Tag: Lebanon
Power, Power and Rice
While some are predicting (or hoping for) big changes in American foreign policy in the liberal interventionist/human rights first direction with the appointments of Susan Rice as national security adviser and Samantha Power as UN ambassador, I doubt it.
Both have already left marks on US foreign policy, Samantha through the Atrocities Prevention Board and Susan in the Libya intervention and many other efforts at the UN, including the successful use of its Human Rights Commission to report on atrocities in Syria. I wouldn’t suggest these are enormous departures from the past, but they certainly reflect the view that saving foreigners from mass atrocity has its place in US p0licy and needs to be given due consideration along with more traditional national interests of the military, political and economic varieties.
The main “to intervene or not” issue today is Syria. Susan and Samantha have both already been involved in internal debates on Syria, where President Obama ignored the advice of Hillary Clinton, David Petraeus and Leon Panetta. They all advised a more interventionist stance. It is the president, not the advisers, who is choosing not to try to stop the Syrian civil war, largely because of issues unrelated to Syria: Russian support on the withdrawal from Afghanistan and in the nuclear negotiations with Iran, not to mention the American public’s war weariness and the parlous budget situation. No doubt someone at the Pentagon is also telling him that allowing extremist Sunnis and Shia to continue killing each other in Syria is in the US interest. Read more
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Not promising
With the strategically placed town of Qusayr about to fall to Syrian army and Lebanese Hizbollah forces, the Syrian opposition coalition (SOC) is saying it won’t attend “Geneva II” peace talks without an end to the siege of Qusayr and a guarantee that any political settlement will ensure Bashar al Asad steps down. Even if those things were to happen magically, it is unclear who would represent the opposition at peace talks, as the SOC has been meeting in Istanbul and struggling painfully to broaden its base even as revolutionaries inside Syria complain loudly about its ineffectiveness.
The regime, emboldened by success on the battlefield and Russia’s decision to provide advanced air defenses, will not agree to either SOC condition.
Where does this leave the US?
We are left holding the diplomatic bag, trying to deliver a political solution in conditions that are not ripe for a settlement. Moscow and Tehran, while claiming to want a political solution and criticizing the West and its Gulf allies (Saudi Arabia and Qatar) for support to the revolutionaries, have been busily bolstering the Asad regime on the battlefield. President Obama is said to have ordered up plans for a no-fly zone, but there is no sign he is serious about implementing them in the face of continued Russian and Chinese vetoes at the UN Security Council.
There is also no sign as yet that the regime can reassert its authority over all of Syria. Large parts of both the north and the south are in revolutionary hands. But the regime has a good chance of securing the route from Damascus to the Alawite heartland in the west and the port at Tartus. Homs is likely the next big battlefield. Government forces there have been making slow progress against rebels in the city center. It may well fall with a whimper rather than a bang.
Meanwhile sectarian conflict is spreading to Lebanon and Iraq, even as both those countries export fighters into Syria. The involvement of Lebanese Hizbollah has important military implications not only within Syria but also in Lebanon and vis-a-vis Israel. Turkey has long harbored the Syrian opposition forces and has suffered a number of military and terrorist attacks from Syria. The sad fact is that only a quick (and unlikely) end to the civil war in Syria will save its neighbors from refugee flows, terrorist bombs, sectarian conflict,and the risk that they too may end up embroiled in a regional Levantine war.
So what is to be done?
If, like me, you are of the school that says diplomacy is getting other people to do what you want them to do, you’ve got to have doubts whether convening peace talks at this point is going to produce a settlement, however much you might like that to happen. They could be useful in clarifying positions, unifying the opposition, establishing some principles, making some contacts and defining better what is at issue, but it is highly unlikely that you are going to get a settlement when both sides think, however unrealistically, they may gain from more fighting and worry that an agreement to lay down arms could lead to slaughter when the other side fails to abide.
There is no trust at this point between the Asad regime and the revolutionaries. Neither side believes the other is serious about negotiating or about implementing a negotiated agreement. Unless one side or the other manages a military breakout that today seems unlikely, we are a long way from the end in Syria, which means the region will be under serious strain for a long time to come.
