Tag: Libya
Libyans be damned
Reversing long-standing policy of supporting United Nations efforts in Libya, President Trump last week opted instead to back Khalifa Haftar’s “Libyan National Army” march on Tripoli from his Benghazi stronghold. Haftar is a former Libyan army officer who spent two decades in Virginia and became a US citizen. Trump says he backs Haftar’s counterterrorism efforts. Haftar’s idea of counterterrorism is killing anyone who opposes him. He doesn’t even pretend to be pro-democratic and is seeking to install himself as Qaddafi’s successor.
Few Libya-watchers think Haftar has the firepower to take Tripoli by force. So far militia resistance appears to be slowing his advance, causing him to resort to airpower presumably provided by his Emirati or possibly Saudi backers. Qatar and Turkey will be supporting Islamist forces intent on holding on to Tripoli, where the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) is hunkered down. It is no paragon: it has failed to gain control even of the capital and has precious little sway in the rest of the country.
Trump’s move to back Haftar was a surprise only because the President had previously indicated the US would not get involved in Libya but instead leave it to the UN and the Europeans. That a would-be autocrat would appeal to Trump should be no surprise, especially one the Saudis and Emiratis support. The French and Russians will be pleased, as they too support Haftar, but the Italians were backing the GNA. Once again, Trump has demonstrated that he is prepared to turn US policy 180 degrees on a dime, especially to favor an autocrat, thus ensuring that everyone who deals with Washington–especially those committed to democracy–needs to hedge.
Washington will presumably let the Emiratis and Saudis try to ensure Haftar’s victory. US forces, not previously known to have been in Libya, have supposedly withdrawn, though it is of course possible that they are still clandestinely shifting to help Haftar. The Emiratis and Saudis have proven inept at best, catastrophically incapable at worst, in Yemen, where their intervention against the Houthi rebellion has stretched into a years-long war of attrition, rendering most of the country in desperate need of humanitarian assistance. Something similar could of course happen in Libya.
If instead Haftar is able to conquer the capital and move on to the west, the picture will be different but not likely pretty. Islamist militias will go underground to continue their resistance and Haftar will react with the kind of blunt force used in Benghazi, where he demonstrated little concern for collateral damage to civilians. Even as civil war has raged on and off over the past eight years, Libyans have enjoyed self-government at the municipal level, where they are in the midst of holding elections. It seems unlikely Haftar, if he succeeds in chasing the GNA from Tripoli, will tolerate even that much democracy. He has been actively stacking local governments in areas he already controls.
President Trump certainly won’t be one to press Haftar, who if he wins will be beholden to the absolute monarchies in Abu Dhabi and Riyadh. The President has found another autocrat he likes, in addition to Kim Jong-un, Xi Jinping, Rodrigo Duterte, Vladimir Putin, and others. Libyans be damned. Full steam ahead.
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Counterproductive
The loss of a large part of Notre Dame de Paris is profoundly sad. There is little I can say to amplify what so many others have already written. But sadder still is a President of the United States who can’t keep his mouth shut and always seems to choose the most destructive course of action. In this case, he suggested:
So horrible to watch the massive fire at Notre Dame Cathedral in Paris. Perhaps flying water tankers could be used to put it out. Must act quickly!
What neither he nor I knew was that dumping water on an ancient stone building can weaken its mortar and cause even more damage than the fire, perhaps even collapse of the whole structure.
This is Trump’s modus operandi. He is unable to acknowledge that he may not know better than others, which requires that he surround himself with yes-people. They encourage his self-aggrandizement, preventing any reevaluation or self-correction. So Trump cancels US assistance to Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, hoping that will somehow block their citizens from leaving. No one can say him nay. But that move is pretty much guaranteed to make conditions in those three countries worse and cause more asylum-seekers to arrive in the US, not fewer.
Ditto policy on Iran. Trump’s tight squeeze there without support from Europe, China, or Russia is strengthening Iran’s hardliners and making even extension of the Iran nuclear deal, which begins to “sunset” in just a few years, more difficult. National Security Adviser Bolton has even begun to lay the foundation for a military attack on Iran, by claiming it could be done under the existing Congressional Authorization to Use Military Force. One more Middle East war: precisely what the world needs right now. Iraq and Afghanistan haven’t yet cost enough.
