Tag: Libya
Russians love their tsars, until they don’t
Russian President Putin is all about power: getting it, exercising it, holding on to it. He also knows when he meets it.
That is what happened with President Biden in Geneva today. Unlike his predecessor, Biden was clear and forceful about Russia’s malfeasance, both internationally (especially the invasion of Ukraine) and internally (especially the jailing of Alexei Navalny and restrictions on the press). The result was a relatively productive confrontation leading to future meetings on strategic weapons, cybersecurity, and prisoner exchanges. Putin did his usual “what about malfeasance in the US” for the TV cameras to broadcast back home, and he got the formal respect he always seeks and responded in kind. But this meeting was a win for Biden: the contrast with President Trump’s embarrassing performance in Helsinki is striking. Trump got nothing. Biden got Russia into conversations the US favors.
Biden claims persistently that personally knowing other world leaders is vital to foreign policy. But his description of his own side of conversations often contrast dramatically with this notion. He is all about convincing other leaders to think about their own country’s interests, not about their personal relations with him. He denies being “friendly” with Xi Jinping, only claiming to know him well. He has consistently downplayed his own remark about Putin being a killer and ignores Putin’s support for Trump. Biden wants the relationship to be about the interests of the two states, not the two leaders. Instead of flattery, he warns that Russian malfeasance could end hopes for foreign investment, in particular if Navalny were to die in prison. He tries, not always successfully, to cast what he wants in terms his adversary might be able to accept. Putin couldn’t care less that blocking cross-border humanitarian aid to rebel-held territory in Syria will cause humanitarian problems.
But Putin did not come to this meeting his usual braggart self. Russia’s economy is in bad shape, he is unpopular after so many years in power, and China is rapidly becoming the superpower he would like Russia to be. Moscow is bogged down in Syria and losing in Libya. Putin needs a better relationship with the US at least as much as Biden needs what he terms a more “stable and predictable” relationship with Russia. Putin also needs the US not to reciprocate interference in the 2016 and 2020 American elections with Washington interference in his re-election effort in 2024. Closing down a few cyberhackers and allowing some independent media might be a reasonable way to try to prevent that. Nor is Putin any more anxious than Biden to spend billions more on strategic nuclear weapons. If they can agree to stand down and focus on getting China to do likewise, Putin won’t be unhappy.
No one should expect a sea change in Putin’s behavior. He is a murderer, as Biden once said, and won’t hesitate to do it again if he thinks it will serve his interests and he can get away with it. Putin is Putin, not Yeltsin. The US should think less about Putin and more about what comes next. As one Muscovite put it to me, Russians love their Czars, until they don’t.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Engagement with armed groups is necessary, “good” or “bad”
The Crisis Response Council and the Brookings Institution’s Initiative on Nonstate Armed Actors June 3 convened a discussion on challenges posed by armed groups to security sector reform (SSR) in the Middle East and beyond. Panelists agreed that SSR too frequently views armed groups from a unidimensional perspective. Militias are not inherent spoilers whose power is limited to the security sector. They are more often politically or socially embedded potential power brokers. State monopolies on violence are an anomaly in post-conflict states. Armed groups can contribute positively to SSR and governance.
The speakers were:
Vanda Felbab-Brown
Director – Initiative on Nonstate Armed Actors; Co-Director – Africa Security Initiative; Senior Fellow – Foreign Policy, Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology
Brookings Institution
Frederic Wehrey
Senior fellow, Middle East Program
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Bernadetta Berti
Head of Policy Planning in the Office of the Secretary General
NATO
Yaniv Voller
Senior Lecturer in the Politics of the Middle East
University of Kent; Stanford University
Ranj Alaaldin (moderator)
Visiting Fellow – Brookings Doha Center; Nonresident Fellow – Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East Policy
Brookings Institution
The present: thriving and misunderstood
Vanda Felbab-Brown highlighted the Corona pandemic’s effect on armed groups around the world. The associated economic downturn has pushed some states to their limits. 200 million people have been pushed into poverty, and many of those will be forced to engage in criminal activities to scrape together a living. Under these conditions, armed groups thrive. Hundreds of millions of people already live under total, partial, or shared control by armed groups. As state spending on social welfare, but also security provision, shrunk, armed groups moved in to fill the gaps.
