Tag: Lebanon
Politics, not religion
The Middle East is fraught with governments, non-state actors and ideologues fighting for dominance, with religious identity a major divide between Sunni and Shia. But is it politics or religion? On September 16th, Abbas Kadhim, Senior Foreign Policy Fellow at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Hisham Melhem, the Washington Bureau Chief Al Arabiya, Joyce Karam, the Washington Bureau Chief of Al Hayat and Geneive Abdo, Moderator and Fellow in Middle East and Southwest Asia at The Stimson Center, addressed this question.
Abdo acknowledged that sectarianism is one of the animating principles and dominant themes in Middle East disputes. But she also noted there is a deeper conclusion to be reached about the role of religion.
Though tension and violence within the Muslim ummah is as old as Islam itself, Melhem noted that the development of political Islam is rooted in the 20th century. Some might attribute the Sunni-Shia divide to rivalry as to whose jurisprudence is more true to the faith, but this only comprises a small element. The actual fight is for political power. When analyzing sectarian violence it is essential to look at the manifestations of political tension and influence in a historical context.
Until 1967, the Arab political sphere was “animated” by secular ideology and driven by nationalism, socialism, and Nasserism. Israel’s devastating defeat of the Arabs during the 1967 war caused a resurgence of Sunni political Islam that capitalized on the increasing feeling of insecurity. The Islamists used the waning support of secular ideologies to consolidate support and power. They saw the defeat at the hands of the Israelis as a way to return to Islamic roots.
The 1979 revolution in Iran saw a resurgence of Shia power, reasserting the sect as a “powerhouse in the world.” Using Iraq as a case study, where sectarian violence is rampant, the Sunni-Shia divide can be seen as a means to acquire power. While some argue that the 2003 American invasion created sectarianism in the country, Melhem concludes that the invasion only made it worse and that Iraq was already “broken.”
Kadhim echoed the sentiment that the conflict between the two sects is deeper than an “old story of rivalry” but rather one of “identity politics.” He further claimed that “Iraq is the cradle of the Sunni-Shia rivalry” that dates back to the early 20th century during the British mandate.
Karam shifted the conversation to Lebanon, a microcosm of regional politics. While noting that Lebanon has never had an extended period of peace due to sectarian tensions and regional violence, she highlighted the moment in which sectarian tension “flared up” during the 1975 civil war in Lebanon. The precursor to the war involved not only the sectarian divide between Sunnis and Shias but included the different Christian factions as well. Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon only made the situation worse as the country continued to struggle with internal issues.
In Lebanon’s second largest city of Tripoli, poverty is pervasive. Karam cites a UNDP report that 57% of residents live in poverty, a city that also happens to have the largest concentration of Sunni population in the country. In addition, Bab Tabaneh, another heavily Sunni populated city with a 87% poverty rate, is where most of the sectarian clashes happen in Lebanon. The socio-economic situation contributes greatly to sectarian tensions.
Following the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri, a void was left in the Sunni leadership in Lebanon, which some say led to the rise of the Salafist movement (mainly in Tripoli). Radicalization was exacerbated by the spillover of the Syrian war in 2011.
Karam disagreed with Melhem’s assessment that the Iranian revolution was the catalyst for political Islam in the region. Instead she concluded it arose from a generation of disenfranchised, undereducated youth who feel their future has been compromised.
As violence rages on in the Middle East, the real issue is the struggle for political power as states transition away from secular autocracies. The sectarian diagnosis is an overstated simplification.
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The fate of the displaced
After more than three years of fighting, the Syrian civil war shows little sign of abating. Meanwhile there has been an intensification of the humanitarian crisis. The rise of the phenomenally violent Islamic State, which has spread from its de facto capital in Raqqa, displacing Syrians previously inclined to remain in spite of the war, has in part contributed to the problems. An increase in the willingness of the government to use tactics which indiscriminately target the Syrian population such as barrel bombing, and the continued use of certain types of chemical weapons, has further added to the number of Syrians seeking refuge. This ongoing displacement has enormous implications not only for the future of Syria, but also for neighboring countries currently playing host to refugees.
