Tag: Libya
Trump is right
Donald Trump said earlier this week about the Middle East:
Now, are we going to stay in that part of the world? One reason is Israel. Oil is becoming less and less of a reason because we’re producing more oil now than we’ve ever produced. So, you know, all of a sudden it gets to a point where you don’t have to stay there.
This is more sensible than 99% of what the man says, even if I think Israel can more than take care of itself. But the main reason for US military deployments in the Middle East is oil, which is far less important than it was in the 1970s and 1980s. That is what prompted President Carter’s 1980 pledge to defend the flow of oil from the Gulf:
Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.
President Carter’s Doctrine was a response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which he feared presaged a thrust towards the Gulf. The Soviet Union is gone, Afghanistan is a mess, and the US economy is now far less dependent on oil imports and energy of all sorts than it was in 1980. The Gulf oil producers, especially Saudi Arabia, are far more dependent on oil exports, which they send predominantly to Asia, especially China, Japan, India, and South Korea.
The US nevertheless spends about 12% of the Pentagon budget on protecting the flow of oil from the Gulf and holds a Strategic Petroleum Reserve of well over 100 days of imports, thus protecting our principal economic competitors from the effects of an oil supply disruption while they free ride on our preparations. It is true of course that an oil supply disruption would also affect the US economy, since oil prices are set in a global market and US consumers would feel the price hike in imports of goods of all sorts. But changed circumstances should affect burden-sharing: we need to do less and other oil consumers need to do more.
There are other ways in which the Middle East merits lower priority for American foreign policy. Middle East terrorism now has little impact on Americans both at home, where right-wing attackers are far more common than Islamic ones, and abroad, where relatively few Americans have suffered harm, most of them either by sheer accident or by travel into known danger zones. Nuclear proliferation is still an issue, but mainly a self-inflicted one due to American withdrawal from the nuclear deal with Iran, which is far from the giant threat the Administration is portraying it as. Even if that were not true, American deployments in the Gulf are far too close to Iran for war-fighting purposes. We would need to move them farther away in order to use them in an attack.
The problem is that withdrawal from the Middle East is as problematic as intervention there. That is what President Obama demonstrated. His restraint in Libya, Syria, and Yemen left vacuums filled by jihadis, Iranians, and Gulfies. The results have been catastrophic for each of the states in question. Intervention by middling powers without multilateral authorization and on one side or the other in a civil war is known to have little chance of success and to prolong conflicts. Where the US re-committed its forces in Iraq, whose state was in far better shape than those in Libya, Syria, or Yemen, the results were far more salutary, even if not completely satisfactory.
Part of the problem for the US is lack of diplomatic capacity. American diplomacy has become far too dependent, both physically and strategically, on military presence. Military withdrawal requires a diplomatic posture that can be sustained without the troops. Many other countries by necessity have learned the trick of hitting above their military weight with diplomatic capacity. Witness an extreme example like Norway, or a less dramatic one like Germany. These are countries that lead with their diplomatic and economic clout, not with their troops, ships and planes.
There has been to my knowledge no serious discussion of the difficulties of withdrawal and how they can be met. Part of solution lies in beefing up the political, economic, and cultural capacities of American diplomacy. But withdrawal will remain perilous anyplace a legitimate, inclusive, well-functioning state does not exist. Statebuilding has gotten a really bad name from the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, but it remains a vital component of any effort to reduce US commitments abroad. About that, both Trump and Obama have been wrong.
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Midterms and foreign policy
I gave a talk this morning at the Italian International Affairs Institute (IAI) on “The 2018 American Midterm Elections: What Do They Signify for the US and for Europe?” Here are my notes for the occasion, which I pretty much used as written:
- It is a pleasure to be back at IAI, which has been kind enough to host my talks many times over the 25 years since I left Rome as Charge’ d’affaires ad interim of the American Embassy.
- Let me start with some basics: the elections are “midterm” because they fall in the middle of a Presidential mandate. They are multiple, that is elections rather than election, because more than one institution is contested: all of the House of Representatives, about one-third of the Senate, and many governorships, state legislatures, and local positions.
- They are also multiple in another sense: even elections for Federal offices in the US are run by the 50 states, not by the Federal government. While all the states elect members of the House from single-member districts with approximately the same population as well as two Senators (no matter what the population of the state), the rules governing who is eligible to vote, design of the ballot, polling procedures, opening times, counting, tabulating, and ultimately deciding the outcome vary quite a bit from state to state and even from county to county.