Wehrey discussed the case of Libya, where armed groups have thrived in part because they were misunderstood by outsiders. Emerging after the fall of Gadhafi, they were useful security providers, but politicized and prone to state capture and corruption. The Libyan case could have ended more positively if the ‘prizes’ for militias had been placed under better oversight. Oil revenues, ministerial positions, ports, airports were targets for militia competition. Protection of such prizes could have prevented the militia growth that Libya has seen.
Multiple efforts to “train and equip” a Libyan army from scratch have failed. Such an effort takes years and the security vacuum that exists before its completion is sure to be filled up by someone. Furthermore, in Libya new armies have often recruited from specific tribal, communal, or political backgrounds. These are less national armies and more new militias. This is something Wehrey sees happening now with Turkish support for the Tripoli-based armed forces. The current effort to defer security issues while working on political unity is reminiscent of 2012. The outcome might be similar: a relapse into violence.
The panel agreed that armed groups are not anomalies and they will not go away. Ahram suggested states do not necessarily want to be centralized. There are many examples of leaders deliberately fragmenting power. Militia fighters are not unlucky souls whose dream is to join the regular army and leave the militia life behind them. These groups are an embedded part of their communities and not easily fixable aberrations.
What makes an armed group “good” or “bad”?
The exact drivers of armed groups are poorly understood by academia and policy makers. Voller focuses his research on the question of why certain pro-government militias act predatorily, while others do not. Rather than an inherent inclination to violence, he believes that a core determinant is whether an armed group acts in a theater where its constituency is present. The predominantly Shia PMF in Iraq became predatorial when they entered the Sunni northwest in the fight against ISIS, while the Kurdish Peshmerga refrained from doing so as they always operate among their Kurdish communities. Felbab-Brown countered that other factors must also be important, as there are plenty of examples of armed groups acting predatorily among their own communities. She posits that any armed group gets feedback from its community, even if it is only by means of resistance to violence. If a community lacks social cohesion, this feedback can be unclear or weak, allowing greater predatory behavior.
Wehrey warned against an overly economic focus when it comes to controlling militias. Paying off armed groups to steer them, or turning off their incomes to force their hand, only treats part of the reality. These groups are embedded in and motivated by communal identity, religion, and history. Ahram agreed. He added that armed groups are also not merely political, as there are many cases of armed groups engaging in negotiations or elections and still continuing their armed struggles. Normative motivations are also part of the equation, as local norms, national laws, and even international law (and the fear of a Hague tribunal) are all considered by militias. Ahram believes that the onus is on researchers to identify which of these different levers matter under which circumstances, and how they can be used effectively.
Berti joked that she would enjoy this academic exercise, but that the policy maker in her called for a different course of action. She warned that all of these tools are highly context specific. What works best in practice is a willingness to enter a long-term commitment to a peace building effort. An intervening power needs to engage in a dynamic relationship with local power brokers and be willing to deal with new actors and change course when the situation calls for it.
Policy makers’ task: flexibility and pragmatism
The panel agreed that thinking in terms of “good” or “bad” militias is a fruitless exercise. Voller emphasized once more that militias are embedded in their communities. He used the example of Syrian militias that might align with Assad and engage in repression in order to protect their own constituencies. We might not call these actors “good”, but we can understand what motivates them. Felbab-Brown explained that it is better to think in pragmatic terms of available alternatives. An armed group might be odious, yet be the best option in terms of service provision, behavior, and accountability. Local populations as a rule adapt to harsh and illiberal actors if they provide stability and security.
The task that faces policy makers is a daunting one, as current tools and theories are poorly equipped to deal with the realities. The key is to be flexible and to accept militias as an embedded part of society. Berti and Ahram underlined this. We often speak of ‘allowing’ armed groups to exist or participate in a society. In practice, however, we usually have little influence over their existence. Voller emphasized that engaging with a militia directly as the state, rather than condemning and ignoring it, is usually the best way to have a positive influence on its behavior. Using the example of the Lebanese Hezbollah, however, Berti warned us to beware of who’s steering whom in these dynamics.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Stevenson’s army, June 4
Reuters says Justice Dept will elevate ransomware investigations. [Good & right because these are criminal not military matters.]
Another proper assignment: Biden shifts Chinese investment oversight from Defense to Treasury.
