Yesterday’s event on electoral reform in Lebanon, hosted by the Lebanon Renaissance Foundation and the Aspen Institute, aimed to find a path away from political sectarianism. The necessary reforms are clear enough, but the challenge is how to implement them in a system where fear of change still trumps resentment of an undemocratic system.
Dr. Arda Ekmekji, Dean of Arts and Sciences at Beirut’s Haigazian University, began by stressing the question mark in the event’s subtitle (“What’s in Store for 2013?”). With elections scheduled for 2013, the Lebanese do not yet know what law will govern them, or even if they will take place as planned. Ekmekji addressed three different electoral laws: the 2009 electoral law, the Charbel proposal, and the defunct Boutros draft law.
The 2009 elections took place under essentially the same system (with minor adjustments) in use since the 1960s, based on majority vote for parliamentary seats allocated according to religious sect. Interior Minister Marwan Charbel has put forward an electoral reform proposal for proportional representation in place of the winner-takes-all system that sends the winning party’s entire list for a district to parliament. In 2006 the Boutros Commission proposal for a combined majority and proportional system was rejected. Both the Charbel and the Boutros proposals are in theory viable, if imperfect, but they lack support among the political elite with entrenched interests in the current system. Ekmekji proposed the creation of a bicameral legislature with an upper house elected by majority and a lower house elected proportionally as the first step in phasing out political confessionalism.
Hassan Mneinmneh, Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, focused on the challenges to reform. Confessionalism is entrenched in the political system of Lebanon, which he described as a communitarian federation rather than a unitary state. This presents three levels of resistance to reform: existential, conceptual, and operational.
On the existential level, vertical segmentation of society is too powerful: people speak the language of reform in public but in private hold on to the confessional division of society. Conceptually, the main problems are defining the electorate and organizing a political system that can buck communitarian division. The current 50/50 division of seats in parliament between Christians and Muslims makes a mockery of what is more likely a 70/30 Muslim-Christian split in the population. A better organization would be a bicameral system with a symbolic communitarian upper house and a lower house elected on issues rather than sectarian loyalty. Municipal elections in Lebanon are already decided on concrete policy concerns, and Mneimneh suggested the possibility of transferring that system to a national lower house.
Operationally, the challenge of changing the system may be too great. Mneimneh argued there has never been a Lebanese election that was not determined by a small group of patrons under the influence of an international board of directors (principally the US, Syria, and Saudi Arabia). Elections are little more than en exercise in endorsing leaders selected by communal elites.
Leslie Campbell of the National Democratic Institute reported very little change in the Lebanese situation since he authored a report on electoral reform as part of an NDI mission in 2009. He counseled gradual progress guided by international standards for elections, among them fair districting, an independent election commission, expatriate voting, and pre-printed standardized ballots. He warned against the “inherently undemocratic” presence of nongovernmental security forces (read: Hizbullah) with the power to coerce people to vote their line.
The toughest question came from Elias Muhanna, author of the Lebanese politics blog Qifa Nabki, who has been researching electoral reform in Lebanon. He challenged the panelists to answer a recurring criticism of the bicameral system, namely that reforms won’t change voting habits and that a proportionally elected lower house would still be dominated by sectarian parties. Ekmekji answered that even a bicameral legislature would be transitional, but would represent a good start and provide an opening for political forces independent of sectarianism. Mneimneh argued that despite his own predilections, imposing secularism on the Lebanese would be elitist; it is up to the voting public to determine whether to retain the model of Lebanon as a federation of communities rather than a unitary state. The important thing is to make the process fair. A non-sectarian house would do not only that, but also provide a national forum for voting on issues rather than passions.
The panelists agreed on some vital elements for any electoral reform law. A bicameral system and proportional representation topped the list, but other suggestions included lowering the voting age to 18 and allowing expatriates to vote, along with procedural improvements like pre-printed ballots and an independent election commission.
This vision of a fair Lebanese electoral system free from the bonds of sectarianism has to confront a grim reality. Extensive civil society efforts have achieved little. International efforts have met with limited success. Funding has run dry as attention shifts to countries caught up in the Arab Spring. The popular upheavals in Egypt and Tunisia have not appeared in Lebanon, and in any case mass street protests in Lebanon are extremely vulnerable to politicization and cooptation by elites. Ekmkekji declared that the solution must come from the top down, and yet political elites are unlikely to embrace changes challenging their traditional prerogatives.