Double ditto on North Korea, where the President has lurched from threatening (nuclear) war to befriending one of the world’s worst tyrants and meeting with his good friend (shall I say lover?) twice to no good effect. Now the Administration is contemplating a third meeting. What’s that saying, attributed to Einstein, about doing the same thing and expecting a different result?
Triple ditto on the Israel/Palestine conflict, where Trump is trying to squeeze the Palestinians by denying them humanitarian and law enforcement assistance. There aren’t enough desperate young Palestinians ready to take up the cudgels?
In none of these situations is it difficult to imagine the Trump Administration’s decisions making things go from bad to worse. And there are others:
- the decision in Syria to withdraw, then not to withdraw, but still to withdraw;
- the President’s comment that US troops should stay in Iraq to keep an eye on Iran, which makes it more difficult for Iraqi politicians to give the necessary approval;
- telling the world the US isn’t interested in Libya, which opened the door to a military push on Tripoli likely to re-ignite the civil war there, or possibly lead to re-imposition of a military dictatorship;
- threatening military action in Venezuela, where everyone understands there is no serious military option, thus reducing the US to a paper tiger;
- continuing to cozy up to President Putin despite Russian behavior in Ukraine and the Sea of Azov, not to mention interference in US politics on a daily basis;
- the threat to close the Mexican border, which would devastate the US and Mexican economies.
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the President is incorrigible, mainly because he doesn’t abide correction. His response to criticism is to double down on failed policy and hope that will work, or turn 180 degrees and hope that will. It doesn’t. The more this shambolic Administration continues, the more the rest of the world, friends and enemies, will adjust by hedging that reduces American influence. Trump is destined to be remembered as not just ineffective but also counterproductive.
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Watch the pot
The pot is boiling once again in North Africa. Sudanese President Bashir, in power since 1993, is under arrest and his country under de facto martial law. Algerian President Bouteflika has resigned after almost 20 years in power. Libyan General Haftar is trying to take Tripoli by force. The smart money is betting he will bog down in a stalemate with opposing militias from Western Libya.
Not everyone is in turmoil. Morocco and Tunisia, which both embarked on political reforms in the wake of the Arab Spring, are at least for now continuing in that direction. Egypt’s President and former Field Marshall Sisi has restored its military dictatorship, cracked down hard on both Islamist and secular opposition, and embarked on some economic reforms.
Less visible in all these countries is the role of the Gulf potentates. The United Arab Emirates has backed both Sisi and Haftar, hoping to they will eradicate Islamists from their polities. Qatar has backed the Muslim Brotherhood in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. The Saudi-led coalition fighting against the Houthis in Yemen has used mercenary Sudanese troops, thus indirectly supporting Bashir. Iran has backed the Houthis but has not engaged heavily in North Africa, since there are few Shia there. Tehran’s interests are much stronger in Syria and Iraq.
American engagement in North Africa has been sporadic and targeted mainly against violent Islamist extremism, especially in Libya and more indirectly in Egypt. President Trump has said Libya is Europe’s problem, which makes a lot of sense since Spain, France, and Italy all have strong stakes in North Africa due to migration as well as oil and gas supplies. The problem is that the Europeans have found it hard to combine their efforts. Instead they compete for influence and undermine each other. It is unlikely that they will find a way to use their considerable clout to good effect.
The result will likely be that the North Africans will be left to find their own way. That might not be the worst of all possible worlds, even if it is fraught with risks. Libya’s downward spiral after its 2011 revolution does not suggest much indigenous capacity to manage without international help. But Libyans have always resisted it and are now vitiating the latest UN efforts to unify its state structures and begin the process of recovery from civil war.
Sudan and Algeria have better prospects. Their revolutions have so far been mostly nonviolent (apart from the force the police and military have indulged in). Nonviolent revolutions have a much higher probability of generating peaceful and democratic outcomes. But in both places the strong role of the military runs the risk of a detour to autocratic rule, as in Egypt. That is a contingency the demonstrators will have to guard against, so as not to fall into the Sisi trap.
