Tag: Lebanon
Protest rises across the Middle East
“Today we are witnessing not only Lebanon and Iraq’s powerful protest movements calling for greater rights and an end to corruption, but also solidarity movements in Palestine and Syria supporting the Black Lives Matter movement in the United States. What common goals are shared by protest movements across the Middle East? What lessons can the civil resistance currently surging in the United States learn from social movements and activism in the Middle East, and vice versa? What impact has COVID-19 had on ongoing protests in Lebanon and Iraq?” On June 24, the Middle East Institute held an online discussion on protests and solidarity movements in states throughout the Middle East. The event was moderated by Zahra Hakir and featured four guest speakers:
Zahra Hankir (Moderator): Freelance journalist and author, Our Women on the Ground: Essays by Arab Women Reporting from the Arab World
Zahra Ali: Assistant Professor of Sociology, Rutgers University-Newark
Ahmed Abu Artema: Palestinian journalist and peace activist
Razan Ghazzawi: Doctoral candidate, University of Sussex
Lokman Slim: Director, Hayya Bina and UMAM
Iraq
Ali believes that the protests that have occurred across Iraq since October 2019 symbolize an unprecedented attempt by ordinary Iraqis to change the course of their nation’s contemporary history. In Tahrir Square in Baghdad, activists occupy the streets and have begun to provide free educational and cultural services to Iraqi citizens. Through their work, these activists have developed new codes of conduct that question traditional conceptions of gender norms. Ali believes that the US invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003 engendered divisions along sectarian lines. To protesters in Iraq, resentment against these divisions lay at the heart of their dismay.
Syria
Ghazzawi highlights that recent protests in Daraa, Idlib, Afrin, Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, and Suwayda arose following the imposition of new political and socio-economic realities by the Syrian state, Russia, Iran, and Turkey. The demand to release detained protesters has uniformly resonated throughout protests across Syria. Ghazzawi believes that these protests challenge previous analysis of essentialist notions of sectarianism in Syria. In addition, Ghazzawi finds these protests to be significant in the way in which they challenge authoritiarian, colonial, and partition geography. The protests require one to think beyond the model of the Syrian state vis-à-vis the opposition.
Solidarity with BLM in Palestinian Territories
There is a history of solidarity between the cause of Palestinian liberation and Black social justice movements. Abu Artema highlights the recent development of solidarity movements in the Palestinian Territories with the Black Lives Matter movement and protests against the death of George Floyd. Abu Artema stresses that in expressing solidarity with the Black Lives Matter movement, Palestinians have simultaneously protested against instances of aggression by Israeli soldiers.
Lebanon
Slim underscores that the rise of anti-establishment protests in Lebanon has surpassed sectarian lines. Similar to Iraq, Lebanon remains plagued by the ramifications of sectarian divisions. Because of the economic collapse and the failure of the Lebanese healthcare system amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, protests in Lebanon have increased in intensity. To Slim, these protests have exposed growing dislike for Hezbollah among Lebanese citizens, who associate the group with Lebanon’s corrupt government. Furthermore, the enactment of the United States Caesar Civilian Protection Act may have deleterious consequences for Hezbollah, which has backed the Assad-regime throughout the Syrian Civil War.
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Lebanon near collapse
“While the unprecedented mass demonstrations that began in October 2019 succeeded in pressuring the government of then-prime minister Saad Hariri to resign, they have yet to lead to the radical change that many protestoers were seeking. As Lebanon continues to flatten the coronavirus curve and as the country opens up again, the protest movement is expected to make a comeback, with protesters again voicing demands for an independent judiciary, accountability, early parliamentary elections, and financial reform—among others.” On June 17, 2020, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Middle East Center hosted a virtual panel discussion on the Lebanese protests’ resurgence and the prospects for real reform in Lebanon. The discussion featured four speakers:
Maha Yahya: director of the Carnegie Middle East Center
Lara Bitar: founding editor of The Public Source.
Alia Ibrahim: founding partner and chairwoman of Daraj.
