Tag: Libya
Preventing mass atrocity after Assad
Reuters (http://reut.rs/WMw240) published this piece today:
As the second anniversary of the Syrian uprising approaches, close to 80,000 people have been killed, a million are refugees and several million are displaced. The Syrian army and air force are under severe stress and attacking civilian populations, the revolutionaries are increasingly radicalized in a Sunni Islamist direction and Lebanese Hezbollah as well as Iranian Revolutionary Guards are getting deeply engaged in the fight.
It may seem superfluous to worry about what happens to the Alawite community — the mainstay of Bashar Al Assad’s regime – after he falls. But revenge killing is common after an uprising of this sort, and few regimes born in mass atrocity survive as democracies. A massacre of Alawites could be prelude to state collapse, an extremist regime and regional warfare far worse than the spillover we have seen thus far.
How can mass atrocity in the aftermath of the Assad regime be avoided? Above all, it is Syrians who will need to make sure it does not happen. The Syrian Coalition of Revolutionary and Opposition Forces has already made clear that it intends to construct a multi-sectarian, multi-ethnic and democratic regime post-Assad. What needs to be accomplished to achieve that goal?
A lot. Here are just a few of the options that need to be considered:
- A negotiated end to the regime. Atrocities will be far less likely if there is a clear, well-constructed and well-communicated end to the Assad regime, with a roadmap to a future democratic constitution that will respect minority rights. A chaotic collapse of the regime will make mayhem much more likely, including a possible “stay-behind” insurgency like the one in Iraq after the American invasion.
- International supervision. The roadmap could be implemented with oversight from a “contact group” that includes the main international powers with influence, including neighbors and regional powers. The big issue here is whether Iran is in or out, which depends on Tehran’s attitude toward any negotiated settlement.
- An international intervention force. There will be many armed groups in Syria, however the conflict ends. A strong, legitimate international intervention force of both police and military could separate warring parties, establish a safe and secure environment and protect minorities. The big question is: Who would provide these troops and police? Iraq’s neighbors have all been parties to the conflict. The Arab League is inexperienced at stabilization and peacekeeping. The United States and Europe are trying to stay out.
- New security forces. Assad’s army, police, intelligence and other security forces will be thoroughly discredited once the regime is gone. It will be necessary to reconfigure, retrain and reform the security forces so they can reestablish a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence accepted by both former regime elements and rebels. It was the failure to do this effectively that has made a mess of post-Qaddafi Libya. Training of a small Syrian “stabilization” force could begin even now outside Syria, for deployment into liberated areas.
- Accountability and justice. It is never possible to punish all those who have supported a dictatorial regime, but victims will be looking for satisfaction. This can initially be offered in a well-articulated plan of action for holding a clearly defined and limited number of senior regime figures accountable for abuses, as well as a broader reconciliation effort to give victims an opportunity to voice grievances and seek eventual redress.
- Outreach by the new leaders to communities that have not supported the revolution. Few countries are blessed with a Nelson Mandela, but even lesser figures could try to reassure those who have supported the regime and provide credible guarantees of security. They might even invite in foreign forces to establish a “safe and secure environment” for particular communities at risk.
- Basic human needs. Many Syrians are lacking food, water, sanitation and shelter. The country will need a rapid infusion of vital humanitarian assistance that is distributed fairly and transparently by a duly constituted authority.
- Quick stabilization of the economy. The Syrian economy will be in free fall. The country will be unable to pay its debts and will need relief from international obligations. It may also need a new currency and a credible central bank. It will certainly need jobs, especially for the many youth already unemployed before the war. They will otherwise find employment with militias unlikely to be sensitive to human rights.
- Local community development. Major development projects will have to wait. They will require a well-functioning government and a credible sovereign guarantee to reopen lending by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. A well-targeted reconstruction effort that local communities help plan and monitor, like the successful National Solidarity Program in Afghanistan, would be a good start, provide livelihoods and contribute to mitigating the likelihood of violence.
- Dispute settlement. As people return to their homes, disputes will break out over property, much of which will be badly damaged and destroyed. It is important to establish a relatively quick administrative procedure for settlement of disputes and recovery of private property, in particular real estate.
