Tag: Libya
Peace picks, September 9-13
Here are this week’s peace picks, courtesy of newly arrived Middle East Institute assistant Sarah Saleeb. We are still working out some kinks, so some links are missing in this posting. Be sure to register on the website of the sponsoring organization.
1. Pakistan Elections and Regional Stability: How Foreign Assistance Can Help
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Needed: creative diplomats
An attack to punish Syria for its use of chemical weapons is on hold due to British parliament reservations. The American Congress also has reasonable questions it wants answered. The P5 (that’s the veto-wielding members of the UN Security Council, namely US, UK, France, Russia and China) met yesterday and failed to agree to a draft UK resolution authorizing all necessary means. President Obama is hesitating, or at least hoping for better conditions. He still has to present the case for military action to the American people, who haven’t forgotten the Bush Administration claims about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq (and some even remember President Johnson’s Gulf of Tonkin incident). The UN chemical weapons inspectors are scheduled to leave Syria this weekend. If military action is in the cards, the earliest it is likely to happen is next week. The President is supposed to be at the G20 summit in Saint Petersburg September 5/6. It might be the better part of valor to wait until after that.
So there is time for diplomacy. The deal President Obama should be offering to Moscow is this: agree to implement the Geneva June 2012 communique, which calls for Bashar al Asad to hand executive power to a government approved by both the opposition and the regime, and we will desist from a military attack. That would save Russia the embarrassment of another Western military intervention without UN Security Council approval.
Iran, where there is admittedly some concern about the use of chemical weapons, might still prefer a military attack, because it would give its military a good deal of intelligence on current American capabilities. But if Russia pushes Bashar aside, Tehran will want to shift its support to ensure continuation of its alliance with Damascus. More than likely, it will put its chips down on one of the security force commanders, hoping that he can maintain the autocracy even if Bashar is a goner.
The trick is that a credible offer of a political solution can only be made if the threat of military attack is real and imminent. Otherwise Moscow can simply ignore the deal. Nor can the threat of military attack be a one-off, limited strike of the sort President Obama seems to think appropriate. To get Bashar to step aside, or to get Moscow to push him aside, will require a near certainty that failure to do so will lead to a military attack that tilts the battlefield against him and guarantees that his days are numbered. The notion that diplomacy will work without an “existential” threat is delusional. Diplomacy and military strategy have to be fully synchronized.
Won’t a short, focused military attack do the trick? No, it won’t. President Reagan tried that to retaliate against Libya for a terrorist attack on American service people in Germany. It had no serious impact on Qaddafi, except to make him a a bit crazier. Nor did the Clinton-era attack on an Al Qaeda facility in Afghanistan do anything to deter Osama Bin Laden. Pin pricks can be useless at best, counter-productive at worst, if they signal weakness or precipitate escalation. Bashar al Asad may well react to a well-targeted and narrow attack by using more chemical weapons.
The diplomats should focus then on two things:
- Making the military threat as real, broad and open-ended as possible by close consultations with whatever coalition of the willing can be hammered together over the next week;
- Getting Moscow to realize that it stands to lose more by backing Asad than by pushing him aside.
I doubt an effort along these lines will succeed, mainly because of the difficulties in mounting a credible existential threat. But that’s where creative diplomats come in.
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Solid kernels in a not so good idea
My SAIS colleague Ed Joseph and Aaron David Miller earlier this week put forward a proposal for a Union of Arab Democracies that merits examination despite its deep and fatal flaws. There are nuggets therein worth preserving.
The idea in their words is this:
Egypt and its fractious neighbors desperately need a unifying vision that can inculcate respect for democratic norms across glaring differences. Although Arab nations have no interest in joining the European Union or NATO, the Arab world can draw on the model of Eastern European transition, with fledgling Arab democracies devising their own supra-national organization dedicated to advancing democracy. Like the E.U. in its infancy, this Union of Arab Democracies (UAD) could start with limited objectives and evolve toward ambitious goals, including, ultimately, pan-Arab political union.
