Tag: Lebanon
To JCPOA or not to JCPOA is the question
The Biden Administration in the runup to the November 8 election has hesitated to return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA aka Iran nuclear deal). This is understandable. In domestic US politics, return to the JCPOA carries no political advantage and considerable political risk.
The post-election dilemma
This hesitation sets up a post-election dilemma. During the past month, a serious protest movement has again emerged in Iran. The main focus has been rules on wearing the hijab, which is a highly visible symbol of the theological dictatorship. The protests have been widespread and growing. No doubt if the protesters succeed in overthrowing the Islamic Republic, the nuclear question would be seen in a different light.
But there is no telling whether that will happen within a relevant time frame. Iran has seen repeated episodes of public protest that the Islamic Republic has repressed brutally. Any one of the protest movements might have succeeded. They did not.
So immediately after the US election, President Biden will confront a choice. He can go ahead with a return to the JCPOA, or he can wait to see if the protest movement will succeed at displacing the Islamic Republic. If he proceeds with the JCPOA, that will give the Islamic Republic massive resources as well as sanctions relief and diplomatic prestige, thus enabling it to repress and buy off opposition. If he continues to hesitate, a vital opportunity could be lost to back Iran away from nuclear weapons.
Nuclear weapons or return to the JCPOA?
This is a serious dilemma. Nuclear weapons aren’t so useful in wartime, as their non-use the past 77 years demonstrates. But Iran can see from North Korea’s experience that they make other nuclear powers hesitate to destabilize a country. They also enable increased power projection in the region, which others will try to counterbalance. Iranian nuclear weapons would thus precipitate a regional arms race, with Turkey and Saudi Arabia the main contestants. The United States would not welcome that.
But return to the JCPOA will give the Islamic Republic a new lease on life as well as the resources it requires to remain in power. The gain in pushing Iran back from nuclear weapons would be a few months, not years. Once you know how to enrich uranium, the remaining technological obstacles are not great. Certainly the billions the US and others will need to return to Iran will be sufficient to ensure that nuclear weapons are only a few months in the future.
Make lemonade?
Someone might ask, if you have lemons why not make lemonade? Why not insist that Iran stop the internal crackdown as part of the price of returning to the JCPOA? While I might want Washington to try, I doubt that gambit would succeed. The negotiations are already overloaded with lots of non-nuclear issues. These include American prisoners in Iran and Iranian prisoners in the US, Iranian power projection in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, and American encouragement of ethnic rebellion inside Iran. Getting back to the JCPOA will require ignoring most if not all of these. The main question is JCPOA or no JCPOA. And it isn’t an easy one to answer, even if like me you think Trump’s withdrawal was a stupid mistake.
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The time to remember has come
My esteemed Middle East Institute colleagues Paul Salem and Brian Katulis have set a low bar for President Biden’s trip to the Middle East this week. They want him to send a signal of renewed diplomatic commitment to the region.
There’s a hitch
It’s an important objective, but there is a hitch. It is the signs of reduced US commitment that have incentivized many improvements in relations among Middle Eastern countries. This is clear in Yemen. The current ceasefire came about in part because of US reluctance to continue supporting Saudi efforts to counter the Houthis. Iraq’s current role mediating between Iran and Saudi Arabia would be inconceivable if the Americans hadn’t withdrawn most of their forces. The wars in Syria are calming partly because the Americans have mostly withdrawn. The remainder are limiting action exclusively to the Islamic State and Al Qaeda.
Israel’s newfound ambition to help guard Arab Gulf security is also a consequence of reduced American commitment. The Ibrahim/Abraham accords that President Trump initiated essentially trade Arab recognition for Israeli security assistance. The Arab Gulf monarchies regard that as better than American help. The Israelis don’t demand respect for human rights. Spyware and air defense have proven attractive propositions. Diplomatic recognition hasn’t proven costly to the Arab states that have done it so far (UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco), but the Saudis have hesitated.
