Tag: Lebanon
Ineffective solutions to the wrong problem
John Kerry’s renewed advocacy of safe zones and possible arming of the Syrian opposition provokes me to repeat what I’ve said before: these are ineffective solutions to the wrong problem. If you want to protect civilians, the worst thing you can do for them is to concentrate them in one place where Bashar al Assad can be sure he will be killing his opposition. And if you want to bring Bashar down, an armed opposition is one of the slowest and least effective ways to do it.
First, safe areas, corridors, or whatever you want to call them. They will not be safe because the UN Security Council declares them safe. Remember the safe areas in Bosnia and the UN protected areas in Croatia. They were target-rich environments, because that is where the enemies are. To make areas safe, you have to destroy the Syrian army’s capability to attack them, in particular with aircraft (including helicopters), missiles, artillery and armor.
In order to do that, you have to take down the air defenses. Think Libya times five or maybe ten, because Syrian capabilities are significantly greater. Libya was impossible without the jump start the U.S. gave the operation. And there is someone out there who thinks Jordan and Turkey will do Syria on their own? The EU and the U.S. are simply not going to engage in this effort–they have too much else on their minds, and the Americans want to keep the Russians on side for the nuclear negotiations with Iran.
Second, arming the opposition. This is already happening to some extent–small arms circulate widely in the Middle East. But small arms aren’t going to stop armor, artillery and aircraft, or even mass arrests and torture. An assassin could of course get lucky, but armed rebellion has little prospect for overthrowing Bashar, whose army and other security services have remained cohesive. We can of course feed an insurgency in Syria, but that is no quick solution. Insurgencies typically take decades to succeed, and they more often don’t.
These propositions are not only ineffective. They would take things in the wrong direction. Safe areas would attract mainly Sunni Syrians, thus increasing the sectarian segregation that the civil war has already begun. Arming the opposition would also drive away from its ranks the relatively few Alawites, Christians, Druze and others who have joined its ranks.
Sectarian warfare comparable to what happened in Iraq in 2006-7 is just about the worst outcome imaginable in Syria from the American perspective. Odds are it would overflow to Lebanon, Iraq and maybe even Turkey and Jordan.
If you want to intervene militarily in Syria, the United States should lead the effort and target the command and control of the Syrian armed forces, including Bashar al Assad himself. Talking about half measures that won’t work but instead make things worse is not helpful.
The consequences of a serious military strike on the regime are unpredictable. Would Bashar be killed? Who would take over? Would it intensify the civil war? How will Iran react? This too is a solution that could make things worse.
The Annan plan, even not 100% effective, starts looking like a reasonable proposition when you take a good look at the alternatives. We should stop talking smack about it and do our best to support it.
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Think twice
With U.S. officials saying–malgre’ moi–that the Annan plan is already failing, the White House is pledging to ramp up pressure on Syria. The House Foreign Affairs Committee has also held hearings looking for policy options.
They aren’t finding many, other than the now tired safe areas, humanitarian corridors, no fly zones and other euphemisms whose only real utility is to initiate what would no doubt be a lengthy and frustrating international military intervention with an uncertain outcome. Arming the opposition is another standby, but the perils of doing that have become more obvious with the continued fragmenting of the Syrian National Council, which was supposed to serve as the opposition “umbrella” and conduit for money. It just isn’t clear who might eventually benefit from the arms. Giving weapons to Sunni-dominated insurgents in Syria could have repurcussions in Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan and beyond that would not be in the U.S. interest.
The one point of consensus in the testimony is provision of greater support to the in-country opposition, including intelligence about the movement of the Syrian security forces. This is eminently reasonable, but even those who say
The regime has had a far harder time dealing with civil resistance over the past year than armed resistance
still advocate support to the armed resistance, presumably to gain influence over it. That’s too bad, since armed resistance tends to discourage the more effective nonviolent resistance.
We can always tighten sanctions, or get someone else to tighten them, but it is in their nature that the easy and more obvious restrictions get done first. The extension of financial and travel sanctions to more and more marginal regime figures may net a few bad guys, but the marginal utility is likely to be low, unless we happen to hit a regime fixer more important than he appeared to be in the first round. A look at who is still buying Syrian oil might turn up something interesting we could accomplish, and it would likely be useful to extend some of the sanctions on Iran’s banking system to Syria. But let’s be clear: doing that will unquestionably make life even harder than it has been for ordinary Syrians.
