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Normal, but still far from ideal

If life seems normal in Benghazi these days, it is still far from ideal.  Having previously discussed the positive developments, I need to delve into the directions in which growth and development is still required.

The most obvious to the eye and nose of the casual observer is what my wife and I call “garbagio,” a term we invented forty years ago when traveling in southern Italy (well before we both learned Italian).  Every public space in Benghazi seems littered, sometimes to a depth of several inches.  I asked some young Libyans yesterday about this.  They said things have actually improved a good deal since the revolution, with people cleaning up a lot more than in the past.  The garbagio problem developed, they added, because no one felt pride in being Libyan.  The public space belonged to the state, so throwing trash into it was a tacit, maybe even unintentional, form of protest.

Libyans held the state in low esteem not only because of the way it treated them but also because they had no voice in it.  Essentially no independent civil society was permitted–only service organizations, and they had a hard time even doing things like helping the poor because Qaddafi denied that there were any.  Hundreds of nongovernmental organizations have sprouted rapidly in Benghazi, though they are naturally in a rudimentary state, and spontaneous contributions to social improvement like directing traffic if the stop lights go out are common.

There is still little visible sign of political parties.  I spent the evening yesterday wandering among the many tents/booths set up in the courthouse square, where people gather each evening to enjoy the sea breeze and talk.  The different tents host discussions of issues while a goodly number of men alternately pray and listen to talk radio (or was it television?) broadcast over loud speakers.  The Libyans are really enjoying their freedom.  They seem almost reluctant to organize political parties because it will lead to divisions among them.

Newspapers have sprouted as well, with something like 80 newspapers and magazines now publishing in Benghazi (most not dailies), where there were only six before the revolution.  One of the young people I talked with is getting ready to put out a free English language weekly for distribution in Benghazi hotels.  Will there be enough foreigners left to attract advertisers now that the National Transitional Council (NTC) seems really to be moving to Tripoli?  Maybe not, but The Voice would like to give the enterprise a try.  There will of course be a dramatic weeding out of some of these publications, but in the meanwhile it is thrilling to talk with people who are for the first time in their lives discovering that their thoughts and writings might actually make a difference.

Another area where a great deal of “capacity building” (that’s what the development types call training) is needed is human rights.  My compliments go to USAID (that doesn’t always happen) for the human rights training that I attended yesterday, conducted under contract to the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights (Warsaw) by three veterans of the Polish transition.  The day was devoted to a moot court to consider the case of a prisoner who had died of a heart attack while incarcerated.  The outcome was different from the real case, in which the Polish government lost for the first time at the European Court of Human Rights.  But it was argued with an intelligence and style that I hope foreshadows what Libyan courts may be like in ten years.

The court system is in fact a big problem.  Corrupted under Qaddafi, it will require a thorough vetting and retraining, something that will take more than a few years.  In the meanwhile, Libyans generally want Qaddafi, his family and his cronies tried in Libya, if only because here there is a death penalty not permitted at the International Criminal Court (ICC).  But a debate at the human rights workshop ended with the young Libyans voting to send Qaddafi to the ICC, due to the difficult problems of meeting international standards and preventing the trial from becoming a political nightmare.

The political nightmare could be deadly, as Libyans are still armed to the teeth.  This will only change if stability is maintained and a spiral of revenge killing prevented, as few will give up their guns if they really think they need them.  There has been some effort to collect the weapons, but there are still a lot more out there.  Re-restablishing the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force will not be easy or immediate.

Surprisingly, I’ve found relatively little complaint so far about the economic situation.  One Libyan did say that his salary of 350 Libyan dinars per month working in oil services was low, but he seemed to mean that in comparison to international wages rather than in comparison with what other Libyans make.  I suspect the grumbling will increase, but Libyans are clearly pleased that Mustafa Abdul Jalil, the chairman of the National Transitional Council (NTC), lives in a modest house in Benghazi and is thought to be uncorrupted.  At least to some, that makes a big difference and may account for patience on the economic front.

With apologies for the lack of photos–I have no way of getting them from my nonfunctional cell phone to my computer–these are some of the ways in which Libya is still far from the ideal.

Benghazi: a normal life, for the moment

It would be wrong to suggest that everything is going well in Libya.  Yesterday’s attack on oil facilities at Ras Lanouf by Qaddafi’s forces and the failure of an apparent government (that is Transitional National Council)-led offensive at Surt show otherwise.  But here in Benghazi even yesterday’s inspiring TNC rally in Tripoli seems far off.