And a fly in the Saudi ointment
That’s because of the fly in the ointment. Israel is refusing not only to make peace with the Palestinians but even to accept two states as the basis for a future peace. Israel’s current ambitions are clear: to keep the Golan Heights and all of Jerusalem as well as many of the settlements on the West Bank. The Palestinians would then get only a “state-minus.” That would lack not only an army but sovereign control over its very limited territory. Israel’s attitude is unlikely to change, even after its next election. Prime Minister Netanyahu is gone, but not his singular accomplishment: killing the spirit of Oslo.
Plus an elephant in the room
The elephant in the room is Iran. Negotiations for re-entry into the Iran nuclear deal (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) are faltering. If they fail, Iran will have the option within a year of producing enough enriched uranium to make several atomic bombs. Attacks on its nuclear facilities and personnel would only delay the inevitable, perhaps by years but more likely by months. They would also give Tehran reason to attack the Gulf states, either directly or through proxies.
The situation will improve only marginally if the JCPOA is revived. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps will then use sanctions relief to reinvigorate their proxy military interventions in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. That is precisely what the Gulf states don’t want.
Diplomacy>military
Paul and Brian rightly underline the good things American diplomacy could try to do: improve governance, encourage regional de-escalation and integration, and build civilian ties to the United States, both with citizens and institutions. But Washington has proven inept so far at beefing up diplomatic efforts once the troops are gone. Witness Iraq, where a mostly civilian-focused strategic framework agreement has languished after the military withdrawal. As Chas Freeman pointed out years ago, our diplomats have forgotten diplomacy without force. The time to remember has come.
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No sword dancing on treacherous terrain
President Biden’s op/ed in the Washington Post previews his visit next week to the Middle East. He will stop in Jerusalem, the West Bank, Jeddah (for a regional Arab meeting), and Riyadh. The piece has two audiences: the domestic one and the international one, especially in the Middle East but also in Europe and the Far East.
What the Americans want
There are four salient issues for Biden’s domestic audience: the Iran nuclear deal, support for Israel, oil prices, and human rights. America is split on the Iran nuclear deal. Half support Biden’s desire to re-enter it. The other half want to continue the so far unsuccessful effort to sanction Iran into submission, with the possibility of military action if that fails. On support for Israel’s security, there is overwhelming support. But Americans increasingly want accountability for Israeli abuses against Palestinians. Biden avoids that subject in the op/ed.
Most Americans want lower oil prices. Saudi Arabia has been reluctant to increase production, partly in retaliation for Biden’s criticism of human rights practices in the Kingdom, particularly the murder of Jamal Khashoggi. That is not a dinnertime conversation topic in the US. But there are many informed voices calling for accountability beyond the minimum the Saudis have so far done.
What the world wants: nuclear deal and Iran’s regional power projection
The rest of the world has a somewhat different set of priorities: not only Iran’s nuclear program but also its regional power projection as well as oil prices. Beyond the US, there is little concern for Israel’s security or human rights, apart from the plight of the Palestinians.
Most of the world would like to see the Iran nuclear deal operating once again. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have not, despite the risks to them of war if Israel or the US seeks to destroy the Iranian nuclear facilities. Biden should be aiming to understand their perspective better. My guess is they would be fine with re-entry into nuclear deal provided the US pushes back harder on Iran’s regional power projection.
That could mean doing more to weaken the Houthis in Yemen. It could also mean reducing Iran’s presence in Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq, where the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its proxies are major players. Strengthening the nascent regional air defense system (see video above) or even Saudi entry into the Ibrahimic accords are other possibilities.
What the world wants: oil prices and Palestinians
On oil prices, the Saudis may seek some assurances on the downside while the Americans push for increased production. Europe and the Far East will wish the Americans success. Russia, Iran, Iraq, and other major producers will want prices to remain above $100 per barrel. That is what they all need to balance their budgets. No American president can promise sustained high oil prices. But the US is now a net oil and gas exporter. A nod to stability in the oil market is not out of the question.