Seeking to address some of the issues the region is facing, Carol Batchelor, the Turkey representative in the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Brian Hansford, the UNHCR spokesperson in Washington DC, and Andrew Tabler, senior fellow in the Program on Arab Politics at The Washington Institute, Tuesday joined Elizabeth Ferris, the co-director of the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement in a discussion on Syrian Displacement: Views from the Region.
Opening the dialogue, Brian Hansford noted the sheer number of Syrian refugees now registered by the UNHCR. As of August 29, that figure stood in excess of three million, though Hansford stressed that this does not account for those internally displaced within Syria, or for those who have crossed borders but failed to register. Indeed, those Syrians who are now registered often report having been displaced within the country multiple times before attempting to cross the border. He also drew attention to the number of children – making up more than half of the refugees – now in camps in Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan.
Carol Batchelor picked up on the significance of the number children in refugee camps, noting that this is exerting a toll on the education of a generation of Syrian children. The situation is complicated further in Turkey where the lack of a common language between host and hosted has led to educational difficulties. In some cases children have now missed up to four years of schooling. This is important when considering the long term strategies for rebuilding Syria. If its people are to succeed in reconstruction then they must be furnished with skills and opportunities so as to be empowered to rise to the challenges of rebuilding a state.
Batchelor also warned of the dangers that have arisen as the humanitarian crisis has become more protracted. While she praised the generosity of the Turkish state in its efforts to accommodate refugees, she expressed concern that little has been done to transition from short term, reactive strategies focussing on the emergency encampments set up at the onset of the crisis, to a longer term strategy. As the situation stands, the psychological well-being of the refugees is suffering after three years of living in tents. If this is not addressed there may well be implications both for short-term stability and for longer term rebuilding efforts.
For Andrew Tabler the primary concern lies not with the refugees inside of the camps, who are relatively well cared for despite their growing numbers. Instead he drew attention to those refugees who are unregistered and unaccounted for, whom he believes represent a two-fold security concern. On the one hand there is concern for these displaced persons’ personal security and well-being, which without support from the UN and NGOs may become vulnerable. On the other hand there is the more general security concern that these unaccounted refugees could become radicalized or facilitate attacks and unrest in host nations.
The panelists were all in agreement that there is no end in sight, either for the war or for the displaced Syrians. Tabler estimated the crisis could easily continue for five years, with full settlement taking a decade or more.
But there was disagreement as to how Syria might one day be reconstructed. Though Tabler claimed that it was beyond Syrians themselves to put the pieces back together, both Batchelor and Hansford stressed that the refugees in Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan do not see themselves staying in their host countries indefinitely: generally they want to return, and to play a role in shaping the country’s future once it is safe enough to do so. It is now important for the UN and the international community to ensure that these refugees are empowered so when the time comes they are able to realize this future.
Listen to the event here.
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Politics first
The American philosopher Alfred North Whitehead talked of the “fallacy of misplaced concreteness,” which is like putting the emPHAsis on the wrong syLLAble. We are at risk these days of doing that in Syria, Iraq and Libya.
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) rapid advance toward Baghdad is getting a lot of attention, as it should. But Sunni-based ISIS is not a military threat to a city of nearly 4 million people, most of them Shia. ISIS might target the western outskirts near Baghdad International Airport and Abu Ghraib prison, which will grab big headlines. But ISIS is not going to march into what used to be called the Green Zone.
Nor did ISIS take Mosul, Tikrit and other Sunni-majority towns in the north and west solely because of its military prowess. Its success is due to broad Sunni support for action against Prime Minister Maliki, who proved his popularity among the Shia in April’s election but has governed in an increasingly authoritarian and sectarian way. That’s why President Obama has made assistance to him conditional on taking a more inclusive approach. Yesterday’s meeting and declaration of support from a broad cross-section of Iraqi politicians was meant to be Maliki’s response.
What we are facing in Iraq is not merely a military challenge but rather a political challenge to a fragile state.
