Tag: Libya
What if Gaddafi holds on?
The Atlantic Wire has usefully assembled all the occasions on which Muammar Gaddafi has indicated he will step down. Obviously that hasn’t happened, and it may not, malgré Juppé. The question is what do we do if he continues to hold on to power in Tripoli and the rebels are unable to make real headway in taking territory? What is plan B?
Failure is definitely an option, at least in the near term. While the rebel National Transitional Council (NTC) in Benghazi has not lost any ground in weeks, it hasn’t gained much either. It is managing more or less to administer the territory it does control, where street crime is down, local councils have been set up and humanitarian assistance is delivered. Electricity and water are still ample, but fuel and medicine is reportedly low in some areas.
The NTC is viewed as legitimate outside of Tripolitania (Tripoli and the western portion of the country), not least because it is not claiming to be a government-in-waiting but only a stopgap until a full interim administration with representation from the whole country can be formed after a ceasefire takes effect. Its roots are particularly strong in Cyrenaica (the eastern portion of the country, where Benghazi is located).
If Gaddafi manages to hold on to Tripoli and there is no ceasefire, my guess is the NTC will need to do more than it currently plans. This creates a great moral hazard: the more we help the NTC to govern the country separately from Gaddafi, the greater the likelihood Libya will split into two (or more) pieces, something that most in the international community would find highly objectionable.
What would be needed then is a concerted effort to broaden participation in the NTC and keep its governing structure as open as possible to eventual reformulation. This might mean incorporating more prominent representatives from Tripoli, creating a Tripoli administration-in-exile and maintaining some degree of consistency between how Cyrenaica and Tripolitania are governed. It would mean maintaining insofar as possible those infrastructure networks that still function across the front lines between Gaddafi’s forces and the rebels.
It will also likely mean finding a way to get at least some of Libya’s oil and gas flowing again. This will not be easy: oil company lawyers are rightfully cautious about property rights, which would remain “sketchy,” as my kids say, if Gaddafi is still around. I gather it is legal to buy from Arab Gulf Oil, which is under rebel control. A mechanism for depositing revenues into a UN or other fund, with transparent and supervised drawdown by the NTC, might help get the oil and gas moving again.
The question of currency is likely to arise sooner or later. Libyans seem still to be using Gaddafi-era dinars, but what if they run short in areas outside Gaddafi’s control, or if people lose confidence and want a substitute? Issuance of a new currency would be a big step in the direction of dividing Libya. It would likely be better to allow euro-ization or dollarization to proceed according to market forces, something that has worked reasonably well in a number of conflict situations.
The UK-led International Stabilisation and Response Team, which visited Libya May 20-June 30), has prepared an excellent draft report on what to do once a ceasefire is in place. Is it time to consider more deliberately what happens if there is no ceasefire?
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Diplomacy stirs
I won’t claim it is due to what I asked three days ago on peacefare.net (where are the diplomats?), but there are stirrings in the last day or so of American diplomacy. Ambassador Robert Ford made his way to Hama in a show of support show of support for the Syrian demonstrators there, along with French Ambassador Eric Chevallier. Anti-terrorism “czar” John Brennan met with Yemen’s President Saleh in Saudi Arabia and let it be known he had asked Saleh to sign the Gulf Cooperation Council agreement that would begin a transition with Saleh stepping aside. Less visible: U.S. Ambassador to Libya Gene Cretz has cancelled a scheduled Middle East Institute event this week, I understand in order to meet with Libyan National Transitional Council people in Doha about planning for the post-Gaddafi era.
All good, if a bit late and less decisive than I might like. Ford is in a particularly sensitive spot, as the Syrian-government sponsored “national dialogue” is supposed to have started today, with a good part of the street opposition staying away. The Americans still have not asked for President Assad to step aside, and it seems unlikely he would even if they did. That said, there is likely more to be gained from the American perspective from a successful transition to a more democratic society in Syria than just about any place else, since it would presumably offer less cooperation to Iran and Hizbollah. Ford needs somehow to signal clear support for transition without getting out ahead of the demonstrators or President Obama, who inexplicably hangs on to the hope that Bashar al Assad will undertake serious reform.
