Tag: Libya
A soggy version of the Arab spring
Big Carnegie Endowment/Harvard discussion of Arab Spring yesterday. Outcome: pretty gloomy. But these are experts, who admittedly failed to see the budding of the Arab Spring and are unlikely to be able to predict its course either. They all acknowledged the many unknowns and the difficulties of prediction.
Marwan Muasher, who prefers reform from above, thinks doing nothing in response to the protests is no longer an option but also noted there is more “empire strikes back” (Libya, Yemen, Syria) and “buying time with money” (the Gulf) than “promises of reform” (thin in Jordan, a bit more serious in Morocco). And his criteria for successful reform from above were exacting: it has to be holistic and inclusive, power has to be shared seriously, it should be gradual and measurable. Nothing makes the cut yet.
No optimism from Marina Ottaway either. She noted that even in Tunisia and Egypt there are problems of political will to complete the reform process, that some of the politicians formerly associated with the ruling parties will be able to recycle themselves, that secular parties are weak and fragmented, that Islamists may be a bit stronger but also fragmented, with Salafi influence rising. It is not clear yet what the protesters will be able or willing to do politically, and it is too early to count the military out.
Tarek Masoud did not like what he sees in Egypt. He noted the intense conflict among political forces and between political forces and the military, with the military wary of democracy. They don’t want democratic oversight, fear the demand for justice and don’t want to break with past policy on Israel and the U.S. The military would like to reign without ruling, keeping out of the public eye and avoiding responsibility for governing. They have already made mistakes by scheduling the constitutional referendum, then having to fix the amended constitution with their own constitutional declaration. Early elections will favor Islamists, and opening the constitution to a constituent assembly will open the question of the relationship between state and religion, which is not a good idea. The future holds more discord.
So spring wasn’t so cheery. How about the U.S. policy response?
Nick Burns praised President Obama’s relatively rapid and thoroughly nuanced response in a difficult international situation. He was not too late to support the Tahrir protesters, correctly hesitated about Libya but signed on in response to the Arab League appeal in light of Gaddafi’s threat to Benghazi, and gave the Gulfies more slack because there was no rebellion to sign on to in Saudi Arabia, Oman or Qatar. Only under questioning did Nick state baldly that he could not understand why we hadn’t zapped Bashar al Assad earlier and admit that in Bahrain Washington had chosen interests over values. Nick urged that we focus on Egypt, decrease out focus on governments and security, increase our focus on development and outreach to people, move on Israel/Palestine and shift to a containment policy on Iran.
Agreeing that the case-by-case contextual approach was the right one, Steve Walt concluded that we would soon face Arab governments more sensitive to public opinion, that there would be no easy fixes for the problems of over-centralization and corruption in the Arab countries, Western governments are not flush and would find it hard to ante up, Israel’s position would be weakened as Egypt and Jordan became less compliant to U.S. wishes and that U.S. strategy in the region is obsolete even if its interests are the same as always: unhindered flow of oil and gas, nuclear nonproliferation, countering terrorism and protecting Israel. A more effective policy would pay more attention to Arab public opinion, embrace reform, sustain multipolarity in the region, get U.S. troops out (to an offshore balancing role, naturally, that would still prevent others from exerting control), internationalize the Israel/Palestine peace process (including encouragement of European support for the Palestine resolution at the GA and a possible settlement imposed by the Security Council). Most importantly: we need to stop threatening Iran, which gives Tehran incentives to build nuclear weapons and attempt more creative (unspecified) diplomacy. In response to a question, Walt said he also thought we need a residual force in Iraq to counter Iran.
Chris Boucek, focused mainly on Yemen, warned of economic meltdown, suggested we manage the Saudis better and noted that the youthful protesters are espousing our ideals.
There was a good deal more, but this gives you the flavor: the U.S. focus on stability, peace and democracy has failed: no stability, little prospect for peace and not much for democracy either. Burns and Walt, each in his own way, thought the U.S. could still play an important role, but no one was sanguine about the prospects for the Arab spring or U.S. interests in its aftermath.
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Après eux?
President Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen and non-president of Libya Muammar Gaddafi will soon be gone. They have cracked their respective countries beyond repair. It looks unlikely that Bashar al Assad will last much longer in Syria. What can, or should, come next?
There is no reason why these revolutions should follow a common pattern, but it may be worthwhile to look at what is happening in Egypt to get an idea of the issues that will arise. The New York Times has made a brave effort in this week’s magazine to give us a well-rounded, if optimistic, snapshot. I was struck with this compelling observation:
The revolutions of 2011 were led by a generation that is tired of ideologies and that tends to see its own struggle in terms of more concrete personal rights and freedoms.
