Tag: Lebanon
Some good news
There is good news this morning: French forces in Mali have taken the northern town of Kidal, donors have pledged over $450 million for Mali and $1.2 billion for Syria. These are not small things, but they are not the end of the story either.
In Mali, there is now the question of Azawad, the largely desert area northwest of Kidal where Tuareg live. They have been seeking independence–it was their rebellion that touched off the Islamist insurgency that in turn precipitated the French intervention. The Islamists have not fought the French advance. Instead they have retreated northward. The question now is whether the Tuareg will help the French do them in, or at least expel them from Mali. France is already calling for the Mali government to talk with the Tuareg, hoping of course to keep them on side even if independence is out of the question.
A second important issue is deployment of African troops under UN command to Mali. The UN Security Council has already approved a mission, but organizing it, financing it and deploying it will be a big challenge. The French will presumably take the lead in trying to make this happen, as they would like out before anyone discovers that their troops might be an easy target. The Mali government and Tuareg insurgents are likely to want to keep the French in, each hoping that they will gain advantage in a negotiation over the north that is not likely to go smoothly.
In Syria, the gigantic pledges at yesterday’s donors’ conference in Kuwait are at least a sign that the world is appalled at what is happening, but humanitarian assistance is really not an adequate response to Bashar al Asad’s homicidal behavior. The head of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, Moaz al Khatib, is offering to meet the Syrian regime in various Middle Eastern capitals. That is an offer unlikely to be taken up. UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi is thought to be close to giving up on the search for a political solution, as Kofi Annan did before him.
What is needed in Syria is the kind of decisive move that France took in Mali. The trouble is no one has come up with what that might be. Boots on the ground aren’t going to happen. A no-fly zone might be a big help to the rebels, but President Obama is showing no appetite for it, fearing the Russians would retaliate by denying him support for the Northern Distribution Network for Afghanistan and the P5+1 nuclear talks with Iran. The Israelis yesterday reportedly attacked a convoy in Syria most likely thought to consist of missiles headed for delivery to Hizbollah in Lebanon. That kind of pinprick from that source is not going to make a difference.
Unequivocal support for a new government in Syria, appointed by the National Coalition, is about the best proposition out there these days. It will guarantee nothing, but at least it would signal determination to make the inevitable happen: the fall of Bashar al Asad.
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Syria is getting what Assad wants
A Syrian reader, Hashem al Shamy (whom I know only as an occasional commenter on peacefare.net) writes (with some small edits by me):
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Submitted on 2013/01/05 at 9:44 am
Dear Mr Serwer, Thanks a lot for taking the time to respond to my comment, which I hope you did not find aggressive. I only wanted to point out what I think of your blog which brings the experience of a seasoned diplomat to the realm of international relations. The fact that I am Syrian should not discredit my dispassionate analysis, since covering the political risk and violence in Syria is part of my job. However, my experience as a Syrian is still valuable because I attended Syrian schools, studied its heavily propagandist curriculum, wore the green uniform to school, had to chant for the late President and the Baath Party. I also was a senior member of the Youth Lead Vanguard of Revolt Council in my high school, and a member of the Baath Party, and worked with senior government officials until six months before the start of the unrest. Unfortunately, I have lost many friends since the start of the unrest in Syria because of their support of the grass roots movement, providing shelter and medicine to fleeing civilians and opposing the regime’s policy publicly. Recently, two of my friends have been referred to the “Terrorism Court” set up by the regime last year after remaining incommunicado for months, which most likely [will] culminate in their execution on charges of undermining the authority of the state and supporting terrorists. I dont want to summarise the events of the past 22 months, which I am sure you are fairly acquainted with. I just would like to clarify some misconceptions that have been distorting the narrative of the Syrian conflict, including some comments posted by your readers. The Assad dynasty since it took power in 1970 The people on the other hand knew very well the limitless repression and the heavy price they will pay once they openly declare their opposition to the regime. When I was asked after my return from Syria in February 2011, one month before the start of the uprising, about the prospects of a