While Biden will visit the West Bank, he has so far done little more than restore aid to the Palestinians President Trump had zeroed out. The op/ed fails to mention the two-state solution or Israeli responsibility for human rights abuses against Palestinians. It doesn’t even mention the rumored intention to re-open the US consulate in Jerusalem. That had acted for decades before Trump as a de facto embassy to Palestine. We can only hope Biden will be more forthcoming on those issues during his trip.
Treacherous terrain
The Middle East is treacherous terrain for any American president. Trump blundered by sword dancing with the Saudis, both literally and figuratively. He also wrote the Israelis a blank check (including for their territorial ambitions) and ended support for the Palestinians. Biden won’t commit those mistakes. He will try to build on the Ibrahimic accords that Trump initiated, strengthen and unify Arab defenses against Iran, and reach some sort of accommodation on oil production and prices. Odds are the trip will not be a brilliant success, but the ambitions are at least more realistic than his predecessor’s.
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Siyasa Podcast: Episode 2: The Lebanese Crisis — with Randa Slim
Second episode of podcast Siyasa, which discusses Middle East policy and politics. The first episode, with Vali Nasr, is here.
Host Ibrahim Al-Assil discusses with Dr. Randa Slim different dimensions of the Lebanese crisis, the domestic conditions, and the regional dynamics.
You can also listen to the podcast on:
Spotify
Google Podcast
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Hezbollah holds sway over the Lebanese state, and it’s hard to see it go away
Chatham House’s Lina Khatib recently launched a paper entitled How Hezbollah holds sway over the Lebanese state. The paper deals with the past trajectories through which Hezbollah has become the pivotal actor in Lebanese politics. To discuss her findings and their implications for the state of crisis that has gripped Lebanon for over a year, Chatham House convened a panel discussion July 8. The panel agreed that Hezbollah has played its cards well and has become engrained in Lebanon’s corrupt and non-functioning political system. In fact, it has become its most powerful player in many ways. The current crisis has made its transition from a purported ‘defender of the oppressed’ to an established and corrupt part of the political elite all the more clear. Unfortunately, the panel considered the most needed reforms that would actually benefit the Lebanese people unlikely to succeed in the near future.
The speakers were:
Joseph Daher
Visiting Professor,
University of Lausanne
Lina Khatib
Director of the Middle East and North Africa Programme,
Chatham House
Mona Yacoubian
Senior Adviser,
U.S. Institute for Peace
Emile Hokayem (moderator)
Senior Fellow for Middle East Security,
IISS
Hezbollah as a unique, but entrenched part of the corrupt system
Lina Khatib summarized the findings of her new paper. She describes what is commonplace for Lebanese: that Hezbollah has become an entrenched part of the Lebanese system. There is no ‘state-within-a-state’: “Hezbollah permeates the state in Lebanon.” It employs many of the practices that have come to define the corrupt political system. There is no transparency on government tenders, and using ministries to provide rents to constituents is the standard.
Joseph Daher maintains that Hezbollah is the primary defender of the Lebanese neoliberal, sectarian political system. It presents itself as a defender of the oppressed (following the Iranian ideology of ‘Khomeinism‘), but this has proved mainly rhetorical. In practice, it oppresses labor unions and favors wealthy industrialists and crime bosses through the ministries it controls. In short, it behaves exactly as the other political entities in Lebanon.
Nonetheless, Khatib explained that Hezbollah is also unique in Lebanon. It has surveillance capacity. Not just within the state, but within its opponents too. This gives it a large advantage over others. Similarly, most parties take advantage of Lebanon’s corrupt political institutions. Hezbollah is different because they have been systematic in using any opportunity – no matter how small – to advance their influence. Hezbollah has political and coercive leverage over both its allies and its opponents, which gives it a great advantage within the Lebanese state. Even opponents of Hezbollah make deals with it behind closed doors – or sometimes even openly. This is what keeps the system in place. As Mona Yacoubian put it, Hezbollah has transformed into the “praetorian guard” of the corrupt Lebanese system.