- Quite a few of our states have trouble getting it all done, especially when the margins are narrow. There are still a few seats undecided.
- Nevertheless, the general shape of the outcome is clear: Democrats have won control of the House of Representatives; Republicans have maintained control of the Senate, widening their margin by a couple of seats.
- What does this mean for the future, especially for American foreign policy and relations with Europe, including Italy?
- First thing to understand is that the election was not about foreign policy. The two biggest issues were health insurance for Democrats and immigration for Republicans. Trade, national security, nuclear nonproliferation, arms control, the Middle East, Iran, China, Russia and all the other issues IAI and I care about were virtually absent from the pre-electoral discourse.
- It was vigorous and led to a high turnout by American standards: about 50% of registered voters. That will sound very low to you, but it is not low in the US, where about 60% turn out for presidential elections and midterms generally draw about 40%.
- There are many reasons for this. Americans move frequently and die pretty much at the rate of everyone else. There is no national procedure for updating registration lists, and virtually no one unregisters when they move out of a community to another one. So some of the low turnout is a statistical artefact.
- The resulting anomalies have led to Republican claims that there is a great deal of fraudulent Democratic voting in US elections. There is no evidence for that. To the contrary, the evidence demonstrates concerted efforts by Republicans in many states to suppress voting by their opponents with ID requirements, closing polling places, and other tricks of the trade.
- The higher turnout this time around occurred among both Democrats and Republicans, but the Democrats have more to gain because their relatively young voter population normally turns out much less than the older Republican voter population.
- What looked like a modest shift the day after the election turned into a considerable Blue Wave as more results are finalized. The shifts from the last midterms in 2014 are notable:
under 30, +11D to +35D
women, +4 to +19
Latinos, +26 to +40
Asians, -1 to +54
college grads, -3 to +20
independents, -12 to +12
single, +13 to +24
not white evangelical, +12 to +34
- Rural areas voted heavily for Republicans. Suburbs, which have generally leaned Republican, turned bluer this time, mainly because of the votes of college-educated women.
- In short: Americans are divided, perhaps more than they have been since World War II.
- On one side, we have a modest, but bigger than normal for midterms, recovery of the Obama coalition, despite a House of Representatives gerrymandered in favor of Republicans and a Senate “map” that incidentally favored Republicans.
- Some high-profile progressives like Beto O’Rourke—a challenger for Ted Cruz’s Senate seat in Texas—and Andrew Gillum—the black Democrat who ran for governor of Florida—lost, but their showings were respectable enough to make them serious future candidates.
- On the other side, we’ve got a Trump-dominated Republican party, which will be more radical than in his first two years. Many of the relative moderates are not returning to Congress. The Republicans there will be whiter, more male, and more rural than before.
- The big winners in this election were those who want America divided and immobilized. That includes Presidents Putin and Xi. America will be consumed for most of the next two years with the 2020 presidential election. The Mueller investigation and oversight hearings will increase the noise and divisiveness, perhaps even to the point of impeachment.
- The Democrats, who are mostly moderates, have limited powers to influence foreign policy. Their main lever of power will be oversight: the power to convene House hearings and subpoena witnesses. The Senate will continue to rubber stamp Trump’s nomination of judges and ambassadors.
- That said there has been considerable agreement in the current Congress between Democrats and Republicans on maintaining the foreign affairs budget and toughening up against China, Russia, and North Korea. There are disagreements on the Iran nuclear deal, which Democrats favor, and on the defense budget, which Republicans traditionally favor.
- In the Middle East, we are likely to see a continued US effort in eastern Syria, some effort at rapprochement with Turkey, and Congressional pressure to stop the war in Yemen as well as sanction Saudi Arabia for the murder of Jamal Khashoggi. The Administration will resist that pressure but may give in on Yemen, which would bring Washington into closer alignment with most Europeans.
- It remains to be seen whether the consensus in favor of funding defense, development and diplomacy that existed in Congress since 2016 will be maintained. The Administration itself has signaled an intention to cut defense. Many newly elected Republicans will want to cut development and diplomacy. Democrats will defend both, but compromises should be expected. There is nothing popular about the foreign affairs budget in the US, though most Americans do favor continuing commitments abroad.