Jean Kassir: co-founder and managing editor of Megaphone
Current Crisis
Bitar underscores that for the last thirty years, Lebanon has endured paramount social, economic, and environmental crises. Yahya regards Lebanon’s current situation as the most significant crisis it has faced since the 1975-1990 Lebanese Civil War.
1. The Lebanese political power sharing model remains on the verge of collapse. Lebanon possesses a “sectarian-confessional governmental system” in which high-ranking offices are reserved for members of specific religious groups. The President must be a Maronite Catholic, the Prime Minister must be a Sunni Muslim, the Speaker of the Parliament must be a Shi’a Muslim, and the Deputy Speaker of Parliament must be Eastern Orthodox Christian. This system is based on the last census of the Lebanese population in 1932 and in theory, is intended to deter sectarian conflict and fairly represent the demographic distribution of Lebanon’s recognized religious groups.
2. The Lebanese economic model of banking and tourism has collapsed, and Yahya predicts that there will be an exodus of Lebanon’s remaining middle class professionals.
3. The Lebanese pound has lost 50-60% of its value. The World Bank predicts that poverty in Lebanon could rise to 50% if the economic situation worsens. In addition, the World Bank estimates that unemployment, especially among youth, may sharply rise.
4. The Lebanese government says that Lebanon’s public debt has reached $83 billion. Businesses within Lebanon continue to collapse and in January 2020 alone, it has been estimated that nearly 200,000 Lebanese citizens lost their jobs.
5. COVID-19 lockdowns have highlighted structural inequalities and socio-economic disparities in Lebanon.
Lebanon since the October 17th revolution
Bitar believes that the prominent feelings of euphoria felt by Lebanese citizens at the start of the October 17th (2019) thawra, or revolution, has disappeared and future prospects remain grim. In addition to the nearing financial collapse, Lebanese face the constant prospect of shortages of medical supplies, food, and petrol. Bitar highlights that in the last few weeks, domestic migrant workers have been abandoned on the streets of their consulates in Beirut.
Kassir stresses the increasing role of young Lebanese citizens in political discourse. Kassir believes that young people have traditionally felt alienated by the ways in which politics have been conducted in Lebanon. Since the beginning of the October 17th revolution, Lebanon has witnessed a rise in anti-establishment sentiment among its youth.
Ibrahim underscores the increasing restrictions placed on the independent press in Lebanon since October 17. The Lebanese judiciary has recently allowed the prosecution of those critical on social media of the Lebanese President, Michel Aoun. Going forward, Ibrahim believes that much work must be done to ensure the legal protection of those working in the independent media. In co-founding Megaphone, Kassir attempts to create space in which one can think critically about economic and social issues. Furthermore, Kassir aims to provide a platform for the amplification of the voices of Lebanon’s most marginalized groups. These groups include women, refugees, and migrant workers.
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Peace Picks | June 15 – 20
Notice: Due to recent public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live-streaming.
- A Conversation with H.E. Anwar Gargash, UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs | June 17, 2020 | 9:00 AM – 10:00 AM | Middle East Institute | Register Here
As the second largest Arab economy- with a burgeoning regional role in the Gulf, the Red Sea and North Africa- the United Arab Emirates is facing a range of domestic and regional challenges, but also opportunities, in light of COVID-19 and the drop in global oil prices. Furthermore, the rise in great power competition, particularly the rising role of Russia and China in the Middle East, makes an examination of US – UAE relations that much more timely and important.
To discuss these important issues and more, the Middle East Institute is glad to welcome H.E. Dr. Anwar Gargash, UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. Please join us for this timely discussion moderated by MEI President Paul Salem.
Speakers:
Dr. Paul Salem (Moderator) : President, Middle East Institute
H.E. Dr. Anwar Mohammed Gargash: Cabinet Member and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, United Arab Emirates
- COVID in South Asia: Regional Responses | June 17, 2020 | 9:30 AM – 11:00 AM | United States Institute of Peace | Register Here
In South Asia, diverse, densely situated, and economically precarious populations add further complexity to fighting the coronavirus pandemic. Measures to limit the virus’s spread have spurred massive economic contraction, disproportionately affecting the region’s most vulnerable populations, while recent steps to re-open economies are fueling a rise in cases and risk overwhelming health and governance systems. The crisis has also exacerbated societal fissures and structural problems, including religious, caste, and ethnic divisions, ineffective communication, and political tensions. Amid compounding challenges, how governments respond to the pandemic will have a lasting impact on the region’s stability and the future of its nearly two billion citizens.