Brennan’s visit with Saleh to read him the riot act and get him not to return to Sanaa is likewise a good move, but one that comes late in the game. Saleh shows no signs of wanting to sign an agreement he has repeatedly promised to sign. Brennan is the right guy to deliver the message because he controls the military assistance to counter-terrorism in Yemen that Saleh values. But I trust he is also lining up the Saudis not only to say the right things but to do them: they should not allow Saleh to leave for Yemen and they should make it clear his allowance will be zeroed out if he manages somehow to get back to Sanaa.
As for Libya, it is high time Europeans, Americans and Arabs put their heads together to plan the post-Gaddafi era. As I’ve previously note, there is a lot to do, and the international community is thoroughly occupied elsewhere. But somehow we’ve got to put together a serious post-conflict reconstruction effort in Libya, if only to prevent a failed transition: restoration of a Gaddafi or Gaddafi-like dictatorship, split up of the country, or breakdown into chaos. Any of these outcomes would discredit the Security Council-authorized, NATO-led intervention and put American interests at risk, if only by providing our terrorist enemies with a new platform. We need a Libyan-led post-Gaddafi effort, one that can command broad legitimacy not only in Benghazi but also in Tripoli. Easier said than done, but I’m glad to the effort beginning to move ahead.
PS: For those with Arabic, and even for those without (watch Brennan’s unhappy face) here is a video report on Brennan’s meeting with Saleh:
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Where are the diplomats?
In Libya and Yemen, presidents are hanging on way past their “use by” date. Ali Abdullah Saleh appeared today on TV, both defeated and defiant. Muammar Gaddafi is defiant and seemingly delusional. In Syria, Bashar al Assad may not be quite as far along to perdition as the other two, but he seems to have chosen their path: hang on until physically removed from the scene (and in Saleh’s case even after being transferred to a hospital in Saudi Arabia).
Military means are not working well against Gaddafi or Saleh. This is not entirely surprising: Gaddafi obviously prides himself on personal resistance to the use of force and doesn’t give a hoot what happens to his country. Saleh seems like-minded. I wouldn’t even want to imagine what Bashar al Assad thinks: he no doubt was brought up to believe the use of force is vital to a ruler, and he is well on his way to imitating his father’s use of it. What is needed in all three cases is a stronger diplomatic effort.
It is hard to believe that the Saudis can’t deprive Saleh of enough money and other support to make him choose retirement over an attempt to return to Yemen. The question is why they don’t use the leverage they’ve got, and what can we do to get them to use it? The American Ambassador reportedly threw his support behind the Gulf Cooperation Council plan for transition in Yemen. My hope is that he is working assiduously to get it implemented.
Gaddafi seems to have stockpiled enough cash and gold to survive a long time, but he too should be realizing about now that the cause is lost. The British, African Union and maybe others have been sporadically engaged in trying to devise a plan to get Gaddafi out. They need to redouble those efforts, making it clear that any sweeteners will soon be irrevocably lost if he doesn’t grab hold tight now.
Republicans in Congress are asking for the recall from Damascus of Ambassador Robert Ford, certainly among the State Department’s finest Arabists. This is wrong-headed. They should be asking the Ambassador to do more, not less. His visit to Hama in support of the demonstrators today was a step in the right direction. Far better that he do enough of this kind of thing to get expelled rather than be withdrawn by Washington.
We should keep the lines of communication open to all these miscreant presidents. But there should be no doubt whose side Washington is on: the people of these three beknighted countries are asking their presidents to make way for more democratic societies. That’s what the diplomats should be helping to make happen.
