Tag: Libya
Surprise!
Yes, the “leave” vote surprised me. I expected economic rationality and political equanimity to prevail over distaste for immigrants and flag-waving England firsters. Identity politics has triumphed once again. Let it be a lesson to me.
The immediate economic implications are already clear: a sharp fall in the British pound, a sell-off in stock markets worldwide, an even shakier euro, and more than likely renewed recession in Europe as well as a sharp slowdown elsewhere. The US may be the exception for a while, as many people will seek safe haven in the dollar, but that will drive it up, weaken exports, and slow already slow growth. Uncertainty will persist: Scotland will proceed with a second referendum, Wales may follow suit, and Catalonia will try to do so. Will the Netherlands or France put the EU to a vote?
What about the Balkans and Middle East, where my attention is focused?
In the Balkans, both the immediate and longer term effects are dire. The region is heavily dependent on European trade and investment, which are going to be hit hard right away. But perhaps more important will be the political impact. Balkanites (that’s what I call people who live in the Balkans) have already been finding it hard to believe in their European prospects, which seem farther away than they did five years ago. Now they would be fools not to doubt the willingness of Europe minus UK to accommodate their membership.
These doubts will open the door to increased Russian influence, not only in the Balkans but also in Ukraine. No one gains more politically than Putin does from the UK referendum: it weakens his antagonists in the UK and the EU, makes his annexation of Crimea and occupation of southeastern Ukraine look more acceptable, and validates his ethnic nationalism. The vodka should be flowing freely at the Kremlin today. It will also flow into the Balkans. Putin will no doubt intensify his efforts in Serbia, in Bosnia’s Republika Srpska and in Macedonia to wean Slavs from their EU and NATO dreams.
The Middle East is a harder call. There are a lot of wealthy Gulf sheikhs with money and property in Britain. They won’t like seeing the pound collapse, and some may already be so strapped by low oil prices that they panic and get out. But my guess is that most will hang on. Slowed world economic growth will however crimp oil prices once again, after their recent rise to $50 and change. So the future of Gulf money in Britain is likely dimmer than it was in the past.
Britain’s role in the Middle East may also change. It has been a major European contributor to intervention not only in Iraq but also in Libya and Syria. A more inward-looking and reduced Britain is not going to have the same resources and will to underwrite such efforts.
Britain will of course raise its barriers to Middle Eastern immigrants, but it hasn’t been taking many of them in any event. The main focus of resentment has been against East Europeans and the threat of immigration from the Balkans. Young Albanians, Serbs, Bosniaks and Macedonians are going to lose both education and job opportunities that many have been enjoying in recent years.
Ironically, one of the many problems that need to be resolved during the two-year negotiation to implement Brexit, will be Brits abroad living in the rest of Europe, who number 1.2 million. Three million people from other EU countries live in the UK. If no accommodation is reached to allow these people to stay, we could see a massive population movement with unpredictable implications. Even if they are allowed to stay, this kind of migration is finished. The next British government will have to do everything it can to prevent foreigners from reaching its soon to be diminished shores.
Net net: Brexit is bad news for the UK, the EU, the US, the Balkans and the Middle East. It is good news for Vladimir Putin. My friends and I will not be celebrating.
PS: It took a couple of days, but John Oliver did a great, if pretty gross, explainer:
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Good critique, but where’s the beef?
Hillary Clinton went after Donald Trump on national security issues yesterday, landing lots of body blows and a head shot or two as well. She said he was unqualified to be president, both substantively and temperamentally. Her fans are applauding loudly.
It is easy enough to slam a guy who likes (and gets endorsements from) President Putin and Chairman Kim Jong Un. He also advocates withdrawal from NATO, US government default on its debts, nuclear weapons for Japan and South Korea, a blockade on Muslims from entering the US, and Mexican payment for a wall on the border. Little of what he says makes sense. Much of it is dangerous. But what would Hillary Clinton do (or not) about the Islamic State (ISIS), the civil wars in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Libya, North Korea’s nuclear weapons and China’s challenges to freedom of navigation in the South China Sea?
She didn’t outline her own national security perspective. Her speech suggested little more than continuity with President Obama’s efforts:
We need to take out their strongholds in Iraq and Syria by intensifying the air campaign and stepping up our support for Arab and Kurdish forces on the ground. We need to keep pursuing diplomacy to end Syria’s civil war and close Iraq’s sectarian divide, because those conflicts are keeping ISIS alive. We need to lash up with our allies, and ensure our intelligence services are working hand-in-hand to dismantle the global network that supplies money, arms, propaganda and fighters to the terrorists. We need to win the battle in cyberspace.