Please join USIP and experts from Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka for a discussion on states’ responses to the coronavirus pandemic across the region and what countries can do to maintain and restore their economies, health systems, and citizens’ trust in elected officials.
Speakers:
Amb. Tariq Karim: Former Bangladeshi Ambassador to the U.S.
Amb. Maleeha Lodhi: Former Pakistani Ambassador to the U.S. and former Pakistani Ambassador to the U.N.
Dr. Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu: Executive Director of the Centre for Policy Alternatives, Sri Lanka
Amb. Arun Singh: Former Indian Ambassador to the U.S.
Tamanna Salikuddin (Moderator): Director, South Asia, U.S. Institute of Peace
- Lebanon at a Crossroads: Is Real Reform Possible? | June 17, 2020 | 10:00 AM – 11:00 AM | Carnegie Endowment of International Peace, Middle East Center | Watch Event Here
Lebanon remains a highly volatile sociopolitical and economic environment, compounded by a crippling financial crisis, a large protest movement nationwide, increasing tension among political and sectarian factions, and a large presence of Syrian refugees. Its vibrant civil society has played a leading role in pushing for reform to address the significant threats facing the country.
While the unprecedented mass demonstrations that began in October 2019 succeeded in pressuring the government of then-prime minister Saad Hariri to resign, they have yet to lead to the radical change that many protestors are seeking. As Lebanon continues to flatten the coronavirus curve and as the country opens up again, the protest movement is largely expected to make a comeback, with protestors again voicing demands for an independent judiciary, accountability, early parliamentary elections, and financial reform—among others.
Speakers:
Maha Yahya: Director, Carnegie Middle East Center
Lara Bitar: Founding editor, The Public Source
Alia Ibrahim: Founding partner and chairwoman, Daraj
Jean Kassir: Co-founder and managing editor, Megaphone
- Egypt Faces the Pandemic: Politics, Rights, and Global Dynamics | June 18, 2020 |10:00 AM – 11:15 AM| Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | Watch Event Here
In many countries, the pandemic is providing justifications for crackdowns on rights, changes in law, and postponement of elections. What is happening in Egypt? And will the pandemic lead to any changes in its regional and global relationships?
Speakers:
Khaled Mansour: Independent writer and consultant on issues of human rights, humanitarian aid, and development
Mai El-Sadany: Managing director and legal and judicial director, the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy
Amr Hamzawy: Nonresident Senior Fellow, Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Senior Research scholar in the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, Stanford University
- Civil-Military Relations Amid Domestic Crisis | June 18, 2020 | 11:00 AM – 12:15 PM | Johns Hopkins SAIS | Register Here
The speakers will address the politicization of the U.S. military and urgent issues of civil-military relations in the current environment. With President Trump’s order of the U.S. military and federal law enforcement to Washington DC; the forcible removal of peaceful protestors to secure a photo op with military leaders; and Secretary Esper’s reference to American cities as the “battlespace,” the divide between society and service members has rarely been so stark.
The speakers will also examine the implications of President Trump’s recent actions on U.S. national security, both domestically and abroad. What are the various ways the current situation could play out? What are the medium- and long-term implications on civil-military relations? To what standard must we hold our senior civilian and military officials, as well as our service members?
Speakers:
Eliot A. Cohen: Dean of Johns Hopkins SAIS
Mara Karlin: Executive Director, Merrill Center for Strategic Studies, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Paula Thornhill: Associate Director, Merrill Center for Strategic Studies, Johns Hopkins SAIS
LTG David Barno (USA, ret.): Senior Fellow and Visiting Professor, Merrill Center for Strategic Studies, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Nora Bensahel: Senior Fellow and Visiting Professor, Merrill Center for Strategic Studies, Johns Hopkins SAIS
- Webinar—The International Monetary Fund’s COVID-19 challenge: A conversation with Geoffrey Okamoto | June 18, 2020 | 2:00 PM – 3:00 PM | American Enterprise Institute | Register Here
The coronavirus pandemic has plunged the global economy into its worst recession in the past 90 years and has delivered a severe blow to practically every economy in the world.
