Tag: Mali
Easier said than done
Hillary Clinton is on her way from Cambodia to Jerusalem. This is precisely the opposite direction from the one President Obama intends for American foreign policy: his announced intention is to pivot American attention from the Middle East to Asia. His visit to Asia just a few days after re-election was meant to underline that message.
The current Middle East crisis is over Gaza, where rocket launches against Israeli targets have precipitated a ferocious response, so far mainly from the air (though there have also been sea and land artillery barrages). Israel has mobilized ground forces, which appear ready for a land incursion into Gaza. Hamas, which governs Gaza (but does not necessarily launch all the rockets), has attracted support from Turkey, Qatar and Egypt, which is seeking to mediate a ceasefire.
This is a pretty clear cut case of the urgent taking priority over the important. Even in the Middle East, there are things going on that are more important to vital U.S. interests than the highly regrettable Hamas/Israel conflagration. The civil war in Syria above all requires more attention than it has gotten, even if Obama’s hesitancy to get more deeply involved is understandable when you look at the array of unappealing options available. Iran’s nuclear program continues to produce 20% enriched uranium. If diplomacy does not produce an end to its nuclear weapons ambitions in the next few months, military action by both the U.S. and Israel becomes likely. The fight against al Qaeda in Yemen isn’t working well–the drone war seems to produce more terrorists than it kills. Let’s not even mention the sometimes faltering revolutions in Tunisia and Libya, or the apparent extremist takeover of northern Mali.
Whatever. For the moment Gaza is at the top of America’s to do list. The immediate problem is a ceasefire, but Ehud Yaari argues that a broader arrangement is really what is needed. This would entail high-level political agreements between Egypt and Israel on blocking arms smuggling to Hamas, clamping down on extremists in Sinai and opening the border crossing between Egypt and Gaza to both trade and people.
The problem with these ideas is that they tie Hamas-governed Gaza more closely to Egypt and loosen its already attenuated ties to the West Bank, where the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) governs. If there is any sense at all in Israel’s right-wing efforts to block Palestinian statehood and the two-state solution the rest of the world favors, it lies precisely in a scheme to separate Gaza and the West Bank, returning the former to Egypt’s suzerainity and the West Bank to Jordan.
But that does not mean Yaari’s ideas are bad, only that what I take to be their unintended consequences should not be allowed to block Palestinian unity. It is an added irony that the main obstacle at the moment is the Palestinians themselves, who have not managed to reconstitute a united polity despite many efforts to do so. It will be interesting to see if the Israeli air attacks sharpen the differences between Gaza and the West Bank or narrow them. Palestinian unity, like the pivot to Asia, is easier said than done.
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A sad commentary, even if my man won
It’s hard to write more than 140-character tweets about last night’s “foreign policy” debate. Governor Romney lined up behind President Obama on almost all current policy issues. He even liked foreign assistance, gender equality, democracy promotion and diplomatic efforts to end Iran’s progress toward nuclear [weapons?] capability. Not to mention their agreement on drones, sanctions, withdrawal from Afghanistan and support for Israel. And they agreed that America’s strength abroad depends on the health of its economy and educational system at home. We’ve got a bipartisan foreign policy, whether we like it or not.
The real problem is that the Ryan budget, which Romney supports, is not aligned with what the Governor advocated. This is particularly clear on foreign aid, which the Ryan budget guts. I realize this is a wonkish concern, but it is also a real one. Priorities not reflected in budget proposals are not real priorities. We can be sure that a Romney presidency would not do what Romney says, because he would not fund it. He would prefer a massive military buildup, on top of the massive military buildup of the past ten years.
The disagreements last night were almost entirely about past events. Romney wanted to leave many more troops in Iraq than Obama and blames the president for the failure to reach a status of forces agreement. The fact that the Iraqis were not willing to bend on legal jurisdiction over the Americans remaining went unmentioned. By the way: the issue is not “immunity,” as most of the press would have it. American troops remain liable in U.S. courts for criminal acts committed abroad, even if the “receiving country” agrees to waive its jurisdiction. The administration resisted tightening Iran sanctions, until of course it no longer resisted because it thought the timing right.
If you want to check the facts, the Washington Post offers a good rundown. I don’t think there was much advantage or disadvantage in the errors, though it is a bit troubling that Romney does not know that Syria does not border Iran, which has ample routes “to the sea.” I wish Obama had not exaggerated the increase in exports to China. The numbers are pretty good without embellishment.
I agree with Peter Beinart: George W. Bush won this debate. Both Obama and Romney defined American foreign policy purely in military terms. This is a serious misreading of the challenges we face as well as the instruments needed to meet them. While pointing repeatedly to problems like Mali’s Islamist insurgency, Iran’s nuclear program, Pakistan’s failing state and Egypt’s economic deterioration, neither talked about the civilian instruments required to resolve them. Diplomacy, foreign aid, international law enforcement, multilateral financial and other institutions simply don’t register on the presidential level, even with my preferred candidate. That itself is a sad commentary on what we call foreign policy, bipartisan or not.