- On NATO and the EU, I don’t think much will change. Trump has made it clear he thinks little of NATO and less of the EU. The Congress and the American people are more favorable to both and will try to insist on maintenance of the Alliance. Trump’s hostility to the EU will, however, find some resonance among protectionist Democrats and Republicans. The steel and aluminum tariffs seem destined to stay, at least for now.
- Macron and Merkel notwithstanding, there are of course many in Europe who are sympathetic to their own version of Trump’s nationalism: make Italy, Hungary, Poland, or Denmark great again by blocking immigration, protecting domestic industries, rallying anti-minority sentiment, and undermining the rule of law. Berlusconi after all was an Italian invention.
- I’m afraid the only thing that will sober some of Trump’s American supporters will be a major economic downturn, and even then they may prefer to blame it on someone other than the incumbent, most likely minorities, immigrants, Europeans, and terrorists.
- That said, I think we have passed the moment I would call “peak Trump.” Even without a recession, most Americans—3 million more of whom voted for Hillary in 2016 and haven’t approved of Trump since—are now fed up. Unlike 2016, that majority has spread into red suburbs and states and mobilized more effectively. Democrats won the popular vote for Congress by about 7%. That could be a landslide in a presidential election.
- Trump has a difficult road ahead. But that should be little comfort. If I had to guess, his fall might be at least as painful as his rise. He will resist accountability and transparency to the last.
- Europe has a tremendously important role to play during the next two years. Merkel and Macron have already done great work in maintaining the vision of a united and liberal Europe. So long as Germany and France remain on that line, I can hope the rest of Europe and the US will eventually find their way back from ethnic nationalism.
- But they and those of you who agree with that vision are going to have to do much more. Here are a few concrete suggestions:
• The NATO allies really do need to meet the 2% goal by 2024. Failing to keep on the tracks plays directly into Trump’s malicious hands. If they do so by joining together to form Macron’s European army, I have no objection.
• A negotiated resolution of the trade dispute is highly desirable. Even better would be returning to the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which offered big economic benefits.
• The US and Europe need to hang together on Russia and China or hang separately as Ben Franklin said to his fellow revolutionaries. US gas supplies should help on the Russian front.
• On Iran, I see no hope of a US/EU accommodation so long as the US stays out of the nuclear deal. But I don’t really see how it can re-enter under this president. Some issues will have to wait for 2021, when discussing a follow-on deal will be needed anyway.
• On Syria, prospects are better. The US and Europe seem to be on the same wavelength in withholding reconstruction aid until there is a credible and irreversible political transition under way. That is the way to succeed, but pressures on Europe will be great.
• On Libya, the Americans are hoping Italy and France will work together to end the civil war and put the country back on a sustainable path.
- There are lots of other issues, but the overall strategy should be this: hang together where possible, help each other out, and hope to get to 2021 in good enough shape to return to the trajectory most of us would prefer: a Euro-Atlantic community whole and free, though wiser and better, from Vancouver to Vladivostok.
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Awry
President Trump’s first tweet of September 11 was this:
“We have found nothing to show collusion between President Trump & Russia, absolutely zero, but every day we get more documentation showing collusion between the FBI & DOJ, the Hillary campaign, foreign spies & Russians, incredible.”
@SaraCarterDC@LouDobbs
An hour later he tried to mend the mistake, retweeting a picture of himself signing a “Patriot Day” declaration with this profound insight about the occasion:
Then there was this from his arrival at Shanksville, Pennsylvania, for a 9/11 ceremony there:
The President cares not a hoot about 9/11 and its meaning for Americans.
That meaning has become grossly distorted in the 17 years since the Al Qaeda attacks. President Bush got it at least partly right in the immediate aftermath: Americans needed to unify and respond to the attacks but not go to war against Islam. He chose instead to attack the Taliban in Afghanistan, seeking to punish the Al Qaeda leadership holed up there.
But things then went awry. Osama bin Ladin and most of the Al Qaeda leadership escaped the American invasion. Bush turned his attention to Iraq, which had nothing to do with the 9/11 attacks. Al Qaeda scattered to Yemen, Libya, Syria, and elsewhere, even as more extreme competitors, including the Islamic State, emerged there and elsewhere. The US has tried to kill as many of these extremists as possible, but there are now demonstrably more of them in more countries than in 2001. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have cost about 7000 American lives and several trillion dollars, but failed to reduce the numbers, the appeal, and the ferocity of Islamist extremism.
