Tag: Libya
Ingredients of success
I’m spending the day at the “The Arab Spring: Getting It Right,” the annual conference of the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy in lovely Crystal City. Here are a few highlights.
The first session focused on the ingredients for successful democratic transitions. Here are my quick notes:
Dan Brumberg, Georgetown, in the chair:
- Systemic problems need systemic solutions: if you get rid of torture, you need forensics.
- Need process of consensus and pact-making.
- Religion is an important dimension of identity that needs to be part of that process.
Jason Gluck, USIP: constitution-making
- People need to know why they need a new constitution. What are the core principles they want enshrined there?
- Egypt: battles over timing, constitutional committee reflect lack of answers. Exclusiveness undermines the constitution-writing body.
- Tunisia: using simple majority, not consensus, in committees writing the constitution, with little outreach to civil society beyond Tunis.
- Libya: only four months for constitution-writing, which doesn’t allow deep consideration or public participation. Inclusivity is in doubt.
- Process matters more than constitutional content. Because it makes for legitimacy. Making a constitution is a political, not a legal exercise. It incarnates core values of the state and society.
- Not a drafting exercise but a national dialogue about needs and aspirations.
- Inclusive, participatory, consensual, transparent, deliberative processes are more likely to have good results.
Alfred Stepan, Columbia: transition needs these elements:
- Legitimate constitution written by a representative group.
- A government results from popular vote.
- Powersharing (with military or religious authorities) is not necessary
- The government has to have real authority over policy.
- Civil society more important in deconstructing autocracy than in reconstructing the state, which requires political society and leadership.
- Major transitions (end of WWII, 1989) have required international support, but Arab awakening is getting much less external assistance.
- Brumberg: ironically, opposition consensus building happens more in autocratic society like Tunisia rather than in more open one like Egypt.
Tunisia has been successful because parties have been talking with each other and developing consensus (pact-making) for a long time (since 2003)
Laith Kubba, National Endowment for Democracy: getting it right means avoiding chaos or crisis. Indicators:
- Military “neutralized” and under civilian control: Tunisia OK, Egypt not and militias are the problem in Libya.
- Security apparatus has to shift from protecting regime to protecting state.
- Economic equity has to increase.
- State institutions need to emerge that allow society to be free, including at local level.
- Democratic culture, including associations, free but responsible press.
- New elites emerging in political parties, youth groups, think tanks.
- Education improving.
Big risk: those who reject democratic culture as a foreign import.
Comment from a Tunisian participant, whose name I missed:
- Traditional solidarity was important in Tunisia. Reduced likelihood of revenge.
- So too was role of women.
The second session focused on regional and global impacts:
Radwan Ziadeh, Syrian National Council and Carr Center, Harvard
- Syria is not like Tunisia, Yemen or Libya. It is now more like Bosnia: international community hesitancy, political opposition cannot deliver so Free Syria Army is taking over, regime crimes are systematic.
- Hoping for protection of civilians in a safety zone along Turkish border by an Administration that includes people who made the mistakes in Bosnia.
- Three hundred observers are insufficient.
- Need for military action without UN Security Council approval, but UNGA (137 countries) and Friends of Syria provide cover.
- Everyone looking for U.S. leadership, but Washington is inhibited by domestic considerations, lack of oil interest.
- Arabs lack resources and legitimacy to act.
Brian Grim, Pew Research Center: Religion and the Arab Spring
- Government restrictions on religion are increasing in more countries and those with greater population before Arab spring.
- Problem is especially strong in Middle East and North Africa (MENA), where constitutional guarantees for religious freedom are not strong and apostasy laws are prevalent, enforced both by governments and social hostilities.
- Restrictions on conversion 80% in MENA, where both government violence and social hostilities are prevalent.
Caryle Murphy, Woodrow Wilson Center: A View from the Gulf (especially Saudi Arabia)
- Arab Spring affects Saudi Arabia externally: Egypt, Bahrain, Iraq.
- Saudi effort is to manage and keep it away from the Gulf.
- Foreign policy activism: GCC confederation? First step with Bahrain?
- Riyadh is disappointed in the U.S., lack of confidence in U.S. willingness to intervene.
- Arab Spring also affects Saudi Arabia internally: TV, internet and Twitter have made young Saudis more aware of the rest of the world and want to be more like it. Ditto those studying abroad.
- But impulse is still evolutionary, not revolutionary. Unemployment is the big youth problem. Government is aware but will it move fast enough to accommodate youth demands for jobs and more freedom?
- Society still very conservative, political consciousness very limited, including both secularists and Islamists.