Many observers worry that the generals who now run Egypt may want to remain in power, or that the well-organized Muslim Brotherhood may dominate the post-revolution political space, or that economic distress will upend hopes for democracy. All these worries are real, but the Times found the generals interested in returning to barracks, the Muslim Brotherhood split and other Islamist groups less threatening than imagined. Economic problems may well endure and present the most serious threat to improvements in personal rights and freedoms.
Jane Novak, a keen observer of Yemen blogging at Armies of Liberation, proposes a locally-based approach to politics, social services and jobs once Saleh is gone. I don’t really know if her “Interim Transitional Mechanism” and its local “Community Centers” is realistic. Is it too schematic? Cartesian organization doesn’t strike me as a likely formula for success in Yemen. But she is on to something: the Saleh regime’s attempt to run Yemen from Sanaa has been notably unsuccessful, and the political “opposition” seems also to lack strong roots outside the capital. It might be a lot smarter post-revolution to try something more locally based, drawing on tribal loyalties. There is of course a risk that southerners will take advantage of the opportunity to secede, but Novak seems to feel this can be prevented, at least temporarily.
It is easy to imagine something similar in Libya, where the resistance to Muammar Gaddafi seems to have evolved largely along municipal and tribal lines, starting in Benghazi but certainly extending also to Misrata and other towns. The same is true on Gaddafi’s side of the ledger, where his tribal strength in Sirte helps to protect Tripoli from the insurgent forces. Building the new Libyan state from the grassroots up strikes me as preferable to replacement of Gaddafi with some internationally acclaimed worthy. Far better a decentralized approach that makes Tripoli listen to other population centers more than it has in the past. Libyans seem fully committed to national unity, despite the current civil war, and economic hardship could pass quickly if the oil revenue is used effectively. But of course that is a tall order.
In Syria, the risk of disintegration is serious. Some of its Kurds–treated as second class citizens in an Arab Republic–aspire to the kind of autonomy they see next door in Iraq. So too is the risk of a Sunni Islamist takeover that would breach one of the current regime’s only virtues: commitment to religious pluralism. Many Syrians will be looking to settle accounts with the Alawites who run the current regime, and they will not wait to be attacked before defending themselves (that in a sense is already what they are doing). Constitutional succession in Syria seems even more unlikely than in Egypt, which abandoned that route mid-stream. Economic problems are likely to be at least as challenging, as Syrian oil production is declining and the current regime’s repressive efforts are no doubt emptying the treasury (if it hadn’t already been emptied by the kleptocrats).
I don’t have a ready-made formula for Syria, Yemen or Libya except this: we need to listen to the locals, and follow their lead if we can figure out what it is. It is striking, as the Times observes, how the street protesters are committed to individual rights and freedoms. We should be finding and supporting that vein of gold in each of these societies. I remember all too well how we quickly abandoned the Otpor youth who led the revolt against Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia, because we were more concerned to support the new government than to make sure it was true to democratic ideals. Above all, we should not make that mistake again.
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Not if but when
A May 25 first-rate panel on Syria at the Carnegie Endowment had a clear bottom line: Bashar al Assad might survive in power for a while, but not for long. I took this to mean a year, not more.
Ammar Abdulwahid led off noting that the protests in North Africa and the Middle East should not have been a surprise to anyone who read the Arab human development reports: demographic growth, the youth bulge, unemployment, governments incapable of reform and out-of-touch oppositions, combined with the recent availability of social media, made the protests inevitable. The results of the protests in Tunisia gave the Syrians confidence. At the same time, Bashar al Assad–having broken out of the international isolation he suffered after the Hariri assassination–disappointed Syrian expectations.
The result is a movement which is now “self-organizing” with a clear goal: Bashar out. The next step will be organization of a transitional council, like the one in Libya but necessarily outside Syria under current conditions. A upcoming conference in Turkey will move in the direction of forming such a council. There is no possibility of restoring the status quo ante. A new era has already begun. The protesters are reaching out to the West and the United States for support.
The shift in President Obama’s speech last week was welcome, even if it rhetorically retained the option of Bashar staying to lead reforms, something that will not happen. The President needs to go farther and ask that Bashar step down–only that will convince regime loyalists to turn against him.
Murhaf Jouejati agreed there is no going back. Bashar al Assad has lost his legitimacy and authority. What is needed now is a “pincer movement” of the domestic and international forces to squeeze him out. The regime is determined to survive, and it may do so, but not for long. The economy is a shambles, inflation is up, oil production is down and the government can’t afford to keep the promises it is making.