Toeing the line between state and non-state
Hezbollah’s other major advantage is its status as a hybrid actor. Khatib explains that toeing the line between state and non-state is an ideal situation for Hezbollah. It has influence and legitimacy due to its ties to the state, but is not really a state actor, and is not seen as really in charge of state institutions. There are four main reasons why Hezbollah has no intention of changing this situation:
- The Lebanese state is very weak and not appealing to take over
- There is no Shia majority in Lebanon; outright Hezbollah rule would not be tolerated
- Hezbollah avoids accountability by shirking ownership of the state
- Hezbollah is under sanctions as a terrorist organization in the West, complicating its role as would-be regime.
All of them means all of them
Yacoubian pointed out that Hezbollah’s image has been tarnished, even among its own constituency. The slogan of the Lebanese protest movement ‘all of them means all of them’ refuses to differentiate among the political class. “You see now a political class that is defined purely by self-enrichment and is utterly devoid of any pretense of representing any higher ideal or value.” Yacoubian would go so far as to maintain that there are few real political divisions left among Lebanon’s ruling class.
Hezbollah’s resilience: Iranian support and no alternatives
According to Khatib, Iran’s support to Hezbollah is absolute. Anyone who thinks that Hezbollah can Lebanonize and be removed from Iran’s orbit is dreaming. Steadfast Iranian support makes it stronger than its domestic opponents. With its constituency, it proves resilient because it argues that there is no alternative. Hezbollah’s constituency might not like the party, but they see that there is no realistic alternative to the services it provides. Daher added that Hezbollah’s humanitarian outreach is very large. It claims to have helped some 50.000 families on top of their normal activities in the months of April and May alone. No other actor in Lebanon can match that.
Prospects for reform
So how to move forward? Khatib made it clear that the solution is not to extract Hezbollah from Lebanon, as this would be impossible. A solution would be to reform the Lebanese political system. This needs to be Lebanese-led, but it will require foreign aid. Yacoubian agreed. She proposed a number of concrete reforms that foreign actors can contribute to:
- Support the Lebanese Armed Forces, the only state institution standing between where we are today and total chaos. This is one of the few policies that is continuing today, primarily by the US.
- Cabinet formation and the ability to move forward with reforms are essential. The US, Gulf, and EU can do more to pressure the political elite to form a technocratic government. Steps towards this could be sanctions against the most corrupt political leaders who are obstructing government formation. This is currently happening haphazardly, but it could be done more concertedly.
- The international community can and should do more in the way of humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable Lebanese. Bypassing the government is vital to avoid corruption. Perhaps a special UN agency could be tasked with this.
Khatib warned that economic pressure and sanctions alone are unlikely to change Hezbollah’s behavior on its own. As with the IRGC, a weakened currency only benefits Hizbollah, as they make their money abroad, in US dollars. The same is true for Assad in Syria. Sanctions are important, but they aren’t a primary tool. They need to be part of a comprehensive approach.
The panel was pessimistic about the prospects of efficient foreign support for reform. Khatib warned that Hezbollah benefits from the common attitude that sees Lebanon as a lost cause. If the international community gives up and maintains the status quo, Hezbollah benefits. Therefore, bottom-up reform is key. But Daher believes that the Lebanese protest movement has failed to create a unified answer to the corrupt system. He sees the international response as lacking originality. They are now attempting to get Saudi Arabia back to the table and to resume cabinet formation. These efforts will sustain the sectarian parties and system in the paradigm that has been employed for the last several decades.
Khatib emphasized that incremental change must be possible. The gradual approach by which Hezbollah grew its influence can be reversed in small steps. Nonetheless, Hokayem summarized Daher’s pessimistic view. Reform won’t come from the top down in Lebanon, it isn’t emerging in an organized form from the bottom up, and meaningful change is unlikely to come from the outside.
