Tag: Libya
Does anyone still listen to podcasts?
I did two yesterday:
- One for Irish Radio;
- The other for The Economist.
I confess I thought this format had all but died, but maybe there is still someone out there who listens to podcasts?
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Where does Libya go from here?
My piece from Reuters, published today:
With the press focused on scenes of joy in Tripoli and Benghazi, continued skirmishes with regime loyalists, and speculation about where Gaddafi might turn up, it is time to lift our sights and focus on the really difficult transition ahead. If another autocrat succeeds Gaddafi, the transition could be over soon. But if Libya embarks on an effort to create a more democratic state, unified and inclusive in many dimensions, we’ll need to wait the better part of a decade to know whether it has succeeded or not.
There are no magic formulas for how to go about this. Each contingency has its own requirements. We have seen many more partial failures than full successes: think Iraq and Afghanistan.
Certainly in Libya security will be job one. The immediate goal is public order, so that people can move freely without fear of large-scale violence. But there was public order of a non-democratic sort in Gaddafi’s Libya. What the rebels have done in areas liberated in recent months is as clever as it is remarkable: they have organized local councils to try to ensure security and other immediate requirements. This does not always happen in civil wars but it suggests a way forward. There were at least four councils in Tripoli before Gaddafi fell. Can they step in to organize local communities to protect themselves from the inevitable aftershocks of Gaddafi’s fall?
Even if that works, it is only a temporary expedient. Libya will need a retrained and re-oriented police force, one that seeks to serve and protect rather than intimidate and repress. International assistance in this regard has become the rule rather than the exception, but there is little unused international capacity, because of Afghanistan, Kosovo and other requirements. It is tempting to suggest that Arab countries take on this task, but difficult to imagine that they will do it in a way that encourages the kind of community policing that is needed. Even training and retraining 1,000 per year, it will take at least the better part of a decade to put in place a police force Libyan democracy would want.
Even well-trained police are no use if there are no courts where the people they arrest can be fairly tried and sentenced, as well as prisons to put them in. Courts require not only judges but also prosecutors and defense attorneys, not to mention court recorders, registrars and bailiffs. If the formal court system fails to provide fair and rapid justice, Libyans will turn to informal methods of dispute resolution, especially where tribal structures are strong in the countryside. There is nothing inherently wrong with that, but there are difficult issues to be resolved concerning the interaction between tribal and formal justice systems, and the treatment of women in tribal systems.
The justice system is an important part of the state, especially in post-war situations, but it is not the only thing that needs fixing. Libya has only rudimentary state institutions apart from the oil ministry. There is no constitution. All power lay in the hands of Gaddafi and his family. So there will be a need to build the state almost from the ground up. There may be advantages in this, as there will be less to sweep away. The Transitional National Council (TNC) that has led the rebellion has published a good, relatively liberal and democratic constitutional charter. But the TNC needs to reformulate itself to be more representative of parts of the country that have been liberated only recently, including Tripoli. And its capability to implement its good intentions is not yet clear.
The TNC would like to prepare a new constitution within six months and hold elections within a year to help establish democratic legitimacy. The problem with this idea is that a democratic environment and culture cannot be created in such a short time frame, which favors those with an existing organizational infrastructure like Islamists (who will use the mosques) and disfavors those with shallower roots in Libyan society, like secularists. This tension is still being played out in Egypt. It might also be wise to consider holding local elections first, since they produce results more immediately reflective of citizens’ needs and provide a test of both the electoral mechanism and political outcomes. But in the end Libyans will need to decide. I will not be surprised if the one-year time frame gets extended to two, and the real outcomes are not apparent until the second elections, presumably four years later.
All this requires money. Libya’s economy is essentially 100 per cent dependent on oil and gas. It will take time to get production back up to pre-war levels. In the meanwhile, the TNC will need access to the frozen assets of the Gaddafi regime. This is not a simple matter. In many countries, including the United States, it requires not only a decision of the president but also a presentation to the sanctions committee of the United Nations. There are ample funds — well over $30 billion are frozen in the United States alone. But getting them to the TNC, and ensuring that they are spent accountably and transparently will not be easy. There are few well established oil and gas producing states that have managed that trick.
The people of Libya in the meanwhile are living in dreadful conditions. Food, water, health care and electricity are lacking, especially in vulnerable populations like the poor and displaced. The TNC needs somehow to begin to deliver goods and services, especially in the major cities. Libyans will be celebrating for a few days, but then they are going to start to wonder how they are better off. That is a question that will persist even once immediate needs are satisfied. Ten years from now Libyans will be discussing whether justice has been done to those who committed crimes under the Gaddafi regime, and whether the traumas of that regime and the civil war have been healed.