The trick is to bring the pot to boil, but not let it boil over. If it does, extremists will exploit the situation. North Africa is not immune to Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and more localized jihadist organizations. Derna in Libya, where the US marines fought “on the shores of Tripoli,” has seen several revivals of extremists since Qaddafi fell, though Haftar for now seems to have things there under control. Tunisia has likewise generated lots of foreign fighters for the extremists, despite its so far successful political transition.
Let’s keep an eye on this pot.
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Empowered decentralization
The Brookings Institution held a panel discussion March 12 about a city-based strategy for rebuilding Libya, with Jeffrey Feltman, Fellow in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, Alice Hunt Friend, Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Frederic Wehrey, Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Karim Mezran, Senior Fellow at the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and Federica Saini Fasanotti, Senior Fellow in the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence. The report outlining the city-based strategy is “Empowered decentralization: A city-based strategy for rebuilding Libya.”
The report recommends focusing the country’s economic, political and security activity on its major cities, with the return of US permanent presence in Libya.
Wehrey asserted that General Khalifa Haftar has gained ground in Libya, extending his control over oil and water sources. In addition, on territory and population still out of his control some armed groups and political actors have declared themselves with him, while other militias are still negotiating. Haftar also provides cash and protection for some towns and municipalities in the south, but clashes among different armed groups still flare up and militias still hold sway in some places. Haftar’s meeting at the end of February in Abu Dhabi with Fayez Al Sarraj (chair of the officially recognized Presidential Council) was an important step forward, but ordinary Libyans are upset with the UAE’s role in deciding their country’s future. Reconciliation among elites is important, but so too is grassroots involvement in the political process.
Mezran emphasized that the main goal of the Libyan revolution is to ensure dignity, freedom, human rights, and a pluralist political system. In most cities, local authorities have handled the security situation. The UN has to understand local dynamics and help to strengthen their work. This work at the local level needs to be inserted in a national framework to create a decentralized state, not establishing merely a state of cities and villages. Just as Libya was supported by the US and the UN to get independence, international guidance is still very much needed today. The US can play a key role in settling the conflict.
Feltman made clear that any agreement among the Libyan elite needs to have grassroots support. The Abu Dhabi meeting was a promising start for a top-down agreement. Long-standing political proposals such as reform of the presidency council, unification of the institutions, setting up a new government, and holding elections were on the table. Polls show that the Libyan people expect to choose their own leaders through elections, but Feltman cautions that elections alone do not create a democracy.
Fassanotti spoke about the tribal and ethnic differences that are still present in Libya. Most of the people reside in big cities, but people in the desert have not changed and desert culture is still influential and widespread. The idea of federalism can be a solution for a democratic Libya in the future. The type of federalism Fassanotti contemplates for Libya is similar to that of Germany and Switzerland, with a strong center able to govern the state. For the time being, a city-based model might be more viable as the state is still in the process of reconstructing itself.
Friend stated that the primary security institution in Libya is the militias, who are extremely variable in their size, shape, power, and territory, along with ideological commitment and economic leverage. Although there is a government-organized security institution, national security provision is lacking. Control over security provision in Libya is thus a major source of political power. General Haftar and the National Libyan Army have consolidated most of the territory but not all of it. Since security is a major issue, decentralization of politics and power remain a challenge. The presence of ISIS, though a minor issue for Libyans, is a major concern for the US that might incentivize more US involvement in Libya in the future.
