increasingly fractured Middle East—a vital and enduring U.S. national security interest—requires confronting the spread of Iranian influence.
Join us on May 14 for a discussion on Iran’s influence in Syria and Iraq, and the release of a report from the Task Force on Managing Disorder in the Middle East on U.S. Policy Toward Iran: Strategic Options. Fireside chat includes Amb. Eric Edelman (Former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey) and Jake Sullivan (Former Director of Policy Planning, U.S. State Department and Former National Security Advisor to the Vice President). Panel includes Amb. James Jeffrey (Former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey and Iraq), Mary Beth Long (Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs), Denise Natali (Director, Center for Strategic Research at the Institute for National Strategic Studies) and Blaise Misztal (Director of National Security, Bipartisan Policy Center). Moderated by Arshad Mohammed (Diplomatic Correspondent, Reuters).
A Tale of Two Elections: Recapping the Polls in Lebanon and Iraq | Tuesday, May 15 | 12:00pm – 2:00pm | Middle East Institute | Register here |
As Lebanon holds its first parliamentary elections in nine years and Iraq paves a way forward in the aftermath of the war against ISIS, many questions remain as to what the political future holds for both countries. The parliamentary elections in Lebanon on May 6, and in Iraq on May 12, serve as a barometer for transparency, inclusion, and the political realities in both countries. The polls have raised pressing political and governance issues such as how to overcome sectarianism, corruption, and economic stagnation in order to encourage further openness and plurality. The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to host a panel discussion to examine these issues. MEI’s Bilal Y. Saab and Paul Salem will be joined by Abbas Kadhim (SAIS), Omar al-Nidawi (Gryphon Partners), and Bilal Wahab (WINEP) for a two-hour panel event moderated by MEI’s director for conflict resolution and the Track II Dialogues initiative, Randa Slim.
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5. Cuba: Post-Castro Transition | Wednesday, May 16 | 12:00pm – 1:30pm | Hudson Institute | Register here |
In April, Miguel Díaz-Canel became the 19th President of Cuba and the first in over 40 years who was not a member of the Castro family. This appointment — not election — of a new Cuban president raises a number of important questions about the future and stability of the regime. In a post-Castro era, Cuban politics will likely change, though the direction and magnitude of those changes remains to be seen. On May 16, Hudson Institute will host a panel to explore these issues and discuss the possibility of a democratic transition on the island. Panelists will include Eduardo Ulibarri, a Costa Rican journalist, diplomat, university professor, and international consultant; Hector E. Schamis, a teacher at Georgetown University’s Center for Latin American Studies and Democracy & Governance Program; and Ambassador Jaime Daremblum, senior fellow and director of Hudson Institute’s Center for Latin American Studies.
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6. Decision Point: Iran, the Nuclear Deal, and Regional Stability | Wednesday, May 16 | 1:00pm – 2:30pm | Wilson Center | Register here |
President Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear agreement will have far reaching implications for U.S. policy; the trans-Atlantic alliance; non-proliferation efforts; and even on regional stability – particularly in the Israeli-Lebanese-Iranian-Syrian arena. Indeed, those implications may go far in defining the U.S. posture in the region for years to come. Join us as four veteran analysts and policy advisers on the Middle East assess the implications of the president’s decision, including on U.S. foreign policy in the region at large. Featuring speakers Robert S. Litwak (Senior Vice President and Director of International Security Studies, Wilson Center), Michael Singh (Managing Director and Senior Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy), Ray Takeyh (Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations), and Tamara Cofman Wittes (Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution). Moderated by Aaron David Miller (Vice President for New Initiatives and Middle East Program Director, Wilson Center), with introductory remarks by Jane Harman (Director, President, and CEO, Wilson Center).
There will be a live webcast of this event.
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7. Turkey’s Early Elections | Wednesday, May 16 | 2:00pm – 3:30pm | SETA Foundation | Register here |
On June 24, Turkey will hold its first presidential and parliamentary elections under the new presidential system that was adopted in the 2017 constitutional referendum. In the presidential race, several political parties have nominated their own candidates, while in the parliamentary elections, several parties have formed alliances to gain the majority in the legislature. The winner of the presidential election will form the first Turkish government under the new presidential system for the next five years. The parliamentary makeup will be of critical importance in the transition to the new system. Please join the SETA Foundation at Washington DC for a timely discussion on Turkey’s upcoming June elections, current coalitions, political party dynamics, and the future of Turkish politics. With speakers Ihsan Aktas, President, GENAR Research and Polling; Nebi Mis, Director, Domestic Policy, SETA Foundation; and Murat Yesiltas, Director, Security Policy, SETA Foundation; with moderator Kilic Bugra Kanat, Research Director, SETA Foundation.