All these decade-long challenges will require an alert and informed Libyan citizenry. The activism and energy that they have shown in resisting the Gaddafi regime needs to be continued and channeled into the development of civil society organizations that can mediate between the citizens and their new state. Hundreds of such organizations have already emerged in Benghazi and other liberated areas. More will emerge in Tripoli. They are vital to keeping a democratic transition on track.
The international role in all of this is still unclear. The United States is trying to limit its burdens. It has too much to do elsewhere and no truly vital national interests at stake in Libya, even if it might have some specific interests in preventing Libya from becoming a source of arms trafficking and a haven for international terrorists. European interests are more compelling: oil and gas, related investments, and the desire to prevent migration from Libya becoming an issue in European domestic politics. The Arab League and its members also have an interest in seeing Libya back on its feet as soon as possible.
The international community, which so far has based its efforts on UN Security Council resolution 1973, needs a clear set of goals and a reasonable division of labor to guide it in the future. Getting Libya right in the post-war decade is going to require a lot of European and Arab support, and the Americans need to be ready to pitch in where they have unique capabilities.
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Libya a decade from now
I got tired of writing about first steps in Libya and decided to lift my sights and write about scenarios ten years hence. Here is the result, published by foreignpolicy.com yesterday.
Ten years after the guns have finally been laid down, will Libya still be a mess?
BY DANIEL SERWER | AUGUST 22, 2011
Libya is currently consumed in that strange combination of joy and residual violence that marks the end of war. But instead of fixating on the events playing out on the streets of Tripoli these days, the world should focus on how the postwar scenario will play out over the next decade. What is the best we can hope for? What is the worst that can be imagined? Where in that is Libya likely to settle?
There are many worst-case scenarios. Muammar al-Qaddafi is doing his best, even now, to promote chaos and continued resistance, which in turn could inspire revenge killing or degenerate into internecine warfare. Continued chaos could tempt someone of his ilk — in the army or among the rebels — to seize power and concentrate it in his own hands, under the guise of restoring law and order. Renewed autocracy could engender continued resistance, leading to a downward spiral of violence and repression. An effort to seize power might also split the country. Indeed, Libya like so many places in Africa, was cobbled together from disparate provinces in the early 20th century; it wouldn’t be the first country to come apart along old fault lines.
Chaos, autocracy, and partition are only three of the perils facing Libya. The country has in the past produced a significant number of Islamist fighters and suicide bombers who targeted U.S. troops in Iraq. If Libya remains anarchic, areas outside the central government’s full control could become havens for extremists. The many unguarded weapons floating around Libya could also reach the international arms market, putting Stinger-type missiles or even chemical weapons into unfriendly hands. Worse, Libya’s new rulers could revive the Qaddafi-era nuclear program and make material and expertise available worldwide. And there has been little accounting of just how many weapons have been smuggled in more recently to aid the rebel cause.
Even if the immediate postwar chaos subsides, major risks lie ahead. Libya’s economy is dependent on oil and gas production. Qaddafi seems to have stowed most of the oil and gas revenue in banks abroad, leaving many Libyans destitute. Very few countries in which the government is able to fund itself from natural resources have developed in a liberal and democratic direction. Transparency and accountability are not easy to establish; perhaps only Norway and East Timor can really claim to have mastered this trick.
Nondemocratic states commonly suffer from competition over revenue gathered from natural resources. This struggle can become especially debilitating if the competition is complemented by ethnic, tribal, or regional fractures. There is ample reason to fear this scenario in Libya: While most Libyans are Arabs, some are what Americans call Berbers, who will unquestionably want to express their identity more openly than they were permitted in the past. Tribal distinctions are not strong in Libyan cities, but they persist in the countryside. Qaddafi was skillful at playing the tribes off against each other, but he was far less successful in co-opting the region around the northeastern city of Benghazi. That may become even more difficult in the post-Qaddafi period, as much of the oil and gas production is in the east.
What is the best we can hope for in Libya within the next 10 years?