PS: Here is a Voice of America piece I participated in before the debate:
PPS: And here is the piece KSA2 (an English-language Saudi station) did the night of the election:
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Follow the money
The real difference between the candidates on foreign policy issues is not what they say they would do but what they want to fund, which ultimately affects what whoever is elected can do. The Ryan budget proposal, which Romney has said he backs, cuts international affairs spending by almost 10% in 2013 and close to a quarter by 2016 while funding a giant military buildup (on top of the buildup that has occurred since 9/11). Obama does not propose cuts to military spending, but he is trying to keep it below previously projected levels. His “international affairs” budget proposal for 2013 would keep that category more or less at current levels, taking inflation into account.
The consequences of this difference between the candidates for American foreign policy are dramatic. We are already overusing our highly competent, effective and expensive military forces. In Iraq and Afghanistan, they often substituted for far cheaper, but unavailable, civilians: the military provided not only humanitarian aid, which it is required to do in “non-permissive” environments, but also development and state-building assistance. I won’t be surprised if the U.S. military (along with the paramilitary parts of CIA) now has more foreign assistance money available than USAID. The Ryan budget proposal, if adopted, would dramatically increase reliance on the U.S. military for non-military aid, statebuilding, international law enforcement and other fundamentally civilian tasks.
This is not smart. At well over $1 million per deployed soldier (counting support and infrastructure costs), the U.S. military is a fabulously expensive way of getting things done. Relying on it for civilian tasks is the international equivalent of relying on emergency rooms for routine medical care. You may get it done, but only at a far higher price than providing the same care in doctors’ offices or community clinics.
The supposedly business-savvy Governor Romney is suggesting both health care in emergency rooms and use of our armed forces when civilians might suffice. Moreover, experience indicates that the existence of a strong military instrument without equally strong civilian instruments will get us into wars that we might otherwise avoid: need I mention Iraq? If anyone doubts whether our military has been thinking ahead to Iran, this map should be instructive:
I do not mean to suggest, as many of those publishing this map do, that we would be better off without these military installations. Clearly they lend credibility to the threat of force that will be essential if ever there is a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear problem. And if diplomacy fails, the military option needs to be on the table.
But it is hard for me to imagine that we spend more 1 one-thousandth of the cost of these bases on the diplomatic effort with Iran. We may in fact spend significantly less. That means that a 1 one-thousandth chance of a diplomatic solution is worth pursuing. I would put the real odds of diplomatic success at more like 50/50 or maybe 25/75. Someone on the right might say the odds are 1/10. But what Ryan and Romney are proposing is that we cut the diplomatic effort and increase the military push. Does that make financial sense?
I hasten to note that Romney has also made some sensible proposals to use American foreign assistance money more effectively by focusing on rule of law and establishing conditions for successful private initiative. The trouble is there won’t be any money in the government kitty to do those things if he is elected and the Ryan budget adopted.
Iran is the odd problem these days. It may require a military solution, but that is unusual. China as a currency manipulator does not. Even Russia as a geopolitical threat, if you think it one, requires diplomacy more than military mobilization. George W. Bush, no retiring violet, did not try to respond militarily to Russia when it went to war with Georgia, a country he wanted to get into NATO. The list of problems not amenable to military solution is long: Pakistan’s drift toward extremism, Afghanistan’s corrupt government, the stalled Middle East peace process. It is striking that the international community is busy mobilizing an exclusively military response to Islamist extremism in Mali, where a more balanced approach that emphasizes local community economic development would be far more likely to succeed.
I know it won’t happen, but this is what the two candidates should be asked at the debate: given the strains on the U.S. military, what would you do to strengthen America’s civilian instruments of foreign policy and how are those priorities reflected in your budget proposals?
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Security in ungoverned spaces
Earlier this year I enjoyed a day talking about North Africa, including the Sahel, an area that is now attracting more attention than is healthy for its inhabitants. The focus is largely military. I did not publish my presentation, as it was available only in barebones form. It still however seems germane and some of you may find it useful. So here is the outline of what I said at an undisclosed location:
Security in Ungoverned Spaces: Options
0. Doing nothing is an option
- No international airports
- Threat is mostly local
- Going after it can make it worse
1. Conventional and unconventional military means
- Yemen analogy: local conventional forces trained and equipped by U.S. with U.S. drones and special forces acting more or less in coordination
- Can kill, can’t govern: leaves vacuum as at Zinjibar, filled by Ansar al Sharia, problems of compensation, may create more terrorists than it kills
- Creates moral hazard with government, which has to keep terrorism alive to get aid
- Also gives regime trained and equipped units with which to protect itself
- Risks use of U.S. assets against regime enemies, false intelligence
- Mistakes increase local support for terrorists
2. Policing
- No evidence uniformed police would be well received in remote communities
- Corruption rife
- Less than 50 per cent trust in Algeria: what might it be in Sahel?
