Tag: Libya
Endgames: local legitimacy is key
It is easy to get caught up in the drama and thrill of events as people throughout the Middle East lay claim to inalienable rights, but we shouldn’t forget that revolutions don’t often end well. What can and should we be doing to try to ensure that the hopes and aspirations of so many don’t end up serving the interests of a few? And what vital U.S. interests need attention?
Libya. Hillary Clinton will be attending a meeting Monday in London to talk about the future of Libya, which is a particularly difficult case because the country largely lacks a state. What it has though is a strong tradition of local councils, most evident in Benghazi but also apparent in other places that have been liberated. If these local councils can gain a degree of legitimacy by being inclusive, they could become the foundation for a decentralized post-Gaddafi regime. My guess is that this would be far better than building the new Libya from Tripoli outwards, which won’t be possible in any event until Gaddafi departs.
As for U.S. influence, the most obvious way to guarantee it is to provide arms to the rebels, as Blake Hounshell suggests. There are many downsides, not the least of which is eventual misuse of the weapons to commit atrocities. Revenge killings are more than likely in the aftermath of Gaddafi’s fall, which is one of the reasons he and his minions hold on so tenaciously. That said, I would opt at least for the rocket-propelled grenades the rebels need to defend themselves against Gaddafi’s armor. The bigger question is whether supplying them is done
- without changing the existing UN Security Council resolution (1973) on grounds that they are part of the “all necessary means” required to protect civilians (either overtly or clandestinely), or
- by adopting a new UNSC resolution that recognizes Gaddafi’s failure to comply with 1973 and adopts additional measures required to unseat him.
If arms supplies are to get there in a timely way, the former is obviously preferable to the latter. But the latter is far better from the perspective of maintaining legitimacy of coalition operations against Gaddafi.
Yemen. President Saleh’s days are numbered, but he is insisting on an orderly transition of power. That is not a bad idea. It would certainly be preferable to the kind of mess we are seeing in Libya, and it really does not matter much whether it occurs this month or next.
To whom should Saleh hand over? The parliament is little more than a rubber stamp, some of the army leaders who have gone over to the protesters are arguably worse than Saleh when it comes to cozying up to terrorists, the political opposition is undistinguished and the protesters are still an amorphous mass. Here is both challenge and opportunity for the Americans, in whose interest it is to guarantee an orderly transition to someone who will be at least as good as Saleh in pursuing Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which is not saying much. Here, too, they might look to grassroots tribal, religious, political, civil society and other leaders outside Sanaa for at least a validation of legitimacy. Part of the Yemen problem is that the current regime really has little or no support beyond the capital. Building a new regime that has serious representation from both north and south would be preferable to just finding another headman like Saleh.
Syria. It has indeed gotten serious, as I’ve already suggested, with widespread demonstrations yesterday met with regime live fire, killing how many dozens no one knows:
This time it will be hard for President Bashar al Assad’s spokesperson to claim that he ordered no firing on demonstrators, though that won’t stop them from trying, but the protests have so far stopped short of asking for his ouster. Bashar is still regarded by many Syrians as above the wrongdoing they associate with the regime, though it is hard to believe that his personal immunity will last much longer.
Bashar has been no friend to the Americans, even if Senator John Kerry thinks we owe him rather than the other way around (at least that is what he said in an appearance at Carnegie Endowment last week). But again orderliness is next to godliness, now that we’ve got the U.S. military preoccupied with two and a half wars. Bashar can still survive, but he needs to get serious about the reforms he promised this week, and stop the live fire on demonstrators. I can’t for the life of me think what it is about the events of the last couple of months that would convince an autocrat that firing on protesters would help him survive. It seems to me the evidence is all on the other side of the proposition: let them demonstrate and adopt reforms to meet their legitimate demands, then you might survive.