The sad fact is that there is not much else we can do to raise the costs to Bashar al Assad, unless we are prepared to take military action. Despite White House mumbling about ramping up pressure, my sense is that we are nowhere near that decision. There are good reasons for this. Apart from all the tactical difficulties of attacking Syrian forces that are inside major population centers, the Administration’s top priority has to be mounting a credible military threat against Iran’s nuclear program.
An attack on Syria without UN Security Council approval could end Russia’s support for the P5+1 negotiations with Iran about its nuclear program, and any prospect for UNSC approval of action against Iran. We also run the risk that an attack on Syria would not go well, or that it would chew up U.S. assets like cruise missiles, or that it would provide Iran with intelligence on our capabilities that would make an attack there less effective. You don’t want to get into a scrap in Syria if your top priority is Iran (that’s true even though I would oppose an attack on Iran).
This leaves the main U.S. focus in Syria on diplomacy, in two directions: Moscow and the Syrian opposition. The renewal of the UN observer mission in Syria comes up in July. We need Moscow to bring Bashar al Assad into full compliance with the Annan plan by then. At the same time, we need to get the Syrian opposition in compliance, by ending its counter-productive use of violence. This is what none of those testifying at the House have been willing to say.
If we get to July without the Annan plan implemented, then we will need to consider withdrawal of the observers as well as the use of military force. I understand perfectly well the arguments in favor–there is no doubt in my mind that Bashar al Assad is capable of continuing the crackdown and committing much greater atrocities than he has so far. And I understand why some U.S. government officials (and President Sarkozy) are trying to create the impression that military action is likely, even though it isn’t.
But President Obama is unlikely in the middle of an election campaign focused on the economy to take us to war, yet again, in an Arab country Americans don’t care much about. Withdrawal of the observers without the subsequent use of force would leave Bashar al Assad to crack down even harder, which is what he did after the departure of the Arab League observers. That would not be a good outcome.
We need to be thinking twice about Syria at every stage.
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Grasping at straws
That’s what the thinktanksphere is doing on Syria: Bruce Jones at Foreignpolicy.com offers a hazy scenario in which the Syrian army allows a Turkish-led “stabilization force” in with a wink and a nod, even without a UN Security Council mandate. Fat chance. Only if Bashar al Assad thinks he has won a total victory and needs the internationals to pick up the pieces.
What no one wants to admit in Washington is the obvious. The most likely scenario is Bashar al Assad continuing in power and fighting a low-level insurgency against Free Syria Army units. This is a very bad scenario for the United States and anyone else in the world concerned about stability in the Middle East, which is just about anyone who uses oil. We have already seen refugee flows to Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq and Jordan. Deadly shots have been fired across the border into Lebanon and Turkey.
Of these countries, only Iraq is an important source of oil, but that is no small matter with gasoline at or above $4 per gallon in the U.S. and Iraq pumping all it can (around 2.7 million barrels per day). With Saudi Arabia and Qatar talking openly about arming the opposition in Syria, how long do we think it will take for Syria and Iran figure out ways to retaliate? Even hard talk can cause increases in oil prices. Damascus and Tehran, which are heavily dependent on oil revenue, are hoping that the threat of regional chaos will enrich their coffers, weaken the American economy and make us accept Bashar al Assad’s continuation in power.
This is not an easy situation, and it may endure. We need to be clear about what does and does not further U.S. interests. The goal should be the end of the Assad regime. That would serve not only U.S. interests, but just about everyone else’s except Iran’s. Even Russia is not going to find Assad’s Syria the reliable partner it was in the past. But while Bashar persists we need to try to ensure that the means used to achieve his downfall do not cause more harm than necessary. Arming the Syrian opposition plays into Bashar’s narrative: terrorists are attacking a regime ready to reform.
Recommitment of the opposition to nonviolent seems impossible to many at this point, but in my view it could be game-changing. A real opportunity exists tomorrow, when the UN-sponsored ceasefire is supposed to take effect. The Syrian government says it will stop all “military fighting” as of 6 am tomorrow. Admittedly this leaves big loopholes: how about police and the paramilitary forces known as Shabiha? Who is there to verify compliance? But the right response from the opposition is to make a parallel announcement that it will halt all military action at the same time. That will provide an opportunity for a return to peaceful demonstrations.
The possibility is less imaginary than might appear. Most Syrians are not taking up arms against Bashar al Assad, and those who do are not having a lot of success. Here is a nonviolent “flash” demonstration said to be in front of the Syrian parliament yesterday, with demonstrators holding signs that say “stop the bloodshed”:
The revolutionary leadership would do well to ask the Free Syria Army to take a break tomorrow morning and see what happens. If nothing else, doing so will gain the revolution significant credit internationally.