Waving their magic wand, Ed and Aaron then tell us all the good things that would happen if such an organization were to come into existence, despite the shambolic history of pan-Arab political union proposals.
If Egypt and the other Arab uprising countries were capable of creating such an organization, they wouldn’t need it. The weakness of the proposal is all too apparent when Ed and Aaron get to proposing that Iraq, Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority (known to me as Palestine) would be the leading democracies, with transitioning countries (Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen) and supposedly “liberalizing” countries (Morocco, Jordan and possibly Oman) tagging along. What a democratic club! Several are more likely to find themselves joining an Islamic union than a democratic one.
Nevertheless, there is a core idea here that is important: transitions need a destination. When the Berlin wall fell, the former Soviet satellites of eastern Europe and the Baltic “captive nations” quickly set their aim on meeting European Union and NATO standards. This gave direction and impetus to countries that would otherwise have wandered as aimlessly as the North African revolutions are doing today.
The way to answer the question “transition to what?” is not to have nascent Arab democracies try to figure it out for themselves. They cannot reasonably aim for membership in NATO or the EU, but they should be able to aim at two easier targets: the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe or, as my Turkish colleague Aylin Unver Noi suggests, the Council of Europe.
OSCE comprises 57 states and plays an important role in the Balkans and the more Asian parts of Eurasia. Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia are already among its “cooperating partners.” Several OSCE members are no farther along in democratizing than their Middle Eastern partners. With 47 member states, the Council of Europe regards itself as the continent’s leading human rights organization. It has a human rights court with some real enforcement capacity that could provide minorities in the Middle East with real recourse if their mother countries were to join.
The idea of extending OSCE and the Council of Europe to the southern littoral of the Mediterranean may seem far fetched, but efforts to construct more ad hoc arrangements have not worked well. Neither the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership nor the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative gained much traction before 2011, Aylin says, and their relevance will be further reduced by the Arab uprisings.
Another of the world’s more restrictive clubs, the rich people’s Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) , has opened its doors to newly developed states like Korea and Mexico, much to their benefit and the benefit of the organization. Opening the OSCE and Council of Europe to new Middle Eastern members, who would need to meet clearly defined criteria in order to get in, would be a worthwhile experiment. It would give the Arab uprisings, if they want it, a destination as well as a tough-minded qualification process, which is really what Ed and Aaron were calling for.
So “no” to the Arab Democratic Union. “Yes” to Arab democracy that aims to meet the not too exacting standards of the OSCE and respects human rights as defined by the Council of Europe.
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Bad but not hopeless
News from the Arab uprisings this morning is particularly grim:
- In Egypt, the police and army are attacking pro-Morsi demonstrators, causing what appear to be well over 100 deaths;
- In an unconfirmed report, Italian Catholic priest and opposition enthusiast Paolo Dall’Oglio is said to have been killed by opposition Islamists in Syria;
- The American mission in Yemen remains closed as the US continues its heightened drone war against militants.
Add to these items the Islamist government in Tunisia finding itself unable to protect non-Islamist politicians from assassination and Libya’s continuing difficulty in gaining control over revolutionary militias and you’ve got a pretty ugly picture.
I don’t want to minimize any of this. It is all real and problematic. But it is not catastrophic. Revolutions have their bad moments (and days, months and years). Some of them end badly. There is no guarantee that won’t be the case in the Middle East, with some or all of the uprisings.
Egypt is in the most peril. It has not found a steady course but lurches between extremes: either military-backed secularists or Muslim Brotherhood/Salafist dominance. Co-habitation of the two has proven unworkable. It is hard to picture how today’s crackdown can put things right. The Islamists will find it harder to compromise. Secularists and minorities will fear even more a return of the Brotherhood to power. Read more
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Washington’s fault
Even for someone who served abroad as an American diplomat, the Egyptian penchant for conspiracy theories about Washington’s supposed role is astonishing. So too is the crudeness of Egyptian anti-Americanism. While I was treated to a good deal of poor taste and baseless speculation about American machinations while serving as an American diplomat in Italy and Brazil, the admixture of hope for good relations with the United States was significantly greater there. Egyptians seem genuinely to dislike the US and attribute many of their ills to it.