- Funding for civil society. Syria under Assad lacked the vigorous nongovernmental organizations that provide advocacy, serve as watchdogs and help protect human rights and minorities in open societies. Funding and empowerment of grassroots organizations committed to a democratic outcome and organized across sectarian and ethnic lines, including the revolutionary local administrative councils that have spontaneously appeared in liberated areas, can strengthen social cohesion and prevent violence.
- Safe havens for particular minorities. Odious though it may be on other grounds, temporary separation of ethnic and sectarian groups in the immediate aftermath of violent conflict can help to prevent violence and reduce risks to vulnerable minorities. Many Syrian neighborhoods are more or less segregated. It may be best to keep them that way for a time, but to move once trust is re-established in the direction of much more sectarian and ethnic integration.
Syrians will have to decide for themselves what they want to take advantage of, or not, from this laundry list. They may well also discover some new tricks. But the country will be far better off in the long term if Syrians and internationals start thinking now about what to do to prevent the worst from happening after Assad falls.
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Tunisia: stalled
With no constitution written and no date yet for elections, the political transition in Tunisia is stalled. At SAIS’s Thursday discussion of economic decline and political violence in Tunisia, former governor of the Tunisian Central Bank Mustapha Nabli warned that continued political stagnation will condemn Tunisia to a serious economic crisis.
The post-revolutionary transition has neglected the country’s economy. Inflation reached 6% in 2012, up from 3.5% in 2010. The budget deficit reached 8% of GDP in 2012, up from a mere 3% in 2010. The slow transition has already cost Tunisia at least 200,000 jobs. In the absence of firm political leadership, the indicators will continue in this undesirable direction.
The sharp polarization between Islamists and secularists is stalling the transition and obstructing progress on the economic front. Steve McInerney, executive director of the Project on Middle East Democracy, argued that since coming to power Ennahda has increasingly catered to Islamist radicals while ignoring secularist and Western fears. Party leader Rashid Ghannouci’s high profile 2011 visit to Washington soon after the revolution brought assurances of moderation. But the party’s strategy changed thereafter as the Salafists appear to gain strength. A worrisome video featuring Ghannouchi strategizing with Salafists on how to drive liberals out of positions of power disturbed secularists. Since then events have escalated, culminating in the assassination of secularist opposition leader Chukry Beleid and the subsequent dissolution of the government.
Tunisia has more than political instability and an uncertain economic prospect to worry about. A perfect storm of porous borders, floods of Libyan weapons, Al Qaeda in the Maghreb, and the flow of uprooted militants from France’s Mali intervention increasingly threatens Tunisia’s security. Alexis Arieff, an analyst at Congressional Research Services, pointed to evidence of Tunisia’s role as a transshipment point for weapons, people and militants to the rest of the region. Skirmishes between Tunisian security forces and militants are on the rise. Instances of religious-based Salafist violence are also on the increase.
Nabli claimed that the political stagnation stems from misunderstanding of the October 2011 elections. The elections were meant to establish a constituent assembly, but Ennahda insisted it had a mandate to govern. Until this fundamental issue is sorted out, it will be difficult to address political differences and move on to taking care of the economy.
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Keeping an eye on Asia
Trying to catch up on my Asia reading, as things are heating up there:
- The Japanese scrambled jets last week in response to a Russian violation of airspace over the Kuril Islands.
- China has been pressuring North Korea not to conduct an announced nuclear test.
- Tokyo is complaining that Chinese radar “locked on” to Japanese ships, a step generally associated with initiating an attack, in the East China Sea (where the two countries dispute sovereignty over the Senkaku/Daioyu islands).
The smart money is still betting that China and Japan won’t go to war over uninhabited islands that Japan administers but China claims. There have been recent rumblings of a possible accord between Russia and Japan on the Kurils. It is of course welcome that China should restrain its North Korean friends from defying the UN Security Council again with another nuclear test. It is unclear whether Beijing will succeed.
The US Navy, facing budget and reducing its presence in the Middle East, has found a useful “hegemon” and bully in China. In the mist of preparations for the Quadrennial Defense Review, naval advocates would like to regain at least some of the budget momentum they lost when Mitt Romney–a strong naval advocate–was defeated for the presidency.
But that doesn’t mean the needs are not real. America’s ships are vulnerable, even to Iranian never mind Chinese cruise and other missiles. Washington has a lot of obligations in Asia: to Japan, to Taiwan, the Philippines, to South Korea. It also has some relatively new friends to oblige: Vietnam and Burma in particular. It is not going to be easy to meet all the needs in a severely constrained budget environment.