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180 miles from disaster
Yesterday’s Friends of Syria meeting occurred in Amman, just 180 miles from the battle for Qusayr, a Syrian town located just off the road from Damascus through Homs to Alawite-populated areas of the west. If the opposition can hold Qusayr and Homs, it will split Damascus from the west. If it can’t, Bashar al Asad will have what he needs to maintain a regime axis that splits the liberated areas of the south from the liberated areas of the north. Either way, the outcome is likely to be a disaster for someone.
The Qusayr fighting involves Lebanese Hizbollah fighting with the Syrian army against mostly Sunni rebels, including Jabhat al Nusra. It naturally has echoes inside Lebanon, where Alawites and Sunnis have clashed in Tripoli. There is a real risk of spillover. While some in Washington may wonder why we should worry about Hizbollah and Sunni extremists associated with Jabhat al Nusra kill each other, it is important to widen the aperture a bit: state structures in Levant are at risk. Were they to collapse, the chaos could be widespread. Syria never has been comfortable with Lebanon as a separate state and established diplomatic relations with it only in the last few years.
It is hard to be optimistic about the preparations for next month’s Syria peace conference. Apart from the parlous military situation in Qusayr, Moscow is insisting not only that Iran be present but that the Syrian opposition come to the table without preconditions (in particular that Bashar al Asad step aside before any political transition). Then and only then is Moscow willing to set a date for the conference.
Iran’s presence is certainly necessary if the conference is going to produce anything like a political solution. The Russians are not wrong about that. Its fighters, and Hizbollah fighters it supports, are very much engaged in Syria. As for Moscow’s pre-condition that there not be pre-conditions, I suppose George Sabra–the current, interim head of the Syrian Opposition Coalition–will figure out a way to fudge that, perhaps by noting the Coalition’s acceptance of the formula already accepted last year at the Geneva conference: a transitional governing body that would exercise full executive powers “formed on the basis of mutual consent.”
More problematic is the Russian transfer of major new weapons systems to Syria and its deployment of warships off the coast. Russian thinktankers claim
non-intervention is now a basic Russian principle…
but that is neither true nor new. Russia is certainly intervening in the Syria conflict on the side of the regime it considers the legitimate sovereign. And it intervened on behalf of rebel forces in Georgia, when that suited its preferences. Russian policy might better be stated as preventing Western intervention in areas it regards as within its sphere of influence. We would no doubt return the favor if they were to muck in the Gulf.
The most sensible comment yesterday comes from Salim Idris, titular head of the Free Syrian Army. He is quoted as saying in a letter to Secretary Kerry:
For the negotiations to be of any substance, we must reach a strategic military balance, without which the regime will feel empowered to dictate … while fully sustained logistically and militarily by Russia and Iran…Such untenable situation requires that the Unites States, as the leader of the free world, provide the Free Syrian Army forces under the Supreme Military Council with the requisite advanced weapons to sustain defensive military capabilities in the face of the Assad forces.
He is said to be seeking anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons. He is correct that a mutually hurting stalemate, which the opposition has not so far been able to reach, is needed before the Syrian regime will negotiate seriously. If Bashar thinks he can do better by continuing the fighting, he will.
Secretary Kerry has limited himself so far to feints: he said yesterday Friends of Syria would consider arming the opposition and supported an effort to lift the European Union arms embargo. He is a man used to the niceties of the US Senate, where sparring is a verbal activity. The Russians, Iranians and Syrians certainly understand what he is threatening, but they doubt he is willing to do it or that his doing it will be effective in the time frame available.
President Obama is fond of saying he doesn’t bluff. It is time for him to play a stronger hand, one way or another.
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No narrow way out
This rare interview with Salim Idriss, who (sort of) commands the forces in Syria that call themselves the Free Army, is telling. It demonstrates three things:
- The rebels are still in need of weapons.
- Their fragmented structure makes supplying them a dicey proposition.
- Disunity is a serious impediment to their military progress.
This is not an unfamiliar situation. It is comparable to the Bosnian army during the first year of that country’s miserable war, which started more than twenty years ago and went on for three and a half years before the Federation forces started winning and the Dayton accords ended it.
By then, the Bosnian (ABiH) was unified under General Rasim Delic and fighting in tandem with the Croat Defense Force (HVO) and the Croatian Army (HV) against the Republika Srpska army (VRS). But things hadn’t started that way. The HVO and the ABiH had even fought with each other in 1992 and 1993, just as some rebel forces inside Syria have in recent months.