Itamar Rabinovich said Israel is ambivalent about Bashar al Assad, who is at war with Israel but has kept the peace. Israel destroyed a Syrian reactor being built secretly by the North Koreans in 2007, but Bashar never retaliated. Israelis want to know, “what is the alternative?” The Palestinian demonstrations at the fence on the Golan Heights were an attempt to demonstrate the credibility of Makhlouf’s threat of instability if Bashar falls. Syria has a large number of Scud missiles that would create real problems for Israel. For the moment, there is definitely no “Syria option” for the peace process.
The regime will not survive, but it is unclear what will come next. Certainly the fall of Bashar al Assad would weaken Iran’s position, and Israelis naturally like the idea of a more democratic Syria. But the road to democracy is bumpy and bad things can happen along the way. It is particularly important that the peace agreement with Egypt be maintained–if it is not, Israel will not trust any agreements in the future.
Tamara Wittes reiterated that Syria has changed irrevocably as a result of the mass murders and arrests. Contrary to its claims, the regime is not a source of stability but of instability. The U.S. is pushing Bashar al Assad every day to stop the violence, release the prisoners and accept human rights monitors. There is little possibility he will agree. The international community is preparing additional sanctions that will sharpen the choice. Change is coming; we need to focus on how it happens.
Paul Salem, while agree the issue is not if but when, raised the question of what will happen? A Syrian implosion would affect the whole region. There is a possibility the regime will hang on for a while, even that Bashar might move in the direction of reform. There is also the possibility of civil war, perhaps with a quick opposition victory. Or a prolonged period of Syrian weakness, as in the period 1945-58. In short, there is a baffling array of scenarios.
The neighbors are each looking out for their interests. Turkey is pressing Bashar for reforms, which it prefers to come from the top down. Not wanting democracy to spread, Saudi Arabia is supporting the regime, at least in part as a quid pro quo for Syrian support on Bahrain. Egypt has already welcomed Hamas back from Syria. Iran is worried that its position in the region could be seriously damaged. A Sunni takeover in Syria would cut Hizbollah off from Iran.
In response to questions, Ammar said the middle class is protesting in the Damascus suburbs, less so in Aleppo. He thought a clear statement that Bashar must leave office is required before the army will engage seriously against the regime. Murhaf underlined that the protestors need to alleviate the fears of minorities like the Alawis and the Christians, who otherwise will stick with the regime. Salem and Rabinovich agreed Hizbollah will not risk a war with Israel, but it may be tempted to provoke further border incidents.
The protesters still face an uphill battle, because the wall of fear is not completely broken. The older generation is still not taking to the streets, and the demonstrations–while widespread–are not massive. But something irreversible has happened–it remains to be seen whether the outcome can be kept on a path towards democracy.
I might say the same thing about Libya and Yemen, where autocrats are holding on well after their sell by dates. Success in ousting Muammar Gaddafi and Ali Abdullah Saleh would no doubt have an inspirational effect also on Syrians.
PS: Read also Andrew Tabler on the end of days for Bashar al Assad.
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Gaddafi won’t stop or go
While Bashar al Assad won’t stop the repression in Syria and Ali Abdullah Saleh won’t leave office in Yemen, Muammar Gaddafi is willing to do neither in Libya.
NATO is pounding Gaddafi’s command centers more seriously than in the past, and the Benghazi-based National Transitional Council is gaining diplomatic prominence. Yesterday, the European Union’s “foreign minister” Catherine Ashton opened an EU office in Benghazi. I think some Americans are already there, though they have not made a big deal about it. President Obama said in his Middle East speech on Thursday that Gaddafi would “inevitably” leave power–when Americans use the i-word, they usually mean that they are trying hard to make it happen.
The Libyan oil minister has defected, Gaddafi’s wife and daughter are reportedly in Tunisia and the International Criminal Court prosecutor has requested a warrant for his arrest. As the prosecutor put it:
The evidence shows that Muammar Gaddafi, personally, ordered attacks on unarmed Libyan civilians. His forces attacked Libyan civilians in their homes and in the public space, repressed demonstrations with live ammunition, used heavy artillery against participants in funeral processions, and placed snipers to kill those leaving mosques after the prayers.
Also included in the request to the judges for arrest warrants are Gaddafi’s son Saif al Islam and brother-in-law, who heads the military intelligence service.
This real-time use of judicial proceedings is controversial, as it appears to close off options for Gaddafi and give him an incentive to continue his resistance. My own view is different. He has had lots of opportunity to stop the repression and leave Libya. The arrest warrants, if they are issued, will be a clear and compelling warning to his subordinates that they face the same fate if they don’t act soon to stop Gaddafi’s criminal behavior.