The outcome of this challenge may well be determined by neither Sunni nor Shia, the prime protagonists of the current fighting. Kurdish peshmerga under the command of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) have already filled the vacuum left in Kirkuk by the evaporation of the Iraqi Army. The Kurds have long claimed Kirkuk as their own and won’t leave it without a fight. It is a major oil-producing area that could bring the KRG to the breakeven point: 100% of the oil produced within KRG control could generate as much revenue as the 17% of all of Iraq’s oil that Baghdad is supposed to provide. But Maliki has cut off KRG revenue for months, due to a dispute over accounting for it and over the KRG’s authority to decide on the export and sale of oil independent of Baghdad.
In the past, Kurdistan’s political independence seemed impossible because of Turkish opposition. But Turkish attitudes are changing. Ankara this year received oil directly from Kurdistan, allowing it to be stored and then sold without Baghdad’s permission. Prime Minister Erdogan has appreciated the KRG’s cooperation in tamping down Kurdish violence inside Turkey. Even the Turkish military might think an independent and relatively secular Kurdistan would be a more attractive neighbor than either an ISIS-run Sunnistan or a Shia-run autocracy.
The Kurds will not want to go their own way until ISIS is defeated or contained. But KRG President Barzani even before the latest ISIS advance was promising Kurds a referendum on independence. If he ever follows through, the vote will be overwhelmingly in favor. It is hard to picture the Sunnis staying in an even vaguely democratic Iraq that would then be 60-70% Shia. Sunnistan under ISIS control would be a real threat to the United States and to Iran, which is why Tehran and Washington are trying to make nice these days even as they compete for influence with Maliki while trying to keep Iraq unified.
Focusing exclusively on Iraq would be another fallacy of misplace concreteness. ISIS does not confine its ambitions to a single country. Iraq, Syria and Lebanon are already a single theater of operations. The place to attack an enemy is where he is weakest. That might well be inside Syria rather than in Iraq. The Obama administration was unwise to let ISIS get as strong as it has in western Syria. It is late to beef up support to its competitors or help them succeed against Bashar al Asad, but it is still worth a bolder try than Washington has made so far. The issue is not just a military one in Syria either: one of the key shortcomings of the Syrian Opposition Coalition there is its inability to deliver services in liberated areas. That is a political and governance issue, not only a military one.
The same is true in Libya. I’m delighted Ahmed Abu Khattalah is in US custody and will be tried in a civilian court. But whatever role he played in Libya’s Ansar al Sharia will be filled quickly by another jihadist. The problem in Libya, as in Iraq and Syria, is a weak state that lacks legitimacy with its people and is unable to maintain even a modicum of law and order. Dealing with this problem only by training up a General Purpose Force and leaving the governance and political issues unresolved is one more fallacy of misplaced concreteness.
PS: On Iran, best to listen to Randa Slim on NPR this morning:
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Survey says
Tuesday Jay Leveton presented the results of the 2014 ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller survey at the American Security Project. It focuses on Arab youth perspectives, concerns and aspirations throughout the region. The survey consisted of 3,500 face-to-face interviews conducted over the past year across sixteen countries in the Middle East. The sample was split equally between males and females ranging from 18 to 24 years old. Leveton highlighted the top ten findings:
- Arab youth are embracing modern values. 46% of Arab youth believe that traditional values are outdated and belong in the past. This number has risen from only 17% in 2011, demonstrating a shift away from traditional values. This change is also reflected in the decreasing influence of parents, family, and religion on Arab youth.
- They remain confident in their national government’s abilities. Arab youth show approximately 60% confidence in the government’s ability to address living standards, economic stability, war, unemployment and terrorism. There is great surprise in this confidence, specifically in countries that have suffered from economic hardship or political instability following the Arab Spring. Approval of the impact of the Arab Spring has declined from 72% in 2012 to 54% in 2014, most likely due to the continuous civil unrest and political instability in countries such as Egypt and Syria.
- They are increasingly concerned about the rising cost of living and unemployment. 63% of Arab youth are concerned about growing living expenses, while 42% expressed significant worry over unemployment. Approximately half are apprehensive about their own national economy. However, 55% of youth in countries outside of the GCC are concerned about unemployment, while only 39% within the GCC. This is due to the GCC’s proven ability to assist in job creation, while countries in North Africa and the Levant struggle with their youth unemployment rates.