similar movement to the ones in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, I was dismissive of any potential event. The reasons were the overconfidence of the regime and the firm grip of its security apparatus on the country, the absence of a grass roots effort to mobilise people on the ground, the division of the political opposition, and most importantly the capability of the regime to inflict a very heavy price on civilians and entire cities. Nevertheless, I never imagined that the regime would write off whole cities and region and would be willing to inflict catastrophic damage on the country as a whole to preserve its power. In your response, you said that focusing on the community level is a crucial factor which is widely overlooked. The regime, from day one, made its policy to target peaceful demonstrators and their leaders. They embarked on a policy of detaining activists calling for non-violent protests, torturing them and returning them dead to their communities to intimidate people, create a vacuum of potential community leaders, and give prominence to extremism on the streets. This is exactly what happened, when the increasing level of bloodshed accompanied by increasingly brutal techniques of the regime generated a reaction of violent response and emphasized demands of revenge and proactive killings in order to save civilians. This dynamic brought the “opposition” to the regime’s turf where it will be able to set the terms of the game and generate a spiral of violence to scare everyone off. On top of that, the regime has always been good at creating divisions and then exploiting them to create a fertile ambiance of uncertainty to advance its policy. Domestically, it allowed the existence of regime-sanctioned opposition groups who called for regime-led reform. Their job was to invalidate the external opposition rather than focusing on the regime’s performance and actions. It also labeled the protestors and later the rebels as “Islamists, extremists and terrorists” to present minorities with an existential threat and lock them into “us or Fundamentalists” narrative. When the regime had failed to quell the protests, turning into an armed insurrection, it sought to involve regional rivals as it usually does to increase the stake for regional countries for its potential demise. Banking on its initial portrayal of protestors as extremist fundamentalists, it exploited the increasing friction between Sunnis and Shiites in the region. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey on the side of “the opposition” and Iran, Iraq and Lebanon on the side of the government. This strategy unleashed the latent forces in the region and managed to blemish the opposition even more as being aided by countries whose sole aim is to destroy “modern and secular” Syria and replace it with stalwarts of the monarchies in the Gulf. The intense Post-Cold War divisions between the US and Russia have helped the Regime keep the international community paralysed over its response to the Syrian crisis. The US, under the Obama Administration, has sought from the beginning to engage with the “Reformist” Bashar Al-Assad, giving him a maneuvering space when protests broke out. Russia, on the other hand has no interest in dropping a faithful country since the 1960s for the sake of promoting democracy. The triple veto at the UNSC has been a convenient pretext for major countries not to intervene and to blame the international stalemate on the rogue behaviour of Russia and Iran. These dynamics have given the Syrian regime the sense of impunity and the ability to make rational decisions to intensify its response and destroy entire cities, knowing that no one will limit its free hand. The convenient illusion and wishful thinking that the regime will negotiate its own demise and exit (the ultimate departure of the President is imminent) have produced a negative response to ending the Syrian conflict. In conclusion, if the regime is not presented with a “credible threat” there will be no change in the regime’s behaviour and more lives and cities will be destroyed, making Syria ungovernable Post-Assad, which is exactly what the regime wants. Any solution that maintains Assad in power will be highly unsuccessful both in the medium and long term. I have so many much to say, but I just wanted to give a brief overview of how the Regime has properly evaluated its environment and gradually pushed the red lines in the sand to keep itself in power at the expense on Syria as a nation. Best, Hashem Alshamy |
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War with Iran in 2013?
Reuters published this piece today, under what I regard as the misleading title “Will this be the year that Israel goes to war with Iran?”
Israel did not bomb Iran last year. Why should it happen this year?
Because it did not happen last year. The Iranians are proceeding apace with their nuclear program. The Americans are determined to stop them. Sanctions are biting, but the diplomatic process produced nothing visible in 2012. Knowledgeable observers believe there is no “zone of possible agreement.” Both the United States and Iran may believe that they have viable alternatives to a negotiated agreement.