Those who complain about US inattention to Syria, Libya, Afghanistan and even the Balkans need to remember how many other commitments need to be fulfilled. Asia represents an important slice of the future of world economic growth. It also represents a serious risk of armed conflict on a scale that would have global consequences. We may not all be able to pivot to Asia, but we should keep an eye on it.
And I just realized: I am in Asia today, in Antalya, Turkey. Maybe that’s why my eyes have turned east, though the East I am writing about here lies thousands of miles away. Here’s the scenery from my hotel room:
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A state in search of itself
Laurentina Cizza, the second of my Middle East Institute interns this semester, makes her peacefare.net debut with this piece on Libya:
The environment of near-anarchy in Libya is expected to get worse before it gets better. That was the general conclusion of Thursday evening’s Middle East Policy Forum at George Washington University, “Libya: a state in search of itself,” moderated by Ambassador Edward “Skip” Gnehm.
The Library of Congress’ Chief of the African and Middle Eastern Division, Mary Jane Deeb opened with a theoretical overview of the current situation in Libya. She focused on one question in particular: How do we categorize Libya today? A mere political ouster? A civil war? A proper revolution? She argued for the last: Libya is currently undergoing phase two of Huntington’s conception of the western revolution. With the fall of the Jamahiriya and the emergence of new political actors, Libya has done away with the old political institutions and produced new political actors who promise to build a new order.
She categorized Libya’s current political actors in three, not necessarily mutually exclusive, groups: (largely urban) youth, tribes, and Islamists. She expressed optimism for Libya’s long-term prospects. Young Libyans span across the political spectrum, but they represent the most educated generation in Libyan history (under Qadhafi, Libya boasted some of the highest literacy rates in North Africa). Libya’s current chaos represents a side effect of the new political actors’ struggle for equilibrium. But Deeb also forecasted that the instability would continue. After all, the establishment of any self-respecting political order takes time. Bottom line: from an academic standpoint, Libya is exactly where political scientists expect it to be.
Karim Mezran, a Senior Fellow at Atlantic Council’s Rafiq Hariri Center for the Middle East, opened his commentary with this disclaimer: “Being both Italian and Libyan prevents me from being optimistic.” Having set the tone, he focused on two questions: How was the revolution possible and what are the revolution’s chances today?
Regarding the first question, he distinguished between an official and an unofficial narrative of the revolution. The sardonic unofficial narrative postulates that Western powers hold more of the credit for the success of the Libyan revolution than the Libyan people, and not only for NATO’s role. An intensive four-day Al Jazeera campaign did more to prompt Sarkozy’s condemnation of Qadhafi as a war criminal than a 40-year record of human rights violations. Western powers’ withdrawal of support for Qadhafi did more damage than a protracted struggle between the regime and rag-tag rebels ever could. Case in point: Syria. He also took care to acknowledge that Libya’s revolution was also a civil war. Qadhafi had his supporters, who are now a marginalized portion of the population that is all but twiddling its thumbs as the new government struggles to its feet.
Regarding the prospects of the Libyan revolution, time is of the essence. The government’s inability to ensure security is breeding a climate amenable to militias, terrorist networks and criminal organizations. Mezran described the eastern part of the country, the site of Ambassador Stevens’ death, as “near-anarchy.” The current delay in the constitutional process is countering the progress made by the smooth General National Council elections. As instability continues, political tensions boil and the risk of the constitutional process exploding into violence increases. He offered two solutions:
1) That Libya recognize the importance of Western support, particularly in training of security forces and dealing with the militias;
2) An international agreement or treaty providing security for the southern border, which is porous to terrorist and criminal networks.
While a theory-oriented Deeb focused on the promising long-term, a realist-oriented Mezran focused on the painful short-term. Libya has to get through the latter before it enjoys the former.
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Today’s hearings
Secretary of State Clinton answered questions for umpteen hours today in the House and Senate on the September 11 attack on the U.S. facility in Benghazi. It was not only a waste of time. It will have a negative impact on American diplomacy for months, if not years, to come.
This was not for lack of skill on the Secretary of State’s part. She was sharp, intelligent and trenchant. Blood clots haven’t fogged her thinking at all. Yes, she said, she knew armed militants conducted the attack and said so the next day in public. No, she had not seen the ambassador’s request for better security. Yes, State is resource-constrained in meeting security requirements. No, the Libyan government had not provided the kind of security the facility required, due to incapacity rather than bad intentions.