2013 will likely witness no major changes to the system. The best path forward seems to be a gradual reform process, opening up new possibilities for political expression alongside the sectarian system, until they eventually become strong enough to replace it.
In response to a Chicago Council on Foreign Relations poll showing Americans mostly unsupportive of bombing Syrian air defenses or sending troops there, @MaydaySyria this morning tweeted:
We don’t’ care, we don’t need you and your coward #Obama.
Certainly the armed opposition is showing a lot of daring. Today’s attacks in Damascus include a bombing that killed the Syrian Defense Minister, his deputy and possibly other major figures in the Syrian security establishment.
the General Command of the Army and the Armed Forces stresses resolution to decisively eliminating the criminal and murder gangs and chasing them out of their rotten hideouts wherever they are until clearing the homeland of their evils.
It added:
whoever thinks that by targeting some leaders they could twist Syria’s arms is deluded, affirming that Syria, people, army and leadership, is today more determined to counter terrorism with all its forms and cutting off the hand of whoever thinks to harm Syria’s security.
So it looks as if the contest between the Asad regime and its inchoate opposition will be settled (or not) by force, not negotation.
The escalating violence in Damascus is occurring–not incidentally–at just the moment the UN Security Council faces a decision on whether to extend its observer mission in Syria. The Syrian opposition has generally wanted it withdrawn, because of its ineffectiveness. The Russians and the Asad regime have been trying to keep it alive.
I’m entirely on the side of the Syrian opposition in their efforts to bring down Bashar al Asad, but I’d like to see the UN observers stay. They have played a useful role in reporting the various massacres Asad has indulged in as well as its flaunting of the Annan peace plan with the use of heavy weapons in populated areas. I don’t see how reducing the transparency of what is going on in Syria will be helpful to ensuring a successful transition there. If the Asad regime survives and continues the violence against its opponents, the observers could continue to play a limited but useful role in reporting on what they see.
But I confess to another motive as well: if Asad goes, Syria is going to need an international presence to help keep the peace. The UN monitors could form the vanguard of such a peacekeeping force. Where we will find the needed numbers I have no idea. Once Asad falls, Syria will have numerous armed forces still in motion. Keeping them separate and protecting the civilian population will be no easy task. Conventional back-of-the-envelop calculations based on Syria’s population and geographic size would suggest a peacekeeping force of 50,000 or so. I have no idea where such a number would come from, though I can well imagine that Moscow will be offering.
If the international community fails to prepare for post-Asad Syria, there is a strong likelihood of massive violence against the regime’s supporters and sympathizers. Some will be able to protect themselves in Alawite strongholds. Others will flee to Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. But some will be trapped and vulnerable. “Politicide,” the murder of a particular political group, often follows revolution. It would be a serious mistake for the international community not to anticipate the need to protect Alawites, Christians, Druze and Sunni who remained loyal to Asad.
Much as I might wish the fall of the regime, I’ve got to recognize that what comes then is just as important. Excitement about current events should not blind us to future risks. If Syria implodes in a violent spasm of sectarian violence, or even breaks up, the Levant could find itself in chaos for years. Getting Syria onto a path toward unity, stability and eventually democracy is not going to be easy.
What if the Syrian opposition doesn’t unite? Are the Alawites preparing for a separate state? Are the Kurds? What is the likely impact of a Sunni dominated Syrian government on the region? How much U.S. intervention is the right amount? Joshua Landis discusses these questions and the future of Syria.