- Petitions for constitutional monarchy, Umma party formation led to government clampdown.
- Eastern Province: Shia very unhappy.
- Religion is a focus of debate, which is important because it is the foundation of legitimacy.
Aylin Unver Noi, Gedik University (Turkey): Regional Alignments
- Ankara has shifted foreign policy towards Middle East.
- Sunni resistance camp emerging, pro-Palestinian, Islamist-led, democratic governments.
- Revolution in Syria would cause it to join this camp, as Jordan might.
- Turkey concerned with Kurdish aspirations, especially PKK activities in Syria.
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Let your people go!
Tonight is the Jewish festival of Passover, when we celebrate liberation. Last year, I called this season the Passover of Arab liberation, but noted the difficulties Syria was facing.
This year we seem to be somewhere in the middle of the ten plagues, with Bashar al Assad not even beginning to think about letting his people go (and in fact inflicting the plagues, which is not something pharaoh did). The mutual ceasefire deadline is set for April 12, provided Damascus pulls back from populated areas and ceases artillery fire on April 10. In the meanwhile, Bashar seems to have intensified the military attacks in an effort to do as much deadly damage as possible to his opposition. While I hope Kofi Annan’s effort is successful, you’d have to be Moses-like in inspiration to bet on it.
We should nevertheless consider the possibilities. If by some fluke the Syrian army really does withdraw from some places, I hope the revolution will tuck away its guns and somehow demonstrate its overwhelming superiority in numbers. It is particularly important that April 12/13 see a massive demonstration of opposition in Damascus and Aleppo, even if that means everyone just staying home in a general strike. It will also be vital that the UN deploy observers quickly, and in far greater numbers than the couple of hundred currently contemplated.
It seems far more likely that Bashar will not withdraw or cease fire. What then? There is really no sign of international will to intervene. Despite ample documentation of artillery attacks on civilian targets as well as helicopter operations, neither the Turks nor the Arab League are preparing serious military action to enforce a no-fly zone or create humanitarian corridors or safe zones. The Syrian security forces are busy mining the borders so that civilians can’t escape. While it seems unlikely that Bashar can prevail 100%, he is well on his way to reducing the opposition to a low-intensity insurgency, with the bulk of the population sullenly resenting but accepting restoration of the dictatorship. At least for a while, it is likely to be significantly more draconian than before the rebellion started.
This is a bad outcome, but I am afraid not the worst. If the fighting continues to escalate and Bashar still survives, the consequences could be catastrophic for the region. The violence might then overflow Syria’s borders and pose serious problems for Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan and maybe even Turkey. If Bashar manages to stay in place, it is vital that the Friends of Syria, that unwieldy conglomeration of more than 80 countries, maintain and tighten its efforts, in particular the sanctions and diplomatic isolation. We see in Burma how strategic patience can win the day.
Many of my friends and colleagues are appalled that nothing more is being done. I can’t describe myself as comfortable with this state of affairs. But it is important to recognize that there are other priorities on earth. The Administration’s first concern has to be Iran. There is no way to get a negotiated solution to its nuclear challenge, or prevent the Israelis from using military means, unless the United States maintains a credible military threat. Entering a war with an uncertain outcome in Syria would not be a smart prelude to dealing with Iran. American resources, though large, are not infinite–we wouldn’t want to run out of cruise missiles or suffer serious aircraft losses in a second priority fight.
There is also a diplomatic factor. The best way to mount a credible threat against Iran is with UN Security Council backing. What are the odds of the Russians conceding that if we go to war with Syria without their cooperation? The odds may not be good in any event, but we need at least a small chance for success.
So I am afraid our Syrian heroes will need to continue their efforts. I still prefer they be nonviolent ones. Nothing that has happened in the last few weeks of violent attacks convinces me that the Free Syria Army will shorten the reign of Bashar al Assad by as much as a single day. It is far more likely that their attacks will frighten large numbers of people who might otherwise have joined nonviolent protests.
I’ll pray for the Syrians at Seder tonight, as I trust many Jews around the world will do. Not because I think praying will do the Syrians any good, but because the parallel between today’s Syrians and our own liberation narrative should inform our sensibilities. The people of Syria are seeking the freedom that Tunisians, Egyptians, Libyans and Yemenis have all started to enjoy, even if they are still at the beginning of their journeys through the wilderness. I hope the Syrians catch up soon.
The most frequent injunction in the Old Testament is to treat a stranger like ourselves:
…you shall love him as yourself, for you were strangers in the land of Egypt… {Leviticus 19:33-34}
Bashar: let your people go!