While Israel has signaled that its “red line” (no nuclear weapons capability) won’t be reached before mid-2013, it seems likely it will be reached before the end of the year. President Barack Obama has refused to specify his red line, but he has made it amply clear that he prefers intensified sanctions and eventual military action to a nuclear Iran that needs to be contained and provides incentives for other countries to go nuclear. If and when he takes the decision for war, there is little doubt about a bipartisan majority in Congress supporting the effort.
Still, attitudes on the subject have shifted in the past year. Some have concluded that the consequences of war with Iran are so bad and uncertain that every attempt should be made to avoid it. Most have also concluded that Israel could do relatively little damage to the Iranian nuclear program. It might even be counter-productive, as the Iranians would redouble their efforts. The military responsibility lies with President Obama.
There has been a recent flurry of hope that the Iranians are preparing to come clean on their past nuclear weapons activities, which could be a prelude to progress on the diplomatic track. The issue is allegedly one of timing and sequencing: the Iranians want sanctions relief up front. The Americans want to see enrichment to 20 percent stopped and the enriched material shipped out of the country, as well as a full accounting for past activities, before considering any but minor sanctions relief. Some would also like to see dismantling of the hardened enrichment plant at Fordow.
But the fundamental issue is whether Iran is prepared to give up its nuclear weapon ambitions, or whether it is determined to forge ahead. Iranian behavior in the last year suggests no let-up in the country’s regional (and wider) pretensions. It has supported Bashar al-Assad to the hilt in Syria, armed Hamas for its confrontation with Israel, continued to support Hezbollah in Lebanon, assisted North Korea’s ballistic missile satellite launch and made trouble in Iraq. Why would it not also seek nuclear weapons, which would make it immune (or so many in the Iranian regime seem to think) from American regime change efforts?
There are not a lot of good answers to that question, except this: a reasonable man in Tehran might well conclude that Iranian national security is better served by stopping the nuclear program before it actually produces weapons. Once Iran acquires nuclear weapons, the United States will target it. Israel will launch on warning. This hair trigger situation will be more perilous than the nuclear confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War, when each side assumed the rationality of the other and communications between them were good. Neither Iran nor Israel assumes the other will behave rationally, making deterrence unreliable, and communications between the two governments are virtually non-existent. The distance between Tehran and Jerusalem makes quick decisions necessary.
Two big political uncertainties loom over the nuclear issue next year: Iran is scheduled to hold presidential elections in June and the Supreme Leader is thought to be ill. The identity of neither Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s successor as president nor Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s as Supreme Leader is clear. While it may be too much to hope that the successors will be any better than the incumbents, any transition introduces diplomatic delays and uncertainties, even though the nuclear program should be expected to proceed. But will the transitions be orderly, or will the Greens who roiled Iran’s political sphere last time around revive? Iran’s regime has deep roots in revolutionary fervor, which has made it more resilient than Egypt’s. But that does not mean it will last forever.
There is still a slim hope for a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. The prospects are not good, but the consequences of failure are dreadful. The Obama Administration has managed to avoid overt commentary on Iran in the last couple of months. Candidate Romney was cautious during the campaign. The door is clearly open to the Iranians, if they want to come in from the cold of sanctions and isolation. If they fail to do so, and continue to buck the international community, war in 2013 is likely. Not because it is a good solution, but because President Obama might regard it as the only solution, albeit a temporary and highly uncertain one.
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The Gaza war in regional context
While the news media is mainly focused on the exchanges of rocket and air attacks between Israel and Gaza, my guess is that the broader regional picture will be decisive in determining the course and outcome of this latest outbreak of war in the Middle East. Here is a rundown of that broader picture:
1. Egypt: Cairo is trying to broker a ceasefire, with rhetorical support from the Arab League, but the Egyptian Prime Minister’s visit to Gaza Friday made it clear that the Muslim Brotherhood-led government will be more sympathetic to Hamas than Hosni Mubarak. Still, Egypt is in a tight spot: continuation of the war will attract militants to Gaza and the Sinai as well as send an already weak Egyptian economy into a tailspin. While Hamas has roots in the Muslim Brotherhood, a democratic regime in Egypt has to worry that Egypt’s citizens, sympathetic as they are to the plight of the Palestinians, will not want to sacrifice too much on their behalf. A ceasefire could restore Egypt’s role as a key regional player.