Admittedly I too am grasping at straws. But it seems nothing else is left.
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Let your people go!
Tonight is the Jewish festival of Passover, when we celebrate liberation. Last year, I called this season the Passover of Arab liberation, but noted the difficulties Syria was facing.
This year we seem to be somewhere in the middle of the ten plagues, with Bashar al Assad not even beginning to think about letting his people go (and in fact inflicting the plagues, which is not something pharaoh did). The mutual ceasefire deadline is set for April 12, provided Damascus pulls back from populated areas and ceases artillery fire on April 10. In the meanwhile, Bashar seems to have intensified the military attacks in an effort to do as much deadly damage as possible to his opposition. While I hope Kofi Annan’s effort is successful, you’d have to be Moses-like in inspiration to bet on it.
We should nevertheless consider the possibilities. If by some fluke the Syrian army really does withdraw from some places, I hope the revolution will tuck away its guns and somehow demonstrate its overwhelming superiority in numbers. It is particularly important that April 12/13 see a massive demonstration of opposition in Damascus and Aleppo, even if that means everyone just staying home in a general strike. It will also be vital that the UN deploy observers quickly, and in far greater numbers than the couple of hundred currently contemplated.
It seems far more likely that Bashar will not withdraw or cease fire. What then? There is really no sign of international will to intervene. Despite ample documentation of artillery attacks on civilian targets as well as helicopter operations, neither the Turks nor the Arab League are preparing serious military action to enforce a no-fly zone or create humanitarian corridors or safe zones. The Syrian security forces are busy mining the borders so that civilians can’t escape. While it seems unlikely that Bashar can prevail 100%, he is well on his way to reducing the opposition to a low-intensity insurgency, with the bulk of the population sullenly resenting but accepting restoration of the dictatorship. At least for a while, it is likely to be significantly more draconian than before the rebellion started.
This is a bad outcome, but I am afraid not the worst. If the fighting continues to escalate and Bashar still survives, the consequences could be catastrophic for the region. The violence might then overflow Syria’s borders and pose serious problems for Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan and maybe even Turkey. If Bashar manages to stay in place, it is vital that the Friends of Syria, that unwieldy conglomeration of more than 80 countries, maintain and tighten its efforts, in particular the sanctions and diplomatic isolation. We see in Burma how strategic patience can win the day.
Many of my friends and colleagues are appalled that nothing more is being done. I can’t describe myself as comfortable with this state of affairs. But it is important to recognize that there are other priorities on earth. The Administration’s first concern has to be Iran. There is no way to get a negotiated solution to its nuclear challenge, or prevent the Israelis from using military means, unless the United States maintains a credible military threat. Entering a war with an uncertain outcome in Syria would not be a smart prelude to dealing with Iran. American resources, though large, are not infinite–we wouldn’t want to run out of cruise missiles or suffer serious aircraft losses in a second priority fight.
There is also a diplomatic factor. The best way to mount a credible threat against Iran is with UN Security Council backing. What are the odds of the Russians conceding that if we go to war with Syria without their cooperation? The odds may not be good in any event, but we need at least a small chance for success.
So I am afraid our Syrian heroes will need to continue their efforts. I still prefer they be nonviolent ones. Nothing that has happened in the last few weeks of violent attacks convinces me that the Free Syria Army will shorten the reign of Bashar al Assad by as much as a single day. It is far more likely that their attacks will frighten large numbers of people who might otherwise have joined nonviolent protests.
I’ll pray for the Syrians at Seder tonight, as I trust many Jews around the world will do. Not because I think praying will do the Syrians any good, but because the parallel between today’s Syrians and our own liberation narrative should inform our sensibilities. The people of Syria are seeking the freedom that Tunisians, Egyptians, Libyans and Yemenis have all started to enjoy, even if they are still at the beginning of their journeys through the wilderness. I hope the Syrians catch up soon.
The most frequent injunction in the Old Testament is to treat a stranger like ourselves:
…you shall love him as yourself, for you were strangers in the land of Egypt… {Leviticus 19:33-34}
Bashar: let your people go!
PS: I missed this Monday, but you shouldn’t:
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Negotiation time
With all the jabber the last few days about the use of force against both Syria and Iran, media attention is not focused on the prospects for negotiated settlements. But there are such prospects still, even if the odds are getting longer by the day.