Associate Professor and Director, Center for Middle East Studies, University of Oklahoma and author of “Syria Comment,” daily newsletter on Syria
2. War and Protest in Sudan, Center for American Progress, 1-2:30 pm July 16
The one-year anniversary of South Sudan’s independence is fast approaching. South Sudan and Sudan have seemingly stepped back from the brink of all-out war, but they have yet to resolve many outstanding issues within the context of the ongoing North-South negotiation process. Meanwhile, conflict is deepening in a number of Sudan’s regions, while the pro-democracy movement – led by youth, civil society organizations, and opposition political parties – is protesting Sudan’s dictatorship. This violence and unrest poses significant implications for South Sudan and the region at large.Join us for a discussion that will address these multiple and interconnected challenges and explore ways to build peace and security within and between the two Sudans.The Enough Project will also debut a short video – shot in South Sudan – highlighting the reflections of South Sudanese and Sudanese on the occasion of South Sudan’s first anniversary of independence.Featured speakers: Sarah Cleto Rial, Program Director, My Sister’s Keeper Francis Deng, Former U.N. Special Advisor for the Prevention of Genocide Omer Ismail, Senior Advisor, Enough Project John Prendergast, Co-founder, Enough Project
Moderated by: John C. Bradshaw, Executive Director, Enough Project
This event has been moved to the Constitution Ballroom Grand Hyatt Washington. Event registration is now closed. You can view the live event webcast on this page.
On Tuesday, July 17, join the New America Foundation, the American Enterprise Institute, and the Center for a New American Security for an in-depth discussion of the opportunities and challenges posed to the United States by events in the Greater Middle East. Panelists will discuss electoral transitions following the Arab Spring, the changing role of Turkey, and Iran’s regional and international profile. Ambassador Dennis Ross will provide introductory remarks.
This event continues a unique collaboration among these institutions in the presidential campaign season, “Election 2012: The National Security Agenda.” Past conversations covered the U.S. role in the world, policy in East Asia, and the national security budget.
Schedule:
12:00 p.m. — Registration and Lunch
12:30 p.m.-2:00 p.m. —Panel Discussion and Q&A
Featured Speaker
Ambassador Dennis Ross
Counselor, Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Former Special Assistant to President Obama
Former National Security Council senior director for the Central Region
Former Special Advisor to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton
Panelists
Dr. Marc Lynch
Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Center for a New American Security
Danielle Pletka
Vice President, Foreign and Defense Policy Studies
Former Director for Iraq on the National Security Council under Bush and Obama administrations
Senior National Security Studies Fellow, New America Foundation
CNN will livestream this event on the Opinion page. On Twitter? Follow #natsecurity2012 for updates throughout the series.
About the Series:
This fall’s presidential election comes at a critical moment for the United States and the world. The demands for U.S. leadership are substantial–particularly in the dynamic Middle East and Asia-Pacific–yet fiscal challenges are forcing reductions in defense spending, sparking new thinking about American engagement with the world. In this important election season, many Americans will look to the next U.S. president to repair the economy, but he will nonetheless inherit complicated military and diplomatic engagements and govern as commander-in-chief of the globe’s most powerful nation. As a result, the discussion of national security issues must take a central role in the 2012 presidential election.
This event is the fourth in a series of campaign-season seminars on the critical issues of U.S. foreign and defense policy, sponsored by AEI, the Center for a New American Security and the New America Foundation.
4. Electoral Reform in Lebanon: What’s in Store for 2013, Aspen Institute, 12:30 pm July 17
The U.S.-Lebanon Dialogue Program will host “Electoral Reform in Lebanon: What’s in Store for 2013” to launch Dr. Ekmekji’s new policy paper exploring the complexities of Lebanon’s confessional society and avenues for reform in its electoral system. During this conversation, experts will discuss Dr. Ekmekji’s paper in light of the debate on democratic representation and the rights of minorities in Lebanon, Syria, and the region. The panelists will also offer actionable recommendations for lasting reform that reflects Lebanon’s democratic prospects, leading up to the parliamentary elections in 2013.
Dr. Arda Arsenian Ekmekji is the Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at Haigazian University in Beirut, Lebanon. She is professor of intercultural studies and a member of various non-governmental organization boards in Lebanon, such as World Vision and the Middle East Council of Churches. She was the only female member on the National Commission for a New Electoral Law (2006) and on the Supervisory Commission for the Electoral Campaign (2009).
We hope you will join us for what will be an interesting and informative discussion on:
July 17, 2012 at 12:30PM
The Aspen Institute
One Dupont Circle
Suite 700
Washington, D.C.
Please contact Sarah Harlan at sarah.harlan@aspeninst.org or 202-736-2526 to RSVP. We look forward to hearing from you soon.