President Trump is determined to make things worse. He has barred immigration, including refugees (by definition people escaping a well-founded fear of persecution), from some Islamic countries. He has loosened restraints on the use of drones, raising the number of civilians killed, especially in Yemen. He is squeezing Palestinians mercilessly, denying them vital humanitarian assistance as well as political representation. He supports autocrats in the Muslim world and ignores human rights. He denounces Muslim extremists but not white Christian ones, who have killed many more Americans in terrorist acts since 9/11 than Muslims have. He even managed to hold an Iftar dinner to break the Ramadan fast with no American Muslims, only friendly Muslim diplomats. In both symbols and substance, this Administration is anti-Muslim.
No good can come of continuing in this direction. We need new ways forward that do not mistakenly declare war on a means, “terror,” rather than an enemy, which should be violent extremism. We need to recognize that Americans are not on most days in most places at risk. We need to stop doing things that multiply the numbers of extremists and the places where they find safe haven. We need to ensure that Muslims see the United States as friendly to their religion, even if hostile to extremism conducted in its name.
This president won’t be able or willing to change course. The only question is how much worse he will make things before a leadership change saves us from the tragic direction in which we are heading: towards still more extremists in more countries determined to attack America. 9/11 should not be an occasion for vaunting empty patriotism, but for assessing our situation soberly and looking for more effective means to ensure our national security.
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Diplomacy for drawdown
Marc Lynch, after describing well the security dilemmas and state fragility that are driving Middle East conflicts, concludes:
US hegemony in the Middle East will never be restored because the region has fundamentally changed. Moving beyond the wars and political failures that followed the Arab uprisings will not be easy. The damage is too deep.
The question is: should Americans worry about that? Marc doesn’t answer that question, but Steven Metz does.
American interests in the Middle East are usually defined along these lines:
- Countering international terrorism
- Ensuring oil and gas can flow without hindrance to world markets
- Supporting friends and allies
- Preventing nuclear proliferation
Steven essentially says the threat of international terrorism is overblown, US energy vulnerability is vastly reduced (“Petroleum will not be weaponized”), and US friends and allies can (mostly) take of themselves. He doesn’t deal with the proliferation issue, but he really doesn’t have to, because he is talking mainly about military commitments. Military action has never been a good option for dealing with nuclear proliferation, since it would provide a very strong incentive for acquiring nuclear weapons.
Steven’s conclusion: the US should withdraw its military from the Middle East and rely instead on “off-shore balancing” to ensure that no rival hegemon is able to control the region and intervene only in the event that one threatens US interests. The savings could be gigantic: RAND estimated that in 2008 12-15% of the Pentagon budget was spent to securing oil from the Persian Gulf.
Washing our hands of the Middle East is an attractive proposition. Unfortunately it is one that President Obama tried, without a great deal of success. President Trump is tempted in the same direction. But withdrawal has left the many of the vacuums that Marc describes so well, generating security dilemmas and military responses that have left Syria, Yemen, and Libya in ruins and erstwhile American friends like Israel, Qatar, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates at odds and hedging.
It is difficult to see how the United States can withdraw from the Middle East without a focused diplomatic effort to ensure that the region can restore a modicum of stability,or at least remove some of the drivers of instability. Offshore balancing won’t work if there is no balance but only chaos. The Trump Administration is said to be preparing for a Summit to restore some coherence to GCC next month. That makes sense: there will be no serious effort to counter Iran’s behavior in the region so long as Qatar is feuding with the UAE and Saudi Arabia.
But the Administration also needs to end its own feuding with Turkey and restore some balance to its policy on Palestine to make it more palatable to Sunni Arab friends. And it needs to reconsider its position on the Iran deal, which threatens to seriously undermine relations with Europe.
So yes, I agree that we should draw down, if not completely out, from the the Middle East. But there is a lot of diplomatic homework required to make that possible. And a very real possibility that the Administration will focus instead on countering Iran, leading it to increase rather than decrease its military commitments in the region.
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Peace Picks, June 18 – 24
1. ROK-U.S. Strategic Forum 2018: Assessing the Trump-Kim Summit | Monday, June 18 | 9:00 am – 4:30 pm | Center for Strategic and International Studies | Register here
Join CSIS for a timely discussion with scholars, experts, opinion leaders, and government officials from the United States and South Korea who will participate in a series of panel discussions focused on the historic inter-Korean and U.S.-North Korean summit meetings, the potential for denuclearization and building a peace regime on the Korean peninsula, and regional implications of summit diplomacy in Northeast Asia.