- Detention facilities a big problem: no point in arresting them if you have no decent place to put them
3. Community/tribal approaches
- Difficult to know who is who, what is what
- Same moral hazard in a different direction (tribal chiefs)
- Rented, not bought?
- Provide justice?
4. Development assistance
- Youth bulge, unemployment are the real problems
- Need jobs, especially agriculture
- Income not rising with expectations
- Per capita PPP 2011: Algeria 7200 Morocco 5100
- Undernourishment, poverty, especially farther south
- Role of women can be supported
5. Negotiated settlements: precedents, good and bad, in Iraq, Afghanistan
6. Regional cooperation in one or more of the above areas: ECOWAS, African Union
7. Caveat: beware too much security, too little rule of law
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What they don’t want anyone to hear
War in northern Mali has displaced hundreds of thousands. The Islamist rebels there have now prohibited secular music on the radio (only chanting of Koranic verses will be allowed). Isn’t it high time we all got back to listening to what they don’t want anyone to hear?
From the Tuareg group Tinariwen (deserts):
And this:
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Shifting sands
Uncertainty is breaking out all over the Greater Middle East.
With Crown Prince Nayef’s death in Saudi Arabia, the House of Saud will soon have to look past its octogenarian leadership to the next generation, with all the uncertainties that implies. Will the next generation be as attached to religious and social Wahhabi conservatism as the current one? Will it open an era of serious reform?
The suspension of the UN monitoring effort in Syria presages an increase in violent conflict with a highly uncertain outcome. Russia seems determined to keep Bashar al Assad in power, though its Foreign Minister denies it. Iran will certainly exert itself in that direction. I doubt the armed rebellion can beat the Syrian security forces any time soon, but we could see a lengthy insurgency fed by Saudi and Qatari arms shipments through Turkey.
The only real certainty in Egypt is that the military is trying to hold on to power. Whether it can and what the consequences will be is highly uncertain, as are the results of today’s presidential election. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has arrogated to itself legislative power, which means it now has to deal with Egypt’s economy and social problems along security and law and order. I don’t know any military establishments equal to that task, but the risk of new parliamentary elections may be greater than the SCAF wants to run. It could end up forced to rule Egypt, likely badly, for some time to come.
Iraq‘s Prime Minister Maliki has faced down a parliamentary rebellion but Al Qaeda has renewed its murderous attacks against the country’s Shia. If they succeed in reigniting Iraq’s sectarian warfare, the promise of a relatively democratic society that produces a lot of oil will evaporate, leaving a bitter residue.
Iran‘s Supreme Leader Khamenei has concentrated power as rarely before in the Islamic republic’s history, but American and Israeli threats of military attack against it nuclear program make prediction even a year out difficult.
After ten years of rule by Hamid Karzai, even Afghanistan faces the uncertainty of an election (to be held no one knows when in 2013 or 2014) in which he will not be running and an end to the NATO combat role shortly thereafter.
I needn’t mention next month’s elections in Libya or the aging leadership in Algeria, where military success in repressing Al Qaeda in the Maghreb seems to have pushed the militants into the Sahel, where they are destabilizing several other countries.
A region that enjoyed decades of stability–some would say stagnation, much of it autocratically imposed–now registers high volatility. Of course volatility can move in either direction: there are possible positive developments as well as negative ones. Tunisia has pushed the envelope in the positive direction. Yemen seems to be making progress against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and affiliates, though some think the government offensive and U.S. drone attacks are creating more extremists than they are killing. Morocco and Jordan have attempted some modest reforms that seem unlikely to suffice, but they may stave off open rebellion.
It is not easy to deal with uncertainty. Most experts would recommend triage and prioritization. Triage happens naturally. There are only a few Middle East problems that will make it to the President’s desk: Iran and Egypt most frequently, Afghanistan because of the American troops, and we can hope Syria when Obama meets with Putin this week at the G-20 in Moscow.
Prioritization of issues is harder. Even those who recommend it muddle exactly what they mean. Colleagues at the Carnegie Endowment recommend in a recent overview of the situation in the Middle East:
international actors should focus on a few, very specific issues for special emphasis, such as international human rights standards, the maintenance of existing treaty relationships, and the principle of peaceful settlement of international disputes.
But then they go on to recommend economic cooperation aimed at job creation, a non sequitur virtually guaranteed to disappoint expectations given limited U.S. resources and a track record of failure. Not to mention the difficulty of meeting human rights standards, since these require equal gender treatment not readily available in the workplace in many of the countries in question.
Shifting sands will make navigation in the Middle East difficult for a long time to come. I recommend to all my international affairs students that they learn Arabic, or another of the regional languages (Farsi most of all). Even if American oil production continues to reduce already low U.S. dependence on the Middle East, the global oil market and the extremist movements the region has spawned will ensure we remain engaged there for a long time to come, triage and prioritization notwithstanding.
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