- Arab youth believe that the biggest obstacle in the Middle East is civil unrest. 55% believe that the recent uprisings and instability are the greatest impediments to the advancement of the region. 38% believe that the lack of democracy is the greatest issue, while some believe it is the threat of terrorism.
- They are increasingly looking towards entrepreneurship as a source of opportunity. 67% feel that the younger generation is more likely to start a business than in previous generations. This entrepreneurial spirit hints at the perceived opportunities in starting one’s own business, specifically in response to some governments’ inability to provide jobs for their youth.
- The country that the younger Arab generation would most like to live in is the United Arab Emirates. 39% said that the UAE is the ideal country they would move to, while 21% said the United States, and 14% said Saudi Arabia. The UAE is the model country for Arab youth in terms of the right balance of governmental responsibility, national economy, foreign relations, etc. The United States has remained high in favor in Arab youth perspectives.
- Arab youth see their country’s biggest allies to be Saudi Arabia and the UAE. 36% believe that Saudi Arabia is their country’s biggest ally and 33% said the UAE. This was followed by Qatar, Kuwait, and lastly the United States, which marks a shift away from Western countries as the largest allies.
- They have a new concern for obesity and rising health issues. Over the past year, there has been a sharp increase in the percentage of youth concerned about obesity from 12% in 2013 to 26% in 2014. An increasing number of the younger generation is worried about diabetes, cancer and heart disease. Among all countries, 52% of youth feel as though the healthcare in their country has remained the same over the past year, while 34% believe that it has improved.
- They believe that the government should subsidize energy costs and aren’t too concerned about climate change. 74% believe that energy, electricity, and transport fuel should be subsidized by the government. This comes from the rising concern about the cost of living in each respective country. While this is the greatest worry among youth, concern for climate change and the environment is a very low priority at only 6%.
- There has been a great increase in daily news consumption, specifically through online media and social networking sites. Television has been the most popular source of news for the sixth year in a row with 75% of Arab youth using it as their most frequent news source. However, a declining number of youth see the television as the most trusted source of news– 39% now view social media as the most reliable source, rising from 22% in 2013.
While the 2014 survey ranges across sixteen countries that vary in political, economic, and social characteristics, there is nonetheless a great sense of continuity in the hopes, concerns, and priorities of Arab youth in the region.
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There is more thankless work to be done
Lakhtar Brahimi, the UN special envoy for Syria during the better part of the last two years, resigned yesterday, with appropriate apologies to the Syrian people. In many obvious senses, the UN has been a colossal failure in Syria:
- it has failed to bring about a political settlement between the regime and its opposition,
- it has not prevented 150,000 deaths and millions of people displaced,
- it hasn’t even managed more than local ceasefires,
- it delivers humanitarian aid mostly behind regime lines, and
- it has been unable to get concerted regional or great power action to end the war.
But looked at from a different angle it has also managed to do quite well: even before Brahimi’s appointment, it put forward a plan for an end to the fighting, it deployed international monitors, it withdrew them when it became apparent they weren’t doing any good, it managed two Geneva conferences (the first in 2012 at least produced a joint US/Russian plan and the second got the warring parties to the same table), it has helped managed the process of eliminating Syria’s chemical weapons, it has documented human rights abuses, and it has provided absolutely vital humanitarian assistance to large numbers of vulnerable civilians.
The UN is only as good as its member states allow it to be. It is not a miracle worker. But it is also not finished yet, even if Brahimi deservedly wants to withdraw.
So what should it do next? Given the failure of the Geneva 2 talks, and the apparent fruitlessness of further efforts along those lines, what should the UN and its specialized agencies do to alleviate suffering, protect civilians, increase the odds of an eventual political settlement (or hasten its arrival) and reduce the likelihood of a burdgeoning conflict that engulfs Lebanon, Iraq and maybe even Turkey and Jordan?