NYT says autonomous lethal drone strike may have occurred in Libya.
Former Senate staffer urges filibuster reform.
How do people get their news? CJR has an interesting report.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Stevenson’s army, April 22
– Centcom seeks carrier to cover Afghan withdrawal.
– Taliban spreadsheet lists allied violations of ceasefire.
– US gives Iran list of possible sanctions relief.
– DOD investigating possible Russian directed energy attacks on US troops.
-Trial balloon: NYT says Biden will label Armenian killings “genocide.”
– NYT has its tick-tock on refugee numbers snafu.
– WaPo details Kerrry’s work on climate. Says he flies commercial.
– House passes bill to limit Saudi arms sales.
– SFRC bill would give more details on executive agreements.
– Frank Hoffman analyzes 3 defense budget options.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
And then more:
– This is peak hearing season in Congress, and a good time to catch up on defense and foreign policy issues. For example, look at D Briefs column yesterday. You can also locate hearings at the regular LOC site.
– SFRC approved a bipartisan bill to counter China.
– Politico has State’s ambassadorial bid list along with an explanation: the countries not listed may be ones slated for political appointees.
The document is a snapshot and could change, of course. But if a country is not listed, it’s likely for one of two reasons: the post is currently occupied by a member of the Foreign Service and that person won’t rotate out until after 2022; or it’s being reserved for Biden to give to a campaign donor or another political ally.
– Chevron opposes Myanmar sanctions.
– Chad rebels prepared for war in Libya.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Peace Picks | March 1 – March 5, 2021
Notice: Due to public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live stream
- Breaking the Tie: Security and Stability in Belarus | March 1, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | Atlantic Council| Register Here
For the past six months, Belarusians protesting for free and fair elections across the country have faced growing repression as strongman Alyaksandr Lukashenka attempts to cling to power. The opposition has demonstrated staying power and growing political capital, but the army and the security services remain loyal to Lukashenka. This domestic stalemate also presents a strategic problem for the Kremlin, which seems to have no new ideas beyond some monetary support for Lukashenka’s regime. Meanwhile the US and Europe have responded with modest financial sanctions against the discredited president and his cronies.
Do Lukashenka or Moscow have any new cards to play? Does the opposition? How will the situation in Belarus end and how will Washington, Brussels, and Moscow react?
Speakers:
Dr. Pavel Felgenhauer
Columnist with Novaya Gazeta,
David Kramer
Senior Fellow at Florida International University’s Vaclav Havel Program for Human Rights and Diplomacy
Valery Kavaleuski
Foreign Affairs Adviser to Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya
Dr. Marie Mendras
Professor at Sciences Po’s Paris School of International Affairs
Ambassador John Herbst (Moderator)
Director of the Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council
2. Red Flags Report Launch | March 2, 2021 | 1:00 PM ET | Center for Strategic International Studies | Register Here
China’s political and economic influence in the Western Balkans is on the rise, fueled in part by a regional demand for infrastructure which is satisfied by opaque deals in the ICT, energy, and transportation sectors. These projects present risks to good governance, economic growth, environmental sustainability, and digital security. Join CSIS for a virtual discussion of a new CSIS report which describes tools and actions critical for stakeholders to objectively evaluate and respond to these risks. The report concludes a three-part series which examined the nature and impact of Chinese economic influence in the Western Balkans and its implications for the region’s stability and Euro-Atlantic aspirations.
Speakers:
Matthew D. Steinhelfer (Keynote)
Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, U.S. Department of State
Heather A. Conley
Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic, CSIS
Jonathan E. Hillman, Senior Fellow and Director of the Reconnecting Asia Project, CSIS
Valerie Hopkins (Moderator)
South-East Europe Correspondent, The Financial Times
3. Lebanon: Challenges and Future Prospects| March 3, 2021 | 12:00 PM ET | Middle East Institute| Register Here
The Middle East Institute is pleased to invite you to a panel to launch its Lebanon Program, focusing on Lebanon’s current state of affairs and potential US foreign policy options going forward. The months-long political stalemate and the unaddressed financial crisis keep pushing Lebanon further into chaos and uncertainty. In parallel, the new Biden administration is redefining the US stance vis-à-vis Iran and reassessing some of its bilateral relations in the region. Many of these changes will have direct implications for Lebanon. This distinguished panel will address these local and regional developments, think through ways US foreign policy towards Lebanon can be more nuanced and constructive, and highlight themes and signals that are worth paying attention to in the coming months.