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Peace Picks March 11-15
1. A city-based strategy for rebuilding Libya | Tuesday, March 12 | 9:00 am – 11:00 am | Brookings Institute | Register Here | The overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 unleashed a long period of instability in Libya. Although elements of governance and a functional economy remain, Libya’s central institutions are weak, with militias and other non-state actors competing for state spoils, such as oil. This internal crisis has significant security ramifications for Libya and beyond: Besides presenting a potential source of terrorism, Libya’s ungoverned spaces have contributed to the unregulated flows of people from the Middle East and Africa to Europe. However, in recent years, the United States has been largely absent from international–including U.N.-led–efforts to restore governance in Libya. In their new report outlining recommendations for the United States and other outside actors on a new policy in Lybia, it focuses on the country’s economic, political, and security activity on its major cities, with the United States reinstating its embassy and ambassador. John R. Allen, the president of the Brooking Institute, will provide opening remarks, and Karim Mezran, Federica Saini Fasanotti and Frederic Wehrey will join Jeffrey Feltman and Alice Hunt Friend in a discussion moderated by Michael E. O’Hanlon.
2. How Pakistan Navigates the Saudi Arabia-Iran Rivalry Libya | Tuesday, March 11 | 1:00 am –2:30am |United States Institute of Peace |Register Here | The deepening relationship between Pakistan and the Gulf states comes at a period of high tension between Saudi Arabia and Iran, whose border with Pakistan has also been the site of periodic clashes and whose past efforts to launch a gas pipeline project linking the two countries remains stalled. A February 13th terrorist attacked, which killed 27 members of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard and was linked to Pakistani-based militants, only further escalated tensions between the two countries. While Prime Minister Khan has professed a desire to serve as a mediator between Saudi Arabia and Iran, Pakistan faces an increasingly challenging diplomatic balancing act. A discussion analyzing the current Pakistani government’s relations with Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the Gulf States, and implications for regional security in South Asia and the greater Middle East, with Ankit Panda for the Diplomat, Karen Young for American Enterprise Institute and Alex Vatanka for Middle East Institute. Ambassador Richard Olson will moderate the discussion.
3. How Russia is surviving Western Sanctions | Monday, March 11 | 2:00 – 3:00 pm | Wilson Center | Register here | Despite uncertainty in the world economy and sanctions, Russia’s economy is set for a broad-based economic recovery. Policies to boost public spending, notably investment, should contribute. Martin Gilman will explore why the Russian authorities have been able to marginalize the impact of the US-instigated sanctions. Gilman will underscore how the most recent legal case involving Baring Vostok could have a much more chilling effect on economic prospects. The panel will be one-one discussion with Martin Gilman of Higher School of Economics in Moscow.
4. Plan País: Building the New Venezuela – A Roadmap for Reconstruction | Monday, March 14 | 5:00pm -6:30pm | Atlantic Council | Register Here | Venezuela is at a turning point. Interim President Juan Guaidó has received the backing of both the Venezuelan people and more than sixty countries. Looking ahead to the democratic transition, the interim government is focused on the reconstruction of Venezuela’s economy and public sector. Here, the Venezuelan National Assembly has proposed Plan País as the most promising opportunity yet to steer Venezuela out of its crisis. Beyond domestic support, Plan País will require the help of the international community and multilateral cooperation for successful implementation. “How would Plan País rebuild Venezuela, and what would be the role of the Inter-American Development Bank and other multilateral development banks,” will feature panelists Ángel Alvarado of Miranda State National Assembly of Venezuela, Alejandro Grisanti of Ecoanalítica, Paula García Tufro of Atlantic Council, Diego Area of Atlantic Council.
5. Dialogues on American Foreign Policy and World Affairs: A Conversation with Jake Sullivan| Friday, March 15 | 11:30am – 12:45 pm | Hudson Institute | Register Here | Hudson Institute will host Jake Sullivan, former national security adviser to Vice President Joe Biden, for a one-on-one discussion with Hudson Institute Distinguished Fellow Walter Russell Mead on U.S. national security threats and opportunities. Mead will explore Mr. Sullivan’s perspective on the future of the Middle East; Russia and Transatlantic relations; the challenge of a rising China; and other concerns facing American policymakers today and in the years ahead. Speakers include Jake Sullivan of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Walter Russell Mead of Hudson Institute.
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Doha impressions
I’ve been slow to write my impressions of Doha, where I spent four days last week after four days in Riyadh the week before (my impressions there are reported here). It’s fitting though that I should publish on Qatar the very day that its soccer team won the Asian Cup, defeating Japan 3-1 after triumphing in the semifinal 4-nil over arch-nemesis United Arab Emirates (in addition to beating Saudi Arabia).