Syria
International Crisis Group is out yesterday with a “now or never” manifesto rightly focused on prospects for UN/Arab League envoy Kofi Annan’s efforts:
Annan’s best hope lies in enlisting international and notably Russian support for a plan that:
Arming the Syrian opposition, which is happening already, is not likely to improve the prospects for a negotiated settlement along these lines. To the contrary, Western contemplation of safe areas and humanitarian corridors, loose Arab talk about armed the Syria Free Army, the occasional Al Qaeda suicide bombing and a Russian blank check for the regime to crack down are combining to plunge Syria into chaos. Someone may think that deprives Iran of an important ally, but it also spells lasting (as in decades-long) trouble in a part of the world where we can ill afford it.
The Americans have been mumbling about how arms will inevitably get to the Syrian opposition. This is true enough. But some visible support for Annan, and a behind the scenes diplomatic game with the Russians, would be more helpful to the cause of preventing Syria from becoming a chronic source of instability in Lebanon, Iraq, Turkey and Jordan.
Iran
Netanyahu came but this time did not conquer. He needed President Obama to be forthcoming on an eventual military action against Iran as much as Obama needed him to refrain from aligning with Republican critics. It fell to Senator Mitch McConnell to crystallize the emerging U.S. position: if Iran enriches uranium to bomb grade (at or above 90%) or shows signs of having decided to build a nuclear weapon (design and ignition work), then the U.S. would respond with overwhelming force. This is the proposed “red line.”
We should not be fooled by McConnell’s belligerent tone. Even assuming very strict verification procedures, the line he proposes is a relatively expansive one that leaves Iran with enrichment technology and peaceful uses of atomic energy, which is what the Islamic Republic claims is its red line.
While the press was focused on belligerent statements, the P5+1 (US, UK, France, Russia, China + Germany) have apparently responded to Iran’s offer of renewed negotiations. Iran has also told the International Atomic Energy Agency that it can visit a previously off-limits nuclear site believed to be engaged in weapons research, but procedures have not yet been worked out.
Bottom line
I wouldn’t get excited about the prospects for negotiated solutions in either Syria or Iran. But if ever there was a time to negotiate, this is it. By fall, both situations will likely be too far gone, with serious consequences for the United States, the Middle East and the rest of the world.
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More thunder, no lightning
The UN General Assembly today passed a resolution supporting the Arab League plan for Syria, which would have Bashar al Assad step aside from his presidency and turn over power to his vice president, who would form a broad coalition government and initiate a democratic transition. The vote was 137 to 12, which is pretty lopsided even in the UNGA, where lopsided votes are common.
The opponents were: Belarus, Bolivia, China, Cuba, DPRK, Ecuador, Iran, Nicaragua, Russia, Syria, Venezuela, Zimbabwe. This is a crew that needs a name: something like the antidemocrats, but snappier.
So what practical effect will this have? Hard to say, but the legal effect is nil. UNGA resolutions are like preseason football: the games may be well played and show off talent, but they have no direct impact on the standings. Only UN Security Council resolutions have legal effect.
But legal effect isn’t everything and doesn’t guarantee implementation either. The important thing is that the “international community” has made an appropriate noise in response to Bashar al Assad’s military assault on Syria’s citizens. This will weaken Bashar’s position both internationally and within Syria and give inspiration to his opponents, who will also bemoan international community ineffectiveness.
The real question is what should be done now. Some will want to resort to military intervention or arming the Syrian Free Army. This is a serious error in my book. The worst outcome for the U.S. is a prolonged civil war in Syria, which could have a destabilizing impact on Lebanon, Iraq, Turkey and more widely. “Safe areas” and “humanitarian corridors” would, in the absence of Syrian government cooperation, require major military intervention.
As Mona Yacoubian, Randa Slim and Aram Nerguizian were at pains to make clear this morning at a Stimson/Middle East Institute Event, there are diplomatic and political courses of action that still need to be played out:
- The U.S. should lead on getting a “Friends of Syria” group up and running;
- The Arab League and Turkey should lead on pressing the Syrian opposition to unify;
- Sanctions implementation needs to be tightened, especially by the Arab League;
- The U.S. and Turkey need to court Russian support, on grounds that their interests require a good relationship with whatever comes after Bashar;
- The Syrian opposition has to work on peeling away Sunni and Christian merchant, as well as military, support for the regime.
As Randa Slim noted, what helps the regime is fear of instability on the one hand and Islamism on the other. These fears would get worse with military intervention, not better. We need more thunder, no lightning.
PS: Somehow this “Dancing and chanting around an independence flag in Qudaysa, Damascus” tweeted by @LeShaque and retweeted by Robert Mackey grabs me this morning. It is a lot more expressive than the important, if dull, session of the UNGA yesterday and reminds us of what the resolution is really about:
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