Tag: Mali
Damsel in distress
France has answered a call from Bamako to stop an Islamist insurgent move southward. Their quick march towards the capital of Mali against an army led by American-trained officers has
left observers struggling to distinguish between fact, spin, and falsehood.
I won’t be surprised if we discover that the story is more complicated than the narrative so far, which is more or less “damsel in distress” and runs along these lines: Northern Mali is already in the hands of Sunni extremists affiliated with Al Qaeda and responsible for destroying Sufi shrines and documents. They were intending to move south to take over the capital, which appealed to France for help. The Brits and Americans are said to be in supporting military roles.
Just who made the appeal, and who is really in power in Bamako, is not clear to me, and no one seems to be asking. Instead they are rushing to do something. The UN Security Council will reportedly meet today. It had already in December approved an ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) military mission of doubtful capabilities to retake the north, but assembling that and deploying it was going to take months. ECOWAS is said to be accelerating its effort.
These military moves may be absolutely necessary. Damsels do sometimes have to be rescued, even if they are not without blemish in precipitating their distress. Mali’s military has played a dubious role in bringing on this crisis. Still, stopping an extremist takeover of Mali sounds like a pretty good idea to me. It is certainly preferable to fighting entrenched extremists for years, as in Yemen.
But I have no confidence that the north can be retaken by purely military means or that Bamako can be held without dealing with whatever brought on this crisis. Mali has had a pretty good reputation for sustaining democratic processes, but clearly something went awry. A few French bombs are not going to set things straight, even if they do discourage the Islamists from moving south.
For those interested in the deeper issues, this event at USIP in December is a good place to start. Those who imagine that civilian instruments of foreign policy can be jettisoned with the withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan, or that military means alone will solve the challenges we face, had better think again. These damsels will keep turning up where we least expect to find them. We don’t need to rescue them for their sake. What difference does it make if Malians elect their leaders or not?
We rescue governments, democratic or not, for our own sakes: fragile or collapsed states in the hands of extremists have a way of generating explosive packages on international flights, capturing tourists for ransom and investing heavily in the drug trade and human trafficking. These evils in Mali are far more likely to affect Europe in the near term than the United States, so it is a good thing that Europeans are taking the lead. But if they lead only with military means and ignore civilian requirements, whatever they do won’t last long or work well.
PS: @joshuafoust points out that @tweetsintheME (Andrew Lebovich) has elucidated at least some of the ethnic, religious and other background to the conflict. For some of the musical context, click here.
PPS: Jennifer Welsh reviews the legal basis for the French military intervention.
PPPS: The counter-narrative of enemy-producing Western intervention hasn’t taken long to emerge.
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Light where we can, heavy when we must
Today’s New York Times declares victory for those in the Obama Administration who favor a light footprint abroad. The members of the new national security team–Hagel, Kerry and Brennan–each leans in that direction. Though Hagel voted as a senator for the Iraq war, he later became a doubter. His Vietnam experience and Kerry’s make both new cabinet members hesitant about the use of American military force abroad. Brennan, while always talking a good line in favor of a more comprehensive approach to counter-terrorism in Yemen, is the brains behind the canonical light footprint drone war there against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
The light footprint approach is also getting a boost in Afghanistan, where the White House is leaning towards leaving fewer troops after 2014 than some would like. Zero is even a possibility. The leaks to this effect are all too clearly intended to get President Karzai, who is visiting Washington this week, to stop his mouthing off against the American presence and to convince the Taliban that they can get half a loaf if they come to the negotiating table. But feints in diplomacy have a way of becoming reality. America’s parlous fiscal situation will make many members of Congress look benignly on cutting back the U.S. presence in Afghanistan.
I need hardly mention that the Administration has already taken a light footprint approach to Syria–maybe more like a no footprint approach. It provides humanitarian assistance through nongovernmental organizations and as well as political support to the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, now recognized as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people, and other Syrian opposition organizations. It is also setting up Patriot batteries in Turkey and turning a blind eye to arms flowing from Qatar and Saudi Arabia. The results so far have fallen well short of the goal of ending the Asad regime and risk letting Syria fall into the hands of Sunni extremists. But the burden on the United States is mainly diplomacy and foreign assistance, not the far more expensive military.