The others. The Moroccans seem to have understood that proposition, and until yesterday the Jordanians as well. The Bahrainis, with Saudi support, seem ready still to test the effectiveness of regime violence and in the process turn popular protests into sectarian strife between a Shia majority population and a Sunni regime. Their success is unlikely to be long lasting. It is hard to think of anything worse for Saudi Arabia than linking its fate to the survival of the Al Khalifa monarchy in Bahrain, but that appears to be what the Saudis are determined to do.
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Statebuilding in Libya is not optional
While top officials scramble to straighten out how NATO will handle Libya, the situation on the ground there is getting much less attention than it merits. Our new-found rebel friends are not doing well, either in their military efforts or in their attempts to create a proto-governing structure. Heather Hurlburt writes at The New Republic:
I am less frantic about the endgame than many observers, not because I am more sanguine but because very often planners who have a clear endgame in mind are deluding themselves anyway. (The architects of the Iraq War believed they had thought through how everything would play out).
She certainly has a point about the architects of the Iraq war, but that is no reason for not planning now for the end of the Libya war, which will pose difficult problems, whenever it happens.
Libya is a country with less than a complete state, a condition that is readily exploited for nefarious purposes (in the past colonial ones, in this century usually extremist ones). No one should imagine that the state is going to emerge magically from the ashes, ready to accept whatever new leadership we decide it deserves. That in fact was the thoroughly flawed plan for “decapitation” at the end of the Iraq war that she refers to so disparagingly.
Nor should we be imagining that building a Libyan state is somehow a U.S. responsibility, though it is not unreasonable to expect the Americans to contribute in some way to the effort. Arab League? Doubtful. UN? Lots of experience, limited means. EU? Decent experience, lots of means, geographic proximity. It seems to me there are ample options–the important thing is to decide who will lead (I’d obviously opt for the Europeans) and then try to ensure that whoever does brings to bear the necessary resources.
Leaving state-building after this war to chance is dangerous. It could mean a partitioned Libya, or one that collapses like Somalia, or one that becomes a haven for extremism. To be fair, Heather also says,
We should be skeptical, frantically collecting information, hedging our bets and figuring out what the various forces are in Libya and how we can promote better outcomes and hedge against worse ones…
That does not go far enough: we need to ensure that Libya after this war is stabilized and develops the kind of state that will not allow it to go off the rails again. Less than that would be irresponsible. The effort can, indeed should, be led by the Libyans, but they will need help. If someone forgot to tell the President that state-building was part of the package, that was a big mistake. Focusing on the end-state may not seem urgent, but it is more important than the NATO scholasticism that has preoccupied the Secretary of State for days.
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Mil ops are clear, what about civ ops?
The U.S. military is clear enough about what it is doing in Libya (sorry the slides are not all shown in the video):
It is good Coalition partners are picking up about half the burden. I’m not a mil guy, but I am particularly interested in hearing that they are hitting communications. Experience in Bosnia and Kosovo suggests that is important in shifting the strategic balance. Once Gaddafi’s forces are cut off from his command and control, it is doubtful whether they will continue the fight.
That said, this effort has a civilian dimension as well. Relief supplies are starting to move into rebel-held areas. Hillary Clinton says Gaddafi loyalists are in touch with the State Department:
The most important civilian pieces are the ones we are not likely to see any time soon:
- What is being done to ensure that the Transitional National Council is fully representative of the whole country and ready to take over governance if the opportunity presents itself;
- Intelligence cooperation with the rebels;
- Discussions with Gaddafi-friendly places about offering him refuge;
- Diplomatic efforts to keep the Arab League on side, or at least not too loudly opposed to the intervention;
- Planning for the difficult post-war stabilization and reconstruction phase.
The only diplomatic piece that has been visible the last couple of days is the quarrel over who will command and control the Coalition operation, a role the U.S. wants to pass off. It seems now that will go to NATO. You don’t want to delve into the intricacies of that debate, which involves French, Turkish and NATO scholasticism that would please only medieval monks.