I am no isolationist, but the fact is we’ve got more problems than our limited resources allow us to resolve. That’s an important part of the reason Barack Obama tried to get us out of Iraq and Afghanistan and refused to get involved in post-Qaddafi Libya. But withdrawal and abstention left vacuums that ISIS and the Taliban have filled. How would President Clinton bring our capabilities and resources into balance with the requirements? Which problems would she put at the top of the list, and which at the bottom?
President Obama succeeded in getting a decent nuclear deal with Iran, but Tehran continues its regional destabilization efforts in Yemen and Syria. North Korea continues to test nuclear weapons and, without success, ballistic missiles while China continues to build artificial islands. What would President Clinton do to counter them?
It is widely believed that Clinton is more hawkish than Obama, because she recommended the Libya intervention and voted for the Iraq war. But it is one thing to advise the president, or vote in the Senate. It is another to make your own decisions once you hold the levers of power. The admittedly stirring speech–I dislike Donald Trump’s fakery as much as the next liberal internationalist–did little to clarify Clinton’s own positions on the issues.
Of course there is time in what will be an excruciatingly long campaign. Campaigning is also different from advising and governing. Questioning your opponent’s basic qualifications seems a good enough place to start. But it is a cerebral exercise, not an emotional one. It depends on demonstrating incoherence.
That is not an adequate response to Trump. His talent is that he has tapped into a reservoir of emotions, including misogyny, Islamophobia, xenophobia and racism, that were out there and waiting to be exploited. Clinton tried but was less successful at tapping into a strikingly different reservoir: one that treasures pride in the liberal world order, confidence in American talents and optimism about the country’s political and economic future. Here’s hoping she finds the right way!
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Syria frays, Libya wobbles, Yemen improves
The Middle East and North Africa have become difficult to follow without a scorecard. Here is a quick update:
In Syria, the ceasefire appears to be unraveling. The rebel group Jabhat al-Nusra made gains this week in ceasefire territory. This opposition group extended their territorial holds in Aleppo, Hama, and Latakia provinces. This new offensive, though limited in extent, takes back some of the territory the Syrian regime grabbed during the Russian airstrike campaign in early 2016. Jabhat al-Nusra, an al-Qaeda affiliated group, was not a part of the ceasefire agreement, but other rebel groups, such as Jaish al-Islam, have collaborated with them. This poses a threat to the ceasefire holding and the next round of peace talks, planned for April 13.
Even though the opposition has taken back some territory, the regime still holds the upper hand at the negotiating table. The Russian-backed offensive and support allows Assad to keep his seat as the head of the regime. Russia does appear to want a peaceful solution to the crisis and proved so with the partial withdrawal of troops in Syria. The opposition says it wants a compromise, but they are not willing to compromise with their demand that Assad should be removed from power. The regime has spoken of a more inclusive government, but only with Assad as the leader. How successful this next round of peace talks will be is questionable. Neither side wants to compromise Assad’s position. His position is integral to both sides’ approach in achieving a peaceful solution.
The situation in Libya seemed to improve last week and the beginning of this week as the new unity government arrived in Tripoli. The UN-backed government faced competition from rivals in Tripoli and Tobruk. It seemed that the government in Tripoli was prepared to step down until Prime Minister Khalifa Ghweil declared otherwise. The eastern Tobruk government has not voted to formally recognize the unity government. This recognition is essential in order to “establish legitimacy.”
The new unity government will have to face the challenge of garnering support from the militias that backed the rival Tripoli government in the past. Though unity government Prime Minister Fayez Sarraj does not want to suggest that he needs this militia support, in fact it is imperative to gain the backing of these groups in order to implement real change and lessen the violence in Libya.
In Yemen, Saudi-led airstrikes on civilians continued in March. The Mastaba market incident left 120 dead on March 15. Peace talks on Yemen have been agreed upon, though, and this will hopefully lessen the impact of violence against civilians. The Houthis and President Hadi’s delegation will meet in Kuwait on April 18.
Recently President Hadi fired and appointed a new vice president, Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, and prime minister, Ahmed Obeid bin Daghr, to his government. The new vice president is a key army general. The Hadi camp thinks this move will strengthen it at the peace talks. Defrocked Vice President Khaled Bahah thinks the move will be detrimental and detract from Hadi’s legitimacy.