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8. The Risk of Interstate War(s) in the Middle East | Thursday, May 17 | 10:00am – 11:30am | Middle East Institute | Register here |
While armed nonstate actors and proxy militias have been grabbing most headlines in recent years, the risk of interstate war in the Middle East is rising at an alarming rate. Tensions between Israel and Iran have boiled over several times in recent weeks in Syria, risking a serious escalation between the two countries. Iranian-supplied missiles have been launched from Houthi-held areas in Yemen targeting Riyadh and other Saudi towns and cities, risking an escalation between the two regional powers. Tension also persists between the United States and Iran as the Trump administration moves away from the JCPOA. In Syria, U.S. and Russian forces are flying missions in a crowded air and military space; the risk of escalation there between the two superpowers also cannot be discounted. How high is the risk of interstate war in the Middle East? What are the dynamics of these various tension axes? How could the United States and other regional and international powers help avert such potential outbreaks? The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to host a panel featuring Martin Indyk of the Brookings Institution, Kenneth Pollack of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), MEI’s Bilal Y. Saab, Julianne Smith of the Center for New American Security (CNAS) to discuss these mounting tensions and how best to address them. MEI’s senior vice president for policy research and programs, Paul Salem, will moderate the discussion.
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9. Decentralization in Tunisia — Empowering Towns, Engaging People | Thursday, May 17 | 10:00am – 11:30am | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | Register here |
Tunisia’s first ever democratic local elections in May are a crucial step in the country’s efforts to devolve power from the national to the local level. In their latest paper, Decentralization in Tunisia: Empowering Towns, Engaging People, Carnegie Fellow Sarah Yerkes and Vice President for Studies Marwan Muasher argue that if done right, decentralization will both empower local actors and introduce a new political class outside of the country’s traditionally dominant political parties. Successful decentralization requires strong political will from central government officials, who must demonstrate their commitment to participatory local governance both on paper and in practice, and from local officials who must build trust with their constituents, provide opportunities for citizen engagement, and prevent the recreation of ineffective institutions at the local level. With the participation of Carnegie Senior Vice President for Studies Thomas Carothers and PBS NewsHour’s P.J. Tobia in the first session (10:05 – 10:45); Director of the Tunisian Institute of Elected Officials Elyès Ghanmi, independent consultant on local and international governance Laura J. Hogg, and programmes director at the Jasmine Foundation and researcher at Sciences Po Paris Intissar Kherigi with Sarah Yerkes and Marwan Muasher in the second session (10:50 – 12:15).
A light lunch will follow.
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10. The Transatlantic Alliance and the Western Balkans | Thursday, May 17 | 10:30am – 12:30pm | Johns Hopkins SAIS | Register here |
Amid a growing number of foreign policy rifts between the United States and the European Union, the Western Balkans remains one region where the new US administration has identified an opportunity for close cooperation with Brussels. As European political leaders convene in Sofia for the Western Balkan Summit, we will talk about the past and present challenges to transatlantic cooperation in the Western Balkans and how these might be overcome. As European political leaders convene in Sofia for the Western Balkan Summit, we will talk about the past and present challenges to transatlantic cooperation in the Western Balkans and how these might be overcome. The timing for such a discussion is critical, given the renewed secessionist threats in the region and the need for a joint US and EU response to grapple with this challenge. A conversation with Lord Paddy Ashdown, Member of the House of Lords and former High Representative and EU Special Representative to Bosnia and Herzegovina; Ms. Marsaili Fraser; former Head of the Political Department of the EU Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina; and Mr. James O’Brien, Vice Chair of Albright Stonebridge Group and former Special Presidential Envoy for the Balkans; moderated by Dr. Majda Ruge, Fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute of Johns Hopkins SAIS.
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11. Politics and Economics in Putin’s Fourth Term | Friday, May 18 | 9:45am – 11:00am | Atlantic Council | Register here |
As Vladimir Putin begins an unprecedented fourth term as president of Russia, his country stands at a critical crossroads. With a volatile economy and an increasingly authoritarian government, the country is facing high levels of political and economic uncertainty. At this event, Vladimir Milov, Russian opposition politician and economist, will join a panel of US-based experts to discuss the political and economic future of Putin’s Russia. Featuring Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center Dr. Anders Åslund and David M. Rubenstein Fellow at the Brookings Institution Dr. Alina Polyakova, with moderation by Director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center Ambassador John Herbst.