Featuring Dr. Arda Ekmekji, Dean of Arts and Sciences, Haigazian University – Beirut, Lebanon; Author, “Confessionalism and Electoral Reform in Lebanon” Mr. Hassan Mneimneh, Senior Transatlantic Fellow, German Marshall Fund of the United States In a moderated discussion with Mr. Leslie Campbell, Senior Associate and Regional Director, Middle East and North Africa (MENA),
National Democratic Institute
5. Democratization in the Arab World, Carnegie, 12:15-1:45 pm July 18
Wednesday, July 18, 2012 – Washington, D.C.
12:15 PM – 1:45 PM EST
Based on the democratization experiences of other countries, what are the chances that the Arab Spring will lead to a flowering of democracy? In a new book, RAND Corporation experts extensively analyze past democratization examples over nearly four decades and analyze the Arab revolutions that up-ended longstanding authoritarian regimes.
Laurel Miller and Jeffrey Martini of the RAND Corporation will discuss what the successes and setbacks of other transitions from authoritarianism suggest about the problems ahead for Egypt, Tunisia, and elsewhere, and how they might be overcome. Carnegie’s Thomas Carothers will discuss and Marina Ottaway will moderate.
Please join the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center on July 18 for a public discussion entitled, “Can Pakistan Grow Again?” with deputy chairman of the Planning Commission of Pakistan Nadeem Ul Haque.
In the face of major domestic, regional, and international political and economic difficulties, Pakistan’s growth rate has suffered in recent years, falling well behind the growth of its population. Unemployment is rampant, especially among the burgeoning youth population. Rising urbanization is creating new challenges for policymakers. A low tax-to-GDP ratio is often cited as a major hindrance to growth. Yet, there are many other underlying economic issues behind Pakistan’s problem. Dr. Haque will offer his views on how growth may be regenerated in Pakistan and the potential pitfalls that lie ahead.
A discussion with
Nadeem Ul Haque Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission
Government of Pakistan
Moderated by
Shuja Nawaz Director, South Asia Center
Atlantic Council
DATE:
Wednesday, July 18, 2012
TIME:
3:30 p.m. – 5:00 p.m.
LOCATION:
Atlantic Council
1101 15th Street, NW, 11th Floor,
Washington, DC 20005
To attend, RSVP with your name and affiliation (acceptances only) tosouthasia@acus.org.
Nadeem Ul Haque
Dr. Nadeem Ul Haque is the deputy chairman of the Planning Commission of Pakistan, the agency responsible for managing growth and development policies in the country. As a key member of the economic management team of Pakistan, he has led the country-wide research and consultative effort for the development of the “framework for economic growth,” which emphasizes economic reform for sustained long-term productivity. The framework has been approved by all levels of the government of Pakistan and has been implemented into policy.
Dr. Haque has over twenty-four years of wide-ranging operational and research experience from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), including leading technical assistance missions, and policy and research teams. With a strong background in economic analysis and policy development, Dr. Haque has published numerous publications including books and papers in academic and policy journals. Dr. Haque holds a PhD in economics from the University of Chicago.
7. Oslo: Twenty Years Later, IIACF, 9 am-12 pm July 19
Oslo – Twenty Years Later
Capitol Hill – Washington, D.C. July 19th, 2012
9:00am – 12:00pm
No meaningful negotiations have taken place in almost two years, yet the death of the peace process remains a taboo topic in Washington. Recently, both Palestinian and Israeli voices have bemoaned the lack of progress. Mahmoud Abbas is rumored to be, once again, flirting with the idea of dissolving the Palestinian Authority. Yossi Beilin, considered one of the architects of the Oslo Peace Accords, has said it is time to move on.
After 20 years and little positive progress, the time has come to reevaluate our thinking and try a new approach – it is the only hope of moving towards a lasting peace.
Join the IIACF on Thursday, July 19th from 9:00am to noon as we bring together journalists, policy experts and government officials who are shaping the future of peace in the Middle East.
Location: Longworth House Office Building, Room 1539
Address: 45 Independence Avenue SW, Washington D.C.
8. Diplomacy in Syria: U.S.-Russia Relations and International Intervention, Center for National Policy, 12-1 pm July 19
Please join CNP President Scott Bates and an expert panel for a discussion on the current state of the U.S.-Russia relationship, Russia’s evolving foreign policy posture, and the corresponding implications for the crisis in Syria.