Nevertheless, the situation in Yemen looks more positive, as both sides have agreed on a ceasefire, implemented on April 10. The city of Taiz, home to 200,000 civilians, will be the key testing ground.
The Syrian ceasefire agreement is fraying, the new unity government in Libya is wobbling, and Yemen’s situation going into peace talks looks a bit better.
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The Islamic State is the easy problem
While the Obama Administration is leaking profusely plans for military intervention in Libya against the Islamic State, I spent a good part of yesterday with people worrying about what to do there beyond killing extremists. It is all too obvious that an air war without a political solution that mobilizes Libyans against the extremists could leave the country even more destabilized than it already is.
It is not so clear what to do about that. A political solution is on the table, but its implementation is stalled, perhaps permanently. Even if the diplomats succeed in their current efforts to get the Government of National Accord (GNA) sworn in, its move to Tripoli poses big security problems, as the capital is in the hands of 15 or more militias loyal to one of the country’s two separate legislative bodies.
Planning for a peacekeeping/stabilization mission is ongoing with the Europeans, including the British, French and Italians. The Americans won’t contribute ground troops but rather “enablers” like ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance to the civilians among us) as well as whatever is needed (drones, aircraft, special forces) to attack ISIS.
There is a wide range of views on what kind of stabilization mission is desirable or possible. Some think a light footprint limited to Tripoli, or even limited to protecting the GNA and foreign embassies, will suffice and arouse little Libyan xenophobia, provided the strategic communications are adequate. Others note that experience elsewhere would require upwards of 70,000 international peacekeepers in a country the size of Libya requiring peace enforcement. A small force unable or unwilling to protect the Libyan population might arouse more resentment and resistance, not less. At the very least, major routes, cantonments of weapons, borders and oil facilities will need protection, either by internationals or Libyans.
Any stabilization force will require a GNA request, Arab League endorsement and a United Nations Security Council mandate. It will need to be able to supply and defend itself, including from Islamic State and other extremist and criminal attacks. Those are tall orders.
But Libya also has some characteristics that make peacekeeping relatively easy: it is close to Europe, has good ports and a long coastline, it is mostly flat and desert, with few places for spoilers to hide, other than urban areas. The population is mostly Arab (there are Berbers as well–remember the Barbary pirates) and overwhelmingly Sunni. The country’s immediate neighbors–Tunisia, Egypt and Algeria–are all anxious to end the instability and block the Islamic State from establishing a safe haven in Libya, though they don’t necessarily agree on how to do that.
Beyond getting the GNA up and running, what to do about the militias in Libya is the most difficult governance problem. The Finance Ministry, which still functions, has been paying many of them. Others, especially in the south and west, have already gone into private sector, running smuggling and other illicit businesses. Past efforts to build a united Libyan security force by training people outside the country failed miserably. Next time around it will have to be done in Libya. Many of the militiamen will need to be disarmed and demobilized, but there is little in the way of an economy to integrate them into. It is vital to remember that the militias are linked to local patronage networks, which need to be mobilized in favor of stabilization, not against it.
While the US and others have the tools needed to kill extremists, it is not at all clear that we have what is needed to help the Libyans sort out their differences and begin to govern in ways that will deny safe haven to the Islamic State, which already controls the central coastal town of Sirte. We suffer from PDD: paradigm deficit disorder. A hundred T.E. Lawrences prepared to deploy with the militias and help sort out their differences might suffice. But where would we get the 100 Arabic speakers with deep knowledge of the Libyan human terrain? We have all but forgotten whatever we learned about such things in Iraq and Afghanistan, erased because the administration was determined not to get involved again in statebuilding in the Middle East.
The Islamic State is the easy part of the problem. The hard part is figuring out how Libya will be stabilized and governed once it is gone.
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Peace picks February 29-March 4
- Analyzing the Results of the February 26 Iranian Elections | Wednesday, March 2nd | 10:00-11:30 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The event will analyze the results of the February 26 elections for the Consultative Assembly and the Assembly of Experts, focusing on how these elections will influence Iran’s domestic and international policies. Panelists will also discuss recent political and economic developments in light of the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Speakers include Bernard Hourcade, Global Fellow at the Wilson Center and Senior Research Fellow Emeritus at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Suzanne Maloney, Deputy Director of Foreign Policy and Senior Fellow at the Center for Middle East Policy, Energy Security and Climate Initiative at Brookings Institution, and Mohsen Milani, Executive Director of the USF World Center for Strategic & Diplomatic Studies (CSDS) at the University of South Florida and Professor of the Dep’t of Gov’t & International Affairs. The moderator will be Haleh Esfandiari, Public Policy Fellow and former Director of the Middle East Program at the Woodrow Wilson Center.