PS: I missed this Monday, but you shouldn’t:
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Right direction, long road ahead
Libya’s interim prime minister, Abdel-Rahim el Keib, at the Carnegie Endowment this morning laid out a clear and unequivocal vision of a well-governed democracy adhering to the rule of law. El Keib is an electrical engineer who spent decades in the United States before dropping everything to join the revolution in Libya last year. He cited some steps in the right direction that have already been taken:
- The National Transitional Council (NTC), which is now the interim legislative body, has passed the election law and the election commission appointed.
- Elections for a constituent assembly that will prepare the constitution will take place in June.
- An interministerial committee on human rights has been formed to ensure equal treatment under the law and equal opportunity.
- Youth and women will play a strong role in Libya’s future.
- Civil society will help to ensure transparency and accountability.
- Tripoli is to become a Mediterranean financial center.
None of this will be easy, as the Libyan state has to be rebuilt from scratch.
Asked about the NTC chairman’s statement that the first legislation in the new Libya will reintroduce polygamy, the Prime Minister made reference to hypocritical behavior by Westerners (married men with mistresses) and said bluntly that polygamy will not be important in Libya.
Asked about “militias,” he underlined that these were groups that fought for Libya’s freedom. They do not have an ethnic or sectarian basis, he claimed. The government will try to take care of them through a major reintegration project that offers several alternatives: jobs in the Interior or Defense Ministries, or scholarships, loans and other assistance, provided they turn in their arms. He also noted that the celebrations last month of the first anniversary of the revolution were peaceful.
El Keib declared himself in favor of decentralization, citing a law for provinces in preparation in the NTC, central government offices already established in Sebha and Benghazi, location of the managed of the Great Man-Made River in Benghazi, and plans for “cyber” government. He did not comment explicitly on recent political agitation in Benghazi for autonomy.
Noting that Moscow failed to support the revolution, el Keib said Libya will respect contracts with Russian companies and welcome them back, provided there is no corruption involved and no taint of the Qaddafi regime.
On minorities, el Keib underlined the tradition of tolerance in Libyan society and the presence in his cabinet of two women and one Berber. He failed however to respond directly to a question on restoration of Jewish synagogues and cemeteries, noting only that it was important that minorities not have “hidden agendas.” His specific meaning was not clear, but the implication was negative.
Taken to task for failing to communicate the government’s work, el Keib emphasized that it is an interim body that neglected initially to do as much as it should and will now try to correct that mistake. He underlined the government’s commitment to transparency and interest in an upcoming “open government” conference in Brazil.
Despite the occasionally obscure and possibly problematic moment (especially the answers on polygamy and on Jewish property), this is about as good as it gets from leaders in the “Arab spring” countries these days. El Keib is unquestionably pointed in the right direction. But the road to hell is paved with good intentions. The question is whether he can deliver, and in particular whether other forces in Libyan society will allow it.
I’m headed now for another talk on Libya. I’ll supplement this post if there is anything new to be said.
PS: There wasn’t much new in the second, off the record event. The Libyans do not seem to fully understand that their respect for human rights and treatment of minorities, Qaddafites and other at risk populations will be important to how the rest of the world views the results of their revolution. We sent them home with a clear message to that effect.
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A serious military option
Chalk up one more for arming Syria’s rebels and creating safe corridors. To his credit, Roger Cohen also cites the counter-argument:
I hear the outcry already: Arming Assad’s opponents will only exacerbate the fears of Syria’s minorities and unite them, ensure greater bloodshed, and undermine diplomatic efforts now being led by Kofi Annan, a gifted and astute peacemaker. It risks turning a proxy war into a proxy conflagration.
What he does not do is consider a serious military option: decapitating the Syrian regime with a forceful strike against its command and control.
This mystifies me. Safe areas, enclaves, humanitarian corridors–whatever you call them–have consistently and repeatedly failed. They create target-rich environments, which in this case means the Syrian armed forces will attack them vigorously. Nor is arming the Free Syria Army likely to produce a balance of forces, as Cohen suggests. Just ask the Libyans: they’ll tell you they would have lost to Muammar Qaddafi had NATO not intervened from the air.
There is another option: once you’ve taken down the air defenses, a necessary first step no matter what, you can proceed to take down the command, control and communications of the regime. This was what changed the tide of war in Bosnia in the summer of 1995. Specifically, it was when NATO hit the communications nodes of the Bosnian Serb Army that it became incapable of defending the long confrontation line with the Bosnian Army. Something similar happened in the NATO/Yugoslavia war: hitting various security force headquarters in Belgrade and dual-use infrastructure signaled the kind of seriousness that convinced Slobodan Milosevic his regime was in peril. He yielded in Kosovo.