Featuring:
Jeff Mankoff Adjunct Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Program,
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Mark Adomanis Contributor, The Russia Hand, Forbes Magazine *A light lunch will be served*
Where
Center for National Policy
One Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Suite 333
9. Can Libya Really Become a Democracy?, SAIS, 2-3:30 pm July 19
“Can Libya Really Become a Democracy?”
Hosted By: Conflict Management Program and the Middle East Institute
Time: 2:00 PM – 3:30 PM
Location: Room 417, The Nitze Building (main building)
Summary: Christopher Blanchard, research manager at the Congressional Research Service, will discuss this topic. For more information and to RSVP, contact itlong@jhu.edu.
10. Assad’s Coming Downfall?, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 9:30 am July 20
David Enders, Ammar Abdulhamid, John Hannah, Reuel Marc Gerecht
Unbeknownst to most Americans, reports suggest that the rebels fighting Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad may have taken control of a growing portion of the country, and may now be closer to wresting it away from him altogether. While some Syrian soldiers have defected to Turkey, many more are deserting, or simply refusing to fight. Is Assad’s central authority breaking down? Are new power brokers emerging? If so, how can the United States and its allies prevent further humanitarian catastrophe?
To assess these questions and others, FDD is pleased to host a breakfast conversation with:
David Enders, a Pulitzer Center grantee on Crisis Reporting, recently returned from a month of reporting alongside the rebels fighting Bashar Assad’s government in Syria. Author of Baghdad Bulletin, a firsthand account of the U.S. occupation of Iraq, he has reported from the Middle East for news outlets ranging from The Nation to The National, Al-Jazeera, Vice, and the Virginia Quarterly Review.
Ammar Abdulhamid, a fellow at FDD, is a leading Syrian human rights and democracy activist, and also director of the Tharwa Foundation, a grassroots organization that works to break the Assad government’s information blockade by enlisting local activists and citizen issues to report on developments inside Syria. Before founding Tharwa, Mr. Abdulhamid served as a fellow with the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. He has briefed the President of the United States and testified before the U.S. Congress, and has appeared in many media outlets, including the New York Times.
John Hannah is a senior fellow at FDD, before which he served as national security advisor to Vice President Richard B. Cheney. Mr. Hannah has served in a range of senior policy positions in both Democratic and Republican administrations, as a senior member of Secretary of State James A. Baker’s Policy Planning staff during the presidency of George H.W. Bush, and later as a senior advisor to Secretary of State Warren Christopher under President William J. Clinton. Mr. Hannah’s articles have appeared in the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, and the Wall Street Journal, and he blogs regularly at ForeignPolicy.com and National Review Online.
Reuel Marc Gerecht is a Senior Fellow at FDD and a former Iran analyst at the CIA’s Directorate of Operations. He focuses on the Arab Revolt, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, terrorism, and intelligence. Mr. Gerecht is the author of The Wave: Man, God, and the Ballot Box in the Middle East, Know Thine Enemy: A Spy’s Journey into Revolutionary Iran, and The Islamic Paradox: Shiite Clerics, Sunni Fundamentalists, and the Coming of Arab Democracy. He is a contributing editor for The Weekly Standard and a correspondent for The Atlantic Monthly, as well as a frequent contributor to The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, and other publications.
Posted in Uncategorized - May 9, 2012 - 2 Comments
John Kerry’s renewed advocacy of safe zones and possible arming of the Syrian opposition provokes me to repeat what I’ve said before: these are ineffective solutions to the wrong problem. If you want to protect civilians, the worst thing you can do for them is to concentrate them in one place where Bashar al Assad can be sure he will be killing his opposition. And if you want to bring Bashar down, an armed opposition is one of the slowest and least effective ways to do it.
First, safe areas, corridors, or whatever you want to call them. They will not be safe because the UN Security Council declares them safe. Remember the safe areas in Bosnia and the UN protected areas in Croatia. They were target-rich environments, because that is where the enemies are. To make areas safe, you have to destroy the Syrian army’s capability to attack them, in particular with aircraft (including helicopters), missiles, artillery and armor.