At this event, Geoffrey Okamoto, the first deputy managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), will discuss how the IMF now views the world economic outlook and how it is adapting its policies to serve best its membership at this challenging time.
Speakers:
Geoffrey Okamoto: First deputy managing director, International Monetary Fund (IMF)
Desmond Lachman: Resident Fellow, American Enterprise Institute
- Troubled Waters: the Changing Security Environment in the Black Sea | June 18, 2020 | 2:00 PM – 3:00 PM | Middle East Institute | Register Here
NATO member states and partners in the Black Sea have entered a new strategic adaptation phase after the annexation of Crimea and the subsequent focus on territorial defense. The last six years have been a challenge in strategic adaptation to new threats and challenges in the Black Sea, an increasingly militarized and volatile security environment. But success in adaptation has been limited by differing threat perceptions among member states, as well as by difficulties integrating Western defense planning. The Middle East Institute (MEI) Frontier Europe Initiative is pleased to host a panel of experts to discuss the challenges facing the Black Sea countries in adapting to the new security environment.
What are the main challenges for NATO member states and partners in the Black Sea region? How have NATO member states Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey adapted to increasing militarization and volatility in the Black Sea? What are the main challenges for NATO partners countries Georgia and Ukraine and how are they progressing in Western security integration? Are there lessons to be learned for NATO defense and strategic adaptation in the Black Sea?
Speakers:
Stephen J. Flanagan: Senior political scientist, RAND Corporation
Thomas-Durell Young: Senior lecturer, Institute for Security Governance, US Naval Postgraduate School and Journal of Defense and Security Analysis
Iulia Joja (Moderator): Senior Fellow, Middle East Institute, Frontier Europe Initiative
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It’s already war, announced or not
The equation looks like a simple one: the US assassinated Quds force commander Soleimani as he left Baghdad airport, and Iran responded with a missile attack on an Iraqi base housing US forces. Now de-escalation is said to have taken hold. Tit-for-tat, yes, but not really war.
It’s not that simple, or that limited. In addition to the drone attack on Soleimani, the US apparently tried the same day to kill another Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander in Yemen, and a couple of days later Iranian forces in eastern Syria were under aerial attack. Washington has also increased sanctions on Iran. Tehran meanwhile has focused on trying to get the Iraqi parliament and government to evict the Americans as well as on unilaterally lifting all the constraints on their nuclear activities under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA, or nuclear deal).
This is a multi-front contest, complicated further today by the revelation that the IRGC shot down a Ukrainian airliner shortly after it took off from Tehran airport. That has generated explicitly anti-regime protests inside Iran and a brutal crackdown, which is just what the Trump administration would have ordered up if it could. The discomfort of your enemy in moments of crisis is always welcome.
There are lots of things that haven’t happened yet, so far as we know. It is unclear whether the threshold of one thousand battle deaths arbitrarily required by scholars to classify a conflict as a war has been reached. If we went back to the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, that number might be breached in total US and Iranian casualties. We could still see more assassinations in both directions, cyber attacks, more attacks on Gulf oil shipping and facilities, protests and crackdowns in Lebanon and Iraq as well as Iran, attacks in Yemen, Bahrain, or Saudi Arabia, and attacks on or by Israel. We might also eventually see more salvos of cruise or ballistic missiles in one direction and the other.
It is already war, declared or not. President Trump knows the American people don’t support war against Iran and he won’t try to convince them otherwise. He intends simply to proceed, announcing only the good news (from the American perspective) and citing non-existent intelligence, like the plans for attacks on four embassies that no one in the intelligence community has confirmed. Maximum pressure, initiated with sanctions, now includes “kinetic” measures ordered by the President with no authorization from Congress to use military force.
