Tag: Libya
Burma gets real, but how real?
There can be no doubting the significance of Burma’s moves in the past day or two: a massive release of amnestied political prisoners and a ceasefire with Karen ethnic insurgents. There have already been some smaller prisoner releases and cancellation of a Chinese-built dam, which was the subject of local protests. Elections for a limited number of parliamentary seats are scheduled for April 1. Aung San Suu Kyi, a political prisoner for decades, has agreed that her political party will participate.
A military junta has run Burma for almost 50 years. It was only in March that the junta turned over some authority to a “civilian” government. The current president, Thein Sein, spent his entire career embedded in the autocratic regime, mainly as a military officer. Among other distinctions, he ran the much criticized relief effort after Cyclone Nargis in 2008.
Thein Sein seems to have the backing of the generals for a dramatic shift in Burma’s course, one that has already elicited from the United States a Secretary of State visit and an intention to name an ambassador. There has been none in Burma since 1990, in protest of military regime policies, but the embassy remains open under a Chargé d’Affaires.
I am not a great believer in brilliant diplomatic strokes. Most seem that way only in retrospect. Diplomacy is usually a long, hard slog. When the full story is told, this one too may turn out to be more Sisyphean than Herculean.
But I still can’t help but note the incredible difference with what is going on today in Syria or Yemen (and what went on previously in Libya). The Burmese autocratic leadership, after many years of using brutal repression, has decided to go in a different direction. The Middle East would look very different today if Bashar al Assad and Ali Abdullah Saleh had decided likewise before it was too late. Burma has at least an opportunity now to go down the well-trodden Asian road to a more open political system. South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Indonesia and others have achieved democratic reform and improved economic prosperity without violent revolution.
Still, it is not clear how far the Burmese generals intend things to go. Are they opening up the system in a way that will lead to their own loss of power? Or is this an effort to open a restricted space for civilian political competition and governance, with the generals keeping at least control of security and foreign policy? How will they react to efforts to establish accountability for past abuses of human rights? What if it proves difficult to extend the ceasefire with the Karen and other ethnic groups into political settlements? Some of the political prisoners released yesterday had been released years ago, only to be re-arrested. Could it happen again?
What is happening in Burma is real, but just how real is not yet clear.
This week’s “peace picks”
1. International Responsibility After Libya, January 9, 10 -11:30 AM, Brookings Institution
The question of international responsibility for protecting civilians at risk has long been a topic of heated debate within the global community. From the protection of civilians in peacekeeping mandates to the principle of “responsibility to protect,” the international community has grappled with the question of its role in protecting people when their governments are unable or unwilling to do so. The NATO-led operation to prevent Muammar Qaddafi’s forces from inflicting mass atrocities on Libyan civilians was the first United Nations-authorized military intervention which explicitly invoked the “responsibility to protect” principle as grounds for action.
The Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement will host a discussion on what the Libyan intervention means for future international efforts to protect civilians. Panelists include Edward Luck, the United Nations special advisor on the responsibility to protect; Brookings Nonresident Senior Fellow Richard Williamson; Jared Genser, an international human rights lawyer; and Irwin Cotler, a Canadian member of Parliament and expert on human rights law. Genser and Cotler are co-editors of The Responsibility to Protect: The Promise of Stopping Mass Atrocities in Our Times (Oxford University Press, 2011). Senior Fellow Elizabeth Ferris, co-director of the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement, will provide introductory remarks and moderate the discussion.
2. Cooperation from Strength: The United States, China and the South China Sea, January 10, 9 – 11:30 am, Center for New American Security
Grand Ballroom
1401 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20004
American interests are increasingly at risk in the South China Sea. The geostrategic significance of the South China Sea is difficult to overstate – the United States and countries throughout the region have a deep interest in sea lines of communication that remain open to all, both for commerce and for peaceful military activity. Yet China continues to challenge that openness through its economic and military rise and through concerns about its unwillingness to uphold existing legal norms.