Likewise in Kosovo, the Kosovo Liberation Army was not completely unified at first and fought occasionally with the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosovo (FARK), a less well-known group that also fought against the Yugoslav security forces.
The Syrian rebel forces will need greater unity if they are to make further progress against the Syrian army, which has been gaining ground in the past few weeks. That is at least in part due to Iranian and Lebanese Hizbollah forces fighting inside Syria. The regime’s objective is to relieve Damascus and secure the route to the Alawite-populated areas of the northeast, where ethnic cleansing of Sunnis has been proceeding apace.
The rebel forces are also going to need more international help, at the very least arms supplies, but some want a much narrower focus. Aram Nerguizian wants American intervention to focus exclusively on chemical weapons and extremists among the rebels:
How U.S. military power could be used is to selectively target risks tied to proliferation of chemical weapons and other strategic capabilities in Syria. It could be used to contain and curtail the expansion of al Qaeda in the Levant and to prevent the preeminence of radical forces in the region.
The chemical weapons seem to me strategically irrelevant. If used, they have killed a tiny fraction of the more than 80,000 dead. It can still be argued that the President’s “red line” has to be enforced, lest failing to do so sends the wrong message to Iran. Certainly a credible threat of military force to block Tehran from getting nuclear weapons is vital to the diplomatic strategy the President is pursuing. But the notion that chemical weapons, like nuclear bombs, are “weapons of mass destruction” is hyperbole. Syria’s use of chemical weapons has nothing like the implications of Iran gaining nuclear ones. Finding and destroying Asad’s stocks of sarin and other poisons would be a major military enterprise, not the limited intervention some may imagine.
Extremists are likewise a difficult target to engage. Muslim extremists also emerged in Bosnia and Kosovo but were quickly undone once the fighting was over. That will be a far more difficult process in Syria, as it will not be getting the tens of thousands of NATO peacekeeping forces that made it happen quickly, and in retrospect easily, in the Balkans. But how, precisely, does one target Jabhat al Nusra in Syria? Do we really want to be hunting them down with drones while they are fighting the Asad regime? Or encouraging the Free Syria Army, which is less than fully effective against the regime forces, to engage against them while the extremists are fighting Asad? We have made it clear that Jabhat al Nusra is not acceptable to the international community, something the UN reinforced last week with financial sanctions. But do we really need to do more than that right now?
The higher priority is to focus on protecting civilians in Syria. The regime is targeting civilians in rebel-held areas daily, trying to make life there unbearable and governance impossible. The purpose is to get the civilians to expel the insurgents, in the hope doing so will provide some measure of relief from artillery and air bombardment. Protecting Syria’s civilian population from these ravages should be our priority concern.
The costs of failing to do so are high. US humanitarian relief in Syria could total $1 billion by the end of this year. Unless we focus on civilian protection we are not likely to recover some measure of confidence in Syria’s Sunni Muslim population and prevent its youth from further radicalization. A post-Asad Syria dominated by extremists will be a problem for the Middle East and the US for decades into the future. We should want a Syria that respects the rights of its citizens (regardless of sect or ethnicity) as well as its borders with Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, Israel and Lebanon. That will take time and effort. There is no shortcut. A narrow focus on chemical weapons and extremists will not serve these broader strategic purposes. There is no narrow way out.
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Syria: is there hope?
Salon.com asked me to review recent events in Syria and their significance. They published it today under the heading “Has the Syria threat cooled?”:
Watching Syria is like looking through a kaleidoscope. The picture seems to change dramatically in response to the slightest jolt, but the components remain the same. The past week has seen lots of jolts, but no real change in the elements that make up the sad picture.
Inside Syria, the regime’s forces have started an ethnic cleansing campaign in the west intended to clear Sunnis from areas its Alawite supporters want to secure for themselves. The regime has also successfully pushed south toward the Jordanian border. In much of the rest of the country, there is lots of fighting but only marginal changes in the confrontation lines, which run through many urban areas, or between the urban centers and the countryside. Almost 7 million Syrians are now thought to need humanitarian assistance. The number could rise dramatically during the rest of the year.
Secretary Kerry’s visit to Moscow this week revived, once again, hopes for a negotiated settlement. He and the Russians agreed to try to convene a conference, even before the end of the month, that would include both the Syrian opposition and the Assad regime. The prospect of this conference will relieve President Obama of any need for a quick decision on unilateral action in Syria, since it would hardly be appropriate to preempt the conference. That is likely what both the Russians and the Americans wanted: more time.