2. Syria: There has already been an exchange of artillery fire between the Syrian regime and Israel, something that hasn’t happened in a long time. Bashar al Asad may well look to military action on the Golan front in an effort to rally his remaining support and try to divert attention from his war against the Syrian revolution, now more than a year and a half old. The Syrian army won’t have a lot of spare capacity to challenge Israel, but it won’t want to be left out of the fight if the war continues.
3. Jordan: The protest movement against the rule of King Abdullah has intensified. The monarchy will not want to divert security forces to a fight against Israel, with which it maintains good if not warm relations. If the protests are successful, the king will be weakened further. A more constitutional monarchy might well be less friendly to Israel, but still unwilling to risk conflict.
4. Hizbollah: On the Lebanese front, Hizbollah is the main military force. It is already heavily engaged fighting against the revolution in Syria, but it could presumably make Israel’s situation more difficult by joining in the rocket barrage. Its record fighting Israeli ground forces is significantly better than Hamas’, so the Israelis would hesitate to engage on both fronts. But Hizbollah will be reluctant to aid Hamas, which has fallen out with the Syrian regime Hizbollah is supporting.
5. Gulf Cooperation Council: The Saudis and the other GCC states have not generally engaged directly against Israel, but the visit last week of the Emir of Qatar to Gaza (and his promise of financing) suggest that they may play a behind the scenes role bankrolling Hamas and others willing to challenge Israel. This could significantly attenuate the quiet but growing accommodation between Israel and the Sunni Arab world.
6. Turkey: Turkey and Israel seemed headed for rapprochement that would cure the 2010 rift over the Israeli attack on a Turkish aid flotilla headed for Gaza. This now seems much less likely. Turkey’s Islamist government will have to give at least verbal support to Hamas and hesitate to appear to paper over its differences with Tel Aviv.
7. Iran: Many of the larger rockets in Hamas’ arsenal come from Iran, which must be enjoying watching the Israelis engage in Gaza rather than carrying out the threat to destroy Tehran’s nuclear facilities. Iran will no doubt provide Hamas, Hizbollah and Syria as much assistance as it can spare in its sanctions-weakened state, hoping to keep the Israelis preoccupied.
8. The wider Arab world: Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Yemen and Sudan all have their own problems that preclude more than rhetorical engagement in the Palestinian cause. Marc Lynch notes that mobilization in the Arab world so far is limited but could well intensify. The Arab street, which presumably has a louder voice today than before the Arab awakening, is certainly sympathetic to the Palestinians. And it is far more likely to support Hamas’ more aggressive military approach to Israel than the Palestine Liberation Organization’s diplomatic push for membership for membership in the United Nations.
Bottom line: Egypt likely has the decisive role in determining whether this war remains, like the one in 2008/9, a bilateral affair or turns into a wider conflict with more permanent consequences. But Iran, Hizbollah, and Turkey are also important players. If Israeli ground action lines up all the regional forces in favor of Hamas, the unintended consequences could be dramatic.
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This week’s peace picks
It’s a relatively light week for foreign policy events with all eyes focused on the US elections.