The Center for a New American Security (CNAS) will release the report Cooperation from Strength: The United States, China and the South China Sea, which examines the future of U.S. strategy in the South China Sea and the impact of territorial disputes on the maritime commons. The event will feature a keynote address by Admiral Jonathan Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations, followed by a discussion with a distinguished panel of experts chaired by Richard Danzig, former Secretary of the U.S. Navy, and including Ambassador Chan Heng Chee, Ambassador of the Republic of Singapore to the United States, and report co-authors Patrick Cronin, Senior Advisor and Senior Director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program and Robert D. Kaplan, Senior Fellow, both of the Center for a New American Security. RSVP here or call (202) 457-9427.
Copies of Cooperation from Strength: The United States, China and the South China Sea will be available at the event.
3. Reframing U.S. Strategy in a Turbulent World: American Spring? January 11, 12:15 – 1:45 pm
The New America Foundation’s American Strategy Program, in association with Democracy: A Journal of Ideas, cordially invites you to join a brown bag lunch U.S. Grand Strategy discussion.
Participants
Featured Speakers
Charles Kupchan
Professor of International Affairs, Georgetown University
Whitney Shepardson Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations
Rosa Brooks
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center
Bernard Schwartz Senior Fellow, New America Foundation
The Hon. Tom Perriello
Former Member, U.S. House of Representatives
CEO, Center for American Progress Action Fund
Bruce W. Jentleson
Professor, Sanford School of Public Policy, Duke University
Co-Author, The End of Arrogance: America in the Global Competition of Ideas
Moderator
Michael Tomasky
Editor, Democracy: A Journal of Ideas
Special Correspondent, Newsweek/The Daily Beast
Opening Comments
Steve Clemons
Washington Editor-at-Large, The Atlantic
Senior Fellow & Founder, American Strategy Program, New America Foundation
4. Democracy Promotion Under Obama: Revitalization or Retreat? January 12, 12:15-1:45 pm, Carnegie Endowment
Register to attend
Despite their initial inclination to lower the profile of U.S. democracy promotion, President Obama and his foreign policy team have had to confront a series of urgent, visible cases, from political upheaval in multiple Arab countries and unexpected events in Russia to thwarted elections in Côte d’Ivoire and beyond. Has the Obama administration succeeded in crafting a line that effectively balances U.S. interests and ideals? Or have they—as some critics charge—pulled back too far in supporting democracy abroad?
The discussion marks the launch of a new report by Thomas Carothers, Democracy Promotion under Obama: Revitalization or Retreat? Copies of the report will be available at the event.
Libya on track, but delay may be wise
Geoffrey Curfman reports, from the Carnegie Endowment yesterday:
Ali Tarhouni, former finance and oil minister in the National Transitional Council (NTC) and briefly prime minister, gave an upbeat rendering of current and prospective circumstances in Libya at the Carnegie Endowment yesterday. He was optimistic that widespread turmoil seen in other parts of the Arab world would not afflict Libya, but concerned about whether transition to a democratic regime could be accomplished within the established timeframe.
Though remarkably stable for a grassroots movement lacking fundamental sources of cohesion other than ousting an autocrat, Libya’s revolution still faces challenges. Armed militias are hesitant to relinquish their weapons. Most want to disarm, but are worried others will renege. Foggy prospects for integration into a national army and the benefits that would accrue therefrom only increase their reluctance.
Political prospects are also uncertain. Tarhouni hopes a coalition embracing centrist principles will form. Otherwise, the country could splinter or fall to the Muslim Brotherhood, by Tarhouni’s reckoning the only organized political entity in Libya today. To level the playing field, the NTC has considered allocating funds to emerging civic organizations and political parties. But the question of who receives limited financial resources, a point of contention even in a thriving democracy, is especially controversial given the absence of a legitimate legislature in Libya.