Speakers:
Amb. (ret.) Edward M. Gabriel
President and CEO, American Task Force on Lebanon
May Nasrallah
Chairwoman, Lebanese International Finance Executives
Paul Salem
President, MEI
Mona Yacoubian
Senior Advisor to the Vice President of Middle East and North Africa, United States Institute of Peace
Christophe Abi-Nassif (Moderator)
Lebanon Program Director, MEI
4. Agent Sonya: Moscow’s Most Daring Wartime Spy | March 3, 2021 | 12:00 PM ET | Middle East Institute| Register Here
Please join the Intelligence Project for a discussion with Ben MacIntyre on his latest book, Agent Sonya. This true-life spy story is a masterpiece about the Soviet intelligence officer code-named “Sonya.” Over the course of her career, she was hunted by the Chinese, the Japanese, the Nazis, MI5, MI6, and the FBI—and she evaded them all. Her story reflects the great ideological clash of the twentieth century—between Communism, Fascism, and Western democracy—and casts new light on the spy battles and shifting allegiances of our own times.
With unparalleled access to Sonya’s diaries and correspondence and never-before-seen information on her clandestine activities, Macintyre has conjured a page-turning history of a legendary secret agent, a woman who influenced the course of the Cold War and helped plunge the world into a decades-long standoff between nuclear superpowers.
Speakers:
Ben Macintyre
Author and Journalist, The Times
5. Insanity Defense: Why Our Failure to Confront Hard National Security Problems Makes Us Less Safe | March 3, 2021 | 1:00 PM ET | Wilson Center| Register Here
In the wake of unprecedented domestic terror and national security threats in the form of mass shootings and insurrection in the nation’s capital, former Congresswoman & Wilson Center Director, President, and CEO Jane Harman offers her new book Insanity Defense: Why Our Failure to Confront Hard National Security Problems Makes Us Less Safe (St. Martin’s Press; May 18, 2021), which chronicles how four consecutive administrations have failed to confront some of the toughest national security issues and suggests achievable fixes that can move us toward a safer future.
Please join Congresswoman Harman and New York Times national security correspondent and senior writer David Sanger for an in-depth conversation on the book and a discussion on better processes and more sound policy for the next generation of elected officials and the new administration.
Speakers:
Jane Harman
Director, President and CEO, Wilson Center
David Sanger
Former Distinguished Fellow, National Security Correspondent and Writer, the New York Times; Author, The Perfect Weapon: War, Sabotage and Fear in the Cyber Age
6. Religion, Ethnicity, and Charges Of Extremism: The Dynamics Of Inter-Communal Violence In Ethiopia| March 4, 2021 | 9:00 AM ET | European Institute of Peace| Register Here
In recent months, the conflict in Tigray has dominated most analyses of Ethiopian politics. The scale of the Tigray crisis makes this understandable, but in its shadow, inter-communal tensions and conflicts have persisted across Ethiopia. In recent years there were numerous violent incidents, such as the Amhara regional ‘coup’ attempt of June 2019, the violence across Oromia in October 2019, and incidents around Timkat in Dire Dawa and Harar in January 2020.
A team of Ethiopian and international researchers – Terje Østebø, Jörg Haustein, Fasika Gedif, Kedir Jemal Kadir, Muhammed Jemal, and Yihenew Alemu Tesfaye – studied two incidents of inter-communal violence: the attacks on mosques and (mostly) Muslim properties in Mota, Amhara region in December 2019 and the violence and destruction of properties in Shashemene and other towns in Oromia in July 2020. They will present their findings in this event, followed by discussion and Q&A.
Their research shows that in Ethiopia religion and ethnic violence overlap and interact with one another in complex ways. Given the current emphasis on ethnicity in Ethiopian politics, the role of religious affiliation is often overlooked, yet it is here that the accusation of “extremism” is most frequently and most consequentially raised: the mere expectation or accusation of extremism has sufficed to generate inter-communal violence and deepened a climate of mistrust.