The Transitional National Council has set out a constitutional charter that clearly points in a liberal democratic direction, albeit with Islam as the state religion and principal source of legislation. Plans call for preparation of a constitution (Libya had none under Qaddafi) within six months and elections within a year. That is overly rapid in my estimation, but if Libyan institutions cannot keep pace with democratization, there can always be postponements, as often happens in postwar situations. The important thing is that Libya not only develops a constitution that distributes power among its institutions and elections that determine who governs the state, but also a democratic culture of freedom of speech and association.
That will take more than a year or two to develop, but it shouldn’t take a decade. If Libya is to sustain a democratic culture, its government will have to learn the difficult art of accountability and transparency for oil and gas revenue. There can be no real democracy if oil and gas revenue goes to the government without any parliamentary control or public accounting, as happens in most Arab oil-producing countries. All citizens, regardless of tribe, ethnicity, or region, will need to feel that they are getting a fair share of Libya’s natural wealth.
Even if this occurs, Libya will still be in need of a major national reconciliation effort. The Qaddafi regime benefited a single family at the expense of a whole country, but significant numbers of people, especially in Tripoli and Sirte, supported the regime and reaped benefits from it in return. These people are going to be the object of discrimination, disdain, and even revenge in post-Qaddafi Libya. At some point in the next decade, the effort to document, discuss, and disseminate the historical record of the Qaddafi regime will be important to ensuring that the population can move beyond the past and enjoy a more promising future.
Where will things likely end up a decade from now? My prediction is that Libya will be messy — but closer to the democratic end of the spectrum than to the chaotic, autocratic, or partitioned outcomes. If the international community and Libyans themselves are clear about the goals they seek — a united and inclusive Libya, based on the rule of law, that can defend and sustain itself, using its oil and gas resources for the benefit of all its citizens — then we will come close to achieving the best-case scenario.
There will be setbacks, as there have been during the past six months, but there is no reason why Libya cannot follow in Tunisia’s footsteps toward a more open and peaceful society. With a great deal of effort and determination, it could even become a model for other Arab societies hoping to replace their brutal, unaccountable leaders with more just systems of government.
PS: Hard to resist posting Qaddafi’s rebel-appropriate golf cart:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=GniABlMmRwM
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Next in Libya
Joshua Foust and I enjoy a tame bloggingheads:
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Rebuilding Libya: the first few steps
Theatlantic.com published my piece this morning:
Aug 22 2011, 6:39 AM ET
The most immediate challenges facing post-Qaddafi Libya
Reuters
Muammar Qaddafi’s finale in Libya is coming faster than even the rebels likely anticipated. They are reported to have arrested Saif al Islam, his favored son. If they take Qaddafi alive, the rebel leadership body Transitional National Council (TNC), or its successor organization, will presumably transfer him and his son to The Hague, for trial at the International Criminal Court. This would be a remarkable end to a 42-year reign as Libya’s chief governing authority and a first opportunity for the court to try a chief of state, even if he did not claim that title.
Some may prefer to try him in Tripoli, but it is going to be years before the Libyan courts are able to meet the necessary international standards. A show trial will not help Libya in its understandable passion to lay the foundations for a freer society.
Qaddafi’s continued resistance risks making the situation inside Libya far more chaotic than it need be. Some of his loyalists may go underground as people harmed by the regime seek revenge, rivalries among rebel groups may emerge, looting and rioting could break out, and criminal gangs are sure to try to take advantage of any disorder. Restoring public order will be job one, with restoring electricity, food, and water close behind. Oil installations will need to be protected, weapons depots guarded, and secret police files preserved. It is certainly a good sign that the rebels are reported to have thrown up a protective cordon around the National Museum.
The rebels say they believe everything will go smoothly, and they appear to have trained some police to protect sensitive infrastructure and maintain law and order. But hope is not a plan. They need to get things under control as quickly as possible, appealing for foreign help if need be.
European governments could step up to this challenge, since they are tied to Libya via gas pipelines that float beneath the surface of the Mediterranean. If Libya succumbs to chaos, it will be to Europe that refugees will flow, and mostly European investments in Libya that will be lost. Unfortunately, Washington seems to have allowed Europe to remain distracted with its own financial problems. There does not appear to be any serious plan for dealing with chaos in Libya, which could quickly turn into a humanitarian disaster. American boots definitely do not belong on the shores of Tripoli, but it has happened before and may happen again.
The TNC will have to be particularly alert to risks of revenge killings against Qaddafi loyalists, and of score-settling among rebels. They have already lost one of their military commanders, apparently to rebel-affiliated attackers who resented his role in Qaddafi’s army. In immediate post-war situations, the urge to exact quick justice is enormous. But allowing vigilantes to even the score will only lead to a spiral of violence that is hard to stop and inimical to democratic evolution.