The problem is that you don’t know what will come next. Milosevic survived for more than another year, though he then fell to his own miscalculation in calling elections. There is no guarantee that you’ll get Bashar al Assad in a military attack, and even less certainty about what will happen if you do. He might well survive and would be unlikely to allow any serious electoral competition thereafter. These guys do learn from each other.
So here’s a thought: combine the threat of such a direct attack on the regime with Kofi Annan’s diplomatic efforts, offering Bashar a choice between a punishing attack on his security forces’ command, control and communications and a ceasefire with free access to all areas in Syria for humanitarian relief and international journalists. If he fails to deliver, you’ve still got the trump card in your pocket.
Of course if he calls your bluff, you’ll have to go ahead with the military attack, even without a UN Security Council resolution. A bit of diplomacy might at least generate an Arab League request, but it is hard to picture the Russians coming on board. If they do, well and good–I doubt Bashar survives even 48 hours once Moscow abandons him. If they don’t, you’ve still got to go ahead.
If you are not willing to do that, you are thrown back, as I am, to diplomatic means, wisely discussed this morning by David Ignatius in the Washington Post. Let’s not waste analytical talent and high-priced real estate in America’s leading newspapers on half-hearted military propositions that just won’t work. If you want war, go to war, not to humanitarian corridors.
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A year on in North Africa
I enjoyed a fine event yesterday at an undisclosed location discussing north Africa from the Mediterranean littoral to northern Nigeria. Arab Spring was the overall theme, but with very explicit recognition that it has manifested itself differently in different national contexts. The event was not for attribution, so I can’t offer you the names of the distinguished folks involved, but here is a quick summary:
Tunisia: Still looking like the best of the lot, with a glass half full and continuing to fill. The mostly conscript army refused to fire on civilians, the old order has been willing to yield its positions and there have been Islamist moderates (Ennahda) on the rebel side. There could still be splits that would endanger moderation and the elections may not be held before October 23, as planned. Big issues include whether to have a presidential or a parliamentary constitutional system and whether Islamists will insist on implementing legislation for sharia. This was a political rather a social revolution, but so far a successful one. The U.S. should encourage trade and investment with Tunisia and leave ownership of the revolution with the Tunisians.
Libya: The National Transitional Council has had the advantages of uniting the opposition under reasonably good leadership and with decent planning, but it now faces serious challenges from people who are feeling excluded:
- Youth, who are particularly resentful of demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) plans on which they were not consulted;
- Tribes: some of them resent the failure to investigate the assassination of General Younis;
- Women: they get only lip service;
- Those seeking redress for mistreatment by revolutionary forces, especially the population of Tuarga, a town whose population the Misratans have vengefully displaced.
Power post-war is increasingly coming to depend on weapons, capture of high-value regime personalities, and a claimed role in the fighting, rather than on programmatic proposals for the future. Islam could become a source of division in Libya, but so far there is little debate because most Libyans agree it has a central role in their society. Still, there is a risk that Salafist elements, who have attacked Sufi shrines, may ignite tribal and sectarian tensions.
The NTC has been in a hurry, more concerned with speed than the quality of the transition process. The U.S. should focus not on the constitutional framework per se but on broad principles: participation of women, protection of minorities, and a broadly representative system of governance.
Egypt: Islamists of one sort or another have captured about 75% of the parliament. In Egyptian eyes, they stand for rule of law, an end to corruption, cultural authenticity and an end to foreign interference. For virtually all Egyptians, sharia simply means justice.
The economy is in free fall, with tourism hit hard, currency reserves plummeting, government bonds selling only at high interest rates and credit to business drying up.
The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) wants immunity from prosecution and continued control over large portions of the economy. It is cracking down hard on protests.
So far as U.S. interests are concerned, the picture is mixed. Egypt does not appear to be breeding violent extremists. Anti-Americanism is more overt, but military to military cooperation is so far not much affected. Egypt will not support U.S. military action as readily as it did at times in the past, but a U.S. aid cutoff seems unlikely.
On Israel, Egyptians are concerned with the below market sale of their natural gas but they are unlikely to support abrogation of the Camp David peace. They will be more vocal and critical of U.S. support for Israeli settlements, attacks on Gaza and a possible attack on Iran.
The U.S. will do well to accept the election results, not ask the Egyptians to like Israelis, and practice strategic patience. The responsibilities of power will moderate Islamist forces in Egypt and restore balance to its relationship with Israel.