1. Political Shiism in the Arab World: Rituals, Ideologies, and Politics, Monday November 5, 9:00 AM – 11:30 AM, George Mason University
Venue: George Mason University, Arlington Campus, 3301 Fairfax Drive, Arlington, VA 2201, Truland Building, Room 555
Speakers: Jana al Horr, Solon Simmons, Terrence Lyons
Researchers and experts on Arab politics have often debated the role of political Shiism as a source of regional instability and conflict following the 2003 U.S-Iraq war. Some argue that the expansion of political Shiism in the Arab world is a quest for political leadership resulting from a long-standing conflict with Sunnis, coupled with centuries of Shiite political and economic marginalization. Other argue that political Shiism holds revolutionary elements that can be re-interpreted to fit any political context that Shiites perceive as threatening. This view perceives that Shiite religious elements can be made to fit the current needs of various political contexts and are the main drivers of political mobilization and ultimately conflict. Both these views offer a narrow and restricted description of political Shiism; hence, the literature on political Shiism lacks a systematic understanding of the phenomenon. To address this gap, the research asks the following questions: (1) What is political Shiism? Is it monolithic? What are its forms? And who are its ideologues?; and (2) How do Arab Shiites mobilize for political protests?
In order to answer these questions, the research provides an examination of rituals, ideologies, and speeches of political Shiism embedded in the historical and geographical context of the Arab region in specific, and the Middle East in general, during the last century. Following a combination of methodological approaches, the research will first examine the centrality of Ashura rituals and celebrations in political Shiism; second, the research will explore the plurality of political Shiism thought in the twentieth, its progression from quietism to activism, and the influence of regional politics on its development; third, through analyzing current speeches of Shiite leaders in Lebanon and Iraq, the research will shed light on contemporary political Shiism language, its themes that mobilize the masses, and its connection to past ideologues previously examined.
The research seeks to extend the debate over the forces of mobilization of political Shiism, and contribute to a more constructive and coherent understanding of Shiite political actions in the Arab world. It confirms that the transformation of political Shiism from quietism to activism can be traced back socio-political changes that occurred in the early twentieth century. Additionally, it identifies how conflict associated with political Shiism is not linked to the Sunni-Shiite schism. Instead, the divide between the Arab world and the West is at the heart of political Shiism. Furthermore, the research highlights the importance of Ashura in political Shiism, but it is the rituals coupled with local and regional political events that create mobilization.
One important contribution of the dissertation is that it offers an inside descriptive look into the formation of political Shiism, its main ideologues, and issues that distinguish political Shiism as one of the main forces for political mobilization in the Arab world. The research aims at providing a broader understanding of political Shiism to address the gaps that exist in the current literature, and offer a new way of thinking about this rising religio-political phenomenon.
2. The Challenge of Security Sector Reform in the Arab World, Monday November 5, 9:30 AM – 11:30 AM, USIP
Venue: USIP, 2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20037
Speakers: Steven Heydemann, Robert Perito, Querine Hanlon, Daniel Brumberg, Manal Omar
If the first season of the “Arab Uprisings” brought hope, the second season has illustrated many hard challenges, not least of which is restructuring the military, policy and intelligence services of Arab states. Even in Tunisia, where the military played a crucial role in supporting the “Jasmine Revolution,” the ultimate loyalty of the security services remains an open question. To examine this issue, USIP will convene a panel of experts on Monday, November 5, 2012 from 9:30am-11:30am to discuss the institutional, economic and political challenges posed by the quest to remake security sectors into allies of pluralistic democratic change. Please join us for what promises to be a revealing and provocative discussion.
Register for this event here.
3. Turkey in the Middle East: Role, Influence, and Challenges, Monday November 5, 6:00 PM – 7:15 PM, Elliott School of International Affairs
Venue: Elliott School of International Affairs, 1957 E Street NW, Washington, DC 20052, Lindner Family Commons, Room 602
Speakers: Omer Taspinar, Bulent Aliriza, Edward Skip Gnehm
Under the leadership of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan, Turkey is a major player in the Middle East. Turkey’s active involvement in the Syrian crisis, rivalry with Iran, and outspoken advocacy of Palestinian statehood place Turkey at the center of regional events. The panelists will examine Turkey’s rising role in the region, addressing regional opportunities as well as domestic politics.
Register for this event here.