Watch the recording of the event here:
https://www.facebook.com/CHMENAProg/videos/1419092855114088
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The pandemic weakened the weakest governments and social groups
The Middle East Institute June 15 hosted a seminar discussing the impact of COVID-19 on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). This was in collaboration with the recently released 6th wave of the Arab Barometer, an expansive regional survey. Using the results from this survey and analysis from the Brookings Doha Center, the panel assessed the pandemic’s effects on the region and the perceived efficiency of government responses. As the survey was held in three rounds throughout 2020-2021, the Arab Barometer could also register changes over time. Bottom line: the pandemic exacerbated the region’s existing problems and the hardest hit were the most vulnerable communities (refugees, the poor, and women).
The speakers were:
Yasmina Abuzzuhour
Visiting fellow
Brookings-Doha Center
Salma Al-Shami
Senior research specialist
Arab Barometer
Shala Al-Kli
Non-resident scholar
MEI
Deputy regional director
Mercy Corps
Karen Young (moderator)
Senior fellow and director, Program on Economics and Energy
MEI
Exacerbating existing problems
Shahla Kli COVID has worsened existing issues, particularly for IDPs and refugees. She highlighted two of these structural weaknesses in particular:
- Lack of institutionalization: This is manifested in weak healthcare systems and social welfare programs. COVIC pushed these to their limits. Furthermore, some countries (such as Syria or Lebanon) lack well-structured recovery and vaccination plans, exacerbating and lengthening the crisis.
- Unemployment/the ‘youth bulge’: Problems in the labor market abound in the MENA region. Many of its youthful populations work in informal, day-to-day jobs. This is particularly true for migrants and refugees. Often these jobs disappeared during lockdowns. Conversely, many poor citizens and migrants had no choice but to continue working despite the pandemic, potentially falling ill themselves.
Public opinion
Salma al-Shami outlined the relevant results of the Arab Barometer on this topic. The Barometer gathered data on seven countries (Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia) due to financial and access constraints. She summarized the findings in five main points:
- Concern for COVID is still high in these countries, but it is significantly higher among women than among men.
- The loss of education for children and increased cost of living were the the number one and two concerns. In Jordan some 140 days of education were lost according to UNESCO, and even more in Iraq.
- Public opinion on government response to COVID varies with the assessment of the healthcare system and inflation control. If these are positively rated, the government’s response also tends to be. This is the case in Morocco and Tunisia for example, while Lebanon and Iraq lack such public confidence. Morocco was also the only country where significant relief packages were deployed. Some 49% of respondents in that country indicated they received some form of aid, where that number didn’t top 20% in any of the other countries.
- Concerning vaccines, there is still some hesitancy. Where trust in government is high, so is the willingness to take a vaccine, as in Morocco which has already seen an exemplary vaccine rollout compared to its neighbors. However, in Jordan, Algeria, Iraq, and Tunisia, only 35-42% indicate they are willing to take a vaccine. Abouzzouhour added that in Jordan conspiracy theories surrounding the vaccines are rampant, and that the government is often not the public’s primary source of information.
- The survey data also indicates that COVID has exacerbated issues of income inequality and unemployment. Few respondents indicated they lost their jobs because of COVID-related lockdowns, although many did experience a temporary job interruption. Women and migrant labor in general suffered greater consequences.
Government responses
Adding to the statistics related to government response to COVID, Abouzzouhour commented that governments overpromised and underdelivered. The first wave saw major lockdowns and task forces with health experts, leading to a comparatively strong performance. However, the initial best cases (Tunisia and Jordan) failed to follow through on their success because they favored opening up for their economies. Additionally, relief packages and strong vaccination drives often faltered, despite government promises. In general, countries that previously underinvested in healthcare (as a percentage of their GDP) suffered high mortality rates.
Two interesting cases emerged from her story. Once again, Morocco was underlined as a strong performer in vaccination compared to its neighbors. Algeria is less clear-cut. It has some of the lowest infection rates in the region. However, its mortality rate is comparatively high, indicating that case numbers are likely underreported more than in other countries. Algeria was also criticized for failing to set up significant relief packages, despite the nation’s hydrocarbon resources.
Watch the recording of the event here:
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