Speakers:
Terje Østebø
University of Florida
Jörg Haustein
University of Cambridge
Sandy Wade (Moderator)
Senior Advisor, European Institute of Peace
7. COVID-19 and Cooperation in Libya | March 4, 2021 | 9:00 AM ET | United States Institute of Peace| Register Here
Libya is at a turning point after the U.N.-sponsored Libyan Political Dialogue Forum elected a temporary executive authority in February to unify the country and move toward elections by year’s end. However, sustainable peace cannot be achieved with only an agreement at the national level. And the COVID-19 crisis has exacerbated economic challenges, strained the country’s health infrastructure, and added a new layer of complexity to the country’s conflict. Local-level cooperation—and linking these efforts to the national-level peace process—is of utmost importance to achieve a cohesive and peaceful country.
And despite a difficult year, there have been bright spots for Libya on this front. The COVID-19 pandemic yielded many examples of local-level initiatives where Libyans came together in challenging conditions to cooperate for a common goal. The hope is that these successes can lead to longer and more enduring areas of cooperation.
Join USIP as we host Libya’s ambassador to the United States and Libyan civil society leaders for a look at stories of positive community cooperation during the current crisis—as well as a discussion on how Libyan and international organizations can build off these successes to navigate Libya’s complex conflict and ensure a peaceful future for the country.
Speakers:
Wafa Bughaighis (Keynote speaker)
Libyan Ambassador to the United States
Ahmed Albibas
Director, Moomken Organization for Awareness and Media
Abdulrahman A. S. Elgheriani
President and CEO, Tanmia 360
Craig Browne
Program Policy Officer, World Food Programme
Nate Wilson (Moderator)
Libya Country Manager, U.S. Institute of Peace
8. Unraveling the Conflict in Syria March 4, 2021 | 10:00 AM ET | Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | Register Here
In 2012, as the conflict in Syria continued to smolder, then-president Barack Obama made clear that any use of chemical weapons by the Bashar al-Assad regime would constitute a “red line” for U.S. engagement. Yet in the aftermath of a sarin attack outside Damascus just a year later, the Obama administration seized the opportunity to work with Russia on an ambitious plan to hunt down and remove chemical weapons rather than go to war. A decade later, the tangle of “heroes and villains” involved in that particular scenario is clearer.
Speakers:
Joby Warrick
Author of Red Line
Maha Yahya
Director of the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center
9. The Future of ISIS March 4, 2021 | 11:30 AM ET | Atlantic Council | Register Here
On October 27, 2019, then-US President Donald Trump announced that the leader of the so-called Islamic State, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, was killed in Syria in an American special operation, striking a blow against an already weakened organization.
What ISIS accomplished during the period of its rise and growth represents a “quantum leap” in the ideology, strategies, and operating theories of terrorist groups, and requires deep analysis of the organization’s expected future trajectory. The Politics and Society Institute in Amman, Jordan, and the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative in Washington, DC, are pleased to co-host this expert discussion. This panel will shed light on what opportunities exist for policymakers to deal with the legacy of ISIS detainees and returnees, as well as on strategies against a potential resurgence in Iraq and Syria.
Speakers:
Mohammed Abu Rumman
Expert, Politics and Society Institute
Former Jordanian Minister of Youth and Culture
Borzou Daragahi
Journalist and Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council
Andrew Peek
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council
Former US Deputy Assistant Secretary for Iran and Iraq
Mara Revkin
National Security Law Fellow, Georgetown University Law Center
Banan Malkawi (Moderator)
Jordanian-American Researcher and Lecturer
10. Strategic nuclear modernization in the United States| March 4, 2021 | 2:00 PM ET | Brookings Institutions| Register Here
What: As with prior administrations before it, the Biden administration is preparing to undertake a major review of the U.S. strategic nuclear modernization program. Though the U.S. arsenal has decreased in accordance with the New START treaty, new delivery systems are still being developed.
Supporters of the current program argue that implementation is critical for the United States’ ability to deter adversaries and reassure allies. Opponents argue that the current program is well in excess of deterrence requirements and is not affordable over the long term. During the review period, Congress will examine the current program as well as requested funding for these systems.
On Thursday, March 4, the Foreign Policy program at Brookings will host a panel to discuss how the Biden administration will – and should – approach negotiations regarding the future of the strategic modernization program.