- Libya: What’s Next? | Wednesday, March 2nd | 3:30-5:00 | Atlantic Council | REGISTER TO ATTEND | In recent weeks, policymakers in Western capitals have expressed an increasing willingness to intervene militarily against the Islamic State (ISIS or ISIL) in its Libyan coastal stronghold of Sirte, driven in part by an uptick in devastating attacks on Libya’s oil ports by ISIS fighters and the group’s expanding influence along Libya’s coast. Please join the Atlantic Council on March 2, 2016 for a discussion on the protracted struggle for political and military control over Libya. Claudia Gazzini will share her expertise and research on Libya’s recent developments, the rise of ISIS, and recommendations for the development of Libya’s institutions based on recent visits to Tripoli. Karim Mezran will moderate the discussion. As Senior Analyst for Libya, Dr. Claudia Gazzini oversees and directs International Crisis Group’s reporting and analysis on Libya. Dr. Karim Mezran is a Senior Fellow at the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, where he focuses on the political developments of North Africa.
- Internet Freedom in the Age of Dictators and Terrorists | Thursday, March 3rd | 10:00-11:30 | The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe | The original promise of the internet as a mechanism for free exchange of information and greater democratization seems a dream from a distant past. Authoritarian leaders in China, Russia and around the world seek to build walls around their country’s internet and censor incoming information and online discourse, while in free societies we are grappling with the right balance between security and privacy of online information in the face of terrorist threats. The briefing will focus on internet freedom broadly, including censorship and surveillance; and trends in how internet companies are evolving to handle increased government requests from law enforcement. In addition, panelists will discuss the role of export controls in ensuring that U.S. and European technologies do not contribute to human rights abuses. The following panelists are scheduled to participate: Lisl Brunner, Director of Policy and Learning, Global Network Initiative, Rebecca MacKinnon, Director, Ranking Digital Rights, and Tim Maurer, Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Anatomy of Authoritarianism in the Arab Republics | Friday, March 4th | 10:00-11:00 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Dr. Joseph Sassoon’s book, Anatomy of Authoritarianism in the Arab Republics, investigates the system of authoritarianism in eight Arab republics through the prism of more than 120 memoirs of senior officials and opponents. This book aims to enrich the understanding of authoritarianism that prevailed in these countries and the difficult process of transition from authoritarianism that began after 2011. Joseph Sassoon, Associate Professor at Georgetown University and former Fellow at the Wilson Center will give a talk, while Henri J. Barkey, Director of the Middle East Program at the Woodrow Wilson Center will moderate.
- Beyond 2016: Security challenges and opportunities for the next administration | Tuesday, March 1st | 9:00-4:15 | Brookings | REGISTER TO ATTEND | On March 1, the seventh annual military and federal fellow research symposium will feature the independent research produced by members of the military services and federal agencies who are currently serving at think-tanks and universities across the nation. Organized by the fellows themselves, the symposium provides a platform for building greater awareness of the cutting-edge work that America’s military and governmental leaders are producing on key national security policy issues. With presidential primary season well underway, it’s clear that whoever emerges in November 2016 as the next commander-in-chief will have their hands full with a number of foreign policy and national security choices. This year’s panels will explore these developing issues and their prospects for resolution after the final votes have been counted. During their keynote conversation, the Honorable Michèle Flournoy will discuss her assessment of the strategic threat environment with General John Allen, USMC (Ret.), who will also provide opening remarks on strategic leadership and the importance of military and other federal fellowship experiences. After each panel and discussion, participants will take audience questions. Panel information and panelists may be found here.