9:00 am: Registration
9:30 am: Welcoming Remarks
Dr. John Hamre, President and CEO, CSIS
Ambassador Lee, Sihyung, President, The Korea Foundation
9:45 am: Opening Keynote Address
His Excellency Lim, Sungnam, First Vice Foreign Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea
Moderated by:
Dr. Victor Cha, Senior Adviser and Korea Chair, CSIS; D.S. Song-KF Professor of Government, Georgetown University
10:15 am: Coffee Break
10:30 am: Session I: Assessing the Inter-Korean Summit and the U.S.-North Korea Summit
Ms. Rachel Martin, Host, Morning Edition and Up First, National Public Radio
Dr. Victor Cha, CSIS and Georgetown University
Dr. Sue Mi Terry, Senior Fellow, Korea Chair, CSIS
Dr. Paik, Haksoon, President, The Sejong Institute
Dr. Kim, Joon Hyung, Professor, Handong Global University
11:45 am: Luncheon and Keynote Conversation
Moderated by:
Ambassador Mark Lippert, Vice President, Boeing International; Former U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea, U.S. Department of State
1:00 pm: Session II: Denuclearization and Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula
Mr. Evan Osnos, Staff Writer, The New Yorker
Ms. Rebecca Hersman, Director, Project on Nuclear Issues; Senior Adviser, International Security Program, CSIS
Mr. John Schaus, Fellow, International Security Program, CSIS
Dr. Yoon, Young-kwan, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea
Dr. Lee, Sang Hyun, Senior Research Fellow, The Sejong Institute
2:15 pm: Coffee Break
2:20 pm: Session III: Regional Implications of Summit Diplomacy
Dr. Kim, Heung-Kyu, Professor, Ajou University
Dr. Michael Green, Senior Vice President and Japan Chair, CSIS; Professor and Director, Asian Studies Program, Georgetown University
Mr. Christopher Johnson, Senior Adviser and Freeman Chair in China Studies, CSIS
Dr. Lee, Hochul, Professor, Incheon National University
Dr. Lee, Shin-wha, Professor, Korea University
3:35 pm: Coffee Break
3:45 pm: Closing and Keynote Address
Senator Cory Gardner, United States Senator for Colorado
Moderated by:
Dr. Victor Cha, CSIS and Georgetown University
4:30 pm: Adjournment
2. Strategic Challenges in the Baltic Sea Region | Monday, June 18 | 1:00 pm – 2:30 pm | The Atlantic Council | Register here
Please join the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative and Future Europe Initiative for a public event on “Strategic Challenges in the Baltic Sea Region: Russia, Deterrence, and Reassurance” on Monday, June 18, 2018 from 1:00 pm. to 2:30 pm.
As an assertive Russia continues to threaten the stability and security of the Baltic Sea region, NATO’s deterrence posture and readiness continues to evolve. The nations of Northern Europe are also working to address the current gaps in national defense capabilities and ensure the security of the Baltic Sea region.
At this crucial juncture for the future of Northern Europe and the Baltic Sea region the Atlantic Council is hosting a public discussion on the new book “Strategic Challenges in the Baltic Sea Region: Russia, Deterrence, and Reassurance” edited by Council senior fellow Ann-Sofie Dahl. This new book sheds light on the complex security challenges of the Baltic Sea region, and provides insights on next steps for bolstering defense and deterrence in the region.
Featuring:
Dr. Ann-Sofie Dahl, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council
Dr. Andres Kasekamp, Professor, Elmar Tampolf Chair of Estonian Studies, University of Toronto
Dr. Robert Lieber, Professor, Department of Government, Georgetown University
Mr. Magnus Nordenman, Director, Transatlantic Security Initiative, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council
Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, Distinguished Fellow, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council
3. Chinese Expansion and the South China Sea: Beijing’s Strategic Ambition and the Asian Order| Monday, June 18 | 3:00 pm – 4:00 pm | The Wilson Center | Register here
China’s ambitions to become Asia’s undisputed regional hegemon is perhaps most evident in the South China Sea, as Beijing creates military bases along remote reefs and islands in a 1.5-million-square mile expanse. Join us for a discussion with Humphrey Hawksley, author of Asian Waters: The Struggle Over the South China Sea and the Strategy of Chinese Expansion and Los Angeles Times Deputy Washington Bureau Chief Bob Drogin for a discussion on the rivalry between China and the United States, and the dilemma facing countries in the region including Vietnam, South Korea, Indonesia, Japan, and the Philippines to challenge China’s dominance. James Clad, the CNA Corporation’s senior advisor for Asia and former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia, will also join the discussion.