I find it hard to fault the Administration for trying to limit commitments and save money at a time of serious fiscal strain. But it is a mistake to think we will always want to avoid the heavier footprint: troops and civilians on the ground to establish a safe and secure environment and plant the seeds for governance in states that may fail in ways that endanger vital American interests. The problem I see so far is not so much the President’s preference for the light footprint, but rather the assumption that it will ever be thus. Each and every president since the end of the Cold War has tried to avoid state-building efforts abroad. Each and every one has concluded that they were needed in one place or the other. This includes President Obama, who has quietly and correctly (if not alway successfully) indulged in civilian statebuilding to prevent violence in South Sudan since independence (the troops are cheap since they come from the UN). Obama also tried statebuilding in Afghanistan, where it was not a brilliant success.
We need to maintain the capacity to do heavier footprints, civilian as well as military, even as we try to avoid situations in which they are likely to be needed. This is the equivalent of asking the U.S. government to walk and chew gum at the same time. It has a hard time doing that. It is much more inclined to dismantle the extensive apparatus and experience built up during more than 10 years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan than to husband and sustain it. The Civilian Response Corps President George W. Bush established, after declaring as a candidate his disdain for “a nation-building corps,” is already gutted. We’ll be reinventing that wheel if ever there is intervention in Syria, Mali, Iran or half a dozen other places where it might be needed in the next decade. This is not wise or economical.
Our mantra should be: light where we can, heavy where we must.
PS: David Rothkopf hopes what he calls the “disengagers” will redouble diplomatic efforts. Would that it be so.
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Prevent what?
Most of us who work on international affairs think it would be much better to use diplomacy to prevent bad things from happening rather than waiting until the aftermath and then cleaning up after the elephants, which all too often involves expensive military action. But what precisely would that mean? What do we need to prevent?
The Council on Foreign Relations survey of prevention priorities for 2013 was published last week, just in time to be forgotten in the Christmas rush and New Year’s lull. It deserves notice, as it is one of the few nonpartisan attempts to define American national security priorities. This year’s edition was in part crowd-sourced and categorizes contingencies on two dimensions: impact on U.S. interests (high, medium, low) and likelihood (likely, plausible, unlikely).
Syria comes out on top in both dimensions. That’s a no-brainer for likelihood, as the civil war has already reached catastrophic dimensions and is affecting the broader region. Judging from Paul Stares’ video introduction to the survey, U.S. interests are ranked high in part because of the risk of use or loss of chemical weapons stocks. I’d have ranked them high because of the importance of depriving Iran of its one truly reliable ally and bridge to Hizbollah, but that’s a quibble.
CFR ranks another six contingencies as high impact on U.S. interests and only plausible rather than likely. This isn’t so useful, but Paul’s video comes to the rescue: an Israeli military strike on Iran that would “embroil” the U.S. and conflict with China in the East or South China seas are his picks to talk about. I find it peculiar that CFR does not treat what I would regard as certainly a plausible if not a likely contingency: a U.S. attack on Iran. There are few more important decisions President Obama will need to make than whether to use force to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Certainly it is a far more challenging decision than whether to go to war against China in the territorial disputes it is generating with U.S. allies in Pacific. I don’t know any foreign policy experts who would advise him to go in that direction.
It is striking that few of the other “plausible” and high-impact contingencies are amenable to purely military responses:
- a highly disruptive cyberattack on U.S. critical infrastructure
- a mass casualty attack on the U.S. homeland or on a treaty ally
- severe internal instability in Pakistan, triggered by a civil-military crisis or terror attack
It is not easy to determine the origin of cyberattacks, and not clear that a military response would be appropriate or effective. The same is also sometimes true of mass casualty attacks; our military response to 9/11 in Afghanistan has enmired the United States in its longest war to date, one where force is proving inadequate as a solution. It is hard to imagine any military response to internal instability in Pakistan, though CFR offers as an additional low probability contingency a possible U.S. military confrontation with Islamabad “triggered by a terror attack or U.S. counterterror operations.”