It is difficult to understand how people as clever as the Egyptians have failed to break the code of American behavior: Washington understands that it has relatively little influence over what happens in Egypt and is prepared to accept whoever comes to power with a modicum of legitimacy and promises to steer the country towards something like a democratic outcome with as little violence as possible. That’s what happened when Mubarak fell, it is what happened when Morsi took over, and it is what happened when the demonstrations and General Sissi pushed him out.
Washington is following the Egyptian lead. If American behavior seems erratic and incomprehensible to Egyptians, that is largely because the revolutionary course the Egyptians have chosen is so unpredictable. The result is that all sides in Egypt are convinced the Americans are arrayed against them. Neither secularists nor Islamists in Egypt seem inclined to look in the mirror to see the origins of what ails their country. Both prefer to blame it all on Washington, which has been less than adroit in countering the vituperation.
This is not to say there is no basis whatsoever in the conspiracy theories. Ambassador Patterson likely did try to get General Sissi to negotiate some sort of deal with the Muslim Brotherhood. Deputy Secretary of State Burns did not spend several days in Cairo recently lounging around the embassy–he surely pushed for Sissi to clarify the future roadmap for preparing a constitution and holding new elections. The Americans will be concerned to see things in Egypt move towards relatively democratic stability, with the state’s monopoly on the legitimate means of violence restored (especially in Sinai). They may make mistakes of judgment about how that would best be accomplished, but to imagine that they want Morsi back in power, or Sissi to continue in power without elections, is just plain wrong.
I don’t begrudge Egypt its enthusiasm for its latest military rock star. General Sissi has clearly tapped some deep vein of political gold in the Egyptian body politic. But we should all recognize this cult of personality for what it is: a budding autocrat whose similarity to Gamal Abdel Nasser should raise eyebrows not only in Washington. My dean Vali Nasr predicts that the Americans will soon be back to a policy of supporting Middle Eastern autocrats against more and less radical Islamists.
I hope not. The Arab uprisings are a tremendous opportunity to encourage greater freedom in a part of the world that has seen little of it. Things are now going sour in Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, and Egypt, not to mention poor Syria. Each circumstance is distinct, but in all of them the genie will be difficult to put back in the bottle. What is needed from the United States is consistent backing for democratic processes, which require relatively stable and orderly environments. The only thing we should want to be blamed for is support to those who seek human dignity and open societies.
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Peace picks July 15-19
A busy midsummer week:
1. Real Politics of Iran: Views from Within, US Institute of Peace, Monday, July 15 / 2:00pm – 4:00pm
Venue: US Institute of Peace
2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, D.C.
Speakers: Fatemeh Haghighatjoo, Kevan Harris, Farzan Sabet, Daniel Brumberg
Iran’s June 14, 2013, presidential election produced a result that surprised many Iran watchers: a first round win for Hassan Rouhani. A long-time regime stalwart who favors a political opening at home and abroad, his election may signal the return of a more contentious politics—one that could limit the growing influence of the security apparatus or create space for a more productive Western-Iranian dialogue. To probe the implications of these changes for Iran’s internal politics and its foreign relations, on July 15 the United States Institute of Peace will host three distinguished Iran analysts, one of which has just returned from Iran. Drawn from the United States Institute of Peace’s (USIP) Internal Iran Study Group, they will highlight a range of dynamics in the universities, opposition, the economy and even the security apparatus that often escape the foreign headlines. Daniel Brumberg, Senior Program Officer on Iran and North Africa at USIP, will chair this timely discussion.
Register for the event here:
http://realpoliticsofiran.eventbrite.com/
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