There are several options, not mutually exclusive:
- Deliver 360 degree aid: The bulk of UN humanitarian assistance has gone people in need in regime-controlled territory. The UN agencies could join many nongovernmental organizations in providing ample humanitarian assistance across borders from Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan, thus enabling it to deliver more to rebel-held areas.
- Facilitate regional dialogue: While they have embassies in each others’ capitals, the Saudis and Iranians are barely on speaking terms and conducting a proxy war in Syria; refocusing them on common interests like countering violent extremists and maintaining state structures in the Levant could improve the situation. It is a good sign that the Saudis yesterday invited the Iranian foreign minister for a visit.
- Begin planning for post-war reconstruction and transition: When the war ends, as it inevitably will, the UN will be called upon to support reconstruction; it should be thinking about that now, helping to negotiate local ceasefires where possible and to build the local governing structures and civil society that can support the reconstruction process. Efforts of this sort are vital to improving the prospects for a democratic transition in Syria.
- Provide a moral compass: the UN could do more to publicize war crimes and crimes against humanity, it could take a strong position against the presidential “election” Assad is planning to conduct under thoroughly unfair and unfree conditions June 3, it could insist more loudly on protection of civilians and humanitarian access, it could get religious leaders to insist on observance of the laws of war.
- Cut off regime and terrorist financing: The sanctions on the Syrian regime are not nearly as tight as they might be, and terrorist organizations like ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) as well as Jabhat al Nusra are still receiving international funds as well as arms and other assistance from abroad. A more concerted effort to reduce the availability of resources could help de-escalate the conflict and reduce the harm to civilians.
There are arguments against all these propositions. The UN generally requires the permission of the host country to deliver aid from any direction. The regime could conceivably boot the UN from Damascus if it tries without permission. It is not easy for the UN to get the Saudis talking, as they tend to be both secretive and hierarchical. Local level reconstruction efforts to establish a minimum of governance and civil society require a capillary international presence in rebel-held areas, where security is dicey. He who holds a moral compass will not always be welcomed by those–on both sides of the war–who don’t.
But the UN is a reflection of ourselves. If we want these things done, the organization will find at least some people and means to get them done. The soft-spoken and precise Brahimi, well-suited to the high political level he has been dealing at, would not have necessarily been the best person for these tasks. The US needs to lead an effort to ensure that Brahimi’s departure does not end the UN’s focus on Syria. There is more thankless work to be done.
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Lebanon’s neutrality in Syria
The Atlantic Council hosted a discussion on Friday about Lebanon’s neutrality toward the Syrian conflict. Is it hot air or realistic promise? The guest speakers were Paul Salem, Vice President for Policy and Research from the Middle East Institute and Bilal Saab, Resident Senior Fellow on International Security at the Atlantic Council. Faysal Itani, Fellow at the Atlantic Council Center for the Middle East, moderated.
Paul Salem said there is always an issue of neutrality in divided societies. For Lebanon, this has been a challenge for decades. Beirut is trying to survive in a turbulent environment. Figuring out how divided societies should manage foreign policy has been a challenge more recently for Syria and Iraq as well. One option is to reduce the load on the central government and have a foreign policy of neutrality, as it reduces the chances of division in a society.
One of the dangers of this tactic is that local parties will seek foreign alliances. Similarly, regional parties ally with local groups. We have seen this in the Levant and Ukraine. The dangers become particularly acute when the central government is weak. The Middle East today is in the midst of an intense proxy conflict between Iran and the Gulf countries. This has torn apart Syria and Lebanon and it is digging into Iraq. Often these divided societies are very small. Consequently, achieving neutrality requires domestic and external commitment. If the region or world does not respect neutrality, it is difficult for divided societies to maintain it. Machiavelli said that the most dangerous decision a polarized state can make is to try to remain neutral because it will have no regional allies. It is safer to pick a side. Lebanon has tried both. It faces challenges concerning its foreign relations in a turbulent region. On one hand, local players have sought alliances in the region and world to support their domestic positions. On the other hand, outside players have sought local alliances for proxy wars.