In order to do that, you have to take down the air defenses. Think Libya times five or maybe ten, because Syrian capabilities are significantly greater. Libya was impossible without the jump start the U.S. gave the operation. And there is someone out there who thinks Jordan and Turkey will do Syria on their own? The EU and the U.S. are simply not going to engage in this effort–they have too much else on their minds, and the Americans want to keep the Russians on side for the nuclear negotiations with Iran.
Second, arming the opposition. This is already happening to some extent–small arms circulate widely in the Middle East. But small arms aren’t going to stop armor, artillery and aircraft, or even mass arrests and torture. An assassin could of course get lucky, but armed rebellion has little prospect for overthrowing Bashar, whose army and other security services have remained cohesive. We can of course feed an insurgency in Syria, but that is no quick solution. Insurgencies typically take decades to succeed, and they more often don’t.
These propositions are not only ineffective. They would take things in the wrong direction. Safe areas would attract mainly Sunni Syrians, thus increasing the sectarian segregation that the civil war has already begun. Arming the opposition would also drive away from its ranks the relatively few Alawites, Christians, Druze and others who have joined its ranks.
Sectarian warfare comparable to what happened in Iraq in 2006-7 is just about the worst outcome imaginable in Syria from the American perspective. Odds are it would overflow to Lebanon, Iraq and maybe even Turkey and Jordan.
If you want to intervene militarily in Syria, the United States should lead the effort and target the command and control of the Syrian armed forces, including Bashar al Assad himself. Talking about half measures that won’t work but instead make things worse is not helpful.
The consequences of a serious military strike on the regime are unpredictable. Would Bashar be killed? Who would take over? Would it intensify the civil war? How will Iran react? This too is a solution that could make things worse.
The Annan plan, even not 100% effective, starts looking like a reasonable proposition when you take a good look at the alternatives. We should stop talking smack about it and do our best to support it.
With U.S. officials saying–malgre’ moi–that the Annan plan is already failing, the White House is pledging to ramp up pressure on Syria. The House Foreign Affairs Committee has also held hearings looking for policy options.
They aren’t finding many, other than the now tired safe areas, humanitarian corridors, no fly zones and other euphemisms whose only real utility is to initiate what would no doubt be a lengthy and frustrating international military intervention with an uncertain outcome. Arming the opposition is another standby, but the perils of doing that have become more obvious with the continued fragmenting of the Syrian National Council, which was supposed to serve as the opposition “umbrella” and conduit for money. It just isn’t clear who might eventually benefit from the arms. Giving weapons to Sunni-dominated insurgents in Syria could have repurcussions in Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan and beyond that would not be in the U.S. interest.
The one point of consensus in the testimony is provision of greater support to the in-country opposition, including intelligence about the movement of the Syrian security forces. This is eminently reasonable, but even those who say
The regime has had a far harder time dealing with civil resistance over the past year than armed resistance
still advocate support to the armed resistance, presumably to gain influence over it. That’s too bad, since armed resistance tends to discourage the more effective nonviolent resistance.
We can always tighten sanctions, or get someone else to tighten them, but it is in their nature that the easy and more obvious restrictions get done first. The extension of financial and travel sanctions to more and more marginal regime figures may net a few bad guys, but the marginal utility is likely to be low, unless we happen to hit a regime fixer more important than he appeared to be in the first round. A look at who is still buying Syrian oil might turn up something interesting we could accomplish, and it would likely be useful to extend some of the sanctions on Iran’s banking system to Syria. But let’s be clear: doing that will unquestionably make life even harder than it has been for ordinary Syrians.
The sad fact is that there is not much else we can do to raise the costs to Bashar al Assad, unless we are prepared to take military action. Despite White House mumbling about ramping up pressure, my sense is that we are nowhere near that decision. There are good reasons for this. Apart from all the tactical difficulties of attacking Syrian forces that are inside major population centers, the Administration’s top priority has to be mounting a credible military threat against Iran’s nuclear program.