The questioning was almost entirely hostile from the Republican side of the aisle and almost entirely benign from the Democratic side. I imagine no Republican wants to have it remembered three years from now that he was soft on Hillary Clinton, as she is widely regarded as a strong candidate for the presidency. No Democrat wants to be seen as piling on.
This wouldn’t matter much except that it will spook the Foreign Service. Ambassadors are already far too risk-averse, because that’s what gets you ahead in the State Department. Of the 1.4 million cables the Secretary said she receives each year, hundreds (maybe thousands) will ask for more security. Virtually none will ask for less. This hearing–and of course the incident itself–will reinforce risk aversion.
The problem is that you can’t do diplomacy in dangerous places and also reduce risks to zero. Weak states–Libya is certainly that after the revolution–are risky places. Ambassador Chris Stevens was doing precisely what I would want our ambassadors doing: getting out of the capital, talking with Libyans who knew more than he did, and trying to understand a complicated and difficult situation. He knew the risks and thought them worth taking. That’s what ambassadors get paid the big bucks for.
But hearings like today’s make our diplomats hunker down, sit behind 20-foot high walls with barbed wire on top in Baghdad and travel in armored convoys that frighten the locals and create enormous resentment. You just can’t do the real work of diplomacy that way. To its credit, the Accountability and Review Board report on the Benghazi incident said this up front, but all its recommendations went in the other direction.
We are going to end up with diplomats who spend their careers cooped up in fortresses. That’s not going to help us maintain a leadership role in the world. Risk means something will happen now and again. Someone has to say it out loud: Chris Stevens was unlucky, but he was doing what diplomats should do.
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Not a foreign policy Inaugural, but…
President Obama said little about foreign affairs in his Inauguration speech, but what he said bears more attention than it is getting. After a tribute America’s armed forces (and mention that we are ending a decade of war), he went on to say:
But we are also heirs to those who won the peace and not just the war, who turned sworn enemies into the surest of friends, and we must carry those lessons into this time as well.
We will defend our people and uphold our values through strength of arms and rule of law. We will show the courage to try and resolve our differences with other nations peacefully — not because we are naïve about the dangers we face, but because engagement can more durably lift suspicion and fear. America will remain the anchor of strong alliances in every corner of the globe; and we will renew those institutions that extend our capacity to manage crisis abroad, for no one has a greater stake in a peaceful world than its most powerful nation. We will support democracy from Asia to Africa; from the Americas to the Middle East, because our interests and our conscience compel us to act on behalf of those who long for freedom. And we must be a source of hope to the poor, the sick, the marginalized, the victims of prejudice — not out of mere charity, but because peace in our time requires the constant advance of those principles that our common creed describes: tolerance and opportunity; human dignity and justice.
This is extraordinarily general, or maybe tantalizingly vague. I think I know what it means for Iran: continuation of negotiations, at least for a while. But what does it mean for the brave Syrians who are fighting what is proving to be a frighteningly violent regime? It certainly aligns America with support for the Arab awakenings in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya, but what does it mean for Bahrain? Or Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states? Or, even more importantly, for China, where “those who long for freedom” are increasingly speaking out?
What we know from Obama’s first term is that he balances ideals and reality in each case based on specific circumstances. He is lawyerly in approach, treating each contingency on its merits rather than laying out a more generally applicable “Obama” doctrine (other than support for democracy and concern for the disadvantaged). This is very different from his predecessor, who set out general principles and tried to apply them to specific cases without much regard for the particular circumstances, with disastrous results.
My guess is that circumstances will force the President to say and do a great deal more about Iran, Syria, China and other situations in short order. His reference to American alliances and “those institutions that extend our capacity to manage crisis abroad”–that’s presumably the UN, OSCE, OAS and the rest of the alphabet soup of international organizations, including non-governmental ones–is a clear indication that he will be looking for help from others when he decides to act internationally.
What he did not say–but none of us should forget–is that America’s financial situation and its internal politics will constrain what it can do internationally for at least the next four years. We are broke, as the Republicans like to say. But we’ll have to wait at least for the State of the Union message if not longer to see what the Inaugural message means for resources to support both our military and civilian efforts abroad.
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