For now, the recently formed government is cohesive, with both the March 14 and March 8 alliances involved. However, the government only has until this week to announce its policy statement. Otherwise, it cannot be a full functioning government and will become a caretaker. In addition, the president’s term expires in May.
Deciding on its foreign policy is critical for Lebanon. This is an external and internal problem. Externally the fight between two elephants, Iran and Saudi Arabia, will continue to devastate the Levant. The region cannot survive this level of proxy conflict.
Bilal Saab tried to answer the question, is Lebanon’s neutrality hot air or a realistic promise? In his opinion it is hot air unless a specific scenario takes place. The scenario is as follows: Hezbollah would draw or greatly reduce its military involvement in Syria.
Hezbollah sees the Syrian conflict as an existential struggle. However, there have been several moments of crisis in its history when top leaders proclaimed the death of the organization, but it never happened. For example, after Abbas al-Musawi was assassinated, after the 1993, 1996, and 2006 high-intensity conflicts with Israel, and after the tribunal accusing Hezbollah of killing Rafic Hariri, the organization weathered the storms.
The reason it has overcome all of these crises is because Hezbollah has always maintained a strong relationship with the Shia community. Today there is no rupture in this bond, but we are starting to see a few cracks. In Bilal’s opinion, these cracks are key to forcing Hezbollah to change its approach to the Syrian civil war and focus on the Lebanese internal politics.
For now, Hezbollah is nowhere near reducing its involvement in Syria. It has suffered many losses and several bombings, but Hezbollah is willing to tolerate this. The more challenging the situation becomes in Syria, the more the relationship between Hezbollah and its constituency will become tenuous. Out of its own self-interest, Hezbollah will be forced to come up with a compromise where neutrality will again become an option. In this situation, involvement in regional struggles will not be an option anymore.
Another scenario is one in which the intensifying struggle in Syria creates a rally ‘round the flag effect and strengthens the bond between the Shia community and Hezbollah. Bilal does not believe this is the direction the Shia community will take. Greater cracks will force Hezbollah to make some big concessions. Today they may have a tight grip over the community, but older aspirations of the Shias that tended to be more secular and less in line with perpetual conflict will come back to the fore. It is hard to make the case to explain why Shia are dying in Syria. This is the only scenario Bilal thinks could bring about Lebanese neutrality. Otherwise he sees it only as hot air.
Faysal Itani asked, in light of the divide in Lebanon, what are US interests here? What should they be?
Paul Salem: Look at Lebanon in the context of the Levant; it is part of a broader dynamic. When the Syrian uprising started and became increasingly violent, another US administration would have seen a potential to impact of balance of power in the Levant. There was a brief period when the Assad regime would have been vulnerable. That moment has passed mainly because of US reluctance to engage in the Syrian conflict. In the past there was an opportunity to roll back Iranian reach in Syria and Lebanon, which is a potentially major US interest. It might have also brought about a quicker resolution to the Syrian crisis.
By inaction, we have arrived at a bloody balance of power that has destroyed the Syria that used to exist. The war will likely go on for years. It is now the biggest humanitarian crisis of our generation and hugely destabilizes the whole region. From today’s perspective, the attempt to reach a negotiated ending with Assad’s departure and the creation of some sort of transition has collapsed.
The Ukraine issue has collapsed any chance of US-Russian cooperation. The main challenge for Lebanon is to survive the Syrian war. It is not clear if it will survive if the situation continues. The only way to reach a political resolution is by looking at the Geneva I framework. Assad has to leave. For Assad to leave, he must be forced to leave. This means the United States leading allies to raise pressure. The Assad regime is one that governs by force and will only relinquish its power by force. A resolution will not happen until the U.S. puts pressure first, diplomacy second.
Any post-conflict Syria must be more neutral. The united Syria of tomorrow cannot be closely aligned with Iran or it would not be united. To survive the Syrian war, Lebanon could benefit from a strong government and aid from the US to deal with the refugee crisis. Lebanon might otherwise be sunk by the refugee situation. If the refugees become more desperate and armed, Lebanon will not be able to survive. It will collapse and once again become a failed state.
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