4. Restoring Restraint: Enforcing Accountability for Users of Chemical Weapons | Tuesday, June 19 | 9:00 am – 11:30 am | Center for Strategic and International Studies | Register here
In 2012, a 20-year moratorium on state employment of chemical weapons use was broken. Since then there have been more than 200 uses – against civilians, military targets, and political enemies. These attacks have broken norms against the use of weapons of mass destruction and create a gap in the nonproliferation fabric – despite the robust international architecture of laws, treaties, agreements, and norms designed to restrain the proliferation and use of these weapons. Accountability for these recent attacks has been limited or non-existent, which threatens the credibility of the nonproliferation regime and only encourages further use. Leaders must find the political and moral strength to use a full spectrum of tools to re-establish this system of restraint. This event will discuss ways in which the international community is working to rebuild the system of restraint against chemical weapons, and CSIS will also launch on a report on this topic.
9:30 am: Welcome, Rebecca Hersman, Director, Project on Nuclear Issues, and Senior Adviser, International Security Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies
9:45 am: Keynote Address, H.E. Mr Ahmet Üzümcü, Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
10:20 am: Panel Discussion, Moderator: Rebecca Hersman, Director, Project on Nuclear Issues, and Senior Adviser, International Security Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Dr. Yleem D.S. Poblete, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance
Samantha Job, Counsellor for Foreign and Security Policy, British Embassy Washington
Nicolas Roche, Director of Strategic, Security and Disarmament Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs
11:45 am: Event Concludes
4. Columbia’s Vote: The Road Ahead for the Next President | Tuesday, June 19 | 12:00 pm | The Atlantic Council | Register here
The June 17 presidential runoff election between Iván Duque and Gustavo Petro comes at a critical moment for the country’s future. Colombians will choose between two starkly different visions at a time of deep divide. What will be the trajectory for a hemispheric leader and a close US ally on the regional and world stages?
The next president takes office on August 7 with many immediate tasks including: jumpstarting economic growth now as a member of the OECD; determining next steps around the peace process; putting in place new mechanisms to combat corruption; and navigating the challenges of a deepening crisis next door in Venezuela. What new policies can we expect in these crucial areas?
Join the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center on Tuesday, June 19 from 12:00pm to 1:00pm (EDT)— two days after the Colombian election — for a rapid reaction discussion on what to expect from Colombia’s next president on some of the most pressing issues facing the country today.
Speakers:
Alina Dieste, Washington Correspondent, Agence France-Presse
Tomás González, Member, Atlantic Council Colombia Task Force; Executive Director, Colombia, International Monetary Fund
Juan Carlos López, US Political Director & Anchor, CNN en Español
Jason Marczak, Director, Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, Atlantic Council
5. Lawless Skies: Airstrikes and Civilian Casualties in Libya | Wednesday, June 20 | 12:15 pm – 1:45 pm | New America | Register here
In 2011, NATO intervened during a national uprising in Libya to protect civilians from the forces of Libyan leader Muammar al-Gaddafi. Today, the environment remains chaotic. At least four countries and two Libyan armies have continued to carry out airstrikes since the end of the NATO intervention.
New America and Airwars, the UK-based airstrike monitoring group, investigated those strikes and published our findings in the paper “Air Strikes and Civilian Casualties in Libya,” co-authored by Peter Bergen, Vice President at New America, and director of New America’s International Security Program (ISP) and Alyssa Sims, a policy analyst in ISP. New America and Airwars documented more than 2,000 airstrikes that were reportedly conducted between September 2012 to June 2018 in Libya. According to news reports and accounts on social media, at least 242 civilians were killed in these strikes, taking the lowest estimate, and as many as 392 killed, by the highest estimate. This study is the first accounting of these civilian deaths.
To discuss the results of the study and the political environment in Libya, New America welcomes Jonathan M. Winer, the State Department’s Special Envoy for Libya during the Obama administration, Chris Woods, an investigative journalist and the director of Airwars, Oliver Imhof, a Libya researcher and data analyst, and Alyssa Sims.
