Tag: Libya
A better place to start from
More or less half of American voters will cast their ballots for the Republicans in 2016, so it behooves us to examine seriously what they propose to do about Iran’s nuclear program. Jeb Bush has been inaccurate and hazy. Rick Perry is clearer. So let’s consider his proposition, which consists of sanctions, regime change and war.
The problem with ratcheting up sanctions is getting others to follow the US lead. Russia, China and the Europeans have gone along with the Obama Administration’s strengthening of sanctions because they saw it as part of a broader diplomatic effort intended to reach an agreement with Iran. The Obama Administration made it clear war was an option only if negotiations failed. No one would be under that impression if Rick Perry becomes president. He aims to compel Iran to give up its nuclear program, which would lead quickly to the other members of the P5+1 (that’s UK, France, Russia, China and Germany) deciding to abandon the effort. Unilateral US sanctions, as we’ve seen with Cuba, are destined to fail.
If sanctions fail, Perry suggests a push for regime change. That would revive a longstanding American ambition, one that failed for 35 years until President Obama put it on ice. Of course Perry might be better at it than Presidents Carter, Reagan, Bush (41), Clinton, Bush (43) and Obama, but the odds on that proposition are not good. The Islamic Republic will fall some day, because it is incapable of meeting the aspirations of the Iranian people. But when that might happen is anyone’s guess. In the meanwhile, supporting the aspirations of Iran’s Kurdish or Baloch separatists, as has been done at times in the past, is frighteningly risky in today’s Middle East, where state structures are already at risk in Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Libya.
Then there is war, aimed at destroying Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. But in order to do that, the US will need also to destroy its air defenses and somehow prevent Iranian attacks on shipping in the strait of Hormuz. With no prospect of a negotiated solution, Russia is bound to export modern air defenses to Iran. Weeks if not months of bombing would be required. The only really reliable way to protect shipping is to seize the Iranian side of the strait, an option no doubt included in US planning. In the meanwhile, oil prices would spike back to $100 and more per barrel. Any multilateral effort to negotiate an end to Iran’s nuclear program would die an ignominous death.
The net result of the military effort by most estimates would be no more than a two or three year setback for Iran’s nuclear program, which would be redoubled in the aftermath. While some may hope for regime change after a US attack on Iran, experience suggests that the initial reaction will be for Iranians to rally around the flag. The government would squelch any nascent pro-democracy efforts as treacherous and hardliners would be buoyed. That might change later, but there are no guarantees.
Let’s ignore for the moment the possibility–a real one–that Iran will cheat on its obligations under an agreement along the lines of the one already outlined. Can anyone seriously argue that setting the Iranian nuclear program back 10 or 15 years, as provided for in the “framework” agreement, is not better than the Perry formula of sanctions, regime change and war?
I think not, but that still leaves the verification issue. The agreement is strong on verification, but not fool proof. Iran could conceivably establish an entirely separate nuclear program, starting from uranium ore, that would escape the scrutiny of international inspectors and the import controls provided for in the framework agreement. It could also renounce the agreement and expel the inspectors, or even withdraw from the Non Proliferation Treaty, as North Korea did.
But if it did so, we would be much more likely to get cooperation from others on sanctions, regime change and war. The framework agreement looks like a far better place to start from than no agreement at all.
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The Libyan dialogue: ending the impasse
The UN-sponsored Libyan dialogue has entered a final and ‘decisive’ moment according to chief mediator Bernardino Leon. Last week, Leon shuttled from Morocco (where the main political dialogue is taking place) to Brussels (meeting with representatives of Libyan municipalities) through Libya in his herculean multi-track effort to salvage the Libyan peace process. Last Tuesday, in the absence of an agreement by the parties, Leon released a six-point plan indicating what such an agreement might look like:
- A unity Government headed by a president, and a Presidential Council composed of independent personalities not belonging to any party or affiliated with any group acceptable to all parties and by all Libyans. The main members of the Presidential Council will be the president and his two deputies.
- The House of Representatives as a legislative body representing all Libyans under the full application of principles of legitimacy and inclusion.
- A High State Council inspired by similar institutions existing in a number of countries. A fundamental institution in the governance of the State.
- Constitutional Drafting Assembly.
- National Security Council.
- Municipalities Council.
While these points are neither comprehensive nor specific, they would represent significant achievements. Unsurprisingly they are also fraught with difficulty.
The first point has long been seen as the main aim of the dialogue process. Leon has suggested that a list of potential members of the unity government is under discussion and might be agreed upon by the end of the week. Not surprisingly, this point is the source of considerable disagreement: in the polarized Libyan political field, finding personalities acceptable to all parties is hard. According to the governments in Tripoli and Tobruk, their opponents are described respectively as Gaddafi supporters or Islamist terrorists.