PS: Here is the greeting Ambassador Ford got in Hama:
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Yemen will need the Americans
The end is near for Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen, Muammar Gaddafi of Libya and Bashar al Assad of Syria. They may last weeks or even months, but their regimes will never again be able to claim that they are factors for stability, and they are unlikely to risk the kinds of reforms that might satisfy at least some critics and enable them to remain on office. The regimes have suffered mortal wounds, as Saleh himself likely has.
The problem lies in what comes next. Libya at least has an interim National Transitional Council, recognized as a legitimate authority by some major countries. Syria has the beginnings of something similar, a “follow up” “consultative” group growing out of a meeting in Antalya, Turkey two weeks ago. In my way of thinking, it is important that the exile Syrians somehow maintain the momentum of that group and begin to lay concrete plans for how to govern in the aftermath of Assad’s fall, despite the obvious difficulty of coordinating their efforts with the protest leaders inside Syria. It is vital that Syria not succumb to sectarian and ethnic chaos if the revolution there succeeds. Protecting the Alawi and other privileged minorities from the wrath of people who have suffered under the Assad regime is not going to be easy.
Yemen is especially problematic.
The revolution there has several dimensions: students and youth (the “protesters”), political parties (the “opposition,” aka the Joint Meeting Parties), and tribes (especially it seems the al-Ahmar), not to mention a northern (Houthi) insurgency and southern secessionists. In addition, the Americans will be pressing for an “orderly” transition, in order to enable a continuing effort against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The Saudis, who were remarkably inept at exerting their considerable influence to get Saleh out, will nevertheless be big players if they choose to bankroll one competitor or another.
The competing visions of these often disparate and only occasionally harmonious forces will make transition particularly problematic in Yemen, where declining oil production, water shortages and shrinkage of the economy are creating the ideal conditions for state collapse. I am all in favor of the Europeans playing the major role post-war in Libya, and likely Syria as well, and I’d like to see some indication that they are preparing seriously.
But the Europeans are not much of a factor in Yemen. The Americans will feel they can’t afford to ignore Anwar al-Awlaki’s home base, or leave the matter entirely to the ineptitude of the Saudis. It is time for them to begin planning, if they haven’t already done so, for a major post-war effort to support whatever minimal state can be made to emerge from Yemen’s chaos.
Here are the basic categories of things they need to worry about:
- safe and secure environment: initially in Sanaa, but eventually also in the north, where armed resistance to the central government is endemic, and the south, where secessionist sentiment is strong, not to mention the terrorist threat from people taking haven in Yemen’s lawless interior;
- rule of law: likely more tribal than courtroom, but one way or another people need someplace to go to settle disputes;
- stable governance: the Gulf Cooperation Council agreement seems to depend essentially on the existing constitution, which may well be a good way to go since agreement on anything else would be difficult to obtain, but can reasonable elections really be held in Yemen under current conditions?
- sustainable economy: oil and water are key factors in determining whether Yemen can pull of its current economic tail-spin;
- social well-being: food, water, shelter are all in short supply, with a lot of people displaced by various conflicts; health and education are grossly inadequate.
The fixes will come only in the long term. Yemen is going to be a problem for a long time. And it is hard for me to see how the Americans escape at least some responsibility for the post-conflict reconstruction, if they continue to worry about containing Yemen’s terrorist potential.
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A star in my firmament wobbles
In a report out Monday, International Crisis Group calls for an immediate, unconditional ceasefire, deployment of peacekeepers and negotiations with Muammar Gaddafi, rather than continuation of the current NATO-led military effort against regime. Is this wise, or not?
First I should note that the bulk of the report is a first-rate history and analysis of the Libyan Jamahiriya, Gaddafi’s nominally unique “republic of the masses” that in the final analysis operated like other totalitarian regimes. This analytical part of the report covers the complex institutional setup of the Libyan quasi-state, the main pillars of regime support as well as the opposition, tribes, minorities, the evolution of the popular protests, the Interim National Transitional Council (even critics of the INTC in the east) and other background that I haven’t seen elsewhere. Even if I might quibble here and there, it is interesting, revealing, well-documented and well-written: all the things we have come to expect of ICG.