6. The Middle East: A Region in Chaos? | Wednesday, June 20 | 1:00 pm – 2:30 pm | The Wilson Center | Register here
Last December, the Wilson Center and the U.S. Institute of Peace co-sponsored an event on turmoil across the Middle East with four experienced analysts and practitioners. We agreed to gather again a half-year later to review our observations and conclusions.
Six months later, a scan of the landscape reveals many changes: a new phase in the ongoing war in Syria; recent elections in Iraq, Tunisia, and Lebanon; and U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear agreement. At the same time, we see a stalled Israeli-Palestinian peace process – and yet, the possibility of a new peace initiative from the Trump administration; the continuing war in Yemen; a continuing rift within the GCC; and potential for a serious Israeli-Iranian conflict in Syria.
Please join the Wilson Center as our four veteran analysts reconvene to address these and related issues in a region whose volatility shows no signs of abating.
Speakers:
Jane Harman, Director, President, and CEO, Wilson Center
Mike Yaffe, Vice President, Middle East and Africa, U.S. Institute of Peace
Aaron David Miller, Vice President for New Initiatives and Middle East Program Director, Historian, analyst, negotiator, and former advisor to Republican and Democratic Secretaries of State on Arab-Israeli negotiations, 1978-2003; Global Affairs Analyst with CNN
Bruce Riedel, Senior Fellow and Director, Brookings Intelligence Project, Brookings Institution
Robin Wright, USIP-Wilson Center Distinguished Fellow, Journalist and author/editor of eight books, and contributing writer for The New Yorker
Mona Yacoubian, Senior Advisor, Syria, Middle East and North Africa, U.S. Institute of Peace
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Peace picks, May 7 – May 13
- War by Other Means: Russian Disinformation Undermining Democracy, Spurring Conflict | Monday, May 7 | 2:00pm – 3:00pm | U.S. Institute for Peace | Register here |
Russia’s concerted disinformation campaign against the West is sowing confusion and distrust and undermining democratic institutions from Ukraine to the United States. Anne Applebaum—a Pulitzer Prize-winning author, thought leader and commentator on politics and foreign policy—and U.S. Institute of Peace Executive Vice President William Taylor will discuss the challenges to the West from Russian aggression and the weapons of disinformation and disruption, and what the United States and its allies need to do to respond. Join USIP for an engaging and timely discussion about Russia’s influence on democratic processes in both Ukraine and the United States. Featuring Anne Applebaum (Washington Post columnist, Pulitzer-Prize winning author and Professor of Practice, Institute of Global Affairs, London School of Economics) and William Taylor (Executive Vice President, USIP).
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- The Future of War and Challenges for Humanitarians – Featuring the President of the ICRC | Monday, May 7 | 2:00pm – 3:30pm | Wilson Center | Register here |
Will tomorrow’s wars be fought on the same terms as today’s? How will humanitarians need to adapt? Digitalization, artificial intelligence, and big data are transforming our world – and new technologies, such as autonomous weapons and the tools of cyber warfare, are new cause for humanitarian concern. Featuring Peter Maurer (President, International Committee of the Red Cross), Ambassador Martin Dahinden (Ambassador of Switzerland to the United States), Amb. Andreas Kellerhals (Director, Europa Institute, University of Zurich), and Robert S. Litwak (Senior Vice President and Director of International Security Studies, Wilson Center), as moderator. With introductory remarks by Jane Harman (Director, President, and CEO, Wilson Center).
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- Governance and Security in North Africa and the Sahel | Tuesday, May 8 | 9:00am – 3:30 pm | Carnegie Endowment | Register here |
This conference brings together leading scholars, policy analysts, and practitioners from around the world to address the changing political, socioeconomic, and security dynamics within the Maghreb-Sahel region. Panelists will examine the expanding horizons of insecurity and the challenges of uneven development, political contestation, and socio-religious change. They will also discuss the wider implications of the trends for development, peace, and security in both regions.
Panel 1: Contestation and Adaptation in the Maghreb (9:00am – 10:30am) featuring Anouar Boukhars (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), Azzedine Layachi (St. John’s University), Sarah Yerkes (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), and Michele Dunne (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) as moderator.