The second point is also likely to spurn a significant degree of controversy. By insisting that the House of Representatives be Libya’s legislative body, Leon’s plan is essentially rejecting the legitimacy of the parallel parliament in Tripoli, the General National Council (GNC). The Tripoli government argues that the GNC is the only legitimate parliament, drawing support from a Supreme Court decision from last fall (although the process and implications of that decision have been questioned). Meanwhile, the House of Representatives operating out of Baida in East Libya remains the sole internationally recognized legislative assembly in Libya. It has been suggested that the GNC, or elements from it, may be included in the High State Council and that balance between the two assemblies would thereby be achieved. More details are needed to see exactly how this balance pans out.
The fourth point would likely mean an extension of the current Constitutional Assembly, operating out of the Eastern city of al-Bayda. The Constitutional Assembly has long been regarded as one of the few non-politicized institutions in Libya, although its president, Ali Tarhouni, arguably is closer to the Tobruk government than to the authorities in Tripoli.
The two last points of Leon’s plan arguably reflect the parallel tracks in the negotiations, involving militias on the one hand, and Libyan municipalities on the other.
It appears that the threat of Islamic State (IS) expansion into Libya has pushed the parties to come to the table. Militias loyal to both Tobruk and Tripoli are currently engaged in fighting IS: the former against an increasing IS presence in Benghazi, and the latter against their main base in Sirte.
Both sides however appear capable of ‘multitasking’: Khalifa Heftar, Tobruk’s military lead, recently launched a campaign to liberate Tripoli while Tripoli jets have carried out airstrikes on Zintan, whose militia is allied with Heftar. A number of these airstrikes have been launched with the intention of derailing talks: in the latest round in Morocco, the departure of the Tripoli delegation was delayed due to bombing of the capital’s only remaining airport.
A return to a political solution still appears a long way off. Even in the event that the UN succeeds in bringing about a unity government, such a government will risk being just as fragile as the transitional governments that preceded it. Unless the fundamental problems of Libyan politics are dealt with – particularly the issue of integrating the militias within the framework of the state – real progress will not be achieved.
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The Levant will never be the same
I spoke Thursday morning at the International Affairs Institute (IAI) in Rome on “The Fight Against ISIS and US Middle East Policy.” The powerpoint I used is attached.
Questions focused on Iran and whether it might play a positive or negative regional role if a nuclear deal is reached. My guess is that it may continue to play a negative role, because the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) will lose something in a nuclear deal and may require compensation. That could come in the form of a free hand to pursue aggressive Iranian objectives in the region, including not only Syria and Iraq but also in Yemen, Lebanon and Bahrain.
There is, however, one important constraint on Iran: partition of Iraq or Syria would be against its interests, as it would likely lead to problems in the Iranian province of Eastern Kurdistan. Iran will not want its strong support for Shia militias in Iraq or for the regime in Syria to precipitate partition of either of those countries. The question is whether they will recognize the danger before it becomes irreversible. In my view, it is important to have Iran inside any future multilateral talks on Syria, precisely to expose them to the risks of going too far.
A couple of people raised the question of how the ISIS is financed. I know of no one with a really good answer to this question. I certainly don’t have one. It is clear enough that they used to get lots of money from trading in oil and oil products, but the anti-ISIS coalition has destroyed a good deal of their capacity to refine (and the drop in oil prices hits them too). They gained a good deal of hard cash from banks in Mosul, but that is a non-renewable resource. My impression is that Gulf funding has largely dried up, though it may still continue from private sources.
One person asked about the mutual silence of ISIS and Israel. They seem to be leaving each other alone. I think that is a temporary bit of restraint. Both recognize the danger and enmity of the other but are not willing yet to engage. That condition won’t last forever. Israel wants to be sure ISIS does not gain control of its border with Syria. ISIS will go after Jerusalem when it feels strong enough to do so.
A good deal of the discussion, including Riccardo Alcaro’s enlightening introduction, revolved around the question of how stability might be brought to areas liberated from ISIS as well as the necessity of doing so. General Allen has only just begun the process of talking with the Iraqis about stabilization. There are no easy answers, but security, governance and essential services will need to be provided. We are a long way not only from defeating ISIS but also from ensuring that the war does not create vacua that even more radical groups might seek to fill.
If you think of the war against Islamic extremism as having begun with the US attack on Al Qaeda in Afghanistan in 2001, it is clear we have been more successful in fragmenting and spreading the enemy than in containing him, much less defeating him. That’s due in large part to stabilization failures, not only in Afghanistan but also in Iraq, Yemen, Libya and elsewhere. It would be better not to repeat that experience, though I have little confidence we have either the means or will required.
The war has displaced and impoverished many millions. Minorities are on the run. Relative majorities are frightened and distrustful. States are failing. Borders are evaporating. Extremism is reaping rewards. Moderation is fading. The Levant will never be the same.