An attack on Syria without UN Security Council approval could end Russia’s support for the P5+1 negotiations with Iran about its nuclear program, and any prospect for UNSC approval of action against Iran. We also run the risk that an attack on Syria would not go well, or that it would chew up U.S. assets like cruise missiles, or that it would provide Iran with intelligence on our capabilities that would make an attack there less effective. You don’t want to get into a scrap in Syria if your top priority is Iran (that’s true even though I would oppose an attack on Iran).
This leaves the main U.S. focus in Syria on diplomacy, in two directions: Moscow and the Syrian opposition. The renewal of the UN observer mission in Syria comes up in July. We need Moscow to bring Bashar al Assad into full compliance with the Annan plan by then. At the same time, we need to get the Syrian opposition in compliance, by ending its counter-productive use of violence. This is what none of those testifying at the House have been willing to say.
If we get to July without the Annan plan implemented, then we will need to consider withdrawal of the observers as well as the use of military force. I understand perfectly well the arguments in favor–there is no doubt in my mind that Bashar al Assad is capable of continuing the crackdown and committing much greater atrocities than he has so far. And I understand why some U.S. government officials (and President Sarkozy) are trying to create the impression that military action is likely, even though it isn’t.
But President Obama is unlikely in the middle of an election campaign focused on the economy to take us to war, yet again, in an Arab country Americans don’t care much about. Withdrawal of the observers without the subsequent use of force would leave Bashar al Assad to crack down even harder, which is what he did after the departure of the Arab League observers. That would not be a good outcome.
We need to be thinking twice about Syria at every stage.
That’s what the thinktanksphere is doing on Syria: Bruce Jones at Foreignpolicy.com offers a hazy scenario in which the Syrian army allows a Turkish-led “stabilization force” in with a wink and a nod, even without a UN Security Council mandate. Fat chance. Only if Bashar al Assad thinks he has won a total victory and needs the internationals to pick up the pieces.
What no one wants to admit in Washington is the obvious. The most likely scenario is Bashar al Assad continuing in power and fighting a low-level insurgency against Free Syria Army units. This is a very bad scenario for the United States and anyone else in the world concerned about stability in the Middle East, which is just about anyone who uses oil. We have already seen refugee flows to Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq and Jordan. Deadly shots have been fired across the border into Lebanon and Turkey.
Of these countries, only Iraq is an important source of oil, but that is no small matter with gasoline at or above $4 per gallon in the U.S. and Iraq pumping all it can (around 2.7 million barrels per day). With Saudi Arabia and Qatar talking openly about arming the opposition in Syria, how long do we think it will take for Syria and Iran figure out ways to retaliate? Even hard talk can cause increases in oil prices. Damascus and Tehran, which are heavily dependent on oil revenue, are hoping that the threat of regional chaos will enrich their coffers, weaken the American economy and make us accept Bashar al Assad’s continuation in power.
This is not an easy situation, and it may endure. We need to be clear about what does and does not further U.S. interests. The goal should be the end of the Assad regime. That would serve not only U.S. interests, but just about everyone else’s except Iran’s. Even Russia is not going to find Assad’s Syria the reliable partner it was in the past. But while Bashar persists we need to try to ensure that the means used to achieve his downfall do not cause more harm than necessary. Arming the Syrian opposition plays into Bashar’s narrative: terrorists are attacking a regime ready to reform.
Recommitment of the opposition to nonviolent seems impossible to many at this point, but in my view it could be game-changing. A real opportunity exists tomorrow, when the UN-sponsored ceasefire is supposed to take effect. The Syrian government says it will stop all “military fighting” as of 6 am tomorrow. Admittedly this leaves big loopholes: how about police and the paramilitary forces known as Shabiha? Who is there to verify compliance? But the right response from the opposition is to make a parallel announcement that it will halt all military action at the same time. That will provide an opportunity for a return to peaceful demonstrations.
The possibility is less imaginary than might appear. Most Syrians are not taking up arms against Bashar al Assad, and those who do are not having a lot of success. Here is a nonviolent “flash” demonstration said to be in front of the Syrian parliament yesterday, with demonstrators holding signs that say “stop the bloodshed”:
The revolutionary leadership would do well to ask the Free Syria Army to take a break tomorrow morning and see what happens. If nothing else, doing so will gain the revolution significant credit internationally.
Admittedly I too am grasping at straws. But it seems nothing else is left.
Capitol Hill – Washington, D.C.
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