Tag: Libya
There are worse fates
The annual EU Forum, a confab sponsored by the Paris-based European Union Institute for Strategic Studies and SAIS’s Center for Transatlantic Relations, convened Thursday and Friday in Washington to focus American and European luminaries on the thing we all call the Arab Spring, even though we know it started last winter, varies from country to country and may not have results as upbeat as the appellation implies. Almost entirely missing from the day and a half conference were Arab voices. This was an opportunity for the “the West” to put its heads together, not for the revolutionaries or the oppressive regimes to offer their narrative.
They were nevertheless much present in the minds of the participants, who leaned towards enthusiasm for the values of the protesters, as well as their energy and determination, while worrying about the impact on Western interests. The three big areas of worry arise from
- the Islamists: what do they really mean by sharia law? will they really play fair in democracy?
- increased Arab support for the Palestinians: will it make the Israel/Palestine equation even more difficult to solve?
- sectarianism (will it lead to civil wars and possible spillover to other countries, especially in Syria, Lebanon and Yemen?
Underlying all was a sense that the West has precious few resources with which to respond effectively to the revolutions in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, to the continuing repression in Syria and Yemen, or to the reforms in Jordan and Morocco, never mind the still solid autocratic regimes in the Gulf or the fragmented polity in Palestine. No one seemed to feel Western credibility or influence was strong, especially in light of the long-standing support (and arms) both Europe and the U.S. had given to Arab autocracies in the past (and continue to provide to Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and others even now). And everyone was aware that the Chinese, Turks, Brazilians, Indians and other emerging powers will play increasing roles in the Middle East, offering contracts and aid on terms far less complex and burdensome than those of the West.
The Europeans nevertheless came with a strong sense that the Middle East is their “southern neighborhood” and they need to up their game in response to changes that will affect their interests directly, whether through immigration, economic interdependence, oil and gas supplies, contracts, investment and myriad other ties. Precisely what they are going to do about it was not clear, and there was a strong sense that European policy on the Arab Spring has been re-nationalized. The British and French in particular are carving out their own distinct approaches, taking advantage of their forward role in the NATO military action against Qaddafi, while other countries are lagging and the EU itself is still contemplating the interior walls of the Berlaymont.
The Americans would like to focus more on Asia, not only Afghanistan/Pakistan but also China and North Korea as threats to national security. It was clear to all that Europe would not share this Asian interest to the same degree, but yesterday’s talk of Chinese financing to back the euro might change a few minds on that score. The problem for the Americans is that the Asian challenge requires a very different set of policy instruments from the Arab Spring, which apart from Egypt and Yemen Washington might rather leave primarily to the Europeans (no one of course says this quite so bluntly, but if you follow the money that is what they mean). Everyone expects, though, that NATO will remain somehow important and in the end the only real military instrument capable of effective power projection available to the Europeans.
There were lots of other points made. Trade and investment are far more important than aid. We need to be talking not only with secular women but also with Islamist women. Liberal economic reform, associated in Egypt and other countries with the old regimes, is in trouble, at least for the moment. Civil society in the Arab Spring countries needs Western support, but it should not be done through governmental channels but rather by nongovernmental organizations like the American National Endowment for Democracy (and the talked about European Endowment for Democracy). Western conditionality should focus on transparency and accountability rather than specific policy prescriptions.
I could go on, but I trust the sponsors will be doing a far better job of writing up in due course, and tweets are available from EUISS for those really interested. Bottom line: the West is fading even as its values spread. There are worse fates.
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Washington Journal today
I did C Span’s Washington Journal this morning. They don’t seem to allow embedding, so you’ll have to go to their website to watch. We dealt with Libya, Tunisia, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Also Condi Rice. Don’t miss it!
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The witch is dead
Reuters published this piece today, under the heading “Libya’s Democracy Has a Real Chance”:
Libyans will be getting up late tomorrow morning, having enjoyed a spectacular celebration tonight. “The Wizard of Oz” comes to mind: “The witch is dead, the wicked witch is dead!”
Now begins the hard work of building a more open and democratic society with some distinct advantages, and Libya has vast resources—not only the oil and gas in the ground, but also cash in foreign bank accounts. Qaddafi’s ironic legacy is that his ill-gotten gains will fund Libya’s reconstruction.
The population is small (about 6.5 million) and more or less homogenous. There are tribal and geographic distinctions, there are Berbers as well as Arabs, there are blacker people and whiter people and there are rich and poor. But none of these differences has yet emerged as a source of widespread violence.
All the Libyans I talked with during a visit to Benghazi and Tripoli last month showed confidence in the National Transitional Council (NTC), which has drawn a roadmap for preparation of a constitution and elections that is widely accepted as reasonable and legitimate. Much criticized by the Western press for bungling a few public announcements, the NTC has managed to continue paying social security benefits and subsidizing bread. In Benghazi and Tripoli, the water and electricity are flowing, markets are open and well stocked, police are on the street and at least some of the garbage is being collected. For most Libyans, that counts for a lot more than whether an announcement of Saif al Islam’s capture was true or not.