Tarhouni is nevertheless optimistic. Fragmentation along tribal lines is a figment of Western imaginations. Tribal divisions exist, but inter-tribal marriages have blurred many of the lines that may have prevailed in the past. Sectarianism is far less evident in Libya than, say, Iraq or Saudi Arabia. A Sunni by birth, Tarhouni points out that his own name, Ali, is one of the most popular in Libya and is traditionally Shi’a. Islam plays a more moderate role than elsewhere in the Arab world. Individual relations with God are emphasized above interactions between the state and religion. For these reasons, a precipitous decline into civil war, which may occur in Syria, Iraq and even in Egypt, is less likely in Libya.
Libya is a wealthy country. Unlike Egypt, which has been forced to borrow heavily from domestic banks and foreign markets, Libya’s oil revenues can finance the bulk of government services rendered to its small population. Wealth, however, does not guarantee societal prosperity. Resources are still somewhat frozen given the inertia of transitional politics. State domination of the economy under Qaddafi all but eliminated a once vibrant private sector. What remains survived on corruption, now woven into Libya’s cultural fiber.
The NTC has worked to lay the foundation for transparency, which Tarhouni sees as an important prerequisite of free markets in Libya. Laws protecting property rights and requiring the publication of all oil contracts will be crucial. Just as corruption became a cultural phenomenon over time, so too will transparency emerge gradually.
Forming an inclusive coalition is a priority, but who is included and how disparate actors might be brought together is still an open question. This much is clear: in five months, 200 representatives will be elected to draft a constitution, which will then be revised based on recommendations from the NTC. Once the NTC approves a draft supported by an up-or-down vote taken in the drafting body, the constitution will be put to a referendum before being ratified, thereafter providing the framework for future political activity. It is important for this process to occur in a timely manner, since only then can the economic activity required to restore normality in Libya ensue.
But more important than the speed of state formation are the underlying politics. Whether Libya’s new government is sustainable will depend on its legitimacy in the eyes of the people, which itself will be a product of the extent to which society is involved in the formation of the new state. State formation cannot be an exercise restricted to elites and intellectuals, even if they play a strong leadership role. This is especially true given the success Qaddafi enjoyed in driving many elites out of the country during his reign, thereby removing them from day-to-day life in Libya. Elites must interact with society and account for its various preferences, which will take time to develop.
For a country that has been systematically de-politicized over the last forty years, the current timeframe might be too hasty. The unavailability of public funding to stimulate civil society reinforces the need to allow time for an organic process to develop. A democratic government can invite the activities characteristic of democratic politics, such as the formation of civic organizations, special interest groups, and political parties. But this only occurs if societal groups buy into the governmental arrangement in the first place. If not, they’ll work outside the system and undermine it.
What happens in the interim is more important than the amount of time elapsed. In Tunisia, the elected assembly is now drafting a “mini-constitution,” which includes legislation governing institutional procedures that will apply until a permanent constitution is ratified. This “low stakes” effort allows different actors to enter the political fray and influence negotiations without immediately cementing a permanent order.
Political unraveling in Iraq is providing a stark example of the dangers attached to premature political settlements. Libya would be wise not to repeat these mistakes.
Ten places ICG neglects
I don’t entirely agree with ICG’s “Next Year’s Wars,” their choice of conflicts is idiosyncratic, and they don’t really predict anything, but it is hard to compete with an organization that has smart people on the ground in difficult places. I’ll focus on 10 places they don’t mention:
1. Russia: Putin doesn’t make it over 50% in the March 4 election but wins the second round. Demonstrations continue but he resists new parliamentary polls. Weakened, Putin lashes out at his opposition and makes things worse. Who knows where this ends, but it will probably not be in 2012.
2. Saudi Arabia: Crown Prince Nayef succeeds to the throne and tries to roll back King Abdullah’s modest reforms. Demonstrations break out but are brutally repressed. Oil prices, already high due to Iran’s threats to the strait of Hormuz, skyrocket.