The Qataris are riding high, at least in their own estimation and not only on the soccer field. They have more than survived what they term the blockade by Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain and Egypt imposed in June 2017. After an initial panic that emptied grocery stores, cut off family and other personal ties with compatriots, and caused a sharp fall in central bank reserves, the Doha government triggered a successful emergency response planned since the 2014 flare-up of their frictions with the Saudis and Emiratis.
The costs have been high, but the plan stabilized the situation and enabled Qatar to take advantage of its natural gas-derived wealth to make alternative arrangements and also begin to stimulate domestic production to replace imports. People recount the story of flying in 3000 cows for milk production with smiles on their faces. Saudi food supplies, which dominated the market before the “blockade,” are no longer missed.
Relations with Iran and Turkey have improved. Turkey is often credited as having prevented a Saudi invasion early in the Gulf crisis by deploying 3000 troops. The massive US air base at Al Udeid is seldom mentioned, but Qataris clearly treasure their close relations with Washington. Outreach around the world to other countries has grown. Qataris regard the Gulf crisis as a “blessing in disguise,” a phrase heard repeatedly. It compelled Qatar to diversify and strengthen its ties around the world.
The result is pride and allegiance, including (from my limited contact) among the 90% of the population that is expats. Qataris and foreign experts think the government has done well and that the country’s star is rising. Portraits of the Emir, once ubiquitous, are still much in evidence, despite government instructions to remove them. World Cup 2022 preparations are said to be going well. Criticism of labor conditions on the many construction projects has declined, as accidents have proven much less common than some had predicted. The $6-7 billion of direct World Cup spending is only a drop in the bucket, as the government is building another $200 billion or so in new infrastructure. That’s on top of already lavish spending over the last two decades.
The ideological underpinnings are not, of course, democratic. Qatar is an autocracy that does not permit political organizations of any sort. But a lot of people we talked with are convinced that the traditional system of tribal consultations enables the top to hear from the bottom and the bottom to register its discontents. There is talk of elections this year or next for a newly empowered Shura Council, which now issues legislation on behalf of the Emir. But there are also concerns that elections will give the largest tribes dominance that the current system does not permit, thus reducing the diversity of voices and narrowing the political base of the monarchy.
Why did tiny, non-democratic Qatar support the Arab Spring and in particular the Muslim Brotherhood? The most common answer is that Doha supported the political forces it thought Egyptians, Syrians, Yemenis, Tunisians, Libyans, and others wanted. It has dialed back on that support and blocked private financing of radical groups, monitored by the US Treasury.
Doha claims to be a strong supporter of economic and military integration through the Gulf Cooperation Council, whose work has been disrupted. But Qataris want to conduct an independent foreign policy, not one dictated by Saudi Arabia or least of all by the UAE, which is believed to still resent Qatar’s choice to remain independent and not join the other sheikhdoms. Bahrain is the paradigm for what the Qataris do not want: a country forced to follow in the Kingdom’s footsteps wherever it goes.
What about Al Jazeera, the TV news channels that spare only Qatar and not its Gulf neighbors from criticism? Qatar’s neighbors view Al Jazeera Arabic in particular as promoting rebellion and extremism. At least some Qataris are willing to contemplate modifications in editorial policy, but all assume Al Jazeera is not going away, as the Saudis and Emiratis would like. Though said to be privately owned, it is under the government’s thumb and can be reined in when and if need be.
At times in Doha and Riyadh, I felt I was in a hall of mirrors: both claim leadership in modernizing the Arab world, both see the Gulf conflict as a struggle over what one Saudi termed “seniority” in the region and many Qataris termed Saudi/Emirati “hegemony.” In both Saudi Arabia and Qatar these days conservatism is bad, diversity is welcome, dialogue and consultation are promoted, and freedom to organize political activity is restricted. These are absolute monarchies with the deep pockets required to buy their way into the 21st century.
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