In the “moderate” impact on U.S. interests, CFR ranks as highly likely “a major erosion of security in Afghanistan resulting from coalition drawdown.” I’d certainly have put that in high impact category, as we’ve still got 100,000 troops in Afghanistan and a significant portion of them will still be there at the end of 2013. In the “moderate” impact but merely plausible category CFR ranks:
- a severe Indo-Pakistan crisis that carries risk of military escalation, triggered by a major terror attack
- a severe North Korean crisis caused by another military provocation, internal political instability, or threatening nuclear weapons/ICBM-related activities
- a significant increase in drug trafficking violence in Mexico that spills over into the United States
- continuing political instability and emergence of a terrorist safe haven in Libya
Again there are limits to what we can do about most of these contingencies by conventional military means. Only a North Korea crisis caused by military provocation or threats would rank be susceptible to a primarily military response. The others call for diplomatic and civilian responses in at least a measure equal to the possible military ones.
CFR lets two “moderate” impact contingencies languish in the low probability category that I don’t think belong there:
- political instability in Saudi Arabia that endangers global oil supplies
- renewed unrest in the Kurdish dominated regions of Turkey and the Middle East
There is a very real possibility in Riyadh of a succession crisis, as the monarchy on the death of the king will likely move to a next generation of contenders. Kurdish irredentist aspirations are already a big issue in Iraq and Syria. It is hard to imagine this will not affect Iran and Turkey before the year is out. Neither is amenable to a purely military response.
Most of the contingencies with “low” impact on U.S. interests are in Africa:
- a deepening of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo that involves military intervention from its neighbors
- growing popular unrest and political instability in Sudan
- military conflict between Sudan and South Sudan
- renewed ethnic violence in Kenya surrounding March 2013 presidential election
- widespread unrest in Zimbabwe surrounding the electoral process and/or the death of Robert Mugabe
- failure of a multilateral intervention to push out Islamist groups from Mali’s north
This may tell us more about CFR and the United States than about the world. Africa has little purchase on American sentiments, despite our half-Kenyan president. All of these contingencies merit diplomatic attention, but none is likely to excite U.S. military responses of more than a purely emergency character, except for Mali. If you’ve got a few Islamist terrorists, you can get some attention even if you are in Africa.
What’s missing from this list? CFR mentions
…a third Palestinian intifada, a widespread popular unrest in China, escalation of a U.S.-Iran naval clash in the Persian Gulf, a Sino-Indian border crisis, onset of elections-related instability and violence in Ethiopia, unrest in Cuba following the death of Fidel Castro and/or incapacitation of Raul Castro, and widespread political unrest in Venezuela triggered by the death or incapacitation of Hugo Chavez.
I’d add intensification of the global economic slowdown (high probability, high impact), failure to do more about global warming (also high probability, delayed impact), demographic or financial implosion in Europe or Japan (and possibly even the U.S.), Russian crackdown on dissent, and resurgent Islamist extremism in Somalia. But the first three of these are not one-year “contingencies,” which shows one limit of the CFR exercise.
I would also note that the world is arguably in better shape at the end of 2012 than ever before in history. As The Spectator puts it:
Never has there been less hunger, less disease or more prosperity. The West remains in the economic doldrums, but most developing countries are charging ahead, and people are being lifted out of poverty at the fastest rate ever recorded. The death toll inflicted by war and natural disasters is also mercifully low. We are living in a golden age.
May it last.
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The EU kicks the can
Carl Bildt, Sweden’s long-time and much-followed Foreign Minister, tweeted earlier this week from the General Affairs Council of the European Union:
Finally everything done. Cyprus presidency, Stefan Füle and Cathy Ashton moved all EU enlargement issues successfully forward. Off we go.
I wondered at the time what this meant. Now I know.
It meant nothing: no date for Serbia or Macedonia to begin accession talks, no date for Kosovo to negotiate a Stabilization and Association Agreement. Croatia’s membership next year is expected to proceed on autopilot (with some corrections in Zagreb’s course requested) and Montenegro will continue accession talks. Albania still awaits for a date to start accession negotiations.