Life here is about as close to “normal” as it ever has been.  No one is visibly carrying weapons.  The one detonation I’ve heard did not cause any reaction among the Libyans present–they knew right away it was a car engine backfiring.  By all reports, people feel far freer to speak their minds than they did under Qaddafi.  They also feel freer to drive down one-way streets the wrong way and run red lights, though they do both not with abandon but with caution.  Mostly they go about their business trying to earn a living and support their families, which has not gotten easier.  Salaries and other payments made through banks are not fully available to depositors, who can only withdraw one-third to one-half of the total amount.

Libyans know that this is the price of liberty and hope it will not last.  There are some good omens.  Egyptian oil service workers told me this morning that some wells in the east are already producing, the Libyans are respecting pre-revolution contracts and the people they deal with are clearly more relaxed and taking more responsibility than under Qaddafi.  Libyan Air has started up service between Benghazi and Misrata, Turkish Airlines starts to fly to Istanbul on Thursday, and there are rumors of British Air and others preparing to fly.

None of this of course affects most Libyans, who live in what can only be described as poverty despite the enormous oil and gas wealth produced during the Qaddafi regime.  That money seems to have gone into the pockets of few people, who deposited a great deal of it in bank accounts and investments abroad.  Benghazis are certainly convinced that none of it came here.  They are quick to note the outlet for raw sewage that fouls their spectacular beaches and the empty square from which Qaddafi removed the grave of Omar Mukhtar, hero of the resistance against Italy in the early 20th century.  Qaddafi did not want any competition, even from a long-expired hero.

The road ahead will not be easy.  NATO spokespeople may suggest that finding Qaddafi is not so important, but they are wrong.  Few believe Qaddafi can mount the same kind of resistance that emerged in Iraq, or attract the kind of foreign assistance the Sunni insurgency there benefited from, but many in Washington and elsewhere have gotten worried about the possibility of an insurgency.

They are right to worry:  insurgency would make it far more difficult for the TNC to pursue the moderate course it has so far chosen, favoring reconciliation over retaliation and avoiding revenge against those who fought for and protected the Qaddafi regime.  I am already receiving from a Belgian email address pro-insurgency emails.  It only takes the beginnings of suspicion that people are associated with an insurgency to generate fear in the population and a harsh crackdown from the authorities.

None of that is yet apparent in Benghazi today, however.  A friend is teaching a human rights class.  A colleague is arranging a conflict management workshop.   A journalist classmate is tracking the TNC and trying to ask them tough questions when they seem to do things different from what they say.  The Egyptian oil service company people were off to arrange well workovers.   Traffic is heavy, the markets are bustling, people are walking, bargaining, shopping, working.  Water, and since this year’s August Ramadan also electricity, are flowing.

Libyans have experienced both autocracy and war.  The normal life so many people who have lived in those conditions crave has arrived in Benghazi, at least for the moment.

To the shores of Tripoli

Audio of the Atlantic Council’s session this morning on what Qaddafi’s demise means for Libya, NATO and the Arab Awakening is up.  Here are the speaking notes I used:

1. The immediate requirements are clear:  end the resistance, block revenge killing, stabilize Tripoli, get water and electricity flowing, deal with humanitarian requirements, begin an inclusive political process.
2.  But at the same time we need some focus on long-term goals.  Libyans need to tell us where they are going and begin to discuss what kind of help they will need to get there.  European interests most at risk—they should carry the burden.
3. A safe and secure environment free of large-scale violence is the first requirement.
4. But it is not enough:  Libyans will want rule of law.  This is no simple matter:  retraining and reorganization of the police, judiciary and corrections.  Start now, because it takes a long time.
5. TNC hodge podge is good.  Big tent better, with Islamists in, for writing the rules of the game.
6. Roadmap in the constitutional charter already calls for a new constitution within 6 months and elections within 12.  This may be overly fast, but if so they will postpone.   Municipal elections first.  Democratic culture will not develop this quickly—second elections are the real test.
7. There has been lots of focus on getting the Libyans the financial resources they need, less on the mechanisms of transparency and accountability that will be necessary to avoid new problems.
8. Oil and gas will not flow until companies have reassurance, which Libyans are trying to provide.  But citizens also need to know oil revenue will go transparently and accountably to everyone.   Too much money can be more harmful than too little.
9. The immediate social needs are acute:  to provide food, water, shelter and health care to the most vulnerable, especially displaced people.
10. But in the long-term social needs are much tougher:  documentation and accountability of the past regime for its crimes, and national reconciliation.  Strong civil society.
11. These longer term goals—a united, democratic Libya under the rule of law with resources used for the benefit of all its citizens in a way that is inclusive, accountable and transparent—need to be laid out, preferably in a UNSC resolution follow on to 1973, which is OBE.
12. This kind of Libya will be a model for the region and vindicate—though perhaps not justify—the NATO intervention.