Pressure had been building for action, including possible direct American shipment of arms to the opposition, safe areas for displaced people, a no-fly zone, or an attack on Syria’s air force and missiles, which are being used against civilians. Evidence that the regime has used chemical weapons put President Obama on the spot, as he has several times said that crossing this red line would change his calculus. American credibility, some thought, was at stake.
The ink was barely dry on the allegation of chemical weapons use when Carla Del Ponte, a Swiss member of a U.N. human rights inquiry for Libya, suggested that she knew of evidence that chemical weapons were used by the opposition rather than the regime. This allegation has little credibility, not only because of the technical difficulties involved but also because Del Ponte has a record of sensational allegations that are difficult to prove (or disprove).
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Still the beginning
A lot of the news today about Syria is not only about Syria. Keeping your eye on Syria means watching:
- Russia: Secretary Kerry will be in Moscow this week trying to close the gap with the Russians, who have not wanted a political solution that begins by requiring Bashar al Asad to step down. It would be hard to do better for Russia experts than Michelle Kelemen’s piece this morning on NPR, but I confess they did not hit hard on what I think is the best bet for Kerry. Russia and the United States share an interest in preventing an extremist Sunni takeover of Syria. The longer the violence persists, the more likely that outcome is. A concerted, UN Security Council push for a political settlement that moves definitively to a post-Asad regime would not only help the Russians save face but also provide the best chance of blocking extremists.
- Israel: The Israelis have conducted more air raids into Syria, ostensibly to stop war materiel from shipment to Hizbollah. The Syrian government, which in the past has not acknowledged Israeli attacks, denounced them on Sunday, thus providing an opportunity to claim Israel is in cahoots with Syria’s revolutionaries and also raising the odds on retaliation. It would appear the air strikes did not trigger Syria’s much-vaunted, Russian-supplied air defense system. Some say that is because the Israelis entered Syria from Lebanon. Whatever. It still suggests that Syria’s air defense capabilities are over-rated. The US should be able to do at least as well as the Israelis.
- Jordan: The Syrian border with Jordan is now largely in revolutionary hands and refugees are pouring across into a country that was already under severe internal strain from political protests and economic downturn. The UN is projecting a million Syrian refugees in Jordan by the end of the year. Many wonder whether Jordan’s monarchy can meet the challenges.
- Lebanon: Israeli entry into Syria from Lebanese airspace gives Beirut something all parties can denounce, but at the same time it illustrates all to starkly the parlous state of Lebanese sovereignty. Lebanese Hizbollah and Sunni fighters are already killing each other inside Syria. They also clash occasionally inside Lebanon. Hizbollah has made it absolutely clear that it regards preservation of the Asad regime as vital to its own existence.
- Turkey: There are already something like half a million Syrian refugees inside Turkey, which is now blocking them at the border. The Turks have wisely reached a ceasefire agreement with their own Kurdish (PKK) rebellion, thus limiting the damage Damascus can do by supporting Kurdish militants. NATO exercises at Incirlik, close to the Syrian border, were presumably scheduled some time ago, but they occurring now and signal that Turkey has backing in preventing spillover from Syria. But Turkey still faces dissent from its anti-Asad posture from its own Turkish-speaking Alevi population (second cousins to the Arabic-speaking Alawites of Syria).
- United Nations: Carla Del Ponte, a Swiss member of a UN inquiry commission into human rights violations, suggested yesterday that it was the rebels, not the government, that had used sarin gas in Syria. The former prosecutor of The Hague Tribunal concerned with war crimes in former Yugoslavia, she has a previous record of making controversial statements that are difficult to confirm or deny. Best to wait for the UN chemical weapons experts to pronounce on the subject.
I’ll be posting later today on how the Syria crisis affects different political forces inside Iraq. Suffice it to say: the news is not good there either.
Inside Syria, the regime has been ethnically cleansing western parts of the country, presumably in preparation for making them an Alawite stronghold.
What we are seeing are developments–refugees, military exercises and operations, political maneuvering, ethnic cleansing, chemical weapons allegations–that challenge the state structures in the Levant and put many of them under severe strain. The strain is likely to get much worse, as there is little evidence of anything that would prevent a further slide. We are still at the beginning of this tragic story, not near its end.
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