It is impossible to predict how much longer the military campaign against Gaddafi will have to continue before he leaves the scene, one way or the other. Smarter folks are saying there is a stalemate, but my sense is that Gaddafi’s military capabilities are gradually eroding and that at some point the Libyan people will discover that his fortress is largely empty. I wouldn’t want to be identifiable as being on his side when that day comes.
PS: On Saif and his relationship with Muammar, see yesterday’s New York magazine piece, “The Good Bad Son.”
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A right-minded but (mostly) forgettable speech
It is hard for me to knock a speech whose most frequently occurring words are “region” “must,” “change,” “people,” and “rights.” There has to be something to appreciate there. The President was particularly good on Tunisia and Egypt, supporting completion of their transitions to democracy and offering economic help, mainly through debt forgiveness, trade and investment. He was better on Bahrain than I might have expected, underlining that the destruction of Shia mosques there is unacceptable (thank you Roy Gutman for your reporting on that!).
On Syria, he was so-so, appealing once again for Bashar al Assad to lead reform (fat chance) or step aside (fat chance of that too). But that is farther than Obama has gone in the past. He gave President Saleh of Yemen a push toward the exit, but it did not seem to have any real force behind it.
The President was overoptimistic on both Afghanistan and Iraq, claiming we have broken the momentum of the insurgency in the former and established multiethnic and nonsectarian government in the latter. Both may happen, but they aren’t consolidated achievements yet.
On Israel/Palestine, the President took something like Shimon Peres’ approach: focus for now on defining Palestine’s territory and ensuring Israel’s security, solve Jerusalem and refugee return later. Rhetorical support for Israel was strong, as was opposition to the Palestinian effort to get the UN General Assembly to approve statehood. But there was really nothing new. That might be the best he can do for the moment, which is not propitious.
No mention of Saudi Arabia. A bit of talk about Iranian hypocrisy in providing assistance to Syria in repressing demonstrators, but no clarion call for rebellion there. Strong on women’s rights, inter-religious dialogue and rejection of political violence. Big throughout on self-determination (Palestinians take note), values as a focus for American policy in addition to interests, universal rights and strengthening the economic underpinnings of political transition.
A right-minded but I am afraid forgettable speech.
PS: I did not anticipate when I wrote this piece quickly this afternoon the furor that has erupted over the President’s endorsement of the ’67 borders of Israel as the basis for negotiations and eventual land swaps. It is still a bit hard for me to see what other basis there would be in a “land for peace” deal, but I take the point that this is the first time an American president has endorsed an idea that many of us take for granted. Those who object need to explain what other basis there might be for the territorial solution, other than “making the land whole.”
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Rebel leader big hit in wonk world
I confess I was distracted during the visit to DC this week of Mahmoud Gebril ElWarfally, interim prime minister of the Transitional National Council of the Libyan Republic. But he unquestionably performed well: on NPR, in the New York Times, and at Brookings. I imagine also at the White House, where he met with National Security Advisor Tom Donilon.
Gebril, as most seem to call him (and as the New York Times spells his name), has to his credit University of Pittsburgh degrees in political science and strategic planning (MA and PhD respectively) as well as more than two decades of making a living in the Middle East as a leadership trainer, after which he served in the Gaddafi regime as head of the National Economic Development Board. Sophisticated and urbane are the usual adjectives, the kind of Libyan who had enough to say to merit occasional mention in U.S. embassy cables made available by you know who.
Washington was warm and fuzzy on the occasion of his visit, but it did not immediately give him what he was looking for: recognition as the legitimate head of government in Libya, money (from Gaddafi’s frozen stash of $34 billion) or a meeting with the President. I imagine some in Libya may see this as less than half a loaf, but it really isn’t too bad. The United States has the annoying habit of recognizing countries, not governments, so it is hard for Washington to treat Gebril the way he would have liked until he gets to Tripoli. Congress is working on legislation to free up at least some of the money, and Gebril is not actually the top dog in the Interim National Council. That glory belongs to its Chair, Mustafa Mohammed Abdul Jalil, so a call on the president might have created as many problems as it solves. A presidential drop-by to Donilon’s office would have been nice though.
Still, Gebril did okay. Compliments to the Harbour Group. NATO has intensified its efforts, so maybe on his next visit he’ll get more of what the rebellion certainly deserves: unequivocal support from Washington. The sooner we are finished with Gaddafi, the better off Libya and North Africa generally will be.
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