Panel 2: The Challenges of Governance and Security in the Sahel (10:45am – 12:15pm) featuring Boubacar N’Diaye (Wooster College), Ibrahim Yahya Ibrahim (University of Florida), Ousseina Alidou (Rutgers University), Azeez Olaniyan (Ekiti State University, Nigeria), and Cyril Obi (African Peacebuilding Network, Social Science Research Council) as moderator.
Panel 3: Cross-Border Security Challenges (12:45pm – 2:00pm) featuring Jacques Roussellier (American Military University, South Africa), Mohamed Gain (Ibn Tofail University, Morocco), Rawia Tawfik (Cairo University), and Anouar Boukhars (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) as moderator.
Panel 4: Libya’s Impact on Sahel-Maghreb Security (2:15pm – 3:30pm) featuring Lydia Sizer (Independent Consultant), Karim Mezran (Atlantic Council), Manal Taha (USIP), and Frederic Wehrey (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) as moderator.
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- The Rise of China’s Private Security Companies | Tuesday, May 8| 10:00am –11:30am | Carnegie Endowment | Register here |
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative includes many state-owned enterprises that are operating in foreign countries for the first time and face unprecedented security issues. Instead of relying on the People’s Liberation Army or People’s Armed Police, hundreds of newly formed private security companies (PSCs) have been created to provide security services for these new ventures. Aside from the competence of these PSCs, questions remain regarding their effectiveness as a stand-in for the Chinese military and ability to work in harmony with China’s state interests. Featuring Alessandro Arduino (Co-Director, Security and Crisis Management Program, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences) and Michael D. Swaine (Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace).
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- Trump and the JCPOA: It’s the End of the World As We Know It? | Wednesday, May 9 | 12:00pm – 1:30pm | Hudson Institute | Register here |
The Trump Administration is expected to announce plans later this month for U.S. participation in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), better known as the Iran Deal. With John Bolton directing the National Security Council, Mike Pompeo confirmed as the new Secretary of State, and Secretary James Mattis at the helm of the Defense Department, the President’s foreign policy team is in place. But while all the President’s men have successfully established their ability to influence the administration’s policy, their recommendations for U.S. participation in the JCPOA have been contradictory to date. Secretary Mattis has signaled that he supports the U.S. remaining in the Iran Deal, while Secretary Pompeo and Bolton seem to support withdrawal. Panelists include Michael Doran (Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute), Michael Pregent (Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute), Richard Goldberg (Senior Advisor, Foundation for Defense of Democracies), and Behnam Ben Taleblu (Research Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies).
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- Forty Years of U.S.-China Relations | Friday, May 11 | 8:30pm – 1:30pm | CSIS | Register here |
The United States and China are approaching the 40th anniversary of the establishment of formal diplomatic relations. To commemorate this historic milestone, CSIS is hosting a half-day event on the morning of May 11, 2018, to discuss the twists and turns in the relationship over the last four decades and the challenges that lay ahead. The conference will feature key policy figures and experts from both the United States and China. It will begin with a keynote address from a current member of Congress, then have two star-studded panels discussing “The First 40 Years” and “The Next 40 Years,” and then wrap up with a luncheon armchair discussion.
Panel 1: The First Forty (9:25 am – 10:40 am) featuring Mr. James Mann (Scholar-in-Residence, Johns Hopkins SAIS), Amb. Charlene Barshefsky (Partner, WilmerHale), Dr. Suisheng (Sam) Zhao (Director, Center for China-U.S. Cooperation, University of Denver), Dr. Wang (Henry) Huiyao (President, Center for China and Globalization) and Dr. Scott Kennedy (Deputy Director, Freeman Chair in China Studies, CSIS) as moderator.
Panel 2: The Next Forty (10:50am – 12:00pm) featuring Mr. Daniel H. Rosen (Partner, The Rhodium Group), Dr. Oriana Skylar Mastro (Assistant Professor, Georgetown University), Dr. Chen Dongxiao (President, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies), Mr. Wang Wen (Executive Dean, Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies, Renmin University of China), and Bonnie S. Glaser (Senior Adviser for Asia & Director, China Power Project, CSIS) as moderator.
Luncheon & Armchair Discussion: US-China Relations at a Crossroad (12:00pm – 1:30pm) featuring Sec. William S. Cohen (Chairman & Chief Executive Officer, The Cohen Group), Amb. Cui Tiankai (Chinese Ambassador to the United States), and Mr. Christopher K. Johnson (Senior Adviser and Freeman Chair in China Studies, CSIS) as moderator.
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