4. Aiding Conflict: The Impact of U.S. Food Aid on Civil War, Tuesday November 6, 12:30 PM – 2:00 PM, Elliott School of International Affairs
Venue: Elliott School of International Affairs, Hall of Government, 2115 G Street NW, Washington, DC 20052, Kendrick Seminar Room, Room 321
Speaker: Nathan Nunn
This paper examines the effect of U.S. food aid on conflict in recipient countries. To establish a causal relationship, we exploit time variation in food aid caused by fluctuations in U.S. wheat production together with cross-sectional variation in a countrys tendency to receive any food aid from the United States. Our estimates show that an increase in U.S. food aid increases the incidence, onset and duration of civil conflicts in recipient countries. Our results suggest that the effects are larger for smaller scale civil conflicts. No effect is found on interstate warfare.
Register for this event here.
5. Post-Election Day Analysis – What Happened and What Comes Next?, Wednesday November 7, 10:00 AM, Brookings Institution
Venue: Attendance by webcast only.
Speaker: Benjamin Wittes, William A. Galston, Robert Kagan, Thomas E. Mann, Isabel V. Sawhill
This year’s presidential and congressional elections are likely to be close—perhaps very close. They will have a profound impact on the nation’s future course in both the domestic and foreign policy spheres. The outcome of the November 6 election will raise important policy and political questions: What was key to the winning presidential candidate’s success, and what do the results reveal about the 2012 American electorate? In what direction will the new administration take the nation? What might a lame duck Obama administration and Congress look like—and how will the negotiations over the fiscal cliff proceed? What will be the congressional dynamics? What are the incoming administration’s policy prospects during the 113th Congress? And what are the consequences for U.S. foreign policy?
On November 7, the Campaign 2012 project at Brookings will host a final forum analyzing the election’s outcomes and how these results will affect the policy agenda of the next administration and Congress. Panelists will discuss the approach of the incoming administration, the political makeup of the new 113th Congress and the prospect for policy breakthroughs on key social, fiscal and foreign policy issues.
After the program, panelists will take questions from the audience. Participants may follow the conversation on Twitter using the hashtag #BI2012.
6. Syria: The Path Ahead, Thursday November 8, 9:30 AM – 11:30 AM, Brookings Institution
Venue: Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Saul/Zilkha Room
Speakers: Daniel L. Byman, Michael Doran, Salman Shaikh
As the Syrian conflict approaches its twentieth month, fears are mounting that Bashar al-Assad’s regime may stay in power or that Syria will collapse into sectarian war. An enduring conflict in Syria will have far-reaching consequences for the region, could threaten key U.S. partners, and may require urgent decisions. Has the struggle for democracy in Syria been lost? Is there more the United States could do to influence events there? What steps could the international community take to prevent strife and sectarianism from spreading throughout the region?
On November 8, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings will explore these and other questions about the conflict in Syria. Panelists Mike Doran, the Roger Hertog senior fellow in the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, and Director of the Brookings Doha Center Salman Shaikh, appearing by video conference, will discuss policy options for the U.S. and international community, with a focus on Shaikh’s recently authored paper, “Losing Syria (And How to Avoid It).” Daniel L. Byman, senior fellow and research director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, will moderate the discussion.
Participants can follow the conversation on Twitter using hashtag #SavingSyria. After the program, the panelists will take audience questions.
Register for this event here.
7. Ending Wars Well: Order, Justice, Conciliation, Thursday November 8, 12:00 PM – 1:30 PM, Berkeley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs
Venue: Berkeley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs, Georgetown University, 3307 M Street, Washington, DC 20007, Suite 200
Speakers: Eric Patterson, Timothy Shah, John P. Gallagher
Why don’t wars “end well?” From Rwanda to Colombia to Afghanistan, it seems that modern wars drag on and on, with terrible costs for civilians and their neighbors. In his new book, Ending Wars Well, Berkley Center Senior Research Fellow Eric Patterson argues that just war principles can provide a framework for bringing wars to modest yet enduring conclusions. More specifically, he criticizes grandiose peace schemes that are not rooted in the realities of security and political order. In contrast, he proposes a model that begins with investment in Order as a practical and moral imperative. This provides a foundation for Justice (e.g. punishment, restitution) and Conciliation in unique situations.