3. Iraq: The Sadr bloc’s call for new elections in Iraq is echoed by the Kurds and eventually Iraqiyya. Maliki tries to avoid it, but he eventually falls to a vote of no confidence in parliament and elections are held towards the end of the year. I’m not going to predict the outcome.
4. Egypt: The constitutional process is difficult and delayed, but presidential elections are held in the fall (postponed from June). Secularist candidates split their constituency, the Muslim Brotherhood blows its lead by pressing social conservatism and Abdel Fotouh, a relatively moderate Islamist, wins.
5. Libya: Continues to implement its established roadmap, elects the “National Public Conference,” prepares a constitution and succeeds in disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating most militias.
6. Bahrain: The Americans continue to support the regime. Iran, stung by tightened sanctions, sponsors demonstrations against the Fifth Fleet.
7. Sudan: War, between north and south. South wins, takes back Abyei and part of South Kordofan. President Bashir is shipped off to The Hague by his generals.
8. Zimbabwe: Mugabe dies, his loyalists hang on but can’t manage the economic collapse. The opposition takes over.
9. Balkans: Serbia gets candidacy status for the EU but that fails to save President Tadic’s Democratic Party from a parliamentary election defeat. Kosovo meets all the requirements but continues to be denied the European Union visa waiver. Bosnia gets a new government but no constitutional reform.
10. United States: Republicans nominate Mitt Romney. Economy continues slow recovery. Barack Obama is reelected, by a smaller margin than in 2008. Al Qaeda succeeds post-election in mounting a non-devastating suicide bombing.
And for extra measure:
11. China: Big real estate crash late in the year cripples Chinese banks and causes bigger problems for the world economy than the euro, which muddles through.
12. Israel/Palestine: Big but largely nonviolent demonstrations on the West Bank. Israelis say “genug ist genug” and unilaterally withdraw from Palestinian population centers.
That should give me something to write about a year from now! None of it should be mistaken for advocacy, and a good bit of it is based on feel rather than analysis.
I reviewed last year’s predictions yesterday.
Accountability is not only for the bad guys
A Libyan e-penpal writes
As you know the Russians proposed two days ago a project at the U.N. to investigate on the Libyan victims committed by NATO according to Russia. We as Libyans are proud of the involvement of NATO and the United States who freed us with our Libyan fighters from the deposed dictator “Gaddafi”. Even if there were casualties, we as Libyans are confident that it is by pure mistake or by premeditation of the dictator’ forces, who put weapons and artilleries in civilian homes. Everyone in Libya and in the entire world knows the attitude of the Russians when the revolt against “Gaddafi” began February 17, 2011. What we can say is the total hypocrisy of the Russians. Once again, we thanks the U.S.A. and NATO.
I am grateful for the confidence this Libyan and many others place in NATO and the U.S. During my visit to Libya in September I was often stopped on the street to be told how much the intervention was appreciated. Certainly the Russians are less interested in getting to the facts of the matter and more interested in embarrassing NATO.
But I have to confess that I would like to see NATO do its own unclassified after action assessment of civilian damage, cooperatively with the new Libyan authorities. Whether or not we ever conduct an operation exactly like this one again, doing a serious assessment would provide vital information for protection of civilians in the future.
So far, NATO has apparently left the investigating to nongovernmental organizations and the press. They do an admirable job, but what they cannot do is figure out how to decrease harm to civilians in future operations. I have no doubt but that NATO intends to do that–there is just no mileage in killing civilians for the Alliance–but it also has to take the trouble to determine exactly how mistakes occur in order to correct them.
If NATO continues to resist a public inquiry, it will feed the Russian propaganda mill. Better to sit down with the Libyan authorities, the NGOs and the New York Times to figure out how a serious investigation can be conducted. Then go do it. Anyone who claims undertake military action as part of the “responsibility to protect” should be willing to do that much. And the present Libyan authorities, who no doubt fear that such an investigation will extend to the behavior of some of the anti-regime rebels, need to begin to assemble the facts that will eventually be needed to sort out who did what to whom.