Virtually overnight, the rebel leadership will need to shift its focus from fighting Qaddafi’s forces to protecting them. In the past few months, the local councils that have emerged in liberated areas have not generally allowed violence against regime supporters. But that is partly because many of Qaddafi’s loyalists have fled from newly liberated towns to Tripoli. Their concentration there and in his hometown of Sirte is going to make the challenge of transition much greater there than anyplace else in Libya.
It is critical that regime loyalists and rebels alike do not grab and “privatize” state assets, as often happens in chaotic moments and takes years to reverse. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, the government has been trying for years to recover valuable mines from those who took possession of them during the civil war. The liberty Libyans have fought for will require massive rebuilding of the country’s infrastructure and economy, which is in miserable condition. Early efforts to ensure transparency and accountability could help Libya avoid the kind of corruption that has plagued Afghanistan and Iraq.
Only the most selfish and egotistical leader would fail to make arrangements to transfer power and try to avoid bloodshed. Tunisia’s President Zine el-Abidine ben Ali fled, but left the country with a constitutional succession that is enabling a relatively smooth transition. Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak tried to leave power in the hands of his vice president, a move negated only when the army stepped in. Yemen’s President Saleh has so far refused to allow a constitutional succession, leaving his country seized with violence.
Qaddafi is still calling on his supporters to fight and vowing to restore his own version of law and order in Tripoli. This is Qaddafi’s last misdeed. There is no constitution in Libya, so no clear constitutional succession. The revolutionaries have wisely written their own constitutional charter, but the real challenge will not be on paper. It will be in the avenues and alleys of Tripoli.
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Qaddafi’s last misdeed
Muammar Qaddafi and his sons have apparently failed to arrange an orderly transition, leaving at least some of their loyalists lashing out in desperation against the inevitable as rebels enter Tripoli. This risks making the situation chaotic, if not desperate or even catastrophic.
While I certainly hope the rebels who believe everything will go smoothly are right, hope is not a plan. The Transitional National Council (TNC) likely now has a big mess on its hands. They need to get things under control as quickly as possible, appealing for foreign help if need be. Widespread looting and disorder would be a bad way to start the new regime, likely opening the door to someone who claims to be able to restore public order. Continuing shortages of food, water and electricity could also undermine the legitimacy and viability of the new regiome.
I have repeatedly hoped that the Europeans would step up to this challenge, since they are tied umbilically to Libya via gas pipelines that float beneath the surface of the Mediterranean, which is their great lake, not one of ours. We seem to have allowed Europe to remain distracted with its own financial problems. So far as I can tell, my recommendation of a several thousand person EU constabulary force for Tripoli will just not happen. I hope this does not mean NATO steps in, but that clearly is about the only backup capacity anyone has. American boots definitely do not belong on the ground in Tripoli, but it has happened before and may happen again.
The TNC needs to be particularly alert to revenge killing of Qaddafi loyalists, and settling of scores among the rebels. In immediate post-war situations, the urge to exact quick justice is enormous. If my children had died in these months of fighting and repression I would certainly be tempted to claim what justice I could rather than wait for a new regime to catch up with the miscreants. But allowing vigilantes to even the score will only lead to a spiral of violence that is hard to stop and inimical to democratic evolution.
The shift from fighting Qaddafi’s forces to needing to protect them will happen virtually overnight. Libyans have thus far been cognizant of this requirement in the areas liberated in the past few months. The local councils that have emerged are not to my knowledge organizing violence against regime supporters. But that is partly because many of Qaddafi’s loyalists have fled to Tripoli. Their concentration there, and the attachment of the Qaddafi leadership to the privilege and property the regime afforded them, is going to make the challenge of transition much greater than anyplace else in Libya.
Only the most selfish and egotistical leader would fail to make arrangements to transfer power and avoid bloodshed. Tunisia’s President Ben Ali fled, but left the country with a constitutional succession. Egypt’s Mubarak stepped down and tried to leave power in the hands of his vice president, a move negated only when the army stepped in, responding in part at least to a demand of the demonstrators. Yemen’s President Saleh has so far refused to allow a constitutional succession, leaving his country seized with violence.
This is Qaddafi’s last misdeed. There is no constitution in Libya. The revolutionaries have wisely written their own constitutional charter, but the real challenge will not be on paper but in the avenues and alleys of Tripoli.
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