Patterson uses Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, East Timor, the Camp David Accords, and the US Civil War as test cases for this model. The Berkley Center’s Timothy Samuel Shah will moderate Patterson’s discussion with LtCol John Gallagher, a former West Point professor and current staff officer to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Register for this event here.
8. Anti-Extremism Laws in Russia, Pakistan, and China and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Thursday November 8, 3:00 PM – 4:30 PM, Freedom House
Venue: Freedom House 1301 Connecticut Ave. NW 4th Floor Washington, DC 20036
Speakers: David Kramer, Virab Khachatryan, Peter Roudik, Aleksandr Verhovsky, Laney Zhang
Freedom House is pleased to host a roundtable with the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom on the anti-extremism legal frameworks in China, Pakistan, and Russia. Moderated by Freedom House President David Kramer, the on-the-record roundtable will provide an opportunity for participants to engage experts and authors of The Law Library of Congress’s report Legal Provisions on Fighting Extremism. The participants will compare and contrast the differing approaches to anti-extremism laws in China, Pakistan, and Russia. The round table comes at an important time as repressive regimes are developing anti-extremism laws and implementing them in broad terms to suppress criticism.
Register for this event here.
9. Afghanistan 2014: What Happens Next? A Discussion with the Former Ambassador of Afghanistan Said Tayeb Jawad, Thursday November 8, 7:30 PM – 9:00 PM, Elliott School of International Affairs
Venue: Elliott School of International Affairs, 1957 E Street NW, Washington, DC 20052, Henry Harding Auditorium, Room 213
Speaker: Said Tayeb Jawad
Delta Phi Epsilon Professional Foreign Service Sorority and the Afghan Student Association proudly present “Afghanistan 2014: What Happens Next? A Discussion with the Former Ambassador of Afghanistan, Said Tayeb Jawad.” The Ambassador will discuss the future of Afghanistan with the scheduled U.S. withdrawal and the 2014 Afghan elections.
Register for this event here.
10. Cyber as a Form of National Power, Friday November 9, 5:00 PM – 6:30 PM, Institute of World Politics
Venue: The Institute of World Politics, 1521 16th Street NW, Washington, DC 20036
Speaker: Samuel Liles
Dr. Samuel Liles is an associate professor at Purdue University West Lafayette in the Computer Information Technology Department of the College of Technology where he teaches computer forensics. Dr. Liles is a faculty member with CERIAS at Purdue University. CERIAS is known as the premier multidisciplinary academic center in information security and assurance, and has produced nearly half of the PhD graduates in that field in the US over the last 15 years. Previously he was a professor in the Information Resources Management College at The National Defense University in Washington DC, and prior to that the Computer Information Technology Department at Purdue University Calumet. As a researcher his interest is in cyber warfare as a form of low intensity conflict has had him presenting to audiences world-wide. Samuel Liles completed his PhD at Purdue University primarily studying cyber conflict, issues of cyber conflict, information assurance and security, and cyber forensics.
RSVP for this event to kbridges@iwp.edu.
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Half the population, plus
Salma Berrada, who has recently joined me as a Middle East Institute intern, makes her debut on peacefare with this piece on an event last week at Brookings:
While some in the media hastily surmise that the Arab spring has given way to an Autumn rage, the panelists discussing “Women After the Arab Awakening: Making Change” begged to differ. The four women leading Vital Voices Global Partnership projects–in Morocco, Jordan, Egypt and Lebanon –are committed to gender progress in these tumultuous times of transition in the Arab world. The recent protests and attacks on US consulates in Libya, Yemen, and Egypt were horrific and senseless, but it would be a mistake to assume they represent most Arabs or most Arab women.
The US ranks 22nd in the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap report released last week. Middle East countries lag far behind. Women’s advocacy projects in the Arab world reflect a universal struggle for freedom and social justice. Each activist faces a different set of opportunities and constraints in her home country. The common denominator is the hope of reducing inequality and exclusion.