Speakers:
Tom Collina
Director of Policy, Ploughshares Fund
Madelyn R. Creedon
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Center for Security, Strategy and Technology
Franklin Miller
Principal, The Scowcroft Group
Amy Woolf
Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy, Congressional Research Service
Frank A Rose
Co-Director and Foreign Policy Fellow, Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Beyond success and failure lies attractive possibility
Michael Picard, a first-year Conflict Management student at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, writes:
The Wilson Center February 24 hosted a panel discussion on “Revisiting the Arab Uprisings at 10: Beyond Success and Failure.” that weighed the societal impacts of the Arab uprisings 10 years after they broke out. The term “Arab Spring” is a misnomer as the revolts did not result in democratic reform – the term Arab uprisings was used instead.
The key question was whether the Arab uprisings werea failure that is now over or are they the beginning of a longer process of societal transformation?
Panelists
Liz Sly (moderator): Beirut Bureau Chief, Washington Post
Amy Austin Holmes: International Affairs Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations
Marina Ottaway: Middle East Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Asher Orkaby: Fellow, Transregional Institute, Princeton University
Anas El Gomati: Founder and Director, Sadeq Institute
Focusing specifically on the experiences of Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Libya, the panelists presented and weighed the legacy of each country’s uprising 10 years on. Despite initial popular hope, there was never a serious expectation among observers that these states would transition to democracy overnight. What we have witnessed so far is the beginning of a long-term transformation of the MENA region. The memories of pre-uprising realities are still pertinent, and the youthful composition of Arab societies highlights the need for political and economic reforms.
Several panelists noted the US must examine how its policies and signals have impeded demoratic transitions. Regarding the 2013 coup that deposed Mohammed Morsi, Egypt’s first democratically elected leader, the African Union immediately expelled Egypt in response to this setback. The US did not react until the Rabaa massacre, which killed hundreds of pro-Morsi demonstrators. This reflects a broader theme: that the US must consider its democracy promotion goals and what its precise role ought to be in realizing these goals.
The panel also discussed the role of the Gulf monarchies in the Arab uprisings, noting that they saw such movements – both those originating domestically and in nearby states – as existential threats. Ottaway offered an anecdote about a Saudi official who anticipated expatriate students would demand greater civil liberties. This compelled the Gulf states to act – near unanimously – to crush domestic uprisings and take an active international role in promoting counterrevolutions. This has caused immense destruction throughout the region, derailing local conflict management efforts and restraining Gulf proxies from negotiating settlements.
Ottaway observed that perhaps the most pessimistic lesson of the Arab uprisings was that removal of large, unitary, Arab regimes that dominated political life has revealed that the building blocks of democracy were absent, with the narrow exception of Tunisia. Tunisia was able to avoid fates similar to Libya and Yemen because it is a) socially homogenous with relatively few ethnic and sectarian minorities, and b) politically pluralistic. Historically salient political organizations already existed and held society together, albeit in uneasy, unstable balances.
The panelists spoke to new dynamics and outcomes that continue to emerge. Several elaborated on “second generation” protest movements in Lebanon, Iraq, Algeria, and Sudan. In these contexts, protestors demonstrated greater understanding of how their movements could be more inclusive, better organized, and better at extracting meaningful government concessions. This has helped them avoid the high-stakes losses of the “first generation” protest movements.
The panelists noted unanimously that the Arab uprisings have had positive implications for women and some minorities. In several countries, women initiated the initial protest movements, focused on detention of their kin. In war-torn states, women have taken on a more active role in daily economic and social life. The panelists hope that these gains will be locked in with female participation quotas in emergent governance institutions. In Egypt, the Nubian minority gained recognition in the constitution and procured the right to return to ancestral lands from which they were forcibly displaced.
Conclusion
The panel agreed that the Arab uprisings were not failures that are now over but the beginning of a longer transitional process and state-building experiment. Orkaby noted these uprisings sparked the creation of local civil society organizations or strengthened existing ones. El Gomati noted the renewal of social protests in Lebanon, Iraq, Algeria, and Sudan, indicating civilians are still willing to take to the streets. Austin Holmes emphasized that much will depend on how the Biden administration postures itself toward the region, especially with regard to countries that have retained despotic features.
RSS - Posts