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Jon Stewart’s freedom packages
If you didn’t see it on TV, and you are not among the 156,073 people who have viewed it on line since Monday night, this is well worth all 6 minutes and 49 seconds.
| The Daily Show With Jon Stewart | Mon – Thurs 11p / 10c | |||
| America’s Freedom Packages | ||||
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It should stop only with Gaddafi at the exit
While the rest of the world focuses on current military operations, I’d like to focus again on the critical, but not yet urgent, question of when the military effort against Gaddafi should stop.
As Neal Ascherson points out in The Guardian this morning, the problem in Libya is Gaddafi. UN Security Council resolution 1973 does not recognize that. It calls for “all necessary measures” to protect civilians, and Hillary Clinton (among others) has been at pains to reiterate that regime change is not the objective.
This matters because it could determine when the military effort against Gaddafi comes to a halt. Arab League Secretary General, and putative presidential candidate in Egypt, Amr Moussa is already trying to distance himself from the military effort due to alleged civilian casualties. Pressures of this sort will build over the next several days, as Gaddafi is sure to make all sorts of claims about the damage the air attacks are doing.
Resolution 1973 provides precious little guidance on when to stop, beyond the overall purpose of protecting civilians. Yesterday’s statement from the Paris meeting of those states that want to be counted as constituting or supporting the coalition of the willing provides more:
Muammar Gaddafi and those executing his orders must immediately end the acts of violence carried out against civilians, to withdraw from all areas they have entered by force, return to their compounds, and allow full humanitarian access.
If this is fully operative, it is hard to see how Gaddafi could survive in power, as “those executing his orders” certainly include not only the military under his command but also the internal security forces. If they were to withdraw “from all areas they have entered by force,” he would have no means of continuing to control most of Libya, as arguably this phrase could even apply to Tripoli but certainly applies to Zawiya in the west and the towns his forces have taken in the last ten days in the east as well.
In practice, the international community often compromises on issues of this sort, as it comes under enormous public pressure to stop a one-sided military campaign. The military “coalition of the willing” includes not only leaders France and the UK but also Canada, Denmark, Italy, Spain and Norway in addition to the United States. The United Arab Emirates and Qatar, slow on the draw, are thought to be getting ready to contribute combat aircraft. I can only imagine how strong the internal political pressures in several of these countries will be against continuing the military campaign a week from now.
If the campaign stops too early, with Gaddafi still in place and controlling a substantial part of the country, it will be difficult to implement the peace in a way that preserves Libya’s territorial integrity and gives it an opportunity to become a more normal state than it has been for more the four decades. If the campaign stops too late, it will leave Libya in shambles.
At least as much wisdom is required to know when to stop as was required in deciding to start, but getting Gaddafi out should certainly be an important factor in the calculus. I trust American diplomats are working as hard on that as they did on the remarkable Resolution 1973.
PS: I expected pressures to build, but not as fast as this morning, when Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Mike Mullen said on Meet the Press: Qaddafi staying in power is “certainly potentially one outcome,” adding the UN-approved airstrikes “are limited and it isn’t about seeing him go.” I stick by what I said above: he should be at the exit door before we stop. We don’t need another half-baked result that burdens us for years to come.
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One big decision made, another coming
With kind permission of theatlantic.com, here is my piece they published this evening:
The Strikes on Libya: Humanitarian Intervention, Not Imperial Aggression
This has much more in common with the international response to Bosnia than it does with the war in Iraq
The destroyer USS Barry fires Tomahawk missile at Libya from Mediterranean Sea. By Reuters.
A coalition of the willing attacks an Arab country. French warplanes strike armored vehicles. American cruise missiles take down air defenses. It all sounds to some too much like Iraq redux. But it is not. The proper analogy is Srebrenica. This is the international community acting under international law to prevent mass murder.