The tide of the Arab Spring has so far bypassed Morocco. Except for a few peaceful demonstrations led by the February 20th Movement, the monarchy stands strong. Still, there are ripples of change. To me as a native Moroccan, Souad Slaoui from the Isis Center in Fes looked more like my loving grandmother than a grand women’s advocate. Endearingly pushing her big glasses back up the bridge of her nose, she explained how overcoming the gender gap requires the active support of local authorities and high-level government officials alike.
Eight years after the Morrocan family code (Moudawana) was updated and widely praised, barriers remain that prevent the full implementation of reforms in the Moroccan society. Child marriage was officially banned in 2004. But Article 20 allows a judge to sanction underage marriage. Slaoui underlined the importance of collaboration with other associations and politicians to curb this practice. The team began by examining the social and economic pressures that lead girls to be married as early as possible in urban and rural settings. A national media campaign was then successfully launched. While raising awareness about the dangers of child marriage, the strategy also enabled women to recognize and claim their civic rights.
In Jordan, the Sadaqa campaign aimed to require that Article 72 of the state’s labor law be enforced. It stipulates that business firms with more than 20 women are expected to provide daycare for the children of their employees. Not only did Sadaqa lobby the government to ensure that companies comply with the directive but it also set up workshops to highlight the economic benefits to companies for providing childcare to their staff. Randa Naffa, a young Jordanian, emphasized that Sadaqa in Arabic, means friendship. The campaign promotes “a friendly working environment for women.” Its success evinces the positive impact of engaging men to enhance women’s participation in formal labor markets.
Both Randa Naffa and Souad Slaoui emphasized that changing the way people think about gender should be prioritized as an integral component of socioeconomic development in the Middle East and North Africa. But social change is difficult and slow.
Egyptian Marianne Ibrahim, co-founder of the Al Gisr Center for Development, pointed out the importance of the Tahrir square rebellion of 2011 that unseated President Mubarak: “being on the Square, day and night, broke so many red lines for Egyptian women.” The Al Gisr Center sought to capitalize on the Arab spring by partnering with like-minded organizations to elaborate a women’s agenda with input from Egyptian women of all ages and backgrounds. Despite the political dominance of the Muslim Brotherhood and the rise of conservative rhetoric, the Center recently submitted its gender platform to the committee in charge of drafting the new constitution.
Lina Ahmed corroborated that social and economic development go together. This businesswoman and member of the Lebanese League for Women in Business believes women should be proactive and take charge of their destinies. Applying her entrepreneurial skills to further the cause, she identified 15 discriminatory provisions pertaining to labor, social security and inheritance in the civil code. Her team began by networking with local and international NGOs to advocate change. This initiative enabled them to mobilize broader support from the public. Their campaign continues. She is optimistic about the impressive progress already made in civil society engagement. As Tamara Wittes, the moderator of the debate and director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, asserted, “progress operates at all levels through women’s grassroots projects.”
Networking across borders in workshops organized by Vital Voices Global Partnership in the past few months has been important to each of these activists. Many women in the Arab world are not aware of their rights. Awareness campaigns remain fundamental. Resistance is strong. Antagonism towards equal rights for women brings to light deeply entrenched social custom and prejudice. Marianne Ibrahim, a Coptic Christian, views “long-standing patriarchal attitudes” as the greatest challenge faced by activists on the ground. The problem lies less in the potential for a fundamentalist regime to impose the veil than in the prevalence of this dark veil of ignorance. If this unprecedented time of change truly marks an Arab awakening, the rampant culture of patriarchy can no longer be allowed to deny Arab women their rights.
As fragile and tenuous as the road to democracy may be in the Middle East, women’s initiatives are gradually recasting social, economic and political structures. Beyond legal changes, it is important to change popular perceptions. As Lina Ahmed so aptly said: “We constitute half the population and raise the other half.”
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