- Human Rights Abuses in Putin’s Russia | Wednesday, March 2nd | 2:30-4:00 | Atlantic Council | On February 27, one year ago, Boris Nemtsov was gunned down just steps away from the Kremlin. His murder has since become the symbol of the increasing oppression and human rights abuses in Russia under President Putin. To mark the one year anniversary of Boris Nemtsov’s death, the Senate Human Rights Caucus and the Atlantic Council will host a discussion on human rights abuses in Putin’s Russia. This briefing will also seek to examine the current political environment in Russia and address important questions, including: What human rights violations are occurring? How can policymakers support human rights in Russia? This will be a conversation with Senator Mark Kirk, Illinois senator, U.S. Senate, Carl Gershman, President of the National Endowment for Democracy, Rob Berschinski, Deputy Assistant of State for the Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor for the U.S. Department of State, and Paula Dobriansky, Senior Fellow for the JFK Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. John Herbst, Director of the Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center at the Atlantic Council will introduce and moderate the event.
- Violence and Gender: The Other Side of Pakistan’s Urban Unrest | Wednesday, March 2nd | 3:00-4:40 | Wilson Center | REGISTER TO ATTEND | Much of the international focus on violence in Pakistan’s cities tends to revolve around terrorism perpetrated by Islamist extremist groups. In reality, a variety of other major factors drive violence in urban Pakistan as well—including issues associated with water access, waste disposal, transport, and drugs and alcohol. In these cases, gender considerations play a key role. Canada’s International Center for Development Research (IDRC) and the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) recently funded a two-year research project examining how gender and violence intersect in the megacity of Karachi, Pakistan’s financial capital and largest city, and in the twin cities of Islamabad/Rawalpindi, the federal capital and home to military headquarters, respectively. The research was jointly undertaken by the Institute of Business Administration in Karachi and King’s College in London. This event will highlight some of the project’s major findings and possible implications for international assistance programs in urban Pakistan. Speakers include Amiera Sawas, Researcher at Imperial College, London, and Daanish Mustafa, Reader of the Department of Geography at King’s College, London.
- The Syrian Jihad: A Book Launch with Charles Lister | Friday, March 4th | 12:00-1:15 | Middle East Institute | REGISTER TO ATTEND | The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to announce the U.S. launch of the latest book by terrorism expert and Middle East Institute Resident Fellow Charles Lister, The Syrian Jihad: Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the Evolution of an Insurgency (Oxford University Press, 2016). In the book, Lister assesses and explains the emergence of Sunni jihadist movements within Syria’s fledgling insurgency, charts their evolution, and situates them within the global jihadist project. Unprecedented numbers of foreign fighters have joined such groups, who will almost certainly continue to host them. The book scrutinizes the strategic and tactical lessons learned from other jihadist conflict zones, as well as the complex interplay between al-Qaeda and the Islamic State and how their relationship has influenced the jihadist sphere both inside Syria and worldwide. Copies of the book in limited number will be available for purchase and signing at the event. MEI Vice President for Policy and Research Paul Salem will moderate.
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No one gets dragged into NATO
Vladimir Filipović of Belgrade daily Blic asked me some questions about the US bombing in Libya that killed, among others, two Serbs. I asnwered:
1. Do you think that this incident will affect Serbia’s relations with NATO and US, and that maybe Russia will try to use this situation to get closer to Serbia at that expense?
DPS: First let me say how regrettable the death of the Serbian diplomats is. There is no excuse for their abduction and imprisonment. Their deaths in an American raid against their captors was clearly unintended.
Russia will use any incident it can to denounce NATO and the US, as Moscow seeks to block NATO expansion in the Balkans. You can tell how sincere the Russians are by watching how many civilians they are killing in Syria, despite their continuing denials.
2. Do you think that something would be different if the US knew that there are two Serbian hostages in Sabratha, in that specific terrorist object? That the attack maybe would be postponed or differently conducted?
DPS: My understanding of American policy is that Washington seeks to avoid civilian deaths. I certainly hope that the attack would have been postponed or conducted differently had Washington known of the presence of the Serbs, or any other prisoners. But on that subject you really need to talk with an official spokesperson.
Vladimir wasn’t satisfied, so he asked me to expand and I replied again:
3. If you could expand your yesterday’s statement about Russia trying to use the incident in Libya to get closer to Serbia at the expense of NATO and USA.
DPS: What’s to add? It is clear that Moscow is desperate to keep Serbia out of NATO and will use any incident to accomplish its objective.
No one gets dragged into NATO. They come because they believe it will make their country more secure. With Russia increasingly aggressive in Europe and the Middle East, it is not hard to imagine ways in which NATO membership will make a country more secure. The only humiliation comes from toeing the Russian line rather than helping to shape the NATO line.
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