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Sunnis don’t like ISIS
Munqith Dagher Wednesday presented at CSIS his latest findings on Iraqi public opinion concerning ISIS. A pioneer in public opinion polling in Iraq and CEO of the Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies, Dagher challenged common narratives about ISIS as well as more conventional wisdom about terrorism and radicalization.
CSIS Fellow Anthony Cordesman reminded the audience that the Arab world plays the primary role in the campaign against ISIS. Arabs also remain the primary ISIS casualties: State Department data show an exponential increase in terrorist attacks in recent decades, from 300 major attacks yearly between 1998 and 2008 to 4700 in 2013. Neo-salafist extremist groups have been growing rapidly, by 60% in the last two years. Moreover, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) suffers social and economic deterioration, including rapid population growth and high unemployment – particularly among youth. These challenges must be overcome if ISIS and similar groups are to be defeated.
June 9, 2014 was a benchmark in the history of terrorism, Dagher argued. The takeover of Mosul and eventually 40% of Iraqi territory by ISIS was not entirely unexpected – in fact public opinion data had indicated deep problems in the Mosul area for years. In order to understand these problems more thoroughly, Dagher began a careful study of public opinion in Iraq and Syria, relying on a combination of nationwide face-to-face polling and in-depth interviews with opinion leaders from ISIS-controlled areas. The data provide tests for three alternative explanations of ISIS expansion: religion, poverty and lack of services, and political and social factors.
The first proposition is that ISIS represents Sunni religious sentiment in Iraq and Syria. Polling data however, point to disharmony between Sunni populations and ISIS: while 90% of respondents describe religion as important to their lives, only 13% of Syrians support ISIS, whereas 94% of Iraqi Sunnis describe it as a terrorist organization. There is also a strong ideological contradiction between the local population and ISIS: 81% of Iraqi Sunnis want separation of religion from politics. Dagher also pointed to the strong pride that Mosul Sunnis have for their history, which stands in contrast to ISIS’ destruction of cultural heritage. These recent actions may be less ideological imperative than ISIS response to recent controls put in place along the border that make smuggling historic artifacts more difficult.
A second explanation for the growth of ISIS is that it corresponds to high levels of poverty and failure of the state to provide services. This is often put forward as an explanation of radicalization more generally. However, Dagher could find no statistically significant differences between areas controlled by ISIS and areas outside of ISIS control in terms of unemployment. There is also no significant difference between Shia and Sunni household incomes. Dagher also pointed to the growth of ISIS in Libya, a country that has long enjoyed a relatively high level of development, according to UN Human Development Reports.
Instead, Dagher suggested that political and social factors are key to explaining ISIS’ growth. A number of indicators point in this direction. In the months leading up to the takeover of Mosul, 83-91% of Sunnis believed that Iraq was going in the wrong direction, registering high levels of discontent, insecurity and distrust of the state and the justice system. Sunnis also reported a drastic decline in national sentiment: while 80 percent saw nationality as the primary basis for their identity in 2008, only 40 percent did the same in 2014. Distressingly, similar results of growing insecurity and distrust were found in recent opinion polls in Libya and Yemen.
While these numbers paint a somber picture of the political situation in Iraq and the region more generally, there are also hopeful indications. Since the Maliki government was removed, trust in government made a tremendous jump, from 4% to 47%. There is also significant support for the international anti-ISIS coalition. These figures should give impetus to Iraq’s allies to focus on tackling the underlying political and social factors that have contributed to the rise of ISIS.
Dagher cautioned about the destabilizing role of Shia militias and the influence of Iran in the current fight against ISIS. Among Sunnis, the view of the Shia militias is extremely negative. This is hardly a surprise – Shia militias have displaced, killed and imprisoned Sunnis throughout the areas they have conquered. There is good reason to be highly critical of the use of Shia militias to defeat ISIS. The current offensive against Tikrit is one example – according to Dagher the embattled Tikritis would prefer ISIS over the Shia militias. If we want Sunni communities to fight ISIS, we must help them overcome the pervasive political and social problems they are facing and persuade them there is in fact hope at the end of the tunnel.
Dagher’s slide presentation is available here.
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More Free Syria
My publication Thursday of a post marginally favoring creation of clearly defined liberated and protected areas inside Syria (“Free Syria”) has elicited, in addition to many laurels I would like to become accustomed to, some critical comments and misunderstandings. I thought I might respond and clarify.
First a clarification: I in no way think the UN is doing anything wrong by pursuing “freezes” in Syria. It is doing what it should be doing, given its institutional role and mission: taking advantage of any opportunity whatsoever to improve the lot of Syrian civilians by embarrassing the warring parties into treating them better. It cannot advocate protected areas that infringe on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a member state. It needs to respect Damascus’ authority, while trying to get it to demonstrate some restraint.