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12. Can Inclusive Peace Processes Work? Strategies for Meeting Resistance to Inclusion | Friday, May 18 | 10:00am – 11:30am | U.S. Institute of Peace | Register here |
Too often, peace processes only include dueling parties — leaving women; religious, indigenous, and ethnic groups; youth; and survivors of violence excluded from critical discussions that shape the future landscape of a country. Yet, sidelining their voices often results in a resurgence of conflict and fails to achieve comprehensive or sustainable peace. Join the U.S. Institute of Peace and Conciliation Resources for a discussion on overcoming challenges to inclusive peace processes and negotiated settlements. The research draws on case studies and local perspectives with local partners from Colombia, Bougainville and Nepal, exploring how inclusion is negotiated in war to peace transitions, common barriers to and trade-offs between inclusion and stability, and types of external and internal support that have been effective. In three segments: Presentation of Findings with Zahbia Yousuf (Senior Advisor, Peace and Transition Process, Conciliation Resources) and Sophia Close (Senior Advisor, Gender and Peacebuilding, Conciliation Resources); Application and Experiences on the Ground with Deepak Thapa (Director, Social Science Baha; Kathmandu, Nepal) and Rosa Emilia Salamanca (Director, Institute for Social and Economic Research and Action; Bogota, Colombia); and Policy Implications with Esra Cuhadar (JR Senior Fellow, U.S. Institute of Peace) and Jennifer Marron (Peace Process Advisor, Bureau of Conflict Stabilization and Operations, Department of State). With moderator Rosarie Tucci (Director, Inclusive Societies, U.S. Institute of Peace) and introduction by Nancy Lindborg (President, U.S. Institute of Peace).
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It’s the region, stupid
The Middle East suffers from a whole range of problems. War and conflict are besetting wide parts of the region and have caused massive destruction as well as displacement in several countries, including Syria and Yemen. Climate change has brought about enormous environmental degradation such as desertification and water scarcity. At the same time, stressed domestic economies are increasingly unable to provide job opportunities for the region’s disenchanted youth. The Middle East faces enormous challenges that transcend borders and hence require answers that narrow-minded national policy making is no longer able to provide. Indeed, the region is today in dire need of regional responses.
On March 7, the Middle East Institute presented a roadmap of how future cooperation should look like in the Middle East. Resulting from Track 1.5 initiative involving current and former officials and senior experts from across the Middle East as well as from China, Europe, Russia, and the United States, the so-called Baghdad Declaration outlines 12 good neighborhood principles for the region. The discussion featured three major participants in the Middle East Dialogue. Naufel al-Hassan, deputy chief of staff to Prime Minister Haider al Abadi of Iraq, Abdullah al-Dardari, who serves as a senior advisor on reconstruction at The World Bank, and MEI’s senior vice president for policy research and programs Paul Salem provided their perspective on the Baghdad Declaration and the Middle East’s future. A full recording of the event is here:
Regional integration is already prevalent in the Middle East. Abdullah al-Dardari stresses that, excluding oil and gas, intraregional trade accounts for some 40% of total trade in the Middle East; taking the informal economy into consideration, this figure might even reach 60%. Moreover, the Middle East has the world’s highest level of intraregional level of remittances. Paul Salem underlines this observation and adds that only because of the high level of existing regional interdependence and interaction conflicts were able to spread that easily across the Middle East. However, the integration of today is neither well-structured nor reflected in the political relationships between Middle Eastern states.
The region is still in dire need of better cooperation among its members. Al-Dardari argues that the model of country-based economic growth has reached its apex in the Middle East. Self-sustained economic development is no longer possible as national labor markets, productive bases, and consumption levels have become too narrow. Instead, only regional economic integration and the resulting creation of an open regional market can attract extensive investment and the money needed to rebuild war-ravaged countries: an estimated one trillion dollar of assets has been destroyed since 2011. Naufel al-Hassan also points out that political and environmental challenges such as transnational terrorist networks and water scarcity go beyond the problem-solving capacities of single states and require common answers. In the same vein, the region’s governments can only bring back hope to the Middle East’s youth when they collaborate on providing decent job opportunities. A new regional framework is hence not an option, but a necessity.
Although the contemporary conflicts in the Middle East seem to make increased regional cooperation almost impossible to achieve, change is possible. Salem stresses that other regions of the world were able to transition from a conflict system to a stable order. Not even a century ago, Europe suffered from two wars which much exceeded the level violence that has beset the contemporary Middle East. Yet Europe has been able to overcome its international divisions and conflicts and has established a strong system of cooperation, the European Union. At the same time, the Middle East has proven to be able to move beyond regional standoffs, as the surmounting of rivalry between Egypt and Saudi Arabia of the 1950s has demonstrated. We can thus be hopeful whereby al-Hassan emphasizes that a new stage of integration has already begun. To defeat ISIS, the region has displayed a new level of cooperation, which can serve as a blueprint for future efforts to unite in face of political, economic, and environmental challenges.
A better future is hence possible for the Middle East. The Baghdad Declaration offers a distinct vision that can show the path towards deeper integration in the region. When this transition will materialize will however depend on the readiness of the region’s current leadership to cease hostilities and acknowledge that small-minded national agendas cannot act as a remedy. For the sake of the Middle East and its people, this change of mentality and political outlook should occur soon.
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