The current military action against Libya is clearly authorized by the UN Security Council. Qaddafi has claimed it is illegal, but even China and Russia (who abstained from the UN vote) cannot doubt that Resolution 1973 authorized the use of force to protect Libyan civilians. Neither will Germany, Brazil, nor India (all of whom abstained). Angela Merkel has already said “We share the aims of this resolution. Don’t confuse abstention with neutrality.” The others may not like it, but if they had serious legal or political objections they could have voted against. Or maybe their interests in becoming permanent Security Council members overwhelmed their reserves. Either way, the resolution had all the votes it needed.
These strikes are not based on doubtful evidence. Qaddafi has said plainly what he intends to do to civilians who resist, even peacefully, and he has demonstrated repeatedly that he is prepared to carry out his threats. Even on the morning of the attacks, his armor entered Benghazi, in clear contradiction of his own Foreign Minister’s declaration that Tripoli would respect the cease-fire. Later Qaddafi’s spokesman disowned the foreign minister’s statement.
There is a solid coalition backing the military action, one that includes several Arab countries as well as the U.S., France and the United Kingdom. Even the Italians, who have historically close relations with Libya and even with Qaddafi personally, are on board. Iraq, Qatar, Jordan, Morocco, and the United Arab Emirates were present for the meeting in Paris that launched implementation of the UN resolution, as was the Arab League. (Saudi Arabia was missing.) While Russia, China, India, and Brazil were absent, Germany was present.
The U.S., while it has claimed outsized credit for the diplomacy, is not visibly in the lead of the military action. UK and France have claimed that honor, with NATO as the operational forum. American contributions are likely to be substantial, in particular when it comes to cruise missiles, intelligence, command and control and other U.S. assets. But this is not an American operation with a coalition tacked on.
This leaves the question of purpose. Is this offensive, like the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, an effort at regime change, with Qaddafi the ultimate target? Or is the objective, as Hillary Clinton claimed after the Paris meeting, only to protect civilians? For the moment, this is a distinction without a difference. Unless Qaddafi changes not just his tune but his behavior, he represents an imminent threat to civilians throughout Libya. It is up to him to convince the coalition that he is prepared to change his behavior, as he successfully did in 2003 when he gave up his nuclear weapons program.
But it seems Qaddafi won’t change: he appears as attached to the use of force against his people as Ratko Mladic was against thousands of Muslims in Srebrenica, Bosnia. Qaddafi rightly knows he can only stay in power if he can kill Libyans.
Srebrenica, not Iraq, is the right historical precedent for what is happening in Libya. In 1995 the West failed its declared intention to protect civilians in a Muslim-populated enclave in eastern Bosnia, declared a “safe area” by the UN. There weren’t enough Dutch peacekeepers in the area to defend the Muslims and, as a result, thousands of men and boys were massacred in cold blood.
Only a few weeks later NATO responded to Serb attack on another “safe area,” Sarajevo. NATO launched a bombing campaign that broke apart the Bosnian Serb Army and allowed Croat and Muslim Federation forces to advance on the Serb army. As the Serbs reeled from the air attack, they took hostages and used them as human shields. They also parked armored vehicles near mosques and schools. We should expect Qaddafi to do likewise.
When NATO stopped the war, the Muslim Federation had taken about 66 percent of Bosnian territory and might well have gotten to 80 percent within 10 days. At the Dayton Peace Accords, we rolled the federation forces back to 51 percent of the territory, because of a previous agreement between parties on how to bring peace to Bosnia. This decision to curb the federation made implementing peace the difficult task that it remains today, more than 15 years after the end of the conflict.
If history is a guide, then, the next big decision on Libya will be when to draw down the international military campaign. Does it stop when Qaddafi backs down, even if his forces still control a good part of Libya? That would be a hard peace to implement. Or do we wait a bit until his regime collapses and he flees or dies? This may be as important as the decision to launch the military strikes, as it will determine whether Libya remains a single state or suffers the kind of semi-dismemberment that still makes Bosnia, and Iraq, difficult places to govern.
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