Most of Libya was rid of Qaddafi regime more than a month ago. The main sources of friction so far have been two: fighters, mainly from the Nafusa Mountains in the west, who have not wanted to leave Tripoli; and Islamists who seem ready to push for a less secular society than many Libyans would like. Islam is already pervasive in Libya—most women cover their hair, alcohol is prohibited (and not generally available), mosques are ubiquitous and, I am told, well attended. Libya’s Muslim Brotherhood is relatively moderate, as are its secularists.
But there will have to be political differentiation: left and right, Islamists and secularists will begin soon to form political parties. That process will not be an easy or smooth one for people with no democratic experience and a lot of guns, including surface to air missiles looted from Qaddafi’s armories. There is a real risk of revenge killing by militias and of insurgency by Qaddafi loyalists.
But Libya has better prospects than much larger and poorer Egypt, where the protesters handed power to a military that is now reluctant to surrender it. Nothing is guaranteed, but a democratic Libya that enjoys good relations with Europe and the United States is a real possibility.
PS: The details of how Qaddafi came to his end are still unclear, but disturbing. There are videos circulating on the internet that show mistreatment, even cruelty. He was evil, but that does not justify evil treatment. Libyans need to demonstrate much greater discipline and restraint if they want to improve their chances of installing a real democracy.
PPS: NPR is reporting that burial has been delayed to allow the International Criminal Court to investigate the circumstances of Qaddafi’s death. That sounds like a good idea to me, though I wouldn’t bet on the odds of a prosecution.
PPPS: Qaddafi’s motorcade, in an AP video:
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There are still things to do about Syria
I’m an enthusiast, as most Americans I know are, for our ambassador in Damascus, Robert Ford, so here is his Skype performance with Andrew Tabler yesterday at The Washington Institute:
TWI is good about writing up its events quickly, so I won’t attempt that. Just a few high points:
- There is a lot of chatter about revolutionary violence, which inevitably will lead to more regime violence, alignment of minorities with the regime and ultimately sectarian conflict;
- The newly established Syrian National Council (SNC) needs to develop a serious program for how it will govern that promises protection for minorities, establishes broad legitimacy within Syria and attracts international support;
- Concerted multilateral pressure targeting regime individuals, the central bank, the state-owned Commercial Bank and oil sales will hamstring the regime and weaken the allegiance of both the merchant class and some military elements to the regime;
- Regional pressure and openness to refugees, especially from Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq, can also help.
While Russia and China blocked a UN Security Council resolution, they are now urging reforms and might be convinced to go along with international monitors focused on establishing the facts of what is going on. If Bashar al Assad then refuses them, it will reflect badly on him.
Policy conclusions:
- Discourage violence, help the opposition with the tactics of nonviolent civil resistance, including general strikes;
- Help the SNC develop its governance program, with ownership clearly staying with the Syrians;
- Tighten up sanctions;
- Form a regional Friends of Syria including neighboring countries;
- Talk with the Russians and Chinese about international monitors with a UN mandate.
PS: Some courageous Syrians, said to be demonstrating Friday in Damascus:
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The limits of military power
Maybe it’s because I’ve been reading Joe Nye’s The Future of Power, but every event I’ve been to lately around DC has reminded me of the limits of military power in achieving U.S. national security objectives. It is certainly not lack of admiration for the prowess of the American military–they are fantastically good at not only the military tasks that are their bread and butter, but also at the many other tasks presidents toss their way. And if you haven’t had the privilege of hearing David Petraeus or James Stavridis talk, you’ve missed some first class intellectual heft.
But consider today’s problems: Iran, Syria, Afghanistan.
If Iran did in fact plot with a Mexican cartel to murder the Saudi ambassador to the U.S., what are we going to do about it? Sure there are military options, and
people who advocate them. If the plot had succeeded we would probably have used one or two like leveling Quds force headquarters with cruise missiles or capturing a few Iranian miscreants in Iraq or Afghanistan. But it is all too obvious that the Iranians would respond, blowing up some favorites of ours or grabbing a few more Americans taking walks in Kurdistan. The more realistic options in response to a plot that did not succeed are the nonmilitary ones I pointed to yesterday.
Syria is a case where military intervention like that undertaken in Libya might make a big difference, and some of the protesters against President Assad’s regime would like to see it happen. But it won’t: the Russians haven’t even allowed a denunciation of the regime’s violence against the demonstrators to pass, and the Arab League is sitting on its duffs. I know there are some who still hope NATO will undertaken the kind of unauthorized campaign it unleashed from the air against the Serbs in 1999, but it isn’t going to happen so long as Bashar keeps the level of atrocities in the daily dozens. The protesters are in for a long struggle without foreign force on their side.