Admittedly it is difficult to get too excited about anything in the Western Balkans these days. Syria is imploding. Egypt is turning its judicial system over to religious supervision. Iran is making progress towards nuclear weapons. North Korea is successfully launching a longer-range ballistic missile, disguised as a space-launch vehicle. Afghanistan and Iraq are teetering. Al Qaeda is setting up shop in Mali. The euro is going down the tubes. Who cares what the Greeks want to call Macedonia or whether the former belligerents who run Serbia and Kosovo get dates to begin negotiations (Belgrade for accession, Pristina for a Stabilization and Association Agreement) with Brussels?
The people who live in those places do, that’s who. However insignificant the Balkans look these days from Washington, which is busy with its own domestic quarrels above all else, the region is important to those who inhabit it and has the potential to make life difficult for the rest of us, as it has proven repeatedly over the past 100 years.
A closer reading suggests that things might unfreeze in Brussels in the spring. Macedonia at least can expect a framework for negotiations then, provided it delivers on reforms in the meanwhile. Likewise Serbia, which is asked specifically for
…irreversible progress towards delivering structures in northern Kosovo which meet the security and justice needs of the local population in a transparent and cooperative manner, and in a way that ensures the functionality of a single institutional and administrative set up within Kosovo.
Also important is
…the agreement of the two Prime Ministers to work together in order to ensure a transparent flow of money in support of the Kosovo Serb community…
While couched in the EU’s usual obscurantist language, we see emerging here a detailed understanding of the real challenges that have so far blocked reintegration of the north with the rest of Kosovo. Bravo to the EU for acknowledging them!
Some of the same perspicacity is evident in the discussion of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the EU finds the need to reiterate
…its unequivocal support for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s EU perspective as a sovereign and united country enjoying full territorial integrity.
It’s not good news when Brussels kicks off this way, though I’d be the first to admit that its subsequent suggestions of what needs to be done to fix the problem are thoroughly inadequate.
Pristina gets a pat on the back for its engagement in the talks and language identical to that addressed to Belgrade on northern Kosovo, plus a recommendation to develop an outreach plan.
Don’t get me wrong: it is correct for the EU to insist on specific reforms and benchmarks in dealing with the Western Balkans. Unfortunately, it is still true that conditionality is what moves things forward in many of these countries. In most of them, I expect the EU carrot will bring real changes, albeit in fits and starts. The most concerning is Bosnia, where the EU acknowledges the challenges to sovereignty that Milorad Dodik and Republika Srpska pose but fails to offer adequate responses and continues to quarrel with Washington over whether the High Representative should stay or go.
The EU has kicked the can down the road. The best we can hope for is a spring thaw.
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The proverbial hammer
Today greeted me with two contradictory headlines. Fareed Zakaria urged a beginning to the end of the war on terror. The Wall Street Journal reports an expansion of U.S. military authority to intervene in Mali and other parts of the Sahel against extremists, using drones and special ops teams, as we do in Yemen and Pakistan.
Fareed does not argue that the threat no longer exists, only that it can be dealt with in the normal legal framework rather than the extraordinary one put in place after 9/11. Nor, I imagine, will the Pentagon ignore completely the non-military aspects of the fight against al Qaeda linked groups in Mali. Our military officers are far too smart, and far too deeply committed to counter-insurgency, to ignore the social, economic and political matrix that is providing safe haven to extremists in northern Mali.
But the fact is that we are still over-emphasizing military responses to terrorism, rather than using preventive and civilian approaches before the emergence of a clear threat. Northern Mali, Tuareg grievances and various extremist groups existed well before this year. Why were we ignoring them when it might have been cheaper and easier to prevent them from emerging in the first place?
We are still playing global whack-a-mole with terrorists rather than developing a strategy that makes them unwelcome in the poverty-stricken, relatively weak and conflict-prone states in which they find safe haven. If we are successful in Mali, they will no doubt find have someplace else. Strengthening the indigenous capacity to resist and repress extremists is much more likely to produce results. It is also likely to be far cheaper. But it requires a more forward-looking, anticipatory and civilian-based strategy.