Accountability cannot be limited to the bad guys.
What threatens the United States?
The Council on Foreign Relations published its Preventive Priorities Survey for 2012 last week. What does it tell us about the threats the United States faces in this second decade of the 21st century?
Looking at the ten Tier 1 contingencies “that directly threaten the U.S. homeland, are likely to trigger U.S. military involvement because of treaty commitments, or threaten the supplies of critical U.S. strategic resources,” only three are defined as military threats:
- a major military incident with China involving U.S. or allied forces
- an Iranian nuclear crisis (e.g., surprise advances in nuclear weapons/delivery capability, Israeli response)
- a U.S.-Pakistan military confrontation, triggered by a terror attack or U.S. counterterror operations
Two others might also involve a military threat, though the first is more likely from a terrorist source:
- a mass casualty attack on the U.S. homeland or on a treaty ally
- a severe North Korean crisis (e.g., armed provocations, internal political instability, advances in nuclear weapons/ICBM capability)
The remaining five involve mainly non-military contingencies:
- a highly disruptive cyberattack on U.S. critical infrastructure (e.g., telecommunications, electrical power, gas and oil, water supply, banking and finance, transportation, and emergency services)
- a significant increase in drug trafficking violence in Mexico that spills over into the United States
- severe internal instability in Pakistan, triggered by a civil-military crisis or terror attacks
- political instability in Saudi Arabia that endangers global oil supplies
- intensification of the European sovereign debt crisis that leads to the collapse of the euro, triggering a double-dip U.S. recession and further limiting budgetary resources
Five of the Tier 2 contingencies “that affect countries of strategic importance to the United States but that do not involve a mutual-defense treaty commitment” are also at least partly military in character, though they don’t necessarily involve U.S. forces:
- a severe Indo-Pak crisis that carries risk of military escalation, triggered by major terror attack
- rising tension/naval incident in the eastern Mediterranean Sea between Turkey and Israel
- a major erosion of security and governance gains in Afghanistan with intensification of insurgency or terror attacks
- a South China Sea armed confrontation over competing territorial claims
- a mass casualty attack on Israel
But Tier 2 also involves predominantly non-military threats to U.S. interests, albeit with potential for military consequences:
- political instability in Egypt with wider regional implications
- an outbreak of widespread civil violence in Syria, with potential outside intervention
- an outbreak of widespread civil violence in Yemen
- rising sectarian tensions and renewed violence in Iraq
- growing instability in Bahrain that spurs further Saudi and/or Iranian military action
Likewise Tier 3 contingencies “that could have severe/widespread humanitarian consequences but in countries of limited strategic importance to the United States” include military threats to U.S. interests:
- military conflict between Sudan and South Sudan
- increased conflict in Somalia, with continued outside intervention
- renewed military conflict between Russia and Georgia
- an outbreak of military conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, possibly over Nagorno Karabakh
And some non-military threats:
- heightened political instability and sectarian violence in Nigeria
- political instability in Venezuela surrounding the October 2012 elections or post-Chavez succession
- political instability in Kenya surrounding the August 2012 elections
- an intensification of political instability and violence in Libya
- violent election-related instability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
- political instability/resurgent ethnic violence in Kyrgyzstan
I don’t mean to suggest in any way that the military is irrelevant to these “non-military” threats. But it is not the only tool needed to meet these contingencies, or even to meet the military ones. And if you begin thinking about preventive action, which is what the CFR unit that publishes this material does, there are clearly major non-military dimensions to what is needed to meet even the threats that take primarily military form.
And for those who read this blog because it publishes sometimes on the Balkans, please note: the region are nowhere to be seen on this list of 30 priorities for the United States.