But from an American perspective, the freezes are not promising. Experience in the Balkans and elsewhere suggests security for those willing to cease their fire (or freeze the disposition of their forces) is vital to success. Nor are freezes likely to serve Washington’s first priority: weakening, containing and defeating the Islamic State (ISIS). The US should do nothing to detract from the UN effort, but it should also be thinking about its own options.
One highly experienced and knowledgeable diplomat commented to me that protected areas along the Turkish border would arouse strong opposition from the Gulf, whose monarchies don’t want to see Turkish influence expanded in an important Arab country.
I’m sure he is correct that the Arab Gulf will react that way, but I am not so sure they are right to do so.
What harm to Arab Gulf interests has greatly increased Turkish influence in Iraqi Kurdistan done? If Gulf countries are concerned, they should balance any Turkish inroads by supporting the protected areas themselves, with money, arms and if need be ground troops to back up the Free Syrian Army. The Turks would presumably be providing cover only from the air, along with the Americans. Saudi King Salman is showing, friends tell me, less hostility towards the Muslim Brotherhood than his predecessor. A modus vivendi with the Brotherhood-led Turks that helps at least some Syrians may not be beyond reach.
The Turks are irrelevant to a protected area near the Jordanian border, where it would presumably get air cover from the Jordanians and the Americans. That is where the US-trained Free Syrian Army troops are being re-inserted. President Obama would be foolish to risk their rout, which would go down in the annals of American failures with the Bay of Pigs. He will have to provide air cover, or convince the Jordanians to provide it. Israel is already providing humanitarian and likely other assistance across its border with Syria, but expanding that to overt military aid seems to me a bridge too far, at least for now.
Iran will have to have a role in any solution in Syria. How would it react to protected areas? The demands of Syria, Yemen, Lebanon and the nuclear talks have already stretched Tehran’s military, financial and diplomatic capacities. Why wouldn’t the Iranians be relieved to see at least a portion of the Syrian opposition walled off in protected areas, which would necessarily be mostly Sunni and Kurdish? That could enable a focus on the fight against ISIS, in parallel with the US-trained Syrian forces, with reduced short-term risks to the Asad regime (though admittedly I wouldn’t have supported the idea if it didn’t increase the longer-term risks to Bashar).
Russia is the big problem. It will see in the proposal for protected areas the kind of slippery slope that allowed a NATO-led military coalition to take down Muammar Qaddafi. But Moscow is tired and broke. It prioritizes Ukraine. Moscow isn’t likely to allow a UN Security Council resolution to create protected areas until it sees a clear US commitment to do it, resolution or not. But it might then figure better to go along, in order to get a resolution that more strictly limits US and allied military action than was the case in Libya.
So yes, there are serious barriers to “Free Syria.” But they are surmountable, with serious US diplomatic and military commitment. That’s what has been lacking.
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Libya: the difference between east and west
I spent the better part of an hour Thursday on an Al-Arabiya program discussing Libya.The main issue was US and British resistance to lifting the UN arms embargo. The anchor questioned why Washington and London are so concerned with weapons falling into the “wrong hands” and whether that problem can’t be solved by transferring them only to the Libyan army under close supervision. I said I thought the Americans want to see some progress toward unifying the government authorities first. I got this email this morning from a Libyan, which I think merits airing:
I am watching a TV program. Even if I may agree with some of your views, what concerns me is the confusion you have about the reality in Libya. You and others get their information from politicians who have been out of Libya for decades and have lost touch with reality. You do not make distinctions between what happened in the eastern part of Libya and the western part.
In the east there is an army. It is a small number but it is on the ground and fighting all kinds of terrorism (Islamic factions and ISIS) as well as those who are really just gangs of outlaws. I and other Libyans in the east do not understand how the West has denied the Libyan army weapons because of fear that those weapons may fall in the wrong hands. There are no wrong hands. There is an army and there are gangs.
In the western part of Libya there are many factions, militias, gangs, and some of the remaining of Qaddafi army. In fact you can say there is a war among all those factions. It is really a civil war.
As for the government, it has been formed by a freely elected parliament, whether we agree with its decisions or not. Many in the West ignore or do not realize that Islamists, and their allied militias, lost the election. The forming of the Libyan army will cause those militias to vanish gradually. The Islamist faction denies the presence of ISIS in Libya and insists that the government has been formed by Qaddafi’s followers.
Forming a national unity government is a nice idea, so long as there is a power that will protect citizens and enforce the laws, enabling the government to work. That power is a state army, which already exists in eastern Libya, but there are diplomats who see only what they want to see. This is our country and we will defend it with all means.
The West started this process in 2011 but you did not finish your assignment. Your countries have a moral responsibility toward the Libyan people to assist in establishing democracy and securing for the nation growth and development again. For this you need to recognize the very important difference between what is happening in the eastern and the western parts of Libya. If you make this distinction, your judgment will change.
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