Instead, we are now deploying an additional Defense Intelligence agents abroad. They will number 1600 in five years time. This makes no sense, unless they will be doing intelligence collection that would be better done by civilians agencies.
If al Qaeda central still exists, someone there is surely calculating today where to move to when Mali gets too hot. Northern Nigeria? Niger? Back to Somalia? There are lots of options. What we need is a comprehensive strategy that enables a preventive approach to strengthening local governance. The military may recognize that as the requirement, but it is not their responsibility to meet it. Our civilians–State Department and USAID as well as Justice and Commerce departments–need the resources and capabilities to undertaken expeditionary activities that today are possible only for the Defense Department.
We are the proverbial hammer that views everything as a nail. Some jobs require a screwdriver.
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Wisdom, not resolve
I’m in Atlanta this week for Thanksgiving, which Americans will mark tomorrow with parades, running races, a giant meal, lots of football (watching and playing) and much debate on the issues of our day, from cranberry sauce recipes to the state of world affairs. Some will go to church, but most will mark the day entirely at home–or in a relative’s home–with marathon culinary preparations, a lengthy and leisurely afternoon meal and a long denouement of talk, napping and TV, in my family followed in the late evening by a giant turkey sandwich, on white toast.
I mention these things because close to 50% of my readers are non-Americans, only some of whom will have enjoyed the Thanksgiving experience first hand. To my knowledge, the holiday is entirely a New World phenomenon. Canada has its own version, celebrated last month. Of course lots of cultures express thanks in both religious and non-religious ways, but I wonder if any have made it quite the major event that the North Americans have. Readers should feel free to enlighten me.
Americans certainly have a great deal to be thankful for. We are slowly climbing out of a lingering recession, we’ve gotten through the difficult quadrennial drama of presidential elections without the uncertainties that have sometimes plagued the process, our troops are out of Iraq and moving out of Afghanistan, and there is no existential threat on the horizon, even if there are many less dramatic challenges. We are the solution to our own worst problems, which focus on the relatively mundane questions of what the government should spend money on and where it should find the revenue needed.
The world is not in such good shape. While statistics show that the overall frequency of war is down, the catalogue is full of long lasting conflicts and their devastating impacts on people: the revolution and civil war in Syria are getting on to marking two years, Israel and Palestine have been in conflict one way or another for 65 years, the Afghanistan/Pakistan war is dragging into its 12th year, and I don’t know how to determine when the war against al Qaeda in Yemen, the war against its affiliates in Somalia or the war in Eastern Congo began. Then there are the more recent conflicts: northern Mali and the all but defeated revolution in Bahrain. And there are the wars that might come: perhaps against Iran, in the South or East China Seas, on the Korean peninsula or between South Sudan and Sudan.
I can’t claim that most Americans will be thinking about these disasters as they give thanks for their own blessings. They are more likely to be thinking about Breezy Point and Hoboken, two communities that hurricane Sandy devastated early this month. We’ve still got tens of thousands homeless and some without power weeks later. Those who turn to America for help–and many do–are going to find us preoccupied these days with our own needs. I suspect this will not be just a short-term phenomenon, but a longer-term effort to put our own house in order, limiting commitments abroad and prioritizing them in accordance with America’s own interests.
This will sound ungenerous to non-Americans, who may bemoan American interference but also look to the U.S. to step in to help stop the Gaza fighting and turn to Washington when other disasters strike. We will continue to do what we can where vital American interests are at stake, but it will be healthy if we are a bit less committed and rely on others rather more than we have in the past. Our withdrawal–retrenchment is what some call it–will not be absolute. It has to be calculated and calibrated. Good judgment, not ideology, should be its guide.
That is one of the many reasons I am grateful to the American people for re-electing President Obama. I don’t always agree with his judgment–I’d rather he did more on Syria, for example–but he is thoughtful and cautious in ways that fit our current circumstances. Managing the relative decline in American power and constructing a global architecture that will limit conflict and provide space for those who choose to live in free societies to prosper are the great challenges of the coming generations. Wisdom, not resolve, is the essential ingredient to meet them.
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