But I have come to expect something else as well from ICG: policy recommendations that are ill-crafted, only tenuously related to the careful analysis and all too often fundamentally flawed, with an obvious overoptimism about the prospects for negotiated solutions. This report is a textbook example.
Basically what ICG argues is this: continuation of the military effort means more civilian casualties, the UN authorized NATO only to protect civilians, ergo it should stop the military effort and begin to negotiate, thereby reducing civilian casualties. ICG then elaborates a two-phase ceasefire (first a truce then a cessation of hostilities), deployment of peacekeepers, a negotiated exit of Gaddafi and his sons from power that entails guarantees they will not be pursued by the International Criminal Court, and construction of a new Libyan state based on the rule of law that ensures political representation and pluralism.
But this is a false and misleading logic that compares the current situation with an imaginary, even delusional, future in which civilians are protected even though Gaddafi is still in place and his accountability for war crimes and crimes against humanity made inoperable. Wishing won’t make it so. The idea that Gaddafi is going to play a “constructive role” in the short term, in exchange for relief from accountability for himself and his family is thoroughly delusional, even if the International Criminal Court were willing or able to follow ICG’s unlikely prescription for how to make it happen. Then there is some brief generic blah-blah about an interim executive that includes Gaddafites as well as the INTC.
There are many other things wrong with this four-page policy addendum to what otherwise is an interesting 40-odd page report. Where are the peacekeepers going to come from? Where would they be deployed and with what mandate? Why do we think that would be acceptable to the INTC or to the Libyan people? How would they prevent Gaddafi from brutalizing the people who live in the areas he controls?
Most of this policy addendum is just light-headed froth. ICG is wedded to a formula for negotiation that doesn’t take into account the real situation ICG describes in its own report, a failing that plagues other recent ICG products as well. Sad to see this star of my firmament wobble so.
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Where are the patriots?
If nothing else, these weeks of protest and repression are demonstrating how tenaciously autocrats cling to power. This is not surprising, since for the three currently in question–Gaddafi, Assad and Saleh–there really is no role for them if they leave power. Worse, they fear for their livelihoods, their families and their lives.
This occurs to me as I am in Ljubljana (Slovenia) for meetings, one of which will be with a former president. As is all too apparent in the U.S., former presidents play useful roles in democratic societies, whether in talking with the North Koreans (or me), raising support for earthquake-ravaged Haiti, or just as living examples of the possibility of losing power without losing your life. The U.S. even pays and protects them well, as I imagine Slovenia does too.
The problem with our Middle Eastern chiefs of state is of course that they did things during their time in power that might merit justice once they are out of it and available to the courts. Saleh was offered immunity but refused to sign the agreement that would have provided it. The International Criminal Court’s prosecutor has already asked for an arrest warrant for Gaddafi. It is hard to see how Assad is less criminal, though he may have succeeded in preventing much hard evidence getting into the hands of the ICC.
So what we’ve got is four–I’d like to throw in ICC indictee President Bashir of Sudan as well–blatantly criminal chiefs of state (or the equivalent, since Gaddafi claims not to have any official position in what he terms the “republic of the masses”). Military force isn’t yet working against Gaddafi, sanctions aren’t working against Bashir, and protests aren’t working against Assad. Only Saleh seems out of the picture, and that because of an artillery strike that was luckier than the many missiles thrown at Gaddafi.
We shouldn’t expect much better from these four. What I’m waiting for is someone in their respective entourages to take up the cudgels (admittedly something like that has happened in Yemen). All four seem determined not only to stay in power but to take their countries down with them. That’s what should embolden some of their followers: loyalty to their own country and people. Is that too much to ask?
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