In Afghanistan, the Americans have really brought to bear most of their military capability, without a clear result. No one serious believes any longer that there is a military solution there. We’ll have to settle for a political arrangement that gives the Taliban (hopefully not Al Qaeda) some significant measure of what it wants. Afghanistan is looking more and more like Vietnam, less and less like even Iraq. We aren’t likely to come out in 2014, when withdrawal is to be completed, with much.
Let’s not even discuss Israel/Palestine and North Korea, where American interests are certainly at stake. American military capabilities are vital to shaping the environment in both places, but the opportunities to use it are very limited. It is more an insurance policy against gross misbehavior by one of the protagonists than a tool that we can use on a daily basis. In Joe Nye’s terms, military power in these environments can be converted into influence, persuasion and agenda-setting (i.e. soft power) even if use of American force is not likely.
Of course our flag officers know they need stronger civilian counterparts in defending national security. They have repeatedly called for beefing up civilian capabilities. But it isn’t happening. Congress is tearing the budget of the civilian side of foreign policy to shreds, even as the game of chicken between Republicans and Democrats on the budget approaches the moment of truth. I think we know what will happen if it comes down to cutting the national security budget, which includes both military and civilian expenditure. The military may not like what it ends up with, but it will be a feast relative to what the State Department and the Agency for International Development have on their plates.
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IranTel: how should the U.S. respond?
I tweeted this question yesterday: “Do those who think Quds too smart for this operation think we are dumb enough to blame it on them without evidence?” The operation in question is the alleged Iranian plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in Washington.
My Twitterfeed was divided on the answer. About as many retweeted the question as replied “yes.” Those who replied yes had several reasons, mainly linked to the idea that the U.S. is looking for an opportunity to go to war with Iran. Past U.S. behavior, including WMD in Iraq, was mentioned. I am old enough to have lived through the Gulf of Tonkin incident. Remember the Maine.
Several said maybe, that more evidence is needed to decide. I’m with them. There have been several alleged terrorist plots over the past decade that have collapsed like souffles. But we need to ask for more details and confirmation to decide whether this will be one of them. I hope energetic young reporters looking for their first Pulitzer are hard at work [note to Adam Serwer: get busy!]
That said, if the Administration believes that Iran backed this cockamamie plot, it needs to come up with an appropriate response. It has already added four Quds force dodos to the sanctions list. That’s enough if you think those people were directly involved but without higher approval. It’s not enough if you think this was truly an approved operation.
The Pentagon is letting it be known it regards this as a diplomatic and legal issue, not a military one. I don’t see anyone in the Administration ready even for a cruise missile attack on Quds force headquarters, though I suppose we might not know about that until it was over. They seem intent on naming and shaming, likely through a UN Security Council resolution. That’s a good idea, as it would get Russia and China lined up for further sanctions on Iran. But it isn’t going to be easy. Ambassador Rice has proved adept in the past. Let’s hope she can repeat.
What more can be done? We’ve got some time while the journalists sort out whether the plot was real and how deeply it reached into the Iranian power structure, so let’s consider the options
- Republican Senator Mark Kirk of Illinois is calling for a ban on transactions with Iran’s Central Bank.
- Another possible sanctions target is Iran’s oil exports of 2.4-5 million barrels per day.
- Tom Gjelten is reporting that Saudi Arabia might jack up its oil production to bring down Iranian oil revenues.
- State Department is trying to get other countries to tighten existing sanctions, which apparently failed to stop a payment from the Quds force to what it thought was a Mexican cartel account through a third country.
Blocking transactions to and from Iran’s Central Bank would have a devastating impact on the Iranian economy, but it is hard to see how we are going to convince Iran’s major trading partners to join such a move. We’d need to make some sort of exception for food and other humanitarian goods, unless we are ready to find ourselves accused of starving the Iranian population into submission. Iraq’s Oil for Food program is a precedent, one that was rife with corruption and exploitation by the regime we were supposed to be sanctioning.
China gets over 500,000 barrels of oil per day from Iran, 15% of its consumption. Beijing is not going to give that up easily. Nor will Japan, India or South Korea–Iran’s other major markets for oil.
Saudi Arabia may not have enough excess capacity to boost oil production much. If they try, current weakness in the market risks could send prices spiraling downwards past what even the Saudis will appreciate.
Tightening existing sanctions sounds practical, but it is not the stuff of a clear and compelling diplomatic signal.
So let’s have a contest: excluding the four things I’ve mentioned here, and leaving aside military action, what measures should be included in the options for President Obama in considering how to respond to Iran’s plot with what it thought was a Mexican cartel to assassinate the Saudi ambassador?
Do I dare call it the IranTel plot?
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