Iranian maximum resistance will not be limited either. Iran will use its proxies in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen to pressure America’s friends and allies even as it tries to keep the Europeans, Russians, and Chinese on board the nuclear deal, or what remains of it. Iran can also hit American assets again, not only in Iraq but also elsewhere in the Middle East and even in Latin America as well as inside the US. President Trump wanted to restore deterrence with the Soleimani assassination; there is no reason to believe he has succeeded.
The House Democrats effort to restrain the President will fail. Even if the “concurrent resolution” passes in the Senate, it will be non-binding. The President will veto any binding measure. So we are stuck with a war few Americans or Iranians want conducted by a President who doesn’t care and a Supreme Leader who doesn’t either. Each is concerned with preserving his own hold on power. We need better sense to prevail in both countries, before the de-escalation lull ends and disaster come ever closer.
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Escalation dominance
No American should mourn Qassem Suleimani, but his death at the hands of the US requires careful consideration of the consequences. By killing the commander of the Iranian Quds Force, the US has jumped many rungs of the escalation ladder in its confrontation with Iran, which had already heated up with US attacks on Iraqi militia forces earlier in the week. The Administration is betting that Tehran will recognize that the US is so dominant that it can gain little by responding. Washington is also signaling that it is prepared to withdraw its forces from Iraq, since that is a possible, perhaps likely, political consequence.
The first proposition is dubious. Iran prides itself on resistance to the US and has the capability to do serious harm to American interests in the Middle East and beyond. While it may be difficult for Tehran to kill an American military commander, it is not unthinkable. Nor is such a mirror image attack the only possibility. Iran and its proxies have killed many Americans in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. Tehran has capabilities that extend throughout the Middle East and into Europe, Latin America, and even the American heartland.
Ultimately US military power is vastly greater than Iran’s, which is piddling by comparison. But the US public is far from ready for a war with Iran in which we might lose thousands if not tens of thousands of troops and civilians, not to mention ships and planes. When it comes to breaking the will to fight, Iran is likely to be able to absorb far more punishment than the US. As many as half a million Iranians died in the eight-year Iran/Iraq war. Fewer than 7000 Americans have been killed since 2001 in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The killing of Iraqi Kataib Hizbollah commander al-Muhandis along with Suleimani puts the Iraqi government in a particularly difficult spot. No doubt there are lots of Iraqis who won’t mourn al-Muhandis in private, as he left a swathe of death and destruction, especially but not only among Sunnis. He had impeccable terrorist credentials from his time in Kuwait in the 1980s, but he was also credited by many Iraqis with helping to fight off and defeat the Islamic State after 2015. Besides, deadly American military action without Iraqi consent on Iraqi soil against Iraqi citizens can please few Iraqi politicians in public.
US withdrawal from Iraq, if that is what Iraqi politics are going to demand, would be a big prize for Iran, which seeks client states there and in Syria that will give it strategic depth and on-the-ground access to its Hizbollah proxies in Lebanon as well as proximity to the Israeli border. Like the US, Iran seeks to confront its adversaries outside its borders rather than inside. US withdrawal would enable it to do that and consolidate its projection of power all the way to the Mediterranean.
So President Trump has thrown the dice, betting that Iran will break and that Iraq won’t throw the Americans out. It may be churlish, but true, to mention that he got elected on pledges to avoid new conflicts in the Middle East. Not to mention that war with Iran is nowhere in the current Congressional Authorization to Use Military Force. It might almost make you think the President is trying to distract attention from the Senate’s impending impeachment trial. It wouldn’t be the first time he has taken a big risk for little apparent gain. Nor would it be the first time he put his personal electoral interests ahead of the nation’s security.
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Stevenson’s army, December 4
– Julia Joffe paints a devastating picture of State under Trump — 52% of ambassadors are political.
– Dennis Jett piles on with more details about the political appointees.
– But in Congress there’s a new Diplomacy Caucus.
– CFR finds Americans ignorant about many foreign policy matters.
– Maybe Israel was behind long delay in giving Lebanon aid.
– Dexter Filkins looks at PM Modi and changing India.
-Optional reading: House Intell Committee report.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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