Morocco: The King has successfully taken the initiative and coopted the push for a constitutional monarchy, preserving his absolute powers behind the smokescreen of the new constitution he proposed. Social protests are continuing, but there is no serious political challenge to the monarchy. The legislature is weak. Security is a problem, one the relatively weak state may not be able to manage effectively. An uprising is not impossible but unlikely due the regime’s skillful maneuvers and the lack of an effective political opposition.
Algeria: There are lots of reasons why there should be a revolution: mass discontent, especially among the young and more educated, deep and wide corruption, lack of transparency and the state’s contempt for its citizens, widespread disillusion with the political system, social inequities, dependence on oil and gas, the demonstration effect of other north African rebellions, wide availability of social media.
But it isn’t happening. Algeria in many respects already has a democratic political culture, with frequent strikes and relative media freedom. It has used its oil and gas revenue effectively to appease the population, which disdains the state but shows little sign of despising the political leadership, in particular President Bouteflika. The military coup and civil war of the early 1990s have left many Algerians unwilling to risk a challenge to the established order.
Still, something might happen. A presidential succession looms, as do legislative elections (May 10). The political leadership is aging and it is not clear who will inherit.
The Sahel: The presentations focused on particular issues. First was Al Qaeda in the Maghreb, the Algerian terrorist group that has been largely defeated inside Algeria and has now turned to crime: smuggling, human trafficking, drug trade, kidnapping. It is making lots of money. The second was northern Nigeria, where Boko Haram is tying down the Nigerian security forces. That, the situation in the Delta and contestation between Christians and Muslims in central Nigeria are making it difficult for the Nigerians to play a major role in meeting the Sahelian challenge.
I focused on possible approaches to security in the Sahel, based on experience elsewhere. My personal conclusion is that the Sahel today does not today present a serious security challenge to the United States, but some preventive effort there–especially regional cooperation on community-level development, tracking terrorist financing and border controls–would be appropriate.
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Arab world: positive balance, still teetering
I need a scorecard to keep track of political change in the Arab world, so here it is:
- Egypt: New Egyptian parliament led by Muslim Brotherhood met for the first time yesterday. It needs to choose a commission to write the new constitution and call elections for president in June. Other powers are uncertain. Supreme Council of the Armed Forces still running things and holding on to perks and power.
- Yemen: President Saleh has left for the U.S. for medical treatment. I still find it incredible he would come here given the risks of a court deciding to hold him accountable for crimes for which he has immunity in Yemen. A single-candidate “election” February 22 is scheduled to elevate his vice president to the presidency. It is unclear to me what good this will do. Protests continue, his relatives cling to power and dissident parts of the armed forces control parts of the capital.
- Libya: Demonstrators in Benghazi Sunday attacked National Transitional Council offices in a protest over lack of transparency in deciding the electoral law to be used in May elections and in disbursing money. That’s the good news. Occasional strife among the armed militias is the bad news.
- Syria: The Arab League, much criticized because its human rights observers have failed to stop the violence, proposed a serious transition plan, which the Syrian National Council accepted and the Assad regime rejected. The Russians are saying that their patience has run out. A strong UN Security Council resolution would be a fine way to show that they mean what they say.
- Saudi Arabia: The Kingdom is cracking down hard on demonstrations in the majority Shia, oil-producing east.
- Bahrain: Despite the Bassiouni report‘s frankness about human rights abuses during last year’s repression of protests, the monarchy shows no sign of letting up and the Americans, anxious to keep the Fifth Fleet there, aren’t complaining too loudly.
- Morocco, Algeria, Jordan: All attempting various degrees of reform to forestall revolution. Largely succeeding so far. In forestalling that is. Reforms are modest.
So what once looked like a wave of Arab spring protest has now broken into rivulets moving in many different directions as they hit harder and softer obstacles. A few regimes are gone, but most are still holding on, in some cases just barely. Tunisia is the great success story, so far.
There are quite a few shoes that haven’t dropped yet, but likely will: Egypt’s economy is devastated, shoulder launched antiaircraft missiles are circulating in and beyond Libya, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula may well expand further in Yemen, sectarian war threatens in Syria. The new regimes, especially in Egypt, look likely to be tougher-minded towards Israel, even if domestic issues predominate in the short term. 2012 is likely to be even more challenging than 2011.
Still: the overall direction is clear enough. There will likely be more freedom of speech and expression in much of the Arab world once this tide goes out. There will also be more Islamists in power and fewer supposedly secular and pro-Western autocrats. There will likely be more political competition, though how long it will be permitted to last is uncertain. It is also unclear how much governance will improve, in particular whether accountability and transparency will triumph over cronyism and corruption, and whether human rights–especially minority rights–will be respected. The balance for